History

of the

U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Interviewee: Wallace Werble
Interviewer: James Harvey Young, Ph.D.
Date: July 28, 1969
Place: Washington, DC
Deed of Gift

Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

Wallace Werble

As a conditional gift under Section 231 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 238), and subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions hereinafter set forth, I, Wallace Werble, hereby give, donate, and convey to the National Library of Medicine ("NLM"), acting for and on behalf of the United States of America, all of my rights and title to, and interest in, the information and responses provided during the interview conducted at on July 28, 1969 and prepared for deposit with the NLM in the form of recording tapes and transcripts. This donation includes, but is not limited to, all copyright interests I now possess in the tapes and transcripts.

Title to the tapes and transcripts shall pass to the NLM upon their delivery and the acceptance of this deed by the Director, NLM. The Director, NLM, shall accept by signing below.

I place no restrictions upon the use of these tapes and transcripts by the NLM.

The NLM may, subject only to restrictions placed on it by law or regulation, provide for the preservation, arrangement, repair and rehabilitation, duplication, reproduction, publication, distribution, exhibition, display, and servicing of the tapes and transcripts as may be needful and appropriate.

Copies of the tapes and transcripts may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the NLM, including the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Use of these copies shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth in this agreement.

The NLM may dispose of the tapes and transcripts any time after title passes to the Library.

Date: Nov 20, 2015 Signed: Cyril Palmer Werble (son)
Last position held: N/A

Date: N/A Interviewer: N/A

I accept this gift on behalf of the United States of America, subject to the terms, conditions, and restrictions set forth above.

Date: ___________________ Signed: ___________________
Director, National Library of Medicine
**TOPIC OF INTERVIEW:** FDA History

**LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:** Washington, DC

**DATE OF INTERVIEW:** July 28, 1969

**INTERVIEWER(S):** James Harvey Young, Ph.D.

**INTERVIEWEE:** Wallace Werble

**FDA SERVICE DATES:** N/A

**TITLE AND ORGANIZATION:** Founder of *The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (F-D-C) Reports*

### INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tape/Side</th>
<th>Transcript Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Background of <em>The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (F-D-C) Reports</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 4, 11-15, 23, 25, 32, 40, 42, 45-46</td>
<td></td>
<td>Food and Drug Administration (FDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Werble’s background, education, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Press Service (NPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transradio Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3, 37, 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Communications Commission (FCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sol Taishoff &amp; <em>Broadcasting and Telecasting</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3, 14-15, 18, 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>U.S. News and World Report</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>David Lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 5, 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Trade Commission (FTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape/Side</td>
<td>Transcript Page</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, 6, 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wall Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7, 13, 53-54</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Pink Sheet</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Weekly Pharmacy Report</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Green Sheet</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Blue Sheet</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drug Research Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Washington &amp; Lee University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ted Kennedy’s accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>“In Brief”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, 13</td>
<td></td>
<td>“In-depth reporting”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Having trouble creating indices for stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Time, Newsweek, and Fortune Magazines</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Describing “editorial tone” or “editorial quality”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Beings for Biomedical Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13</td>
<td></td>
<td>FDA Recall List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Rand Dixon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 20, 43, 48, 50-57</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senator Estes Kefauver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 53</td>
<td></td>
<td>Congressman Lawrence H. Fountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15, 21-23, 27, 33-34, 37, 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impressions of Commissioner Walter Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>John Galsworthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17, 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proprietary Drug Industry/Proprietary Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-16, 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Frederick J. Cullen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>James Hoge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape/Side</td>
<td>Transcript Page</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Medicine Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-21, 47</td>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Wesley Dunn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Big Six”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Carsnell Fraley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td></td>
<td>American Drug Manufacturers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Carroll Thumbaugh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association merger with the American Drug Manufacturers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jacob Neal, Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Clough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Ralston Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Journal of the American Medical Association</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21, 28-32, 34, 38-42, 45-50, 55-56</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impressions of Commissioner George Larrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22, 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner Campbell looks like Woodrow Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21, 26-30, 32-35, 38-41, 44, 46, 48, 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impressions of Commissioner Charles Crawford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-27, 33-34, 38-41, 46</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impressions of Commissioner Paul Dunbar, Ph.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23, 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Harvey W. Wiley, M.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>FDA transfers from Agriculture Department to create the old Federal Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paul McNutt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thurman Arnold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27, 31, 34, 41, 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>President Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27, 48</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape/Side</td>
<td>Transcript Page</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27, 29-30, 32</td>
<td>Nelson Rockefeller</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ruth Lamb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mrs. Hobby, Federal Security Administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-30</td>
<td>Mrs. Hobby trying to get rid of Commissioner Crawford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31, 32, 34</td>
<td>Brad Mintner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Harold Stassen (Former Governor of Minnesota)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33, 36</td>
<td>Mike Markel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39, 50</td>
<td>Bill (William) Goodrich</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Dunbar-Crawford Era</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Pharmaceutical Industry – “Golden Era of Medical Discovery” (ca. 1958-1959)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41, 44, 50</td>
<td>Difficulty getting money from Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Steve Spencer – <em>Saturday Evening Post</em> – stories of great miracles and biochemical discoveries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Discussion of the 1950’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-44</td>
<td>Henry Welch and the antibiotic case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43, 49</td>
<td>National Academy of Sciences (NAS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Clarke Kerr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-46</td>
<td>Anthony Celebrezze – Secretary of HEW, 1962-1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-46</td>
<td>George Larrick’s illness and retirement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>George Larrick’s deputy, Winton Rankin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner, John Harvey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Post-war scientific discoveries and life-saving drugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Public Scrutiny of FDA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape/Side</td>
<td>Transcript Page</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>McCarthy hearings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>Julius Hauser – First to write IND regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thalidomide incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interview with Wallace Werble
July 28, 1969

JHY: This is a conversation between Mr. Wallace Werble of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (F-D-C) Reports and myself, James Harvey Young of Emory University. As one of the conversations put on tape and then transcripted in the National Library of Medicine, Oral History Project in connection with food and drug history in the United States. Mr. Werble, you began a novel journalistic venture of 1939 which continues specialized journalistic ventures involving the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Indeed, just the other day in the records, I ran across the whole first volume of The Pink Sheet and the very first issue had a letter from you dated February 11, 1939, to George Larrick thanking him for the help that he gave you as you began this journalistic venture. And so, I’d like to talk to you today and have you tell us about how it was, why it was you began this specialized from of journalism and also tell us about your impressions of the Food and Drug Commissioners with whom you were close and perhaps other figures in the Food and Drug Administration with whom you have come in contact during these years.

WW: The first question takes me back and you’ve asked a very large one. I’ll answer the first question about how the first in our series of publications got started and then I think it would be best if you zeroed in on questions as they came down the line. I’m aware of your extensive research in this area and your great knowledge and I’m sure you’ve done other interviews of this kind and when I finish about my own participation which I hope will be the end of the discussion on publications, I’ll leave it to you to ask the questions about the FDA and its policies and its commissioners. I belong to the lost generation; that is, I got out of school in
1933, about nine or ten weeks after “that man” came to Washington. I’d always wanted to be a Washington newsman and I headed here from small towns in Virginia and West Virginia which were my background. It was difficult to get jobs in those days and the pay was low, but I started in the press service, and worked up from a copy boy and telephone dictation man – that’s journalese for people outside the craft until in 1937 and most of 1938, I participated in the pioneering effort to provide news by radio. It is hard for people to believe today with instantaneous communications which we have that there was a time news was not really available to radio. The National Press Service (NPS) would not sell their news services to radio. We didn’t have TV yet. And the publishers actually thought they could keep news off radio. I participated in an early venture with the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) in covering Washington for radio news and this was killed by the publisher who threatened radio stations not to print the programs for the Columbia stations if they stayed in the news business. Out of that grew an independent news gathering organization for radio in which I was one of the early founders and participants. It’s now dead, died somewhere in the forties. In any event . . .

JHY: What was its name?

WW: Its name was Transradio Press. In any event, I covered the primaries in 1938. That was the year that Roosevelt, you may remember, was trying to purge a Southern senator and I went through the Southern states covering those primary campaigns for radio news and because of the primary efforts the work was hard, we weren’t welcomed and the pay was low. We didn’t have any children at the time. My wife traveled with me. By the time we reached Little Rock, Arkansas, she said she’d had enough of it and said that I’d have to get a job in Washington which would let me stay home more and get paid more. When I got back to Washington, I approached a friend of mine, Mr. Sol Taishoff.
JHY: Can you spell that.

WW: T-A-I-S-H-O-F-F was and still the editor and publisher of *Broadcasting Magazine*. It is now *Broadcasting and Telecasting*. It was then only *Broadcasting*. This is a fabulously successful publication that was based upon early regulations by the government of the radio industry. I asked him for a job and he said that he did not have a job, nor did he even have desk space. But he did know of a job possibility. He had the feeling and the publishing concept that any industry subjected to major regulations from Washington, major new regulations, in those days, ought to have a primary source of communications with Washington or information from Washington. As he saw it, it was a two-way communications street. The regulatory agency to the industry and vice-versa. In a tangent sort of way, his own magazine had covered the enactment of the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law. He was not an expert in it; did not know very much about it, but in fact, he did know that here major new industries were being subjected to an additional and a stricter form of regulation than ever before. He suggested that this was one of those publishing opportunities that he’d been interested in. As a matter of fact, he previously had established a new publication very similar to ours that was highly successful on the telephone and telegraph industry covering the regulations of the early Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its predecessors of the telephone and telegraph industry. You see, his own magazine covered radio and he had this specialized type publication with lone news stories without advertising, not printed. Published other types of reproduction processes. And he suggested that maybe this would be a good place to start a new publication. Well, I knew nothing at all about it. I had heard only about the 1938 Food and Drug Law what any general news man had heard. But he was willing to put up a few hundred dollars if I would put up the work to see if we could get it started. The law was passed on June 25, 1938, and the
events recounted had transpired somewhere in October or November of ’38, and the events recounted and on January the first, I left Radio News and started a thing called *F-D-C Reports* the first issued of which was dated February 11, 1939. Initially, it covered food as well as drugs and cosmetics. Later, after a year or so, we saw there wasn’t sufficient community interest between the food field and the drug and cosmetic field even though they were regulated by the same agency. So we established a separate food edition and a separate drug and cosmetic edition. The cover of the food edition was printed on yellow paper and the cover of the drug and cosmetic edition and of the early combined edition was on pink paper. This continued until I was called into the service in the fall of 1943 at which time I sold the food edition to David Lawrence who was then head of the *U.S. News and World Report* and also the Bureau of National Affairs, publishers of a lot of these specialized publications, and he bought the mailing list from me and I went into the service. The drug and cosmetic edition was continued in a pink sheet as we’d call it by now because of the color of the cover. Through the two years that I was in the Army, two years and a half or so, and then when I got out we started to . . . come back to this work. . . and we started to try to make an expanded growth. That’s my life’s story.

JHY: Well, that’s certainly an important innovative part of your life’s story. Would you be willing to say anything about how rapidly it grew? How, not in that specific term, but was it purely at a rapid growth immediate or had there been a kind of general gradient of expansion of subscriptions or…

WW: There had been a steady growth. Initially, it confined itself almost entirely to the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). I’m not talking about the drug and cosmetic edition. As a matter of fact, the very first issue edition was devoted almost entirely to a lay news man’s report of the first hearings on color
certification. These were the hearings that were held the week of the first publications and not knowing anything about the law or technology of the industry, I attended every minute of the hearings and made notes and sat down and wrote the best trained news story cold on what the witnesses said, the questions the lawyers asked and the hearing examiner and the fusses they got into and the first issue was devoted almost entirely to that. Well, it had a reasonable acceptance at first, it grew slowly and we added coverage of Food and Drug and Federal Trade and this produced a period of somewhat faster expansion. When I got back from the service, we then thought they expanded a broad spectrum industry wide vehicle, based primarily on FDA and in the days when it was active in this area, the Federal Trade Commission.

JHY: When was it? Was it at this time that you began to put in the information about the economic status of the individual companies?

WW: Yes. When I returned from the war we added an edition to government, coverage of government news. We began to do analysis of companies, the publicly-held corporations, as their figures became available through the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), through findings with them and subsequently, we continued to add new areas of interest developed by the industry.

JHY: So this opened up subscriptions to people in the stock market.

WW: That’s right. At first, we weren’t even happy having people in the stock market read our publication and we never really made any promotional effort in that area. At one time, I even considered making it as sort of restrictive or as exclusive as possible for the executives of drug and cosmetic industries, but I found that they began to sneak copies to the people on Wall Street if it said something good about their companies so we reluctantly began to take subscriptions from the financial community and now I think about one-third of our total
subscriptions are from not just Wall Street alone but from financial communities all over the country.

JHY: Until you went into the service did you do most of the work yourself?

WW: I did all of it myself. I had myself and one secretary. We mailed the first four issues.

JHY: And then you began to expand your staff as you began to expand the coverage?

WW: That’s correct and as the subscriptions grew and the revenue became a supporting factor. We also began to expand the number of publications. In 1951, we created a four-page newsletter. You understand that The Pink Sheet averages between 30 and 40 pages a week and this is like most any other publication. In effect the weekly newsmagazine without advertising, and done not in newspaper column style, but by a multilith process now. But we started a four-page what we call a bargain basement version of the pink for retail pharmacists, recognizing they couldn’t pay the high prices The Pink Sheet was charging, you know, everything in the drug field is high.

JHY: What was the cost of the The Pink Sheet per year when you began?

WW: Seventy-five dollars.

JHY: Right

WW: It is now one hundred and eighty. But we developed a four-page sort of re-write a few items of special interest to pharmacists. We called it the Weekly Pharmacy Report and because it was printed on green paper, we called it The Green Sheet and incidentally, all of these different colored papers are now our trademark and F-D-C Reports is more widely known as The Pink Sheet than it is by its right name and Weekly Pharmacy Reports is a green sheet. We charge
$15.00 a year for that. The price is still the same and it’s designed for the leadership in retail pharmacy who are really interested in knowing the trends of regulatory government activities.

JHY: And then The Blue Sheet came along.

WW: The Blue Sheet came along in late 1957 which was originally charted with the concept that a special publication should be developed covering matters of interest, chiefly the National Institutes of Health (NIH), then growing; now a million dollar biomedical research program to provide a channel of information on the research being done on drugs. The Blue Sheet is… formerly named Drug Research Reforms. In the intervening years, this one has grown and its news spectrum has also expanded to the point that drug research of course is actually the wrong name for it. Its largest readership interest is in the field of biomedical education and research and now even has for years been covering the growing revolution and the various systems of the delivery of health care to the people. Among its readers are all, I think, but two of the medical deans…deans of the medical school in America. It has a large readership among the heads of the Departments of Pharmacology as well as among the research and development executives in the pharmaceutical industry. But only a small part of its readership now has only a small part of its contents now devoted to specifically drug research and candidly I’ve been giving some thought as to how you’d change the name of a publication to fit a changed content in readership. Now since the name is trademarked, it becomes a little bit of a problem. On Sunday morning when I have nothing else to think about, I wonder how you could change the name.

JHY: Well, I’ve read The Pink Sheet for a long time and I’ve read it retroactively from a research point and one thing about the approach that it has had interested me and that is a historical document is the sense that when you do a current news story, you pay a great deal of
attention within the news story to the historical dimension of whatever the theme is, it has to be
the subject of that news story.

Would you tell me how that came about and how you handled this from the point of view of journalism? Do you have special background researchers or do you have people trained in a certain field or do you have a certain kind of mores of your own that people go to when, they say, monosodium glutamate comes up and you want to find out what may have been said before, why the historical emphasis. It is just a reflection of your interests and then how journalistically do you get the time dimension in each article as it comes out?

WW: I suppose you being a professor you could lay part of the blame if you want to at the fact that my minor when I went to college was in history. I went to an old-fashioned liberal school not like the new ones where you had to take strong majors and strong minors and I also made my best grades in history, so again, this was…

JHY: You went to college at Washington and Lee? I thought that was what it must have been called.

WW: So I guess there always was a kind of bent for the historical perspective. Incidentally, I took some courses in the journalism school but I was an English major so that I was not craft trained if you want to put it that way. In the area of regulatory trends I think everything has to fit into a context and we feel that the context is important and more so now after the years have gone by and developed a readership from our older ones who have passion and certainly newer ones have come in. We have to tell them what’s now. Now what’s new in a regulatory field may not lend itself to the same kind of treatment as the extremely tragic event of Ted Kennedy’s crash…no one thing happens at a specific moment in history. I can only think of perhaps one or two stories and even then they had a historical background that changes the whole
course of events. We, I guess, started a kind of journalistic...we called it in-depth reporting. Not all of our stories are that way. Our “In Brief” tries to bring people up to date in one sentence. We even have what we call our trade and government memos, another shorter form of two or three paragraph stories, but where we really dig in to a regulatory story of three of four pages, we like to put it into the context of the developments that broaden both the industry and the government and get to that particular point in regulatory fields. Now, as I said, we do not have the same kinds of stories as the tragic Kennedy thing. So I often say that we make a living putting in the journalistic form about nuances. We deal in nuances. We deal in nuances, as each step is another step in a progression of events. I suppose the best word would be “continuum.” Do you want me to spell it...?

JHY: Well, I think we can get by on that.

WW: And we deal with that and therefore, I think it’s important to go back and say how you got this. This is one of our most critical editorial problems. The paper is getting too large and too wordy and the executives don’t have as much time to read as they used to. They take these quick reading courses and they miss key words in sentences, but we still feel we have to think why the particular event we are reporting on that given week is news and why it represents a change in movement forward if you want to call it that or backward depending on where you sit and how you look at it and to do this, you have to say where you were before you went forward or backwards.

JHY: Well, now, how did a man who writes the story know that especially if he’s a fairly new reporter in a drug reporting game?

WW: Those people are not very useful to us from six months to a year. We believe this is a particular kind of journalism, we call it in-depth reporting. We did it before Time magazine
used the phrase and our people have to be reasonably informed experts in their particular areas so
that a new person doesn’t come in and really write one of those kinds of stories for months and
the billet of knowledge is cumulative and a lot of it is available by asking the right questions to
the people at the Food and Drug Administration. As a researcher, you certainly understand this
technique. You have dived; I’m sure, into unknown waters and have come up with pearls just by
knowing what…

JHY: I know I had the same problem as you did by not being an expert trained in these
technicalities.

WW: And these people learned as a body of knowledge in the office and one passes it
on to the other. I spend a great deal of my time now just talking with people or making tapes for
them just like you’re doing now.

JHY: Right. Do you have a morgue of half stories all cataloged, of course?

WW: Yes, we do. We have trouble getting an index. That’s our biggest problem,
because most of our stories have so many subjects that it’s been quite a demand recently for an
index of all publications. We haven’t been able to develop it. I once asked an expert in indexing
at the Library of Congress if he would undertake it as a moonlighting job for considerable
money. After trying it for a couple of weeks, he refused. Said he couldn’t do it.

JHY: So that you’re still hoping to get…

WW: We do have a fairly extensive morgue by subjects and old stories clipped. We’ve
put in there, in addition, basic documents. We keep a large number of basic documents, court
filings, briefs, and speeches, statements, legislative matters. I suppose you can see it after you
leave, if you like. What do you think; there are ten, fifteen file cabinets?
JHY: Right. But I think, am I right, a great deal of the importance of the nuances, what to pick, what to accent in the background of the story, comes to the writer from his own cumulative experience and from conversations with you and the others who’ve been here a long time.

WW: Also conversation with the news sources. Now, I’m sure that not everyone at the Food and Drug Administration loves us. As a matter of fact, I know we have some sworn enemies, people who won’t even talk to our reporters, misguided souls, but a number of people at Food and Drug over the years from commissioners on down have regarded this as…our publication…as I hope, a legitimate and proper channel of communications to the industry. So the people at FDA have been willing to talk with us. On the other hand, people in industry were willing to talk with us. We do a lot of talking. I think we do a lot more research than most news publications do except Time, Newsweek and Fortune. But other than that by the time any one of our people do really significant or defending a story as we call it, he or she has done a great deal more research than even the New York Times reporter.

JHY: Do you read everything before you go to press?

WW: I come close to reading almost everything, yes, when I’m in town. Over the years I’ve been tied pretty close to this job and I’m getting a little more way from it now.

JHY: What about the question of what might be called editorial tone or editorial quality? There have been comments a time or two with industry as your major source that there is a kind of industry slant occasionally to the things that you do. Has this been a matter with you that’s been explicit before your consciousness about how you write up a story, any kind of editorial tone that lies behind them or is this a problem in your point of view?
WW: It depends on whom you’ve been talking to, Professor. If you talk to some people, I’m sure they’d say it has an industry tone, if you talk to industry people or read my mail or listen to my phone calls for Monday or Tuesday, you’d think that we are among the most hostile people in the world toward industry.

We try to keep this as straight as a news job. We’ve viewed it as news mixed with a little history, as I’ve said before, and sometimes we’ve even taken positions on certain things that I have deep feelings on and I don’t mind telling you that I know them and I’ll tell anybody because I make speeches on them.

I am very conservative about the use of human beings for biomedical research. I’m not sure that it’s necessary to take it and I’m considered to be quite an enemy of many pharmacologists including one at Emory; I could tell you quite candidly. We even had a public debate once. So that we have some deep feeling in some matters. But generally, we try to see them fairly coldly and I’ve often said we’ve make a living by telling the industry the worst.

For example, nobody else publishes a weekly, what is known as the FDA Recall List. We publish it. That’s a list of all the products that are recalled by the companies during a given week. No one else publishes it; we do. This done tabular form without even commentary. Sometimes, you know, the Food and Drug Administration makes mistakes and we have to correct theirs, because you know the government bureaucrats don’t like to admit they’re wrong. On the other hand, we mail out a story sometimes giving an industry view of the particular regulatory problem. Well that view, too, has some validity, that is an audience that in their democratic system and their checks and balances, however misguided, the people in Food and Drug may feel about it or the people in Congress may feel about it or even we ourselves may feel.
JHY: So you consider when you get…

WW: I consider over the years of any fair-minded person, really, I don’t know what you’ve found in your research reading of *The Pink Sheet*.

JHY: I found certainly a lot of information that I have not found anywhere else.

WW: But I think any fair-minded person would say on balance all sides are told at one time or another, in one form or another and we never made it a point to attack the Food and Drug Administration or to denounce the bureaucrats as they are called. Occasionally we kid them, jaw them a little bit. We have, as I say, even corrected the Recall List. But, I think on the other hand we’re defendants of Food and Drug against criticism from Congressional sources and at that point, we were attacked from both sides.

The late Senator Kefauver whom I knew before he started his hearings reached the point where he couldn’t see me across the room without getting red, and Paul Rand Dixon who is now Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, whom I had known. Didn’t talk to me for years. He said we were unfair to his hearings because he thought we were defending Food and Drug too much. I once had a vigorous exchange of letters with Congressman Fountain of North Carolina in which I felt he had jumped unfairly on Food and Drug. So, I think a fair-minded person given the margin of error that exists in all human endeavors, that is, except those among professors on campuses who are never wrong, then think within the margin of error anyone would read their papers fairly over a period of time would have to say that we at least tried to give the story and all sides.

JHY: Would you say that the degree of detail and the in-depth reporting as you described it are the elements in which your (The) *Pink Sheet* will have the edge over other journalism that is devoted on the drug field? What else would you say about that?
WW: Well, I would hope that’s what we’d provide. That’s why we charge outlandish “drug” prices for our publications because we pay…we have to pay our talent more than other people. We have now a fairly sizeable staff. This thing has grown; I think we have on all our publications up to twenty people in the editorial department. The top people get paid more than most of the news people with the daily papers and press services. In Washington, only the top columnists and pundits get paid more and I would hope that’s what our readers are paying for and I hope they are getting their money’s worth. Here’s for a certain expertise and a certain investment that might not be available otherwise.

However, there are a number of very fine publications in the field and I read most of them. I read them with perhaps greater interest than almost any other reader and I find them doing a good job. I hope we do a different job. I would not say that our job is a better job, just a different job.

JHY: Well, now The Pink Sheet began just between the time that first provisions of the 1938 laws went into effect and the time that all the provisions went into effect. Therefore, it had a life pretty much coterminous with this law and that has meant, of course, that you have had to be, as you’ve said, close to the Food and Drug Administration. I’d appreciate your giving me your impressions of Mr. Campbell who was the Commissioner at the time that this law went into effect. Do you know him very well?

WW: Yes, I’ve had the pleasure of knowing all the commissioners. Mr. Campbell was a complete gentleman of the old school. He almost…he appeared as though he had stepped out of a John Galsworthy [1932 Nobel Prize in Literature] novel. He was a lawyer, attorney, he was a clean, high-minded man, of great principles and he had an iron will. When he made up his mind… He had a very difficult job first of getting the law passed against great opposition, as
you will recall from your research, it took from 1933 to 1938 to get the law passed and his was
the job of getting the initial regulatory processes underway. I would say that at that time
Campbell’s major thrust was to initiate some effort in the food standards field and to start what
might be called reformation of the …what we call the proprietary drug industry…I guess you’d
call it the patent medicine industry, from your book?

JHY: From the first book anyhow.

WW: From the first book, and I suppose if we continue to refer to them as proprietary
medicine industry or proprietary industry, that’s why some of the people might think we’re
biased toward them. I suppose…I believe honestly it’s more descriptive of an industry today
than patent medicine. The word patent medicine is a misnomer because they didn’t have any
patents. In any event, he initiated some of the early major regulatory drugs that helped the
industry, clean itself up. Campbell had a way of working with industry in spite of his sort of
stern and strong positions and I’d like to say here that he had, in reforming the proprietary
industry the help of two very powerful, strong leaders in the industry itself, and the three of
them worked together, that is, Campbell and his whole Food and Drug and there was the late Dr.
Cullen who had previously, before the law had been enacted been the head of the drug division
of the old Food and Drug Administration and had become head of a proprietary association and a
gentleman by the name of…and Dr. Cullen died just a year ago…and a gentleman by the name
of James Hoge, a member of the New York Bar who represented the proprietary industry during
the five-year fight and has since…still happily alive…been very active. Both of them in their
own way contributed…would you say, moving the industry from what you call in your first book
“a patent medicine” industry to what we as “industry lovers” call the proprietary industry.
JHY: Would you describe Dr. Cullen and the kind of person he was and the way he operated in this period of reformation?

WW: Yes sir. Dr. Cullen was a rather heavy set man, a very determined man who had also an iron will. He passed away, I say a year ago, and I should tell you that on this I should warn historians of the future that I’m a prejudiced witness because just this evening Mrs. Werble and I are taking his widow to dinner, so we were friends and the subject of the discount and bias you historians always have to correct for, but he was very determined and he talked straight and he told the people in his industry just what was wrong, what he thought was wrong with their labeling and advertising. I remember attending, shortly after our publication was formed, the meeting of the proprietary associations, its annual meeting at the Biltmore in New York City and he had taken a set of, he made a set of slides out of their labels and their ads and he had his members, the people who were paying his salary sitting in the room and he darkened the room and he put the slides on and he told each and every one of them what the heck was wrong with everything that he put on the screen. I will say that Dr. Cullen did his share of seeking to protect the industry against Food and Drug when he thought they were wrong and I’m sure he also used the technique of industry reformers of threatening his membership of what would happen to them if they didn’t conform.

Mr. Hoge is a great man also and a great lawyer. He delivers an annual speech, and he still does, to this association and in those early days, I remember once we described Mr. Hoge’s speech as “preaching the law”. In effect, preach the law to them. He participated in all of the legislative, proprietary legislative battles. He knew why all the phrases, commas, and all the languages were in the statute and he proceeded to do his best to bring people in line. Now, I’m not going to say that proprietary drug advertising today is a paragon of virtue. I wouldn’t want
to pass judgment on advertising in general. I’ll leave that to the academic scholars but I think that the proprietary drug industry and the content of its products and in the way they’re labeled and the dosages that they’re used in, the purposes that most of them are sold for…you know, there’s a vast difference between not only today but let us say 1950.

JHY: Right

WW: And pre-1938.

JHY: At the time that Mr. Hoge was engaged in working in connection with the law that was to be the ’38 law, his vis a vis over on the pharmaceutical side was Charles Wesley Dunn.

WW: That’s correct, sir.

JHY: Did you know Mr. Dunn?

WW: Yes, I had the privilege of knowing Mr. Dunn.

JHY: Would you give me a vignette of him, if you please?

WW: Incidentally, so that I’ll know how freely I can speak…do you know Mr. Hoge?

JHY: No.

WW: Have you interviewed him?

JHY: No and I hope I may.

WW: And if I can help you, I’ll be glad to see that you do it. I don’t think that your history would be or your research would be as…totally…it would be so incomplete that if you were writing a story for us, we wouldn’t print it in our paper. Now, why don’t you talk with Mr. Hoge?

JHY: All right, I’ll do that.

WW: And so far as Mr. Dunn is concerned, to get a judgment on him, he had a devoted disciple in the name of Frank Gearson, still alive and is a lawyer in New Your…a doctor of juris
prudence and a young man came in to be Mr. Hoge…or Mr. Dunn…who was the number two man and again I’ll say to you that I wouldn’t print your story if you don’t get a recording from Frank Gearson.

JHY: All right, sir. I did hear Mr. Dunn make a speech and visited with him some years ago. Give me a vignette of him.

WW: Dunn was a…well; I’ll say that Hoge was a preacher of the law. He had a different group to deal with. Mr. Dunn, I would call him a statesman or philosopher of the law. In addition, he was a very imposing looking…shot of gray hair…tall, handsome…beautiful language and diction…extremely able and I always felt that he was to the pharmaceutical side of the drug industry what Ephraim Tutt was to criminal law.

If you remember the old stores in the *Saturday Evening Post* and according to the description of Tutt in the *Post*, Mr. Dunn even looked a lot like him and he always wore a handkerchief, a four-in-hand handkerchief in his upper lift-hand pocket which came way out and dipped down. He, too, in his own way was a great force for change in the industry. In every legislative or regulatory crisis that developed subsequent to the 1938 law, he would start out expounding the pharmaceutical industry’s position, always ended up as the conciliator of industry’s position with the regulatory position of bringing the industry along the mainstream of regulations. And I think he did a great job, of bringing them along.

JHY: Do you think that he had a real subtly about that middle position?

WW: The middle position of how the industry does the things that probably they would have to do anyhow…but to do it with a great deal more grace. Now, before that, the people who realized that, in his day, he was considered to be a frequent advocate of every major legislative or regulatory battle. He was even considered by some as “a treasure”. I know a very prominent
food and drug lawyer here in Washington that I’d known for years. I rode back on the train with him from New York after hearing one of Mr. Dunn’s speeches in the fifties and I lost a lifelong friend because he started denouncing Dunn and I told this lawyer who was with a very large law firm that if he contributed as much to the philosophy of the law as Mr. Dunn, he could be proud of him.

What is your history specialty?

JHY: It’s American history.

WW: Yes. You have to have a feel for these and maybe I don’t, but you know, two thing make history: events and men and there always seems to be men each in the right…somehow they emerge in the right niche of just the right personality at the right time. There was another man, a very great man in his own way, the late Carsnell Fraley who headed another branch of the pharmaceutical and prescription drug industry. Mr. Dunn headed one branch, Fraley headed another, and Dr. Cullen headed a third.

JHY: I’ve run across Fraley’s name on the documents, particularly in connection with the Joint Contact Committee.

WW: Right. He was much greater force than that. Mr. Fraley represented the old American Drug Manufacturers Association and it had in its membership, what at that time we called the “Big Six.” They’re still big, but four of the Big Six; were not member of Mr. Dunn’s group. Mr. Dunn had an organization consisting largely of the smaller prescription drug manufacturers plus two of the Big Six; thus, you had a kind of balance and Mr. Fraley who was not given to making speeches or being out in the front in the same manner nor did he have to play…quite the same kind of drama that Mr. Dunn had. Mr. Fraley worked more quietly conciliating government and pharmaceutical industry viewpoints in Washington, but he had the
real power structure. Dunn…Mr. Dunn…had to exert his leverage not only through his group but through his own personality…the force of his own knowledge within and indeed, his own idea of righteousness.

JHY: What was the solvent that broke down the wall between the two and caused the one to come into existence?

WW: The threatening congressional investigations which finally culminated in the Kefauver hearings.

JHY: I see. They felt that they needed to be resolute and resolve differences…

WW: Also, Mr. Fraley had passed on. I think Mr. Fraley died in about 1956. Mr. Dunn passed on not too many years after and in any event, there were rumblings on the Hill. Also the industry had grown up, you see. The pharmaceutical side of the industry had grown from a family kind of industry to one that was rapidly becoming one of the major industries and most profitable ones in the country. Most of the family companies…were going public as we say in the securities and exchange lingo and were selling shares listed on Wall Street and on stock exchanges and they had decided that there was an interregnum between Fraley and the merger and they had a very fine scientist…a very high-type scientist by the name of Dr. Carroll Thumbaugh who headed the American Drug Manufacturers Association in the interregnum.

JHY: Do you know who took the lead in bringing about the merger?

WW: And I might say also that in the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association…that’s Mr. Dunn’s group…maybe I ought to repeat it and get it clear. The American Drug Manufacturers Association was Mr. Fraley’s group and had four major companies that were not in the other. The American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association was Mr. Dunn’s group. Even in that group prior to the merger, the members began to feel that
Mr. Dunn was getting older and I think there was a certain rebellion against strong leadership and they hired a man by the name of Jacob Neal, Ph.D. to head them. And Mr. Dunn remained a general counsel until he passed away then Mr. Foss took over. Now the members themselves…that was about ’57 or ’58…I could look up the date for you…the members took the leadership expecting the merger and they brought the two together and even brought Dr. Clough to Washington to work under Dr. Thumbaugh who worked together for a year or two and as the Senate hearing grew and they felt that they needed a bigger setup, they then moved in to hire Dr. Ralston Smith who had previously been editor of the *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* as their full time paid president. Dr. Clough retired a couple of years ago and is still happily alive. Dr. Baumbart is now in what you call semi-retirement and has a home both in Washington and in the George Washington Memorial Park.

JHY: Now you said something that struck my interest in connection with Mr. Campbell back a distance, indicating that though he had aloofness, that nonetheless he also could work with industry in ways “out of court” so to speak. Could you say a little a more about that?

WW: He did. He was not a hail, well-met fellow. He was always at sort of a distance but the industry, just out of this bruising five-year legislative fight, the industry came out of that with a great respect for Campbell, his integrity, his fairness and his honesty. There was no one to call him Walter. You would never call him Walter; as well as I knew him, I never did, as though I later called Larrick, “George” and Crawford, “Charlie” and I never…maybe I was too young at the time, but I don’t believe anyone would have dreamed of it. He wore pince-nez glasses when he sat behind his desk, very imposing and had a long, narrow face. He had a sort of…I’ll tell you who he reminds me of, Woodrow Wilson. Now, I never had the privilege to
know Wilson. I’m too young for that but I have read some of the local papers and I did dabble in history in my youth, so he reminds me…he even had the same facial structure.

JHY: Well, you are also implying something; I take it, of the puritanical ethical quality.

WW: Right. I had never thought of it until now. I’m glad you came by because I’ve often wondered how I would really draw a picture of Campbell. Yes…Woodrow Wilson…that’s who he was and people respected him and he dealt fairly with them, the industry, they knew it, they knew he’d deal fairly. He made some arrangements as anyone must…which president was it that said that “politics was the art of the possible?”

JHY: Out of respect.

WW: Yes, You’re right.

JHY: Right. Now, I’d like to turn the tape over before we talk about Mr. Campbell’s successor.

WW: Walter Campbell reminds me of what I have read of Woodrow Wilson. They even had the same kind of face, long and narrow, chiseled nose. They both wore pince-nez glasses and Campbell had a unique way of pinching the glasses between his thumb and forefinger in the center, taking them out, holding them about a foot away from him when he was about to make a point. And then he would make his point or his statement with sharp language with a great deal of clarity, almost crystal words, but never offensive. He was always a thorough gentleman. However, there was always the desk between the people at Food and Drug, the people in industry and newsmen and others. I don’t even know of his closest cronies calling him Walter. He was always Mr. Campbell, but he had a way of bringing the industry along with him and I think it was in this respect comparable to the early days of Wilson. He, I think he earned
their respect during the bruising five year fight on which he was on the other side and I believe that they trusted his basic honesty, his complete fairness, his total integrity.

JHY: Very good. Now, his second-in-command was Dr. Paul Dunbar who brought the scientific background. You knew him in the same period and while he was the later commissioner?

WW: That’s right. They almost…they worked together. As a matter of fact, we recently had a kind of twin situation at the head of the Food and Drug Administration and you’ve brought up another point. They had a twin situation with totally different types of people: Dunbar was short and more heavy set, Campbell was tall and lean. Dunbar wore horned-rim glasses, had a slow sense of humor, occasionally told a joke of his own and liked the good ones and he had come up as a chemist chiefly from the food side and together they made a team and they worked very closely together. Actually, I would say this: in those days, if you talked to Dunbar it was just as though you had talked to Campbell and vice versa. There’s a legend and I believe there is some truth to it that both of them joined the Food and Drug Administration…you’ve heard this legend…haven’t you, Dr. Young? About the same time, under Harvey Wiley and they were both made inspectors and at one time, shortly after the 1906 Law had passed, Wiley wanted to get some samples, so he gave them both market baskets and told them to go out and buy food at random and come in and inspect it. But they both had come up from day one in a sense and they had each other’s complete trust and faith. I don’t believe that I ever heard the slightest breath that there was even an argument between them. They were no different, maybe that’s what did it and Dunbar’s forte was the food area. Campbell was overall and as I say, he concentrated largely on bringing the proprietary drug industry in the mainstream of regulatory life at the time. Mr. Campbell retired voluntarily. I remember
him…he did tell me in advance of his intentions to retire and I felt so deeply about it that I asked him not to retire until he’d had another talk with me. This was brash for a young man at that time, but people felt that way about Campbell. You know, I suppose people must have felt that way about Wilson in his earlier days. The comparison is in any event, he felt that he had reached the point that he wanted to retire. He even told me where he was going to buy an apartment. He thought he had passed his time and he did retire. Dunbar just automatically moved in. There wasn’t any question. A political question, that is all. No question of succession at all. I don’t remember whether Food and Drug had been transferred from the Agriculture Department to create the old Federal Security Agency under Paul McNutt before or after Campbell. Do you remember that feud?

JHY: No, I don’t. That was in 1939, as I recall.

WW: No. No. The reorganization act came somewhere during the early war years.

JHY: Oh, well I guess it was the bill.

WW: The ’38 law became effective but they still stayed in Agriculture under the law.

JHY: No, I don’t remember exactly who.

WW: But I think sometime after but the transfer was pretty close and Dr. Dunbar took over and he conceived…of course, we ran then into the war period for attention was diverted from all types of regulatory activity. There was a story around Washington, you know, that the President even wired Thurman Arnold not to engage in anti-trust regulatory work and led to Arnold’s leaving the Justice Department some time, because of the war. I suppose the Food and Drug participated; yes it did. I shouldn’t say “I suppose”. It participated in a way in the war program.
It was early in the penicillin facet, the development of penicillin. It did a step-up in food inspection and the food inspection for the military. But during the war we did not have the great thrust forward of the regulatory stream of events, if you want to call it that. Is that a mixed metaphor? I’ll clean it up later. I think maybe Campbell’s retirement should have been around ’44 or ’45. This is date that can be verified and looked up. Dunbar held the agency together during a trying period. It was the war period. It was difficult to hold them together. The manpower was being drained off. After all, everybody in FDA one way or another was trained in some form of chemistry or medicine…almost everybody…the leading people. Many of the people went to war.

JHY: They went to war and they got more jobs. So they caught it from both directions.

WW: Right. And…well, we didn’t have a major regulatory era. I think Dunbar’s great genius was his ability to hold this thing together that had just gone through a cataclysmic five year legislative fight that had a few years of reforming industry, starting new and a certain amount of industry opposition in every step of the way as there is in every regulatory development. It’s no different than radio or security or power. I don’t want to leave the impression that the industry is worse than any other. So, he kept them together. He was a stubborn man in his own way, but he was stubborn with a smile. He could tell you “no” with a smile. He was still not the hail, well-met. He was not the regular fellow type. But he knew the agency completely from the inside and he ran it very well. He held it together. He carried it through the war, brought it out of the war period and started it on its next leg forward.

In the Campbell-Dunbar duo, there emerged another man, probably one of the most remarkable in the whole history of the Food and Drug Administration, who had a unique talent for seeing ahead for long distances relating to regulatory policy and for writing regulations that
converted policy in the day-to-day operations. And this was a man named Charles Crawford. When Dunbar moved up to the commissionership, Crawford moved into the number two spot. There was hardly any…there was no question about that, no doubts, no fights, no political problems at all. Crawford’s skill, as I said, had been able to convert policy in the regulations that dealt with day-to-day operations. And he taught several people of Food and Drug who were still there now, this skill. He was a connector, if you can use the word, of major regulatory policies that emerged after the war.

JHY: He had done that even with regard to the drafting of the 1938 law.

WW: That’s correct. As I said, I’ve tried to make that point. When I said, earlier, “With the Campbell-Dunbar duo, there still was a third man.” Crawford was a wonderful man. I saw him shortly before he died of leukemia in California. I was in his home, but he had 110% integrity and absolutely no sense of humor at all. He did not know the word “joke” and deadly serious; always driving toward his purpose; a sharp mind that was moving always five years ahead of everybody in the Food and Drug in the industry and he succeeded Dunbar as the commissioner and he voluntarily retired. I think it was about 1954 or 1955. I remember it was during the Eisenhower days and he retired for one purpose. Again, he was totally selfish so far as Food and Drug was concerned. He told me his reasons for retiring. He had tried for two or three years to get major increases in the Food and Drug budget and that’s what he thought was needed with the increased job based upon the size and the technology of the industry that was regulated.

In the early fifties, with a new era of antibiotics and drugs, was a new area of food technology. TV dinners were just beginning to emerge; frozen foods and all that. He tried for about three years to get an increase in the budget and had failed. I’ll tell you one thing that if I’d
had any criticism at all of Mr. Campbell and in part about Dunbar, their pristine purity called
them to go to Congress each year and say how good they were doing with the money they were
getting and never ask for more. I remember writing a story in the forties somewhere where the
Appropriations…House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman did the unheard of thing of
praising Campbell as being the only witness who had appeared before him in that session that
hadn’t asked for more money. Now this, for Campbell, I am certain was a virtue. To him, this
was one of the finest compliments he could have ever gotten and by the time Crawford emerged
as head, I’m sure it also became apparent to him that the agency couldn’t continue to try to keep
up with his job with the same old budget.

JHY: In fact, the budget was actually going backwards.

WW: If I had to have a cut or two, a small cut or two, Crawford caused to be created the
first Citizens Advisory Committee. Don’t ask me about Citizens Advisory Committees. I think
all of them are just failures. I think you were on one of them, weren’t you?

JHY: I was on the Council.

WW: You were on the Council, but you weren’t on the second one?

JHY: No.

WW: I’m glad. Then I can speak freely about the second Advisory Committee. In any
event, I think he had it created…as a matter of fact, I think he developed the concept of that in a
discussion with Nelson Rockefeller, he told me once. You remember Nelson Rockefeller was an
assistant secretary of a Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) department in the Eisenhower
administration. But Crawford had tried to get more money to do the job and had been
unsuccessful in doing so. He defined the reason for his lack of success as being a matter of his
own personality. He said quite candidly that he couldn’t go up and josh with the members of
Congress and he was too sober and he wasn’t a popular figure on the Hill and couldn’t develop it and so on. So in the height of his career, there was no question in the least, he submitted his resignation and told me privately and personally and repeated it to me before his death, he did it only because he felt that a new man would have a better chance of bringing the Food and Drug’s budget more in line with its mission and with the realities of the day. This, as I say, was in ’54 or ’55. We can check the dates while the script is cleaned up. And at that time, under Crawford, as I said earlier, until recently we always had two people and it was a team and this was Crawford and Larrick. George Larrick started very early with Food and Drug. Not back in the Wiley days but a little later, as an inspector, raised to chief inspector and …

JHY: I guess that was then you first knew him.

WW: First knew him. He was chief inspector and I might say that an interesting thing, in spite of that letter which you saw in the first issue; in the second issue we wrote something that Larrick didn’t like and he denounced me. He said he doubted my integrity and, oh, we had an awful wing ding and I simply told him that they had a public relations woman at Food and Drug at the time, a holdover from the legislative fight, by the name of Ruth Lamb.

JHY: I wish you’d tell me what you thought of her, too, because I…

WW: You would not want that on tape, Dr. Young.

JHY: Well, I would. The way you said that, you’ve got to explain it.

WW: You’ve just had it. In any event, well, got caught between the two of them and I told him…I told Larrick that in the long haul, he’d find that I’d do more good for Food and Drug doing my job, as I saw it, than his propagandist. She was more of a propagandist than a public relations lady. Didn’t last long after the new law went into effect.
And over the years, as you know, I don’t know of any closer personal friend I’ve had in
the world than George Larrick. But we started out, in the second or third issue, with a wing ding
fight in which he attached something that we had written. Later, he…we changed it. In any
event, Larrick was Crawford’s alter ego and Larrick, who knew everybody in Food and Drug;
having been the chief inspector, he had been around to every station more than once…over and
over. He knew the people and he was, in my view, and again a prejudiced view and not one, I’m
sorry to say, that’s entertained by too many people at the moment.

I think history, as it often does, will reevaluate George Larrick would not regard
him…has not been regarded as a stronger commissioner as some of the others. In any event,
when Crawford retired…I’d like to tell you an interesting story right here. Crawford came to me
and told me one night at dinner in this very office about three months before he was going to
retire that he’d given his retirement to Nelson Rockefeller and Rockefeller had told him the best
thing to do was keep it secret and that would be the best way to maintain the inside FDA
tradition. Now this shows how naïve Crawford was and I told Charlie that it was the most naïve
thing I had ever heard, but since he’d told it to me off the record, I would not say anything about
it, but I did my best to tell him somehow he should make his intentions known publicly. That
was about April. But he said he had Rockefeller’s word that this was the way that he’d keep the
in-house tradition. Obviously it wasn’t and anyone who had been around Washington for a
while and knows politics that once the top side of HEW would decide that someone else he
couldn’t do anything about nor could any forces be marshaled. Well, I worried and worried
about that thing and thought, “Gee, there ought to be some wait.

Incidentally, Mrs. Hobby came in as HEW secretary in 1952. She was then the first
Federal Security Administrator when the department was created, she sought some way to get rid
of Crawford and even allegedly had signed the letter to the Civil Service Commission to see if she could, but quite a stir was made in Crawford’s behalf and Mr. Dunn, that we spoke of before, stood up strongly for Crawford as did a number of other people and he kept the job. Well, he made this deal with Rockefeller and he was the kind that once he made the deal, even after I’d convinced him that this was a sucker’s deal, he wouldn’t change it. I wondered how in the world I could get to the public what I knew privately. Now, it was my good wife who did that. We were friends of the Crawford’s personally and one Sunday in June, she was reading the Sunday newspaper and there was a real estate ad saying that a house was for sale and it gave the address of the house. She said to me, “Isn’t that the Crawford house?” And I said, “My gosh, it is. And this was wonderful. You have answered one of the biggest problems that I have had.” So, I, next week, wrote a story. I felt then it was no longer a secret. I wrote a story about the Crawford’s offering their house for sale and I did know that they had a piece of property on a mountain looking over the San Francisco Bay harbor. It’s a beautiful place and so on and I said, “This can only meant that he’s thinking of retiring and so on” and I’d written it the week that…there was the convention with Dr. Dunn’s group and we’d gone to the convention and took some copies of our paper. They were distributed at Mr. Dunn’s meeting and he got up at the meeting and said that he had just talked to people in Washington and he was empowered to say that there was no truth in the fact that Crawford was retiring. That’s one of the little things that sometimes happens to a new man and I couldn’t say any more about it, but enough people had seen the lead of the story that a campaign was started then to see if Larrick couldn’t be helped. As a matter of fact, I don’t say this of Nelson Rockefeller, but I do believe that the top side of HEW was looking up our Food and Drug and I think that this was a sucker deal in Washington
terms, in political terms. And a man by the name of Brad Mintner who has to be mentioned here
and if you ever got a tape from him…

JHY: He was an Associate Secretary of HEW, wasn’t he?

WW: Not at this time.

JHY: Not at that time.

WW: Later. I’m getting ready to tell you of the Brad Mintner story if you’d like to have it.

JHY: Yes.

WW: But he is in town here and you must get a tape from him. Mintner was then
general counsel for Pillsbury. He is a very high-type man. He is one of the leading Methodist
laymen in America and he’s on the board of American universities, has been in the forefront of
every good movement in the country that I know of and had been in the forefront of the
Eisenhower campaign. He led the Eisenhower write-in campaign in Minnesota that defeated
Harold Stassen and won the nomination for the General and Brad felt that there should be this
career tradition. He felt Larrick should have the job. He believed it enough, the story, in spite of
the disclaimers, that he came to Washington to see the President. They were intimate enough
until just a few weeks before the President died. He was a regular visitor to the General. And it
was a nine o’clock meeting on a Saturday morning and the General said, “Mr. Mintner, Brad,
you feel so deeply about this job, why don’t you take it yourself?” He said, “I won’t take it
because it should go to Larrick and I think it would be a mistake.” And the President said, “All
right. I’ll make a deal with you.” I don’t suppose the General used the word “deal” – let’s take
that out of the story for documentation, but whatever he said, “I’ll tell you what. I will name, or
see that Larrick” (the President doesn’t name the Food and Drug Commissioner) “I will see that
Larrick is named Food and Drug Commissioner if you’ll be willing to come to Washington and be an assistant secretary of the HEW. That was how Brad Mintner came to Washington. To do so because of Ike’s puritanical view, Brad had to sell all of his stock in Pillsbury, give up his job, come here for a much lower paying job and he was assistant secretary of HEW for about three years. He was the one who insured that Larrick got the job. At that time, Ike was considered highly important by most people in industry, as well as in Food and Drug, in that insuring the career tradition was continued.

JHY: Who was it, as far as the story went at the time, within the administration who wanted to break the tradition and for what reasons? Did that come out?

WW: Not exactly. Let’s put it this way; the Republicans, you will recall as you’re a student of history, had been out of office a lot of years and there’s been a drought in appointments. Let me see…Roosevelt had been in since 1933 and Truman went out in ’54 so there’d been twenty years of no jobs. I don’t think it was a merit matter at all. I don’t think anyone was looking and saying Larrick would make a good commissioner or anyone who had made a study of the Food and Drug Administration’s short comings and so on. I just think the people were looking for…

JHY: As many faults as they could find.

WW: As they could find. And they added up. After all, Larrick had spent all of his time in Food and Drug under a Democratic administration and why not? So, there wasn’t anyone in particular, I don’t think you…and when I brought the Nelson Rockefeller up the only thing I blame Rockefeller for was selling Crawford on the thing of keeping it quiet. To me, all that spelled when I first heard it was that here’s a good juicy vacancy for a deserving Republican that they knew about and were going to keep it quiet. I don’t mean there was anything venal.
JHY: Now the reason that men like the Pillsbury man, Mr. Mintner, and Mr. Dunn and so on wanted the in-house tradition…

WW: There was another man, a Mr. Markel, whom I talked to on the telephone. He got on the phone when Crawford was threatened; he got on the phone on a Friday. I heard about the threat to Crawford on Friday morning and passed the word around and by Friday night I could write a story. That was where we helped make news and make it seem a little bit that the industry was up in arms and that there had been telegrams and phone calls. Now all of the Old Guard, let’s say…

JHY: Now, they supported the in-house tradition because it was a situation where they knew what the rules were. That was part of it, wasn’t it?

WW: Not exactly, no. I think you have it wrong there.

JHY: All right.

WW: They supported it, I think, out of public interest; these people did, because at the time, with all of the difficulties that I’ve mentioned earlier, it was through Campbell, Dunbar and Crawford that an esprit de corps had been built up in Food and Drug. It was almost like a college campus. I mean a college campus before 1960. Not now. The people who worked at Food and Drug were dedicated to it. There was a sense of dedication to jobs, to purpose, and I think that this came through and these leaders in industry, who were chiefly lawyers and high-minded men who didn’t particularly represent a special company, wanted an advantage here or an advantage there felt that this was the best way to run the Food and Drug.

Also I will say one thing. There may be an element of what you put in, yes, that’s the historian’s perspective. Give me sixty percent, give twenty for knowing the rules of the game, the people another twenty, and I’ll give you another twenty. If we break the tradition of naming
them from within, it was said during the Eisenhower administration, even among the giants of industry, what will happen when the next time we get one of those Democratic presidents. He might bring in a real reformer.

JHY: Mr. Mintner would be all right, but the next time, with the tradition changed, it might be a wild man.


JHY: I’m just kind of curious about what some of the elements were as you remembered them. So as a result of this, George Larrick became Commissioner and you knew him best of all of these commissioners?

WW: No. I really knew Mr. Crawford and I knew Dunbar long after Dunbar retired. We visited together. I knew his wife. No. I knew them all. It’s hard to say who I knew best. Larrick was in office longer, so I suppose I had more contact. He was the younger. He didn’t go to Florida. Dunbar, I think, just passed away recently.

JHY: Last year.

WW: Last year and he was in Florida the last ten years of his life. Campbell has been in Florida fifteen years. I would say though, if you won’t press me, that I was closer to him intellectually, I like to think. As a person, I probably was closer to Crawford.

JHY: I see. But you did know Mr. Larrick very well?

WW: Oh, yes. I’d like to bring another man into this picture before you…

JHY: I was just going to ask you more about Mr. Larrick.

WW: I’m going to talk about him some more, but I think I ought to bring you up-to-date or you historical perspective will be lost, if I go through Larrick and come all of the way back.
JHY: All right.

WW: I want to talk about a fellow named Billy Goodrich. Have you ever heard of his name?

JHY: Yes, indeed

WW: His name is William Bundy Goodrich. What does he mean to you?

JHY: Well, I think that he represents continuity and innovation…continuity of the legal tradition and innovation of the way the law might be applied.

WW: True.

JHY: A rather long stretch of time.

WW: Yes. And he represents much more than that.

JHY: All right, sir.

WW: And of this period, this continuity, you put your finger on it. Bill has been the most innovative and the most creative of the forces in the forward movement of regulatory processes. Now, while Crawford could conceptualize new regulatory thrusts and put them in the regulations, it was Billy that thought, in 1945, if we say this what I might have to say in court in 1955. He was the longest of the long haired.

Frequently very much maligned or attacked by people in industry, no less than about four or five months ago, shortly after let’s say after Nixon’s victory when we were writing about possible changes in Food and Drug, we said that industry had only two things against Goodrich; his competence and his mannerisms and Billy is the quick-thinking type, but Crawford…long, slow…, Crawford was a slow burn. You talked with Crawford and he gave you the long view, but slow. With Goodrich, you only had a couple of minutes. You asked the question and you’d get the answer just like that and it’s thought out. He’s thought of all the angles and everything
far ahead. This mannerism has irked an awful lot of people in industry, particularly the lawyers in industry and most particularly, the lawyers in industry can’t think as fast as he can…more than he has bested at various times. They’ve alleged that he’s tricky, that he’s this, and that he’s that. He’s been a fighter for the public interest as he saw it. He will stretch the law unashamedly, admittedly, to do the best he can to give it maximum protection as he sees it for the public. The public’s confidence in this area plus the mannerisms, are the reason that the people in industry, most of them, at any rate, are so opposed to Goodrich.

Now there are some people who are pretty good. Industry lawyers are really and they know their stuff. They don’t…you know the problem, don’t you? You have it on faculties. Don’t you have it with students? A really good student who knows he’s good, you don’t have as much trouble with him. He may disagree with you. Even if he disagrees, you don’t have it as you do an insecure lawyer, Mike Markel, who used to work for Food and Drug. He’s been out in industry for years. He gets along famously with Goodrich. They disagree on almost everything, almost every theory of the law, almost every principle but they understand each other and outside of the law framework, they’re good friends. But others in…they are almost sharp lawyers and more vituperation aimed at Goodrich and I attribute it myself to his confidence plus a mannerism. He’s got a mannerism that he does particularly if you see him at a cocktail party and he does not like some story we wrote. You talked about, you know, people not liking our stories and he’d just walk up to me and just let me have right then and there. But I respect him so and he has been, as you say, not only it’s more than a continuing force. It’s an innovating force; it’s the creative talent for using the law to innovate. Would that be a way of saying it?

JHY: Right. I would agree with that. No question. And you’re suggesting that he was very central to all of the ideas…. 
WW: After he came back from the war, not before, it was after Campbell’s period. Campbell didn’t really need a lawyer. When Campbell was in there, he was his own lawyer and he had some lawyers and they were hacks. I forgot the names of them. Willis was one of them…it doesn’t matter what their names were. A couple of them have written books, since, and some of the books of the Food and Drug case law bears the names of some of Goodrich’s predecessors, but they were real government hacks from way back and I know that when Bill came out of the government…of course, I’m talking about friends. I want to repeat this again for your…for future historians…you can discount because I’m talking. In spite of what Billy said to me and one time he almost slugged me at a cocktail party. I just think he’s a great guy. But when he came out of the service, a leading food manufacturer, the general counsel of which is a friend of mine, asked me if I would approach Billy to come to work for him. I did and he rejected it. He went back to the government. I suppose he’s had innumerable industry offers since.

JHY: What makes him run? Where did he get this great, well, it’s more than integrity, but this great push…?

WW: Drive.

JHY: Drive to innovate, as you suggest.

WW: You know, I think Billy would have been a great lawyer anywhere you’d have dropped him. You could put him in the FCC. It’d have made the FCC…what makes him run. I think he’s all lawyer, that’s all. Not all…he’s lawyer, he’s one of these unique new-type lawyers, you know, that came in with Roosevelt who could take the law and make it serve a purpose in public policies. Before the Roosevelt era, government lawyers didn’t have the feel that law was an instrumentality of public policies.
JHY: Right. But that it should be done.

WW: Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).

JHY: That he should live on the Civil Service salary and all that indicates that there is some sort of moral purpose, it seems to me.

WW: He didn’t have the moral purpose of Crawford. I think it’s purely the thrill of making law.

JHY: So that it’s an aesthetic…

WW: Aesthetics not the word. Let’s find a better word. Let’s you and I work on words here.

JHY: All right, sir.

WW: It’s not aesthetic. It’s a drive, I suppose, it can be a consuming drive like other people…like a corporate executive…why does a corporate executive who’s making as much money as he can possibly use still want to make mergers and things like that? It’s the drive, I guess, to make the instrumentality of business in the commercial world do something.

JHY: I would call that aesthetic.

WW: Well…we won’t debate our definition of aesthetic.

JHY: You mentioned him right as we got to Larrick. Do you think that he played a more significant role in Mr. Larrick’s administration than he did in Mr. Crawford’s and Dr. Dunbar’s?

WW: No I mentioned him only there because of the longer period of time in which Larrick had the job that if I went through the whole Larrick era, I think I said to you earlier, then I’d have to go all of the way back to pick Goodrich up and I was afraid that your history students years from now, if they bother to listen to this, would not get him back into perspective and it
would be very difficult for me to bring him back into the Dunbar-Crawford eras sufficiently enough.

JHY: But you can see that it might have been interpreted as a subtle indication but you don’t mean that…

WW: No. Thank you for your question and for clearing it up.

JHY: Right.

WW: We were going on to Larrick but through all this underneath there was Billy Goodrich. I understand that he can retire with full benefits in two years and I really don’t know what’s going to happen. One of the things about Billy is that he’s been alone. He’s worked a prodigious worker, and he’s done a lot of it himself and I do not know that he’s trained a successor and I don’t know that he could ever be a successor to Goodrich and it was just brought home to me last week that he may be nearing the possible age of retirement and I don’t know what would happen. Now there are, as I’ve said, some real lawyers in the industry handling outside who are good. If you’re good, you don’t mind Billy Goodrich. And I think they, too, wonder what will happen to the forward movement of the quality of Food and Drug law.

JHY: I see that.

WW: I wanted to bring that up that he was…I should say that Billy was closer to Crawford, too, than he was to Larrick, but Larrick would never do anything without Billy and there have often been times when there’ve been periods when people wondered whether Billy wouldn’t want to be the commissioner. He has always said that he didn’t want to be the commissioner. This is what leads me to believe that his motivation that you were speaking of is in the direction of being “the” lawyer. This is a man that wanted to make a law a living instrument.
JHY: Not power.

WW: I think there’d be some different evaluations among some people in industry. Mine would probably be a minority dissent.

JHY: Right. Well, what were George Larrick’s strengths as commissioner?

WW: Larrick’s strengths as commissioner were these; one, he just knew that the Food and Drug Administration upwards and backwards, across the board. He’d know the people. I will say this that Crawford for all his lack of conviviality and he wasn’t that much of a puritan when he enjoyed a drink; Crawford and Larrick got the habit of going across the country and visiting district stations and so on and played poker. And in his regulatory and legislative dealings, Crawford was very much the poker player. Now, George first knew the people. Next he knew the mechanisms. He knew the mechanisms from top to bottom. Third, he believed in Food and Drug. In other words, if you consider the campus, the college esprit de corps that I spoke of, George believed in it and he did everything he could foster it and he thus knew all of the workings all around and he emerged with an effort to carry forward…

Now, we lost one stream…I started out and if I were doing a master’s thesis for you, Doctor, I would not have lost this theme, the progression of the regulatory thrust. Do you remember that? That Campbell did certain things and Dunbar was stopped by the war, and Crawford picked it up and Larrick started to resume. But Larrick was a great realist, too. He had lived through the five-year fight; he knew the power of the industry in Congress; and he was a great believer that there was a time for everything—the timing is the most important thing in the regulatory thrust. Well, he started to try to move Food and Drug forward.

By this time, you see, the pharmaceutical industry had emerged in what we called its golden era of medical discovery…no reference to Dr. Pierce’s product that has sprung up which I
think is in your book. If you don’t…I have an original copy of one of the first Dr. Pierce’s books. But Larrick, too, found difficulty getting money from Congress. We were in the Eisenhower years when “don’t rock the boat” was the best possible advice in the world. Now the industry was on its way. The Saturday Evening Post every other week carrying the Steve Spencer story of the great miracles, biochemical discovery, and they were miracles. There’s no doubt about it that there are millions of people alive today who wouldn’t be alive today if it weren’t for the ten to fifteen year post war discoveries of the pharmaceutical industry. And as a result, Larrick encountered more opposition from industry because of his effort to move the regulatory ball forward. Now the curious thing—he was more like them. He went to their meetings more frequently. He was not stand-offish like Campbell, or more dissident than like Dunbar or puerile like Crawford. He went to their meetings; he’d go deep-sea fishing if they had a convention. I’ve been aboard a boat where he and industry executives…he was totally fearless about his own integrity. He didn’t worry about that and he had it, there’s no question on that. But, everything was going wonderful in this world.

The food industry and its technology were going out like this…I wish you could put on tape how my hands are going out. You know…and the drug industry was the same. Cosmetic industry was booming and the world was wonderful. You remember the fifties? Or do you?

JHY: I think so.

WW: And he found it difficult to get more money. He encountered greater opposition in many of the regulatory thrusts that he sought to initiate. And some of them…alas, now, were some things that were credited to Goddard by some of the crusading writers as you read in the newspapers. They don’t know they were started by Larrick, like the full disclosure doctrine on package insert for all drugs. That was started in ’58 and ’59 under Larrick. But he did encounter
more and it was more difficult to get this thing moving. Also, the fifties were a pretty high era. It was hard to get new and young people into Food and Drug. I don’t want to be making historical observations here. I want to make observations in general, but you have to see the fifties as I do. I look at the fifties with the word McCall remember togetherness…everyone wanted security and that’s what we are suffering from now and no one wanted…the government didn’t have the same appeal. It was hard to get young chemists. Why should he go into the Food and Drug Administration into the Civil Service when he could go into Union Carbide and become a vice-president in five years or ten years or go to International Business Machines (IBM) or go somewhere else? So it became more difficult and Larrick bucked this difficult trend. Maybe he wasn’t forceful enough. I don’t know. He was not outwardly and because he was…he liked to be a well-met fellow. He was a member of the Press Club. He mixed with the newsmen as no other commissioner had done. As I said, he went to meetings…it may have been that he wasn’t forceful enough. But he didn’t succeed in this what developed in the sixties to be the necessities, that is, to get both more money for people and a new thrust, a really new thrust for the regulatory initiatives.

JHY: Well, now, in connection with each of these men, you’ve used the work “integrity”. No question about that. How much was the agency hurt in this respect, particularly in respect to the way that it was used by the Congress, by the Welch Case?

WW: Well, the Welch Case was, of course, what broke Larrick. He knew Welch and he was a friend of Welch and I want to say a word for Welch. We would not have the antibiotic industry of today or the antibiotics, the lifesaving drugs of today if it wasn’t for a man like Henry Welch. If, in 1946, when he came out of the war, (the antibiotics were in their infancy) we had put a repressive, regulatory, dottier of “i’s” and crosser of “t’s” over that industry, we would not
have what we have today. So, you have a balance of and a lot of bad things that have been described of both the industry and the era. I don’t know any way to prove it, but my hunch is that more lives were saved by having a dynamic man at the head of the antibiotic field than a repressive bureaucrat. The Welch problem was that Welch identified himself and the regulatory agency with the growth of the industry, no so much the industry as an industry, but the growth of the science of life-saving drugs and he participated in that growth. He wasn’t content to be the “no-man” or the “holder-back” of the boys. He encouraged them. He even did some of the research himself and therefore, when it came out, and I don’t want to re-argue the Welch Case here, I will say this, I used to read his antibiotic journal. I knew it very well. I knew him well. I think any historian who would go back and review the regulatory period of Welch and everything he wrote in the journal which later became his downfall because of the money involved in it, I don’t believe they could find, absent human error, any judgment that sold the public down the river or any failure to administer the law in the public interest or with integrity.

JHY: So that is what the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee concluded.

WW: Well, I didn’t know that. Yes, I remember now. They did. I’m more impressed with the fact that I can prove it.

JHY: Right. Sure.

WW: I just wanted to tell you that little story about the other thing. I don’t think it should be published.

JHY: Sure.

WW: I think that it wasn’t only the Welch matter. I think it was the entire Kefauver hearings. As Kefauver started out, of course, on an anti-trust, anti-monopoly price thing, it became apparent fairly early on that he would end up only with a regulatory statute if he got
anything at all out of it. And therefore, it became necessary for him (a) to jump on Food and Drug or to jump on industry for doing things which people would then say, “How come Food and Drug let them do it?” Now, we were coming out as I’ve said earlier…15 years of great progress. And the industry had blossomed; the regulatory agency had not been allowed to keep abreast. Remember why Crawford retired? Because he wasn’t able to get enough money for the right kind of people he felt to keep abreast of technological developments in both the food and…don’t think the food industry is so completely clear and they’re getting their comeuppance now, even such things as questioning monosodium glutamate and the day before…last week’s hearings Senator McGovern’s hearing. But all of this technology without enough people and enough money to keep abreast of it was bound to leave some things. Then given the Senator out to make a case against an industry and anytime you make a case against an industry that is governed by a regulatory agency closely in Washington, you’re automatically making the case against the regulatory agency. So, it is my feeling that it is not only the Welch thing but it is the most dramatic thing that you can point your finger at.

JHY: The image of the agency which had a very good image right at the time when it was going to be hit, and therefore weakened it. Is that the idea?

WW: That was the idea. As I said, he was the apostle of the college. I don’t know, but you’re a Kansas man, Clarke Kerr and I were in San Francisco, they had the first things at Berkeley and six months earlier I hear Clarke Kerr deliver the finest lecture in the world on what college administration need to do to bring colleges, universities, into tune with the students. I heard him deliver it at George Washington University here and I’m a worshipper of Clarke Kerr. I went out there to California for a board meeting of the Mental Health Association. I opened the paper Sunday morning and here they were revolting in 1964 against Kerr and it was the last man
in the world it should happen to. He was the apostle, as I saw it, of bringing the universities into
the modern era. He was the...his whole life...his whole official regulatory program and
everything was based upon Food and Drug as a kind of college spirit, esprit de corps, and here
one of his key men and a friend of his became the target. So I think this broke Larrick’s spirit as
well as Food and Drug’s image that you speak of. And together, from then on until Larrick left
and he wanted to leave much sooner. I can tell you this. I have a copy of his first resignation
letter to Celebrezze. It was one year before he was allowed to leave. Celebrezze was the HEW
secretary during this time and why in the...

JHY: Why did he want to leave? Was it...

WW: Well, he had reached retirement age and he didn’t have to take it...oh, he was sick
often. Larrick had tremendous high blood pressure and he had a pulmonary ailment and he had
been in and out of the hospital. He was sick; he didn’t have to work; his wife didn’t want him to.
Celebrezze asked him to remain because Celebrezze wanted a judgeship and he told him that
quite candidly and he said that he did not want the job to become vacant as he wanted no
trouble...all Celebrezze wanted during that year nine months before he was named a judge, was
to get that judgeship. And so he asked Larrick to stay on. Larrick then subsequently retired
about three months after Celebrezze was replaced. I have something interesting to show you. I
have this copy of the initial letter of resignation right here. I thought I’d frame it...well, you
know.

JHY: What’s the date of it?

WW: It was dated well before his...July, 1965...”you will recall our conservation on
last February 12 when I asked after forty-two years of employment in Civil Service to relinquish
my responsibility as Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration at your earliest
convenience. You suggested that we defer the matter until August. To this, I readily agreed. For personal reasons I will retire on December 27, 1965.” It has two more paragraphs. This letter is dated July 3, 1965 to Secretary Celebrezze. It refers to a discussion on February 12 when he wanted to retire when Celebrezze asked him to not do so until August. You recall that Celebrezze, I think, got his judgeship in September.

JHY: Well, it was certainly December that Mr. Larrick did retire. Do you remember that?

WW: Yes, one year later. In case you want to see the documentation, here it is.

JHY: Yes, sir. I speak for the record that I hold within my hands.

WW: You could of course; question, but I didn’t fight this…

JHY: If so, you pilfered some stationery from the Food and Drug Administration.

WW: Right. Larrick, he knew what happened and felt that someone else should carry on and I think that…

JHY: Did he tell you at this time whom his choice would be?

WW: Larrick always hoped that he could continue the in-house, let’s call it, in-FDA tradition. This was not possible and friends of Larrick told me so as nicely as they could. It was not possible because you remember I spoke of the duos that were always down the line. Larrick was the only one that did not have one. There’s a very fine man and a very fine, much maligned man, Winton Rankin, who was Larrick’s top deputy and has not remained as Goddard’s top deputy and also continues now, but Rankin did not…he was not a Larrick, a Crawford, a Dunbar. He was a very valuable man and is still in his role, but in a trouble situation, he just lacked the spark of leadership, I guess you’d say. You know him, don’t you?
JHY: Yes, I know him. John Harvey was a deputy Commissioner for the longest period of time.

WW: And he was the Larrick…I misquote myself…yes, you’re correct and I’m…this is what makes history wonderful. They call you to account. Right…but you see Harvey was older than Larrick. Therefore, or at the same age as Larrick, therefore, I jumped Harvey and said there was really no duo where one was ready to step…there was no line of succession…the duo didn’t include the line of succession and I had to jump Harvey to get to Rankin but…and I was knocking Rankin out of the thing where Rankin didn’t get…but he hoped to get…

JHY: In the event that John Harvey administrated while he was there before he retired, played something of the same role for Mr. Larrick.

WW: He did. But administratively, yes, they had a duo, but the duo was not set up to create the line of succession. Yes, I’m glad you brought that up. You’re wonderful.

JHY: Well, I had just a feeling that…

WW: Yes, I misquote…, I jumped over Harvey…No, and Harvey never had a chance. If it had been for six months or a year, in a quieter, easier era we might…the HEW secretary might have done that. He too was sick. But George was sick. Larrick was sick. He was on the last…I forgot exactly when his illness began, but the last four or five years in office, he has tremendous high blood pressure. He was on high dosages of the blood pressure reducing drug and he had a recurring pulmonary infection. His wife urged him to quit and I remember at a goodbye party for Dr. Klaus. You remember the fellow I said had been with Dunn’s group and merged into the old Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Association (PMA). When he left PMA I guess it was ’63 or something, we gave a little goodbye party for Klaus at the house and Larrick came and Mrs. Larrick who is a find lady, took me off to the side and asked me if I couldn’t do
what I could to get George to quit then, because of health. Now, she was not speaking of any of his governmental problems. Somewhere along the line in there she had come into some money and I think George had inherited some money and here was a man who spent six weeks at one time, I remember, and four at another in a hospital trying to pull his blood pressure down. I looked upon that as a true wife’s reaction. What wife wouldn’t want her husband to quit?

JHY: So that he ran into trouble quickly and …

WW: Not too quickly. He did a pretty good job until was it ’60 or ’61…’60 was when the Kefauver thing came up.

JHY: Right.

WW: But he didn’t run into trouble, he was able to make a program work.

JHY: That first Citizens Advisory Committee that you say had been Mr. Crawford’s brain child.

WW: Correct, sir.

JHY: Made certain comments, the second one which you criticized, came along, in effect said that FDA had not done what the first one told them they should do. Now …

WW: That isn’t what they said. That isn’t what I was objecting. They may have said that…I think you’re right. What I object to was that they began…they reflected…Peak criticism and there’s one paragraph and they’re saying that former inspectors and lawyers should never become the head of Food and Drug. Do you remember that one?

JHY: Yes.

WW: You’re a historian really. Give me the footnotes.

JHY: The main business was that there had been inadequate scientific competence at the…
WW: But this was in the heyday of industry and the industry thought, this is what I think would have been for the industry. You only have to look at the National Academy of Science’s handling of the drug efficacy study to find out that industry is now getting its reward. Industry dominated the Second Advisory Committee. They thought…now remember I said earlier in the heyday of industry they gave Larrick more difficulty. They spent three years to oppose regulations.

JHY: Right.

WW: Alright. They got the idea if we could just get some scientists in the Food and Drug, we wouldn’t have all of these regulations and these fetters and these things which Congress later said Larrick was holding back with the Food and Drug. They thought they were being held back too much and they said “if we could just get some of these campus boys in here, they’d let us go and do anything we darned well pleased.” Well, now they found out that this ain’t so.

JHY: And so this was why you are criticizing the…

WW: With the Secretary, I used ink for emphasis. And that’s why I criticized him, yes. That doesn’t help Larrick’s inability to get a program going. But I used it…I used the Second Citizens Advisory report, not the part that you read, but the parts that I read, in proof of my statement that industry was riding high, wide and handsome, not yet having been hit in the Hill, through that, even through Larrick’s era, which was later criticized of being too soft, was too hard for them and they felt they could do better if they could only get a bunch of professors from the campus to run it.

JHY: Now, what you’ve said makes me think of one question in a kind of a roundabout way. You said, in effect, criticizing industry for…
WW: Gee whiz, and I thought earlier you said that we had sold out to industry.

JHY: No, I was quoting a commentary. You’ve been criticizing industry in this period and you earlier complimented Billy Goodrich for a kind of imagination in application of the laws in the public interest as he saw it and yet, if I did read your attention correctly in the Kefauver period, you didn’t give him credit for the kind of thing you just gave Billy Goodrich credit for at a time when industry needed somebody perhaps to rein them in. What about his motivation? Is it all that pro-politics? Right. You’d like to kind of wrap up your impressions of George Larrick before we turn to Senator Kefauver?

WW: That’s correct. Kefauver of course, is an event in the Larrick era, but I think that the Larrick era needs an evaluation from a much broader perspective. As I said earlier, while he got more…Larrick inherited the problem from Crawford from the tremendous growth in the industries and the technology that Food and Drug regulated and he was unable in the Eisenhower administration and in the “easy days” of the fifties to get either the money or the manpower. By “easy days” I mean not just politically but the easy era that prevailed in the entire country, get the money and the man power to keep up with this vast technology.

At the same time, the industries flush with their triumph in post-war scientific discovery and life-saving drugs, for convenience became stronger in their effort to oppose the forward thrust of regulations. This was the situation when Kefauver emerged on the scene to destroy the golden era and the gee whiz image of the pharmaceutical industry. Larrick suffered from all of these so that the administrated suffered from all of these problems then compounded by the most intensified type of public scrutiny in headline attention than any regulatory agency has received in this country in my memory. Not even the Federal Communications Commission in days of the demonstrated phoniness of the $64,000 and other giveaway shows received that kind of
intensified attention over such a long period of time. Kefauver initially opened by attacking the
industry and not the Food and Drug.

But one of the things that both industries and regulatory agencies sometimes forget is that
they are really inseparable in the public mind and if you attack an industry and make a case
against a regulatory agency that watches it and vice versa. So, all of this compounded to make
Larrick’s job an almost impossible one and also I do believe insured the appointment of someone
from outside of the Food and Drug to try and take over and make, get a fresh start and get the, as
the late President Kennedy said, get the country going again. Get the agency going again.

In addition, in the Larrick era his deputy was his same age and was not hardly a good
candidate to succeed him and the next one in line was a very capable man, one whose leadership
qualities didn’t show through and in a way was apparent enough to make one believe that he
could get an agency going again.

JHY: Now, Senator Kefauver came at a very strategic time or created a time. How are
you going to take the percentages and throw his motivation out? Crusader with the public
interest really in mind, or a political figure trying to seek an issue that would make him or keep
him in the Senate or if it didn’t elevate him into the White House. Have you read that story in
Washington?

WW: Well, I didn’t know. You know, trying to judge people’s motivation is difficult
thing.

JHY: It’s impossible.

WW: Impossible. I don’t like for people to judge mine. I have to accept it as people in
my position do. It’s hard to sort Kefauver out. He was a very unusual person. Quite bright;
drank a lot and he had a lot of habits that in years gone by we would have considered bad and I
never did know or never have had enough information to judge the degree of his dedication to the public interest. I think he got…and this happens not only in his case. I can…look, Senator Dodd is a leading crusader on Capitol Hill against a gun…for adequate gun control and be against juvenile delinquency. You historians are better at that than I am. Kefauver got himself something that made headlines. He had to run again for the Senate. A senator never knows when the lightning is going to strike or when enough headlines are getting him into the Presidential race. He had been a Vice-Presidential candidate. He, in a sense, struck pay dirt and just kept digging or thought he struck pay dirt. Now, I’d like…

JHY: But you also implied earlier that somebody was needed along this time to do something that would shock regulations into a better posture, vis a vis to watch growth of industry, didn’t you?

WW: Yes, but that could have been a good Food and Drug administrator or an active HEW secretary. It didn’t necessarily mean to come from the Hill.

JHY: No, I know I didn’t need to, but I was just wondering if you would deny Kefauver a sincerely creative role.

WW: I wasn’t denying him a role.

JHY: Right.

WW: Now, I’d like to say you asked about why I’ve been critical of the industry’s attitude toward regulations. I don’t think the industry recognized…I don’t think it recognizes the identity of its interest…itself, selfish interest, if you want to put it that way, with the regulatory agency. And if you have a strong regulatory agency, the industry’s going to be better off. I just don’t believe they recognize. I don’t think anyone…they ever will because it’s not within human
nature. The corporate executive wants to do the best he can for his company and he doesn’t see it in that perspective. I think men like Hoge saw it and Dunn and back there.

But getting down to the question you asked earlier, I’m glad that you brought it up again, because I’ve been waiting for this. You spoke earlier that in reading some of our writings of the Kefauver hearings, it didn’t seem like we felt that he was a knight in the white hat on a white charger coming down the pike.

JHY: I don’t think…

WW: That’s true. I want to talk about that. I agree with your assertion and I hate to say accusation. You know, in this news field in the Washington scene as you…particularly if you’re doing an in depth job in any area and this could be as true in the area of air and water pollution, power or any of the other hot areas of regulation activity is doing. A newsman and an editor can do one of two things: one, he can “sell out” and I don’t like to use the expression that people do about me so I might as well use it about others. You can sell out to the Congressional investigators, as they call it and that’s an easy way. You can get a hell of a lot of news. They’ll feed you stories; they’ll give you tips; they’ll give you secret documents in advance; you’ll know what’s going on; you’ll get a lot of hot stories that everybody wants to read; they use you as just as a lot of people use the press. Sometimes I think you use them properly. I have no objections to that, but the trend in journalism, if I can criticize my own craft, has been and is one in which I make speeches at our own professional societies about has been to be spoon-fed by the investigators from the Hill.

Now, Kefauver was not the first that this has happened and our record has been cleared. We’ve had a fight with Fountain and we had a knock down and drag out fight with Hubert Humphrey whom I’d known personally since he first came to town. But, we’ve always taken the
view that you look upon Congressional investigators in this new journalistic role and in the balance of power functions of various elements of government and people who watch government. You look on them just the same as you look upon anybody else and you’re as cynical and you’re skeptical about their motives as you can and if you catch their foot slip or you think you do, you write with hostility about them and you write critically.

Otherwise, I feel that in the…since the McCarthy hearings of the fifties, unless some journalists do not take that position for Congressional investigators, we’re in danger of having the entire country dominated by Congressional investigators at various time and various phases of activity.

Give us a smart enough man, either a knight in shining armor or a Mephistopheles, it doesn’t make a darn bit of difference. So, we do in this office…we do not go whole hog for them. We’re critical of Nelson when we felt that Kefauver’s figures were wrong. When Dr. Blair’s figures fell off base, and if you read the record closely, you’ll see that there were corrections. Sometimes we were wrong in thinking that they were wrong. Other times, they were wrong. We used to have a daily, you know, on his hearings, the Senator read The Pink Sheet before he started his second day hearings, the next day’s hearings every morning. He’d frequently read soft answers and all that. I think this give and take is healthy and I’m not ashamed of…oh yes, I’m always ashamed of something we wrote as we look back. A journalist does not like historians who need not ever be ashamed of everything that was ever written.

JHY: It’s a wonderful position.

WW: Well, we make mistakes and you can cut some of this out…but I’m not ashamed of the fact that we looked as critically at Kefauver as we looked at other things and when we
thought he was wrong or his figures were wrong. Chiefly, his figures. I remember several times in his figures when he thought he was giving a distorted picture.

I’d like to give, if you have a moment before I go, two little stories, one on Larrick and one on the Kefauver thing.

One of the things that I wanted to say about Larrick which frankly he had more than most of the commissioners and certainly had much more than Goddard. You haven’t asked me about Goddard and we’ll have to leave for another time. Goddard did a job that was required in his day, but he left the running of the…the administrative part of the agency in shambles. The job was all public relations all on top. But Larrick had a great sense of timing or he, at least, spent a great deal of his thought on the proper timings, forward thrust of regulatory activity and it maybe that he moved too slowly. It may well be that he didn’t recognize the new climate that was created by Kefauver, but prior to Kefauver.

I have written on a number of people in Food and Drug and some of the things we’ve written reflected prior to the thalidomide incident; I had known that there was a man trained by Crawford in the writing of regulations by the name of Julius Hauser. He was an expert in drug regulation and now about to retire. I had known since 1951 that he had been trying various drafts of stricter regulations dealing with the use of experimental medicines prior to their clearance through the new drug application process.

Now, before the thalidomide incident all you really had to do was to label a drug, “For experimental use only” and you could almost ship it to anybody providing you got a signed statement of some kind. I kept questioning him over and over. I remember calling one top Food and Drug official one day and saying to him in about ’58 or 59, “why don’t you get Julius to haul those regulations out of the top drawer? You’re going to need him.” Larrick had the feeling and
we talked about it over a period of time that in that particular area, I think he was right. The Food and Drug stepped out and fought to impose the kind of regulations that became immediately viable after the thalidomide incident. It was felt, prior to that, that the American Medical Association (AMA) would crush Food and Drug.

That the doctors would rise up in this country and say that no government agency can say that no doctor or any doctor is not competent to administer even experimental therapy if given the proper instructions and told to write the results down. I agree with Larrick. Maybe he was not brave enough in trying it, but prior to the incident, unfortunately, I just don’t think it would have worked even I myself had asked for it or not asked but in private discussion had suggested that this was the thing that needed to be done. Even afterwards, even after the thalidomide incident and after the Javits amendments to the Kefauver Act which caused the patient to think that you had the AMA, the doctors, and you had even the research community rise upon wrath and they’re still angry. Some of them…how long is it now? Seven years later?

I made a speech before the Midwestern medical deans a couple of years ago in which I defended the investigation of drug regulations and the good doctors put me on the table and in a Q and A, question and answers. The evening session ran on for three and a half hours. They put me on the table and they carved my liver out. They answered me by attacking journalism and all its faults which I just admitted…that journalism had its faults.

But Larrick…I use that as an example…now his very sensitivity to the timing and the rightness of the forward thrust of regulatory activity may have made him a bit too timid. He may not have read the signs. Then, after Kefauver, as I said, I think his spirit was gone and his back was broken and he didn’t care to read the signs anymore.
Now, that is the one story that I wanted to tell and then on the other one where you talk about reading a Kefauver copy; as being anti-Kefauver, let me say that sometimes some good comes of these things. I remember the day that Kefauver attacked the oral anti-diabetic drugs, particularly one manufacturer of a company, the second major drug, not the top one. It made all of the headlines. Well, I wonder that evening as I was writing the lead…the staff wrote the running story of the hearing…but I wondered if any people reading in the headlines this politician’s attack on the scientific evidence for an oral anti-diabetic, not really getting the whole story, obviously couldn’t. This is a political forum, not a forum for testing scientific ideas. Wonder if anybody reading the headlines would, who was on this particular drug and whose life depended on continued maintenance dosages of the kind of…the kind of drug a diabetic uses, people might stop taking the drug and some people might get hurt. But we offered a little prize in our paper for anybody who could come forward with a bonafide case, we offered about $500. Well, some cases came forward. We offered the $500, I think, for the first one. It turned out that an authenticated case came forward…was told by an official of the company that put out the drug and I didn’t feel that they deserved that.

JHY: Not your hard-earned money.

WW: Not my hard-earned money, but you know, there ought to be there still isn’t in all of this a flashing attack on medicine from some which are life-saving. There isn’t enough thought given as to whether a political forum is the place to test scientific ideas and merit and some of the copy which you probably designed, Mr. Historian, I don’t know what you’d call it…anti-Kefauver? Critical of Kefauver…was frankly designed to try to keep this thing into balance. For that, I have no apology. I’m sorry for all the mistakes we made and all the times that we were wrong.
JHY:  Well, thank you very, very much for your time and cooperation.

END OF INTERVIEW