HISTORY OF THE
U. S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

Interview between:
John A. Kedzior, Retired
Chief, Industry Guidance Branch
and
Fred L. Lofsvold
Food and Drug Administration
Monterey, California
June 12, 1982
INTRODUCTION

This is a transcription of a taped interview, one of a series conducted by Robert G. Porter and Fred L. Lofsvold, retired employees of the U. S. Food and Drug Administration. The interviews were held with retired F.D.A. employees whose recollections may serve to enrich the written record. It is hoped that these narratives of things past will serve as source material for present and future researchers; that the stories of important accomplishments, interesting events, and distinguished leaders will find a place in training and orientation of new employees, and may be useful to enhance the morale of the organization; and finally, that they will be of value to Dr. James Harvey Young in the writing of the history of the Food and Drug Administration.

The tapes and transcriptions will become a part of the collection of the National Library of Medicine and copies of the transcriptions will be placed in the Library of Emory University.
# TAPE INDEX SHEET

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**GENERAL TOPIC OF INTERVIEW:** History of the Food and Drug Administration

**DATE:** June 12, 1982  
**PLACE:** Monterey, CA  
**LENGTH:**

**INTERVIEWEE**  
**NAME:** John A. Kedzior  
**ADDRESS:**  
**FDA SERVICE DATES:** FROM 1939 TO 1974  
**TITLE:** Chief, Industry Guidance Branch

**INTERVIEWER**  
**NAME:** Fred L. Lofsvold  
**ADDRESS:** U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Denver, Colorado  
**RETIRED?** Yes

**TITLE:** (If retired, title of last FDA position)

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This is a recording in the FDA oral history series. We are interviewing today Mr. John A. Kedzior at his home in Monterey, California. The date is June 12, 1982, interviewer is Fred Lofsvold.

Lofsvold: Mr. Kedzior would you please briefly sketch your background when and where you were born, where you were educated and the various positions that you held with FDA during your career.

Kedzior: I was born in Newburg, New York in 1912. My parents moved to Syracuse, New York about a year later, and I lived in Syracuse the rest of my life, until I graduated from college, and got my first job with FDA. My schooling was in a parochial school in Syracuse, a vocational high school and then I attended the New York State College of Forestry at Syracuse University from 1933 to 1937. I got a degree as a Bachelor of Science with a major in Forest Entomology. After graduating from college, my first job was with the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine as a summer job in Idaho. Then another summer job in 1938, in Asheville, North Carolina, again with the same bureau, where I took an examination as a Junior Entomologist. After that I worked with the Forest Service in Rhode Island, on hurricane damaged timber. It was there that I received a letter from the Food and Drug Administration, asking if I was interested in a position with them. Eventually in August of '39 I reported for duty in Atlanta, Georgia
as a Junior Food and Drug Inspector. After my appointment to Atlanta, I spent 3 months there and was transferred to the New York District, again as a Junior Food and Drug Inspector. I remained in New York until February or March of 1942. At that time I was transferred to Waterbury, Connecticut, as a Resident Inspector to replace Inspector Fred J. Delmore who went into the service. I remained in Waterbury until 1950, was transferred back to the New York District, remained in New York until 1954, then was transferred to Louisville, Kentucky as a Resident Inspector. At that time I opened the Louisville residency and it was important that I work cooperatively with a Mrs. Sarah Vance Dugan who was a personal friend of Mr. Larrick. That was my primary objective in that position. I spent two years in Louisville and in 1956 went to Washington, D.C. for a 6 month tour of duty. In February of 1957 I was transferred to Seattle, Washington as Chief Inspector. I remained in Seattle until 1963 and was then transferred to Washington D.C. where I remained until my retirement in 1974. In Washington, I held various positions ranging from a Branch Chief of the Programs Branch that oversaw activities of our field investigations to Branch Chief of an Industry Guidance Branch which worked with industry to promote voluntary compliance.

Lofsvold: John, how did you first hear about FDA, as a place to work?
Kedzior: Well, the first time I heard that there was such a thing as FDA, was in a letter I received from Mr. Wharton, Chief of the Eastern District asking me if I was interested in a position with the Food and Drug Administration, because my name was one of several submitted to them by the Civil Service Commission. My name was selected from a register of the Junior Entomologist Civil Service Examination, which I had passed the previous year. So after receiving the letter, I decided that I wanted to know something about the organization. I checked certain sources of information and found that there was a Resident Inspector located in Providence, Rhode Island. I received the letter from Wharton while I was working for the Forest Service and I was stationed in Hope Valley, Rhode Island. So I called the resident in Providence, I can't recall his name at this point, and he agreed to see me. A few days later I drove there and talked with the individual, asked him about the organization and from his description I felt it would be something that would probably provide me with a good full-time position, because at that time jobs were hard to find. My chances of obtaining a permanent position with the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, at that point were nil. So after talking with the individual and asking for directions, on how to get to our New York District Office, I corresponded with Mr. Wharton and told him that I would be interested in the job. Later we made arrangements for an
interview with Mr. Wharton in the New York office. I proceeded to borrow a car from a friend of mine in Hope Valley, and drove to New York City for the first time in my life. Incidentally I had only learned to drive the previous year. So the experience was very exhilarating, and very nerve-racking.

My interview with Mr. Wharton and Mr. Ole Olsen, who was there at the same time, was rather frustrating. Mr. Wharton had an unusual ability to discomfit people. He would sit at his desk with his feet upon it, he would stare at the individual through his glasses and the one eye that he could see through, and his desk was piled high with papers as if he hadn't touched them in a week. But his questioning was very, very much to the point and to an individual who was not accustomed to being questioned in that way, it was rather nerve-racking. I managed to answer many of the questions he asked, but when it came to the point where he tried to put me in the position of an inspector, who had come into a store and wanted to inventory the merchandise and other things and that was putting me in a position of an inspector right there in the office made me very, very nervous. I really wasn't very comfortable and I felt that in answering, I sort of made a fool of my self. It just didn't seem to go over with Wharton or with Olsen. But I was at least honest, and at the end of it I
said, "Now look Mr. Wharton, you know I've never done this before, I don't know how to go about it, you're putting me at a disadvantage. You can't expect me to answer the way that you feel an inspector should answer because I'm not an inspector." And of course in the process I used some words that were not exactly the type that you'd use in company...in other words I swore a lot. And Wharton asked me, "Do you always talk this way?", and I said, "What way?" He said, "Well, do you always use curse words?" and I said, "Well, I use them quite a bit." He said, "Well, you know if you got this job you couldn't talk that way". I said, "Well, I could manage to do without it, if necessary." It's a fact, this is what went on.

So when we finished with the interview, believe it or not, I was convinced that I wasn't the kind of a man for this job and that they felt that way too. So before I left the office I turned around and I talked to both of them and I said, "Gentlemen, when I came in here you had a certain impression of me. Now that you've talked to me for a couple of hours, you have another impression of me. Would you mind telling me what that is?" Well, they hemmed and hawed, but they eventually said, "Well, we don't feel that it would be appropriate to make a snap judgment right now, we have to think about it." When they said that I was sure that it meant there was no job for me there. So that evening after I got back to Hope Valley, I sat down and I wrote them a letter.
In that letter, I told Mr. Wharton that I wasn't interested, that after talking with him and listening to the type of work I'd have to do, listening to the travel I'd have to perform, that I didn't feel it was the kind of work I was really capable of doing well and I told him that I felt he should take my name off the register, as an applicant for the job. Two or three days later I get a telegram telling me, "Not to be so hasty, that I am under consideration for the job, and would I reconsider." So, what to do, I thought to myself? I am telling this guy that I don't want the job. He is telling me, "don't reject it yet." So I sent him a telegram and I told him, "I will discuss it with my fiance and I will let you know." I was going to see my fiance in another week or two and before I took the job I would discuss it with her and if she was agreeable, I would then contact Wharton and let him know that I am interested. But I wouldn't take the job if she said that she wouldn't like for me to be away from home, or this or that. As it happened she said, "If you get the offer, take the job, I'll go wherever you go." So I notified them. A week or two later I got a letter, okay, I got the job. It is just like when you offer something to a youngster, he doesn't want it, but if you try to take it away he wants it. So that is how I got the job as a Food and Drug Inspector.

Lofsvold: Then when you reported to Atlanta, what kind of early training did you receive?
Kedzior: We received a little bit of indoctrination at the District office from Mr. McManus who was the Chief of the Station. I believe they called them Stations at the time.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: He was Chief of the Station and from Mr. Ed Holmes who was the Chief Inspector and from Shelby Grey who was one of the more experienced Inspectors located at that Station. Most of our training in Atlanta involved on-the-job experiences with the older inspectors working there. I made field trips with an inspector by the name of Simms, who was an old timer. I spent a little time in Jacksonville, the Resident Office with the resident there. I spent some time with Shelby Grey on a field trip and the field trips involved a variety of things like creameries, pesticide surveys on cabbage and cauliflower.

Lofsvold: For lead and arsenic?

Kedzior: For lead and arsenic, yes. Collecting samples of cosmetics and drugs in wholesale warehouses, and this basically was the type of training we received.

Lofsvold: Did you work at all in the shellfish industry?

Kedzior: No, no not at all, not while I was in Atlanta. We did meet with one of the inspectors who was working on shellfish and his name was Winton Rankin.

Lofsvold: He was one of the seafood inspectors?

Kedzior: He was one of the seafood inspectors, at the time. I never worked on shellfish down there. That was the basic
training we received in Atlanta. However, we were told, in Atlanta, that at some future time our training would involve a concentrated two week course at the New York Station Office. This occurred after I was transferred to New York. The training program took place in January of 1940, it was a two week program. All of the new inspectors that had been hired in the Eastern District during the previous six months or so were there. There were about 20-25 of us. That training session consisted of a concentrated course on the law, legal actions, inspection techniques, and sampling techniques. It involved visits to such places as the wharfs in New York, the various produce places in New York, the auction market in New York where produce is auctioned off to the highest bidders, visits to cosmetic plants, a drug plant, sampling procedures in such things as frozen eggs, frozen cube butter. I think that's basically the training that we received.

Lofsvold: Did Ole Olsen conduct the school as Chief Inspector?

Kedzior: Well, he was one of the principal speakers as well as Mr. Wharton. Mr. Lowe, who was the Chief of the New York Station was one of the lecturers. Then some of the inspectors that were working in New York were lecturers, Fred Delmore, Johny Cain, I can't remember if Eddie Palmer was one of them or not but Eddie Palmer was one of the old time hard hats of the FDA. He was a great character, but everybody loved him.
He could tell an awful lot of good stories about what went on in the old days in Food and Drug when you didn't have the law to back you up. You had to do it on your own. Charlie Greenlee was one of the instructors, and Charlie Hyak.

Lofsvold: He was one of the early drug inspectors.

Kedzior: Oh yes, so was Greenlee, they were both there.

Oh, yes, one of the things we did in that program, towards the end of the two week session, the new inspectors all got together and they decided that they were going...well we knew there would be a banquet, but we decided as a part of the banquet we were going to put on some skits about our experiences as new inspectors. The skits involved such things such as sampling cabbage for pesticide residues in the middle of the night, calling somebody about a problem in this and having them hold the merchandise until it could be seized a few days later, and our experiences with our first interview for the job. These were conducted by the new men and some of the parts that were taken involved Inspector Caldwell from Atlanta taking the part of Ed Holmes. Caldwell was big and Ed Holmes was big. But for Caldwell to really look as big as Ed Holmes he had to stuff a couple of pillows under his shirt to really act the part. Lennington took the part of a new inspector who was being interviewed by Wharton and I took the part of Wharton. I used glasses that...I had to use glasses because Wharton used glasses. I couldn't use a glass eye but I made
do with what I had and I tried my best to imitate Wharton in the way he talked. For instance, he never said inspector he said "Inspec-Tor." That was his way of enunciating it. We had one hell of a good time, and would you believe that Wharton never took offense at the way we portrayed him in the skit.

I'd say that the training session that we had in New York was not only very important to our future and our career, it taught us a great deal, but we also had a hell of a good time doing it.

Lofsvold: Also you got to know everybody else that had started in the District and Stations.
Kedzior: We got to know all, we got to meet them and fraternize with all the new men who came in and that was one of the good parts about that program. It was something that I know later on we missed a great deal because nothing like that, to my knowledge, was held again. Not that comprehensive, not that well structured and not that enjoyable.

After the training sessions in New York, I continued my on-the-job training by making inspections and collecting samples with several of the older inspectors stationed in New York. I remember the first time I ever inspected a condom factory, where they manufacture latex condoms. It was in a plant in New Jersey. My instructor and associate at the time was Charlie Greenlee, who'd made many of these inspections.
The firm we inspected was one that had many problems with holes in condoms. We seized quite a few of their shipments. It was interesting to see how the product was actually manufactured. It's also interesting to note that the employees in the plant were all girls. The only men employed were in a supervisory capacity or management. It was all the girls that did the testing of the material or overlooked the testing of the material. Just to give you an idea of how these things are made. The liquid latex is kept at a certain constant temperature and density in terms of its liquid composition. They are kept in a long narrow vat and a tubular...well not exactly, it's made of hard plastic, it's a tubular form about an inch to an inch and a half in diameter, and about 8 inches to a foot long with a rounded edge, this is carried on a continuous belt and at one point the belt is passed over a section where these particular forms drop down, pass through the liquid in the tank, come out and are rotated constantly and are positioned upright. They pass through a...I think they pass through a chamber where they begin to solidify on the form and then come out and are rolled off by rollers that peel them back from the end toward the tip. I can't recall, somewhere along that line they are powdered to keep from sticking. I have a feeling that they were powdered while they are on the form before they start to roll them back. Then when they are rolled off, they are usually packaged. However, a sampling of
these is tested by the young ladies by putting them on another form that is similar in size, roll them back and air under pressure is forced into the condom and if it leaks it's rejected. Those that don't leak are passed. We found, in this particular plant, a tremendous stock of reject condoms stored in boxes. We suspected that these rejects would eventually find their way, by being salted in with good merchandise at the time of packing, for shipment because in our sampling operations we found rejects in an awful lot of shipments of condoms from this plant. So that's my experience with the condom business.

Losfvolld: You mean they knew about where we were drawing the line as far as tolerances for holes.

Kedzior: Well, they would try to fall below the tolerance that we had at that time, although we tried to keep the tolerance secret.

Losfvolld: They could feed in a few of these into each batch of good ones to get under our tolerance.

Kedzior: They did this. They probably ended up beating us at the game, because we obviously didn't sample all the shipments that they sent out, that's for sure. But that was, at that time, my time in New York, that was one of the major projects that the station had, because it was really a business in which the manufacturer was trying to pass off the bad stuff as much as he could.
Lofsvold: John, after these few years in New York in the early days, then I believe you were transferred to Waterbury, Connecticut.

Kedzior: Yes.

Lofsvold: One man resident post?

Kedzior: Yes. I was transferred there in February or March of 1942. It was a resident post that had been started just about 2 years before by Inspector Delmore, who was called into service because he was in the Reserves. About a month after I reported on duty, I received a telephone call from an individual in Hartford, Connecticut telling me that they were selling some contaminated food in a big warehouse in Hartford. He said that it looked like it was fire damaged merchandise or flood damaged merchandise. So I drove to Hartford and visited the store where the sale was going on and it was true, there was a tremendous amount of merchandise which was in a soiled, in a very badly soiled condition, cans, cartons, etc. none of it had been segregated. It was in really miserable shape, no effort was made to really weed out the good from the bad. I got in touch with the Health Department, and found out that the city health inspector had apparently given his okay to the sale of this merchandise. And obviously he didn't care very much whether it was going to be sold this way or segregated. Since the Health Department is the agency that we would normally go to, to embargo merchandise of this nature if it was
in violation of either their statutes or our statute, I thought I better get in touch with our district office. I talked with Mr. Lowe, Station Chief in New York. I told him about the situation, I said "We ought to seize these goods over here." He said, "Well, hold on a little bit now, don't be in too much of a hurry. Why don't you go over and talk to the health officer in charge of the Health Department in Hartford, talk to him about this, explain to him that the merchandise should be segregated before it is sold to the public and only the good merchandise in salable condition should be sold, and any cans that are puffed or badly dented or have no labels on them, packages that are wet, should be discarded." So, I did. I talked to the health officer in charge. He called in the inspector who had charge of the overall city inspection staff. The poor health inspector was really embarrassed and he was mad at me for having come into the city and disrupted what he felt was the city's prerogative to do what they thought was right. Well, anyway the place was closed down, the goods were sorted out, segregated and most of it was dumped and the remainder was then brought back for the sale. Well, there is a happy ending to it. Eventually we were on good terms with the City Health Department, but for awhile it was touch and go, it really was. There you go, first introduction, new man comes in, raises hell, when he doesn't even know what it's all about.
Lofsvold: It disturbs them.

Kedzior: Oh, it was a bad situation.

Lofsvold: At that time John did you cover all of Connecticut or was part of it covered from Boston?

Kedzior: No, part of it was covered from Boston by the Providence Resident Inspector. He covered the eastern half of Connecticut and I covered the western half of Connecticut. The Connecticut River was the dividing line.

Probably the thing that I remember most about my efforts in Connecticut was the excellent working relationship we gained with the State Food and Drug Commission, I think was their name. The Health Departments in New Haven, Bridgeport, and in Hartford, Connecticut. The Health Department in Waterbury wasn't very much, really. But the cooperation with the State Inspectors was excellent.

There's only one other aspect of my work in Waterbury that was a highlight in my mind, was the work that we did concerning adulterated olive oil. For about 2 years or so we had to pick up samples of blended oil in which olive oil made up anywhere from 5 to 20% of the blend. And we were finding some unusual results in the laboratory.

Lofsvold: Was this labeled as containing a percent of olive oil?

Kedzior: 5%, 10%, or 15% of olive oil.

Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: The label declared that it contained such and such a percentage of olive oil. The laboratory results showed that there was something going on that was wrong because the analytical results showed the presence of olive oil. But the organoleptic testing and other testing showed that there wasn't olive oil in there. So what happened, and I don't know how this came about, but the Food and Drug Office either in New York, it probably was in New York, some way or other learned that the olive oil industry in New York was using the services of a pharmacist who was an expert chemist. He had designed a method of using squalene to add to the oil blend which would replace olive oil. For the information of whoever is listening, squalene was the indicator that we used in identifying olive oil in a blend. It was a chemical indicator.

Lofsvold: It was one of the constituents of olive oil that we could test for and that figure would show the percent of olive oil in a blend.

Kedzior: That's right. We used squalene, that was the indicator for the presence of olive oil in there. Eventually we learned that the squalene was being purchased from Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York. When we learned that, arrangements were made with Eastman Kodak, on a confidential basis, to place a color indicator in the squalene, which we would then trace through samples collected and analyzed in our laboratory in New York to find out whether the squalene
shipments, which had been targeted or identified this way, were finding their way into distribution channels. So we continued sampling blends of olive oil. I was collecting samples of blends of olive oil from regular dealers in Connecticut for the next 6 months or more. Finally when we had enough samples examined and tested, we decided to make inspections of the oil packers in the New York District and check them out to see we could find any squalene and see what they were doing. I was one of the inspectors selected for the job. We worked in teams of two men and we were given assignments and we made simultaneous visits to the plants on a designated date to make our inspections. The plant that I visited was a small operation. It was actually part of a home and they were conducting it in a kind of a detached section on the property. He was one of the packers whose product was identified as containing squalene. During the investigation, Will Swain was with me on that inspection. During the inspection we learned that the packing operations were supervised by the son, while his father had been away visiting Italy, for several months. It eventually developed that the son was the one who was involved in the mixing of the batch of squalene mixture into the blended oil, instead of the father. But in the process of the investigation we had to some way or other make the individual aware that we knew what was going on. Well, I figured the only way we could do this is to let him
know that we knew what he was doing. When he asked how did we know, I said, "Well you know that squalene is the substance that we check for in olive oil, don't you?" He said, "Yes". I said, "you also...but what you may not know, is that squalene that comes from olive oil is not the same, it doesn't test the same way that squalene that comes from something else, it tests different." He said, "You're kidding." I said, "No, okay you go ask your friend, they will tell you." I was trying to get him to admit that he was using squalene, but he wouldn't bite. However, later on, when his father learned what the son had been doing, this was after we had completed our inspection, when the father knew what the son had been doing he forced the son to come in and give himself up and reveal what he was doing. That is what happened. So, we finally prosecuted some of those people, but would you believe that one of the leaders in that business, who was tried, we had a seizure contest on and he got away scot free. I don't know how he did it but he got away. That was one of the interesting jobs that I had in Connecticut.

Lofsvold: Were you able to bring some cases into court?
Kedzior: Some of them were prosecuted.

Lofsvold: Were you able to prosecute the fellow who was furnishing the squalene, the druggist?
Kedzior: I can't remember, but I think we prosecuted him too.

When the doctored squalene was shipped out of Eastman Kodak,
our inspectors were notified when the shipment was made, we noted the carrier, when it was due, where it was going, when it was due to arrive and then we had our inspectors in New York wait for the delivery so that we traced the shipment from Eastman to the source where it was going in New York. It was initially put into a warehouse, and then it was diverted from the warehouse to the supplier. What they were doing, was actually mixing the squalene in one particular place with oil and then supplying this mixture to all the blenders to mix in certain amounts to get a certain result. Oh, these characters were something else. Smart rascals.

Lofsvold: That olive oil business had been, for years, a big problem to us...

Kedzior: Well, essentially at that time during the war, olive oil was very scarce.

Lofsvold: Yes, and a great many people of Italian descent, in that area...

Kedzior: They had to have some oil.

Lofsvold: They wanted...

Kedzior: They wanted some olive oil in the mixture.

Lofsvold: Right.

Kedzior: They would prefer all olive oil but they could get at least some olive oil.

Lofsvold: I remember the stories years earlier about somebody discovering that teeseed oil would test like olive oil in
whatever test we were using at that time and they substituted teaseed oil for olive oil until Jack Fitelson came up with a test that would tell you when teaseed oil was present.

Kedzior: Right. Oh, Jack was a smart chemist. He was a great chemist.

Lofsvold: You mentioned that you had gone to Waterbury, replacing Inspector Delmore. Was that the Fred Delmore, who stayed in the Army, retired as a Brigadier General and came back to work with FDA later?

Kenzior: The same one, a very good friend of mine. The fact of the matter is when I first came to New York, from Atlanta, I stayed at his home for about a week until I found a place to live in New York. Then when we moved to Waterbury, my wife and I stayed with his wife, Kaz, and her two daughters in Waterbury, until we found a home.

Incidentally, in trying this case the defense lawyers were attempting to find out how we determined that squalene was being added to these blends of oil, because they felt there was some secret method that we had designed to identify the squalene, they knew of none. They tried, through the court, to get us to reveal what we actually had used in our method to detect the squalene. We would not, I really can't remember if we would not reveal it or whether the judge didn't insist on it in the long run, that we had used a coloring agent as an indicator in the squalene. This we wanted to keep secret. I suspect that we won out on that score.
Lofsvold: My recollection is, in the trial that there was a move to make us produce our analytical evidence before trial but the judge did not grant the motion.

Kedzior: Well, I think that's how it worked out.

In 1950 I was transferred back to the New York District. I was there until June of 1954. One of the significant cases I remember while in New York at this time involved a "Butterlegging" Operation. Now "butterlegging" is a term that we used for describing a product which simulates butter but basically is made up of margarine with some or no butter in it, but passed off as butter. The case I'm talking about involved a mixture of butter and margarine. We first learned about the presence of this mixture while the inspectors were conducting C.D.T. tests. These tests were designed to detect the melting point of butter, margarine or a mixture of the two. They were tested on a kit that was portable. This kit was designed by Johnny Guill one of the inspectors at the New York District. The kit was basically designed for use by inspectors when they conducted public eating place (P.E.P.) inspections of restaurants or similar places where butter was served to the public. Congress had passed a law which required the Food and Drug Administration to enforce the Oleomargarine Amendment to protect the dairy industry because they were concerned that oleomargarine would be used in place of butter without properly notifying the consuming public that it
was oleo and not butter. The places where this could occur most frequently would be in restaurants or other institutions where butter was served as patties or some other way without the original wrapper etc. on the container, so it was an individual serving. So for the inspector in the field to determine whether a restaurant was actually serving butter in a patty, or whether it was oleo, or whether it was a mixture, something had to be designed to test the product on the spot, instead of bringing it into the laboratory. So this kit was designed to do that in the field.

In the process of making routine inspections of restaurants, inspectors, where they had any reason to believe that maybe there was something other than butter being served, would routinely test the serving pieces. After we had been conducting these inspections and tests for about 6 months to 9 months we encountered some unusual results. When an inspector would find an unusual result on the test kit reading, he would collect a sample, which was then brought into the laboratory for more definitive testing. When we did this on these suspicious lots we found that this was in effect a mixture of oleo and butter. Once we determined that, we made some additional inspections to determine places where this was being sold or used. Then we began to make discreet inquiries, from whom they were buying the material. Well, we continued along this route for some time but really weren't getting anywhere.
We just didn't come up with any answers that would lead us to the source. In the process of these investigations I made an inspection of Best Foods Company in Bayonne, New Jersey. This was more in line with the regular inspection of the oleomargarine manufacturing operations and really had nothing to do with the investigation but, in making any inspection of an oleo manufacturer the inspectors in New York were advised to look for any indication that oleomargarine was being shipped to unusual outlets. We were told to look for any suspicious names on invoices of sale, to make a note of these. So I made an inspection of Swift and Company, for one, but they wouldn't reveal their shipping records, company policy. Made an inspection of Best Foods. Best Foods was distributing Nucoa Margarine, they were also selling bulk margarine too, to various distributors etc. In going through the invoices I made a notation of sales to unusual places. One of the unusual names was Bakers Supply Company, Newark, New Jersey. I made a note of it, so many cases, made sales about every 2 or 3 weeks etc. I made a note of it. I got back to the office a day or two later. Joe North was occupying the desk next to me in the office. I was talking to Joe about something or the other and mentioned that I'd been in Best Foods and Joe asked, "Did you get a look at their invoices?" I said, "Yes, I got a whole bunch of records here etc." So I showed him these records. And Joe had been involved in some of this
investigation on the other side. So he's going down the line, he says "Bakers Supply Company, that rings a bell." So then we start to look at the Bakers Supply Company and found out that their offices were in Newark, New Jersey. It was Rutstein's office but someway or another we found out that Sol Abramson was the one who was actually operating as the Bakers Supply Company out of there. Well, then we had a lead at who was buying oleomargarine in large quantities. Now we had to find out where this was going on, where were they mixing it, etc. Well, it took a little bit longer to find that out. By chance, Joe and I were making an inspection of a bakery and, I think this was in Newark. I have to backtrack a little bit. One of the cartons that had been found during the earlier investigation, was identified by a carton manufacturers' code. In our inspections of bakeries and other places where mixing goes on we were alerted to look for any carton that would have this code. So, now let's go back to the bakery that Joe and I were going to inspect, this bakery in Newark, New Jersey. Joe and I went into this bakery and were making a routine inspection, that's what we told them. And we proceeded to make a very thorough sanitary inspection but at the same time we were looking at empty cartons to see whether we could identify or find that particular carton packers code. Sure enough we did, we found the code. There were a whole bunch of cartons that were in the breakdown stage, you know where you put them
together and pack stuff in it. And these were bulk cartons, for bulk products. At the end of our inspection we began to question the fellow who owned the bakery. Our questioning began to get around to the cartons and pretty soon he was getting a little antsy about the direction that our questions were taking. He began to say, "Well, you fellows came in here looking at my plant, now you're asking me questions about something that's completely irrelevant." Well, we continued and finally we came right out and told him, "You know we've got good evidence that you've been involved in mixing oleo and butter here." Well, he was a little surprised and he denied doing any mixing. Joe and I continued to press him, this was getting on to about 4:30-5:00 in the afternoon. And so we said, "Where is the stuff, we want to know where it is." Well, you wouldn't believe it, but the first thing he told us was that he shipped it over to Merchants Refrigerating in Newark, New Jersey. We told him, "Come on, you better give us a better story than that." Sure enough he started to change his story. Eventually he suggested he dumped it, did this with it, did that with it, but the point of it is that when he told us he shipped it to Merchants that was a fact, but we didn't get it. We didn't think he was telling us the truth. So when we finished with him that day, we went back to the office, it was about 6:00 in the evening. But we didn't check with Merchants, because Merchants was closed by this time.
But we didn't think to check with Merchants in the first place. So the next morning Joe and I sit there thinking to ourselves and Joe said, "Let's check Merchants." So we give Merchants a call, talked with the manager over there, "Hey, you got some stuff from so and so, so and so." "Yes." "You still got it there." "No, it went out this morning."

Lofsvold: Oh, no.

Kedzior: We went over to the warehouse later on and checked things out and etc. and found out when it was delivered, and so on and who picked it up. We found out Sol Abramson had picked it up. Of course we didn't know where it went, but we did finally get a tie-in to this. Now, we figured that Sol had to use some other place to mix this stuff. So now the question was how do we keep track of Sol when he keeps picking up this oleo and will he pick it up at Best Foods again. So we arranged for a...oh let me see now... somewhere along the line we...Joe and I had conducted some night surveillance to question the driver of Sol's truck. Joe and I spent several nights in surveillance in east side New York looking for this guy. We had his name from the pick-up slip, where the driver picked up, signed for it and he was running an independent truck but he was working for Sol, and we needed to know where he was taking that stuff. So after Joe and I had maintained surveillance over a place where we found his car, incidentally we had a license number for his car, but we didn't know him or
what he looked like. So we were cruising around a neighborhood up there, upper east side New York, in a real rough neighborhood at night, and trying to find him. Finally we spotted his parked car, so we parked across the street from it and we were sitting there. A prowl car came by, saw us sitting in the car. Oh God they are going to blow our cover, actually we didn't have any cover. The prowl car stopped by and we told them who we were, that we were waiting for somebody who we were trying to talk to. So they left us alone, they went...but they came by, cruising by every so often. And finally this fellow came out of the house and as he was getting into his car, Joe and I both jumped out of our car and approached him, and just at that time the prowl car came by and stopped over there. So we tried talking to this character and he wouldn't give us diddly, he wouldn't say from anything. We were fortunate that the police were there, because we later found out that this fellow had been arrested for attempted robbery with a gun, that he probably...if he had a gun on him, he wouldn't mind shooting us when he saw us approaching him because he had no idea who we were and this was at about 11:00 or midnight. So we felt very fortunate that the police were there to save us from whatever. That was our brush with the underworld, you might say.

Anyway, eventually we designed a scheme by which Best Foods would tell us, would report to us, when they received an
order from Abramson, Bakers Supply Company for delivery. Then we arranged for some of our people to be in the office when he came in for the pick up. Then a relay of cars to follow him from the pick up in Bayonne, New Jersey to wherever he was going. So this happened on a Friday, when the pick up was made or scheduled to be made. Vic Tursi was the guy in the office over there. And we had all kinds of communications...

Lofsvold: Inspector Vic Tursi.
Kedzior: Yes, Inspector Vic Tursi was in there, in the office where he would see that this order was being filled and etc. and we had other inspectors in cars to follow... We followed the truck across the George Washington Bridge, down into the Bronx and to a butter and egg place in the Bronx, right near the elevated subway. I forget the name of the outfit where this was dumped off, so once it was delivered over there, we then maintained 24-hour watch over the weekend, on the place, 8-hour shifts, two inspectors to a car, around the clock. We didn't see anything unusual all through that time. I was on the night shift with...I think it was with Joe a couple of nights. Anyway on Monday morning the day shift took over, and they began to follow trucks that were leaving the place for deliveries. They followed them for, Bill Kupp, incidentally Bill Kupp was one of the drivers following the trucks. They followed and noted the places where they dropped off butter. Then after about 11:00 in the morning or thereabouts, the
inspectors went into the place to make an inspection. Jerry Martell was one of the inspectors, I think Abe Ledder was one of the inspectors, I don't know whether there was someone else involved or not. But when they went in there to make an inspection they couldn't find anything. They went down to the basement and couldn't find anything. Upstairs they couldn't find anything, nothing. Yet, we were convinced this is where they were doing it. So when they got back upstairs, outside the building, Jerry Martell began to look at the building, the front of the building, looked, went downstairs, looked some more, came back up stairs. I think it was Abe, he said, "Abe" he said, "Something doesn't make sense." He said, "This building is, I'd say is about 25 feet wide or something like that, but you go down stairs that room downstairs it's not that wide." He said, "There has got to be a secret room down there." So they go downstairs and along the...as you face the building from the street, along the left side of that wall there were a whole bunch of moveable dollies, with crates on them. And they were stacked up to the ceiling, ceiling was maybe 7 feet or so high. Anyway there was a whole bunch all along that wall there. So Abe and Jerry began to move these dollies out, sure enough there's a door. They found the secret room, they get inside that door, there's a whole mess of cartons with oleo labels, butter labels, mixing equipment, all in there. And that's where they were doing the mixing.
So we finally broke...and incidentally we found several of
the drops that he made at the stores, they went out and
they...restaurants and stores, they went out and picked up
samples, and it was the mixture.

Lofsvold: Labeled as butter?

Kedzior: Oh, yes. So we got them there. The irony of the
whole thing is, we lost the case. We prosecuted Sol Abramson
for transporting in interstate commerce...how did this go.
Well, anyway for conspiring to adulterate butter and etc. The
judge ruled that we didn't have a case because the mixture of
oleo and butter was...oh I don't know...the bulk, it was in
bulk rather than in retail packages.

Lofsvold: At the time he transported it.

Kedzior: Well, see it was made into retail packages when it
got to New York and sold in New York.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: But the point is that this product was in violation
whether or not it was shipped in interstate commerce.

Lofsvold: Right, under the Oleo Margarine Amendment.

Kedzior: Yes. So I don't know why we lost.

Lofsvold: Was Abramson the only defendant?

Kedzior: Well, I can't remember whether the dealer who was
involved with the manipulation was involved in it or not. He
could of copped a plea, see and get off in order to stick
Abramson with it, I don't know how it went. All I know is
that later on it developed that because it was a bulk product the law did not apply.

Lofsvold: What, about what year was that John?

Kedzior: This was about 195...I can't remember if Dick Williams was the Chief Inspector or Lennington, when this happened, it was around 1951. It was around 1951 when this happened.

Lofsvold: Perhaps we can find the Notice of Judgment as to what exactly did happen at trial and the courts opinion in the matter.*

Kedzior: Well if it would be in the record, it may not even be in the record. I think it was around 1951, 1952 or 1953, somewhere in there. But that was the most interesting case that I was involved in and got into it, you know, at various points in its development.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: But I have a couple of stories about New York. Some of the inspectors in the New York District were great at practical jokes. Eddie Palmer was probably the ring leader in this respect. And he was gladly joined by Charlie Greenlee at various times, although Charlie was more prone to be rather pessimistic about everything that he did or thought about, but a nice guy, actually. The butt of their practical jokes was usually somebody they didn't give a hang about, someone they really despised and all that, someone who thought he was above

the rest of them. That someone in this case was Louie King. Louie King had come to New York from the state of Connecticut where had been an inspector. And Louie actually was a very good inspector. But Louie thought he was better than anybody else. That, of course, endeared him to everybody in New York, particularly Eddie Palmer and Charlie Greenlee, but Eddie mostly. Now Louie King enjoyed making inspections, particularly sanitary inspections, and enjoyed taking photographs. He wouldn't use one of our district cameras, he had his own equipment that he carried in a very special camera bag. Whenever he found some bad conditions in a bakery, or warehouse, or some other plant where sanitation usually is pretty poor, he would exult and this made all of us very happy. One day Louie called the office in a great huff, oh he was mad. He called Leo Lusby, who was the Chief Inspector at the time. And he berated Leo, he said, "Some SOB put a great big rock in my camera case. I went to open it to take some pictures and here is this goddamn big rock in the camera case!"

Lofsvold: No camera?
Kedzior: No camera. And he just, he ate Leo's ear out...
Leo is looking out at the Inspectors, over the top of his glasses, and Eddie Palmer is sitting there and Leo is laughing. Eddie is looking at him, don't know what he's laughing about. Finally when Lou had hung up, Leo said, "I just got a call from Louie King, he's over in this bakery supply place
and he said that his camera was missing when he opened his case to take some pictures and instead there was a great big rock in there. Anybody in here know anything about it?" Eddie said, "I don't know." Charlie Greenlee said, "I don't know". I think they were the only two in the office at that time. Later when we learned about it, we found out that they had put this rock in his camera case about three weeks earlier. He had been carrying it there all that time before he had a chance to use it. He was... lord, when he came back into the office that day, he was livid, but nobody knew what happened. Nobody knew.

Lofsvold: You know, about 2-3 years later when I got to New York, after you had gone, they did the same thing to Greenlee. You remember he didn't drive a car at that time. He traveled by bus and he had a big brief bag and he had everything in the world in that thing, all kinds of forms, etc. Well, somebody found a very large bolt, it must have been an 1-1 1/2 in diameter, about a foot long and they hid it in the bottom of Charlie's brief case under the stuff that he carried in there. He packed that around for several weeks before he got to cleaning his brief case out and found the bolt at the bottom. Nobody ever admitted responsibility, but everybody suspected John Zaic. I wouldn't be surprised.

Kedzior: There is another one that they played on Louie King. Louie used to bring his umbrella to the office. So, one day
after he had gone out to make inspections somewhere, he was out of the office, his umbrella was missing. It was missing for a long time, like maybe a month, two months, something like that. I don't know whether Louie had been on the road and had just come home or had some visitors at the house. This particular evening he was home and had some company there and an express package came for Louie, collect. So they paid it and opened up the package, and there is his umbrella. Isn't that wonderful, I think his wife accepted the package. So she opened up the umbrella and out dropped a dozen condoms, out of the umbrella. Right there with all the company and everything. He got his umbrella back. I guess they didn't know who did it, but it was somebody. They loved Louie. Those are the only two that I remembered. They really loved to play those jokes on the guys.

Lofsvold: Later on he resigned and was head of the American Institute of Baking's Sanitation Program.

Kedzior: Yes, he was with them. He has since retired. He went with them. He was also a resident in Charleston, West Virginia, after he left New York. Then, eventually, he did leave to go the the American Baking Institute. Yes, I knew Louie and he was something else.

Lofsvold: I think that was probably pretty typical of that crew that was around New York at that time.

Kedzior: Oh, they just loved their jokes.
Lofsvold: But they were about as clever a bunch of investigators and the hardest working people that I ever worked with.

Kedzior: I spent a total of six years working in New York. I had to admire the skill, and the perseverance, and the ingenuity that these guys had in making investigations. There is no other place that I had gone, that I found their equal.

Lofsvold: Well, I think that they were a product of their environment.

Kedzior: They were. They knew how the actors on the other side thought. They really did, they knew how they thought. They knew the angles that they would be using. It is a sort of an instinctive thing, it is. Goldhammer, he could get anything out of a guy. He would talk to them, he would talk real nice, but boy he would be bringing out the local police ready to jump on them, or the local health department ready to close them down, or this or that and this poor guy was wiggling over there. He would do anything, he'd tell them to go over anything that you wanted to know. He was just super.

Abe Ledder was another one. He could go in there and he could get anything from these guys. He had more stool-pigeons in that market, the produce market, butter and egg market, Abe did, than anybody else that I know of. They would tell him things, all the time. It was really something to see these guys operate.

Lofsvold: Well, Zaic used to deal in the poultry market the same way, everybody knew him and he could get anything.
Kedzior: Sure, it just takes a certain kind to deal with these people. They knew how to deal with them. No question about that.

Well, then in 1954, once again I go out as directed, but this time they paid me a little compliment. They said, "This time you are going to open a resident post in Louisville, Kentucky." I said, "Why do I have to be a resident again, after all I spent eight years at Waterbury, as a resident. Wasn't that enough?" "Well, that was a small little place, you know, and this will give you more of a challenge. Besides here you have to get along with Sarah Vance Dugan and you had better make sure that you do or you know what is going to happen to you." That is actually a fact that they told me. When you go there you make sure that you work with Sarah Vance Dugan. What they didn't tell me was this, that Sarah Vance had been telling these guys that she wanted a resident office, the office to be located in her building. Well, they wouldn't do that, they put one in the Federal Office Building. So when I got there and I was talking with her she asked me, "How come you all didn't locate your office in my building?" I said, "Miss Dugan, I don't know why they didn't do that." She was blaming Hubble for not doing this.

Lofsvold: He was the Director?

Kedzior: He was the Director of the Cincinnati District. Of course I didn't know that she wanted the office to be located
in there where she could direct me, know what I am doing, tell me what to do, because that is the kind of woman that she was.

Lofsvold: She was in charge of the state Food and Drug Program in Kentucky?

Kedzior: The Food and Drug Program in Kentucky and she was an enforcer. She was good at it. I was fortunate, shortly after I reported for work in Louisville, they had an election. The governor who was responsible for putting her in office was defeated. Someone else came into office, she lost her job. So she was out of that place for a year or more, and then some way or another she got it back. So before I left she was back on the job. And she was a great cooperator, she gave me more cooperation than anybody that I have ever had. When we had the investigation involving the vaccine, Salk Vaccine. Some of the vaccine was contaminated.

Lofsvold: Yes. That's the Cutter Laboratory product.

Kedzior: The Cutter Laboratory vaccine.

Lofsvold: The virus was not properly killed and some patients who got the vaccine contracted polio.

Kedzior: So that they were putting a hold and recall on all of the vaccine of certain batches.

The headquarters notified all the districts to do all they can, to use all their resources, including the local health departments and state health departments to get this thing off the market. When I went to see Sarah Vance Dugan...
about this, she said, "Just give me all the information that I need to know and I'll handle it." So I gave her all the information she needed. She sent out a release to every radio station, every television station, and all the newspapers in Kentucky, she did that. Nobody, nobody that I've ever worked with was that concerned about the public health and was that willing to expend all of her resources to work for the public and the Food and Drug Administration. She was just out-of-sight.

I had a lot of respect for her and I worked with her... she wanted to have an input into our work plan. I couldn't do it, I said, "Sarah you know I can't do that, I'll tell Mr. Hubble what you'd like, but you know what he's going to say." So she and I had a pretty good, pretty good empathy with each other. She never tried to, you might say, do me in. Actually when I left, she wrote a letter, I think to Larrick, complimenting me on the relationship with her.

Would you believe when I was finally transferred from Louisville back to Washington, for a tour of about 6 months, about a month or two after I got to Washington, Chet Hubble was transferred to Washington. After he arrived, his family was still back in Cincinnati. After he arrived there, he came up to me he said, "John how about having dinner." I said, "Fine." So we had dinner. I think it was before my family got there, I don't know. We had dinner. We went to one of
the seafood places over by the river. While we were there
talking he said, "John do you know, you had the right idea
about Sarah Vance Dugan and you did the right thing. I think
I screwed myself, because I wouldn't work with her." I said,
"Well you probably had your own instructions," and he did, he
was told not to cooperate with her, I think. Larrick didn't
know about all these things, and Larrick was a good friend of
Sarah. They knew each other from the time he was an inspec-
tor, and she started in with the Health Department. They were
like this. She would get up in the middle of the night if she
had something unusual to talk about, she'd call up George in
Washington and talk to him about it. She had influence. I
didn't know that she was that close with him until after I got
t here and somebody over there told me. I think maybe it was
Schoonover that really told me, "Now you really got to work
with her very well. Don't ever let anything get in your way.
Work with Sarah and you'll be all right, you won't have any
problems."

Lofsvold: Schoonover would know. He had spent a year and a
half out there.

Kedzior: Oh, I think it was him that told me that, to work
with her. But you see Chet didn't feel the same way. Anyway,
this is how it came about that she helped us a great deal.

Oh, there was one other thing while I was in Louisville
that I remember very well and it had nothing to do with en-
forcing the law or something like that. Oh it was sometime
about the middle of 1955, about a year after I got to Louisville. The administration had received a report of the Citizens Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug Administration. That was the first committee that had been appointed and they had studied the FDA for a considerable length of time, maybe 6 months or more. Their report came out and the Administration sent out copies to each District and I think each resident post got a copy. These copies were roughly 8 x 11. They were plain paper, and paper bound. Then along with this copy I got a note from the District saying, "Try to give this some publicity, maybe disseminate as much information as you can about this in your particular area." They didn't say how to do it, or what. So I said okay. They want me to let people know about the availability of this report, because they felt the more people that would read this, would mean that FDA would get its, you might say, "day in court".

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: That is the public would finally begin to see how understaffed FDA is in the light of what they have to do. Basically it was a ploy to get some attention from the consuming public so that we could get a little bit better response from Congress in our appropriations. Well, I didn't know all that, all I knew is that this was a good report and the people ought to know about it and avail themselves of it, that it's available, and read it if they can. So what do you
do. Nobody told me what to do so I figured well I guess I better use my own judgment. First of all I said, if I go to the newspapers with this they'll want to see it, I may have to leave it with them so that they can look at it. The first thing I did, I designed a plastic cover for the report. Put my business card in there and went to the newspapers. Went to see the editor of the Louisville Times and they ran both papers, a morning and evening paper. I went to see him and told him who I was. I think this is the first time I went to see a newspaper man. Who I was, where my office was, all I had been doing and what I was doing, and the kind of work that we do and I said, "Now I have here a very extensive report on the organization of the Food and Drug Administration. What it does and how important its function is in terms of protecting the consuming public. This report was written by some very important people who studied the Food and Drug Administration over a period of time." I said, "Would you or someone on your staff be interested in going over this in whatever way you want and at least print a piece in the paper that such and such a report has been issued, that it is available and where it's available from, at least could you do this." He looked at me and he said, "Well, it looks like you people do work that is important to the public," he said, "Yes, I'll do it." So I left the report with him and sure enough they put a blurb in the paper about it. So I went to the newspaper in
Evansville, Indiana. I went to a newspaper in Owensboro, Kentucky. Anyway I went to several papers, I went to... At that time I don't think Sarah was there, I went to the Health Department, State Health Department there. When I visited the local health departments in the other places, I told them about it. What happened? First thing I know Hubble, I think Hubble called me for something. "John what are you doing over there?" "About what?" "About that Advisory Committee Report." "Well, I made a copy available to newspapers and cooperating officials." "Washington has been swamped with requests for a copy of the report from your area. They have been getting more requests from your area than any place in the country." I said, "I just did what I thought I needed to do to get publicity for this damn thing." I said, "Isn't that what you people wanted?" He said, "Yes, that's what we wanted but then how are we going to meet all of these requests?" So these are a couple of the letters that I got as a result of that kind of publicity. I can't find it in the file but I think I also got a letter from Larrick commending me. Here's a memo from Rayfield...

Lofsvold: Rayfield was head of the Field Service?
Kedzior: Oh, yes.
Lofsvold: And Hubble was your District Director?
Kedzior: Oh, yes.
Lofsvold: I like the way Rayfield concludes his with the sentence, "Please let us know if Inspector Kedzior needs additional copies for local distribution."

Kedzior: See what I mean. You know this guy Janssen, he is the one that made sure Hubble heard about this.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: Because they were all coming to him. All these requests were coming into him. So when I went up to Washington, the first thing when I saw Janssen he said, "John what did you do over there in Louisville?" "I just promoted it, that's all." "Boy you sure did a job!" Well, I figured you want publicity, you've got to go out there and work at it. Nobody had to tell me what to do, I just went ahead and did it. I kept that copy of that report until just recently. When Billy Hill was collecting memorabilia, I sent it to him.

Lofsvold: Yes, we have it now in Denver, we got all that stuff, all those things that were collected are all kept together in Denver.

Kedzior: You got that stuff? Well okay. Well I don't know how many of those reports you have?

Lofsvold: I think that's probably the only one.

Kedzior: I kept the goddamn thing.

Lofsvold: Right.

Kedzior: Also that plaque that Rayfield got for DFO from Flemming.
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: The framed plaque that he got, you got that too?
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: Because I sent it to Billy.
Lofsvold: We have the stuff that you submitted.
Kedzior: I think this was after the cranberry deal.
Lofsvold: Oh, yes.
Kedzior: Remember? When he complimented the Food and Drug Administration on the job they were doing.

Then one other thing I did while in Louisville. The Administration came out with a press release on aspirin. It was a simple release, advising the public to keep aspirin out of the reach of children because they had so many unfortunate incidents where youngsters would either get sick or die from an overdose of aspirin. I take the release to the paper and I explain to them about the significance of the release first. I said "You'd be doing the public, in your readers' area, a very great service if you would put a piece in your paper about this release, because it really is very important that mothers and fathers, but mostly mothers, know how easily children can be injured by taking aspirin which is everywhere available. You'd be doing your readers a big service." So I left it with him. Sure enough it was published in the paper. But it was picked up by the Associated Press which had an office in that newspaper. They saw this over there. They didn't pick it up
out of Washington, while the release came out of Washington. But they picked it up out of the Louisville paper. And this is what they said. Now this is just a little piece, but this is a little bit of a paper.

Lofsvold: It came out then with a Louisville dateline...
Kedzior: Yes.
Lofsvold: And quoted you as the official of the Food and Drug Administration.
Kedzior: Yes.
Lofsvold: Great.
Kedzior: See.
Lofsvold: This clipping is from the Pasadena Star News, it got all the way out to California.
Kedzior: No it got to me this way, Gordon Wood.
Lofsvold: He was Director at Los Angeles.
Kedzior: Yes. Read it.
Lofsvold: Yes, it's a congratulatory letter, dated October 25, from Gordon Wood. "Let me congratulate you on accomplishing what I have not been able to do, that is to get your name printed right in the middle of the first page of my home town newspaper. I'm enclosing a copy so you can see for yourself. I'm glad someone can get some publicity for the FDA out this way. I can't even get my name into the Want Ads after living here three years."
Kedzior: I tell you it was crazy. You know it's simple things like this and you know at that time FDA was getting diddly in the papers.

Lofsvold: That's right. Well, of course, in Washington the government news releases are a dime a dozen, editors there for AP probably didn't pay a bit of attention to it.

Kedzior: Yes. But even now how many of our Districts make an effort to see a newspaper or a television place, they have done more now than they did you might say 10 years or so ago, their doing it more now. But in those days they could care less, they never did. And yet they were missing an important link in contributing information to the public.

Lofsvold: Right. About things that people could do to protect themselves.

Kedzior: Right. They wouldn't do it. Or they figured just issue a press release, fellows would pick them up, they'll do it. How often did they do it? They did it in recall, life and death situations.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: But on ordinary normal things. The guys that...the press in Washington is jaded. They get too many things and it's a matter of priority here and priority there but you get out in the boon-docks and you can do it.

Afterwards when I went to Seattle I told my residents I said, "You guys have to establish contacts with various
sources and maintain them." But they never got to that point where they would do what I had been able to do. I'm convinced that the reason that I got promoted to Chief Inspector is just because of the things I did right there. Not because I got a seizure or had a good prosecution or anything like that. It's just because of this.

Lofsvold: That and your relationships with Mrs. Dugan.
Kedzior: Yes.
Lofsvold: Keeping her out of the boss's hair.
Kedzior: That's right. Exactly. No other... I mean a lot of guys got ahead because they made a lot of cases or things of this nature. That's to me, well whatever.

As far as Louisville goes, I think those were the two things that I felt, and Sarah Vance Dugan working with me on that vaccine, were really the highlights.

Although we did put a poultry firm out of business. Turkey and chicken processor, put it out of business. I made an inspection with the state inspector at a place that had been giving problems to the neighborhood because they were running their waste water in to some ponds and these were breeding flies and everything and it was a terrible thing and the state didn't seem to be able to do anything about it. The State Inspector came up to see me, from Indiana, not from Kentucky. We went up to this little town, and this guy was operating a slaughter plant, turkey and chicken. This was about a month...
before Thanksgiving. He was operating this plant with well water, no city water, and had apparently a very poor supply because the amount of water that he was using was negligible to wash the birds and etc., and cleaning was minimal.

After he slaughtered the birds and dressed them he kept the heart, giblets, kidneys and etc. in a barrel that was never cleaned out. He would just keep dumping them, all of that into that barrel and then when they were ready to put them back in to the bird, they would take them out and put them in to the bird and close them up. They never cleaned the inside of the bird so that you had a lot of bile that would remain on the inside of the bird after they got through, they never washed it out. The water that they would be using came trinkling out of the pipes where they were cleaning. It was just a very light dribble, not a spray as such.

Lofsvold: Right.

Kedzior: So, this inspector and I made the inspection and when we got all through, and incidentally while making the inspection I also found out that he was shipping the turkeys into cold storage in Louisville, until the right time for Thanksgiving and he would be distributing them from there. And there was only one big cold storage warehouse in Louisville. The next morning I called the District and told them about it and Sid Weisenberg was on the line, he was helping Hubble, I guess, he told me what to do. I examined
the appropriate number of birds, from so many cases, made my notations. Most of the problem was the remains of some fecal material and bile on the birds. They weren't clean. As far as disease I was in no condition to judge whether it was diseased or not, not being a vet. The sad facts on the sanitation they were... So I made my inspection, examination, sent in the results but in the meantime I called them and told them about my results, over the phone, and they said, "It looks pretty bad why don't you have the city put a hold on it." So I had the city put a hold on it. I shipped the sample to the District. They examined it and confirmed my findings and we seized the whole schmeer. This guy went out of business. That was just before Thanksgiving. It made the papers.

Lofsvold: This was in the days when we were responsible for poultry before the passage of the Poultry Product Inspection Act.

Kedzior: Right. They wouldn't be able to get away with it in Kentucky. But they did in Indiana. I couldn't understand it. Well, later on they improved in Indiana but I couldn't understand it at all, or else the Inspector didn't want to do the job. He was one of the Inspectors, that I felt wasn't very aggressive or very interested in doing the work. You find one like that every now and then. So, that is about the size of my experiences in Louisville.
Lofsvold: Then when you went to Washington, that was just a short term training assignment preparatory to your going out as Chief Inspector?

Kedzior: Yes, Rayfield called me from headquarters one day in, I guess it was in July 1956, and he said, "John, how would you like to come to Washington?" I said, "I don't think that I would like to come to Washington. I don't think I would like to work there." He said, "Oh, you would enjoy it" and all this and that. He said, "You might not have to stay here very long." I said, "Do I have to do this for a long time?" He said, "Well, I don't know, maybe a year or so." He said, "Basically it is not a place where we expect that you are going to stay, it is mostly that you need the experience and we want to see how you operate. If a position opens up in the field, you will have a good chance of getting it." He wouldn't promise anything, that wouldn't be proper for him to say, well, you would get a job, etc. because he might not be able to keep his promise. So, I went to Washington. I was there for about six months and worked with Larry Warden, practically all of the time reviewing reports from the field. I think it was in December. We took a vacation and went to Syracuse to visit our folks. Before I left, Rayfield, Lennington and Garfield were there. Reo Duggan wasn't there at the time, this was in '56. They asked me to leave my telephone number in case they had to get in touch with me. I
didn't know why they would need to get in touch with me. Anyway I left my telephone number. Sure enough while I was home on vacation they called me. "How would you like to go to Seattle." I don't know what I told them at time, but I guess I said, "Okay". I had never been further west than Louisville. So, I got back to the office, from vacation, and Kenny mentioned to me, he said, "You know John, it might be better for you if you stayed here for another six months or a year and get some more experience at headquarters before you go out in to the field and be better equipped to handle it." I said, "Well, Kenny I don't know, if he wants to entrust me with the job in Seattle, why should I tell him no. I am going to take it." And I took it. So before I left, I learned that Doug was going to be transferred to Chicago and I think the Chicago Chief Inspector was going to Buffalo.

Lofsvold: Right.

Kedzior: So it was a chain reaction. I think that is the way it worked.

Lofsvold: I was out in Seattle. I had already been transferred to New York for a year but we had gone home for Christmas and I went down to the office and Doug had just come in from a road trip. He had just learned, as you did, by a phone call that he was going to Chicago. He wasn't very happy about it.
Kedzior: Anyway, I went to Seattle in February, latter part of February, and Arnold Morton met me at the airport and took me around. We found a place to stay. If Arnold hadn't been there to help me, I don't what I would have done. So he helped me and we found a place to live and it was vacant so we could move in right away. We were renting at the time, we weren't buying. My wife joined me about a week after I got there. Then our furniture came down a couple of weeks later. So that is how I got to Seattle, and spent from February of '57 until September of '63 there.

Well, Seattle was an FDA service that I probably enjoyed more than any other. The reason was that it gave me an opportunity to work with young men just coming in to the service, who were full of piss and ginger and willing to work hard and it was a pleasure to see such young men and to imbue in them, you might say, a respect for the service. If you can do that with fellows just coming in and if it takes hold, they are going to be good for the organization later on. They will be successful in the organization. Working with them gave me a great deal of satisfaction, seeing young men make good later on.

Lofsvold: This was about the period that we began to expand the agency in size.

Kedzior: When I got to Seattle, there were, at the time, about five new Inspectors that had come on board within the
last year. Then we began to recruit very heavily, from that time on for the next 2-3 years. So during most of the time that I was in Seattle, we were recruiting very heavily and going out to talk to college students to interest them in a career with FDA. This was a very welcome challenge to me and I enjoyed that very much. From this aspect, I considered that work was probably the most self-satisfying for me.

As far as what occurred in Seattle that was important from the standpoint of consumer protection. I think in my mind there is no question that the aminotriazole episode was tops. Lofsvold: In cranberries? Kedzior: The cranberry, Blue Monday, that occurred in the cranberry business was tops. There is one very good reason why I feel that way. Shall I give you the background? Lofsvold: Oh, yes. Kedzior: Now, this occurred in 1959. When this broke it was late October, or the first part of November. I think it was late October. Some background. The year before, Aminotriazole, a weed killer had been used to control weeds in cranberry bogs. This weed killer had the tendency of being transmitted through a plant system and into the berries. It is what they call a systemic pesticide or weedicide. When we discovered aminotriazole in the cranberries the year before, a number of lots were seized. Seattle was one of the Districts that had seized some of these cranberries. I believe other lots were consolidated and all stored at one warehouse.
Anyway, there was a big lot of it stored in a big freezer in Chehalis, Washington. Nothing had been done with the cranberries until late in 1959 when the Ocean Spray Cranberry Cooperative Association decided that they would just go ahead and dump the whole works. So, they notified the Food and Drug Administration that this is what they wanted to do and FDA sent an inspector to witness the destruction, took pictures of it, etc., and reported it to the Administration. Now this report reached the administration, I believe, sometime late in October. In the meantime, in the Spring of '59 we continued to make inspections of cranberry grower bogs to find out whether or not they had been using aminotriazole or had stopped using it. While this was going on there was some indication that the industry would have a reprieve, in that the administration might set a tolerance on aminotriazole in the product. I believe it was in June or April of '59 the Administration switched signals after they had received some clinical data on animal studies which indicated it would cause cancer. So they decided that they can't set a tolerance for the chemical and consequently it was not permitted to be used. However some of it had been used by the growers with the hope that it would be OK'd as a product that would have a tolerance and that they would be within the tolerance. So our investigations in the Spring had revealed that, yes they had used some of it, in the bogs. Kinney was the inspector in those
days. So when the Fall came on and the harvesting started we began to collect samples. We collected a lot of samples at plants where they were processing and packaging it, at dealers places and we were beginning to find some results but we were having a problem with the method at the time. The method that Washington had developed was not a very satisfactory one. So our chemists at Seattle were diligently working to develop a refined method that would be good. They finally developed a method after spending about a month working on it. I think we had maybe 1 or 2 chemists working on nothing but developing that method. Dr. Steers was the Chief Chemist and he was a good chief chemist. They finally got the method down, notified Washington about the methodology and Washington decided that the method was a good method and would stand up on whatever checking they would have to do to confirm.

Well, once that was overcome, we again tested the samples and we found aminotriazole in the samples. This we found on a Wednesday or Thursday and on Friday we got a telephone call from Washington, Larry Trawick called, and he wanted to talk to the Director. Well, Monfore wasn't there at the time so Arnold took the message. I happened to be in Arnold's office at the time. Trawick said, "The Secretary, Flemming, is going to hold a press conference on Monday and he wants to include in the press conference, he has other things to talk about, but he wants to include in the press conference, a commendation-
tion for the Cranberry Association because they did such a wonderful job of destroying all those contaminated cranberries from the year before." He had just reviewed the report we had sent in to Washington and he had seen the pictures, and he thought this was wonderful. Here is this association doing a great thing for the American public. That is what he wanted to do. He said, "We need a little more information, a little more detail on it so could you give me those over the telephone?" He was talking to Arnold and I am sitting there. Arnold said, "This is Trawick, Secretary Flemming is going to give a press conference on Monday and he wants to include in there a blurb for the industry about what a nice job they did in destroying all of those cranberries." I said, "Arnold, you had better tell him that he had better not do that, because we just got 1 or 2 lots that are being recommended for seizure on aminotriazole in this year's crops, the problem is not over." So Arnold tells Trawick, he said, "We can't do that. We have been collecting samples of cranberries and we are finding aminotriazole in the samples." Trawick said, "What!!" "Yes we are." "Are you sure?" "We have been working on this method for a long time and we've proved it out and the aminotriazole it there, we are recommending seizure." He said, "Oh, boy." So, now if I hadn't been in that office, Arnold wouldn't have known. I don't know whether he even knew that Steers and I had been working on this thing that closely. I
think that Monfore knew we working on this, but I don't know whether Arnold had actually been advised of this by Monfore. Anyway, he should have known but I don't know if he did. My being there saved a lot of rear-ends. So, what happened? Larry calls him back Saturday for more details. Well, anyway what finally happened is Larrick calls on the weekend and he talks either to Monfore or to Arnold and he wants the whole story on the aminotriazole in this year's berries. I think maybe Larry Trawick alerted us that maybe somebody else would want more details on it, so he gets the details on this and he's ready for the Secretary on Monday.

So he gets this material to the Secretary on Monday and when the Secretary is holding the press conference he was going to talk about two things as far a FDA was concerned. One was the cranberries that were destroyed. Two was the under-cover work that FDA had been doing on truck stops in which they had already corralled several places. This is what Joe North and Kenny Lennington and Rayfield were happy about, that the Secretary is going to give publicity to the under-cover operation. Well, of course, the first thing that the Secretary mentioned was the aminotriazole in cranberries that they found in this years cranberries. After that all the press left to the telephones and BAM the whole thing went and boy did the shit hit the fan. That's how we got to the aminotriazole in cranberries. Out of Seattle, by chance, by the
merest of chance. If the Secretary had gone ahead and released the information about how good the industry is and then we came back with seizure on this thing, what would he do to the Commissioner?

Lofsvold: Sure

Kedzior: What would he do to the Commissioner?

Lofsvold: On the other hand...

Kedzior: He'd string him up by his balls!

Lofsvold: If the Secretary had not been already thinking about talking about last year's crop of cranberries, maybe Larrick would have stalled...

Kedzior: They wouldn't of called us. No they wouldn't be calling us.

Lofsvold: Yes, they wouldn't have got the word until after Thanksgiving.

Kedzior: Oh, yes.

Lofsvold: The whole thing would of been moot.

Kedzior: Oh, yes. It was just something like that...to me it was supposed to happen.

Lofsvold: It sure did.

Kedzior: It was fate. And would you believe this happened just before Turkey Day. Of course then everybody got busy you know, Blue Monday, orders came out, "Get out there and get that goddamn stuff off the market." So everybody was working, the state, the city, we, all our guys were out on the road. We called it "Blue Monday".
Lofsvold: Ran the labs 24 hours a day.

Kedzior: Oh man! It was terrible, I mean it didn't merit the attention it got, that's a fact. It didn't merit the attention it got.

Lofsvold: No, it didn't.

Kedzior: But that's how it goes.

Lofsvold: The sensitive subject of that final year...

Kedzior: Yes, Bang. But would you believe after I got to Washington on a trip, this was in '60, I was in Washington on something. And while they were talking about some new developments I mentioned this and all I got from Lennington and Joe North and some of the other guys said, "You sure screwed us up". I said, "Why did I screw you up?" "We had this undercover truck stop business, laid out there for the Secretary and you came in with your goddamn aminotriazole in cranberries." And I said, "You SOB's don't know what the hell you are talking about. If we hadn't told the Secretary what we had uncovered, your ass would be in a sling, right now, if he'd gone ahead with that other publicity on the cranberries. You guys are full of shit." I gave it right back to them, I said, "You guys don't know what you are talking about, and it's a fact." They would have been up the creek. What the hell would Larrick be thinking then, if they let that thing get out. Oooh boy! They would come back at Seattle if we hadn't done anything.
Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: They would say, "Monfore, where in the hell were you, why didn't you tell us about this thing. We called you on the phone you said nothing about it." Their ass would be in the fire. Our ass would be in the fire! To me that was probably the highlight of my doings at Seattle. I felt that was probably the best thing that I ever did for the Food and Drug Administration.

I can't remember, you might learn more from Arnold. Did you talk to Arnold?

Lofsvold: Not about the cranberries. We have recorded an interview with Morton but he didn't discuss this particular case.

Kedzior: Okay. Well, I'm sorry he didn't. But anyway he had more important things to talk about. Let me say this. When Trawick was talking to Arnold about the aminotriazole and Arnold came back and told him about our finding the aminotriazole in the cranberries, in this year's crop, I think Trawick said something to the effect that, "Well, do we have to tell the Secretary about this now?"

Lofsvold: Oooh!

Kedzior: I think, I can't remember whether he did or not, but I think he did and then I told Arnold, I said, "Arnold if they don't tell the Secretary, if Larrick or whoever gives the Secretary the information about the destruction of the cran-
berries, and they don't give him the information about what we're finding in cranberries this year, they are derelict in their duties to protect the Food and Drug Administration. I said, "You better tell them, tell Larry about this and don't keep anything back." That's why Larry called us up later, to get the information. Larry mentioned, "Well, do we have to include this in there now?"

Lofsvold: Trawick?
Kedzior: I think Trawick, yes, I think he mentioned this to Arnold. The way I remember the conversation you see...Larry is gone, see.
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: But I think Arnold would remember this. But I think that's how it happened that's why we insisted, "You better tell Larrick about this." So that's how it got to him. And that precipitated all the activity we had later on; on residues.
Lofsvold: Right.
Kedzior: Oh, yes.
Lofsvold: Really brought out...
Kedzior: Oh that brought out all the activity on residues and that brought out the growers and the packers' responsibility in seeing that their produce does not have residues.
Lofsvold: It also brought the possibility that there were some of these chemicals that were carcinogenic to the public's attention.
Kedzior: Oh yes. To me it was the biggest boon to FDA's enforcements efforts on residues in foods. That broke the back on this thing. Before it wasn't very much of a deal, you know, nothing. But it got nationwide attention here and that from then on we had to do our share on this thing. We couldn't...we didn't...we...you know how we dealt with it before.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: It's not that important, but it got to be one of the most important jobs in Seattle. Kinney did practically full time on pesticides.

Lofsvold: Right.

Kedzior: That's how he got his promotion. He was a good man too. He was damn good. Then we uncovered the aldrin in potatoes over there, in the fields in Idaho. And the other Districts began to work on that, but I don't think they found any of it and what else did we do.

Well, we found I think it was DDT in Birdseye Spinach, over there...

Lofsvold: That was over around Walla Walla.

Kedzior: Yes. We also worked on the automated system of record keeping in the FDA.

Lofsvold: Was that while you were still at Seattle?

Kedzior: Shelby Grey's office had developed the initial automated system on T and P cards.
Lofsvold: Time and production reports?

Kedzior: I think so. That was the start. Now once they got started in that they figured that well maybe we can use this to work on other things, in terms of records or whatever within the Administration. And I can't remember whether they did anything back east with it initially or not. But I know that they sent us some instruction or asked us if we could work on this. What they wanted to do was to see whether we could convert work plans into an automated system. And someway or the other we got the job in Seattle. I was Chief Inspector there at the time. To help us in this they assigned a GSA National Archives man to work with us on this. I think we had one fellow there with us for a little while. Then someone else came to work with us and I can't recall whether this man was assigned to a regional office in Seattle or whether he came directly from Washington headquarters. He may have come from Washington headquarters. So this fellow came down and he and I worked together to design a system whereby we could incorporate into the IBM...the work plan into an IBM System. Well, wait a minute, let's go back. I think initially what we were doing was to try and convert the Flex-Site into an automated system.

Lofsvold: The manual records that we used to maintain on...

Kedzior: That was it...

Lofsvold: Samples and inspections.
Kedzior: That was the initial thing we wanted to do. Then we decided, well can we also design a work plan system through this automated approach. So initially we worked on the Flex-Site and then on the work plan and then eventually on the seizures and prosecutions, the legal action aspects of it to tie-in with the whole works. This is what Arnold got his award for. So we worked with this fellow for, I don't know a month or two months or longer and we tried one system. I think we worked with A. B. Dick; I think we worked with Burroughs and eventually we decided that the best one to use was IBM. We went to IBM and worked on the IBM System and eventually designed a program to incorporate all the information needed, designed a card and so forth. We ran a pilot in a military installation down there south of Seattle, forget the name of the fort.

Lofsvold: Fort Lewis?

Kedzior: Fort Lewis. That's where we went. We ran off a pilot over there.

Lofsvold: Using their equipment?

Kedzior: Using their equipment. And then... oh and what's his name came down to see all this... the Spaniard, bald headed fellow.

Lofsvold: Roman Davila, the FDA executive officer?

Kedzior: Davila came down and he spent several days with us, when we were at the final stages. And I think he went down
there to Fort Lewis with us too. So looked liked the system was well on its way to the... Then they took it back east and I think they put it as a pilot in Baltimore. I think Baltimore was the first to really implement the thing. So I'm responsible for, in a large measure, for having the input into the system and working with the man initially to design the works on this. Because I was the one closest to the Flex-Site, the work plan and so forth. So that's how that came about. And I've cussed it ever since.

Well, then when I went to Washington I was involved in going to visit the field districts to explain to them how the system works, and so forth and so on, when they began to work on it. We made trips to about a 1/2 dozen locations and some of those places they would gather the Chief Inspector and the Chief Clerk to the sessions from two or three different districts to come to one place and we would discuss it.

Lofsvold: I remember when you conducted one at Denver at that time.

Kedzior: Yes. I went to Denver, I went to San Francisco, Seattle, Dallas, New Orleans, Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago and I can't remember whether I was in Minneapolis, in Boston, Philadelphia, New York, I can't remember Cincinnati, I think I was in Kansas City. So I think I made it to... I don't think I was in L.A., I think L.A. came up in San Francisco. But... well anyway that's it.
I went to Washington in October 1963 and I worked under Lennington as sort of an assistant to the Chief Inspector. Shortly after I got there Garfield persuaded Rayfield to let me work with him on the automated Flex-Site and work plan projects that he started to put on with districts. So Rosalind Williams and Fred and myself and a computer man, I forget his name now, went together to New Orleans on the first one that I was engaged in. Fred put the program on with Rosalind and this was to...you might say bring the district on board as to the new system we were trying to implement...give them the rudiments of the operation and how it will work eventually. So from then on we visited about 1/2 dozen other districts, well maybe more than that over a period of about a month to a month and a half, to get this all into the works and get them a little knowledgeable about this before we actually start to implement it.

Then in January or February of 1964 they had the reorganization. BFA came into existence. When that came into existence I became Branch Chief of the Programs Branch, which had to deal with reviewing the field reports, and designing programs for the fields. The section out of Shelby Grey's office had come into our office.

Lofsvold: That was the...
Kedzior: Program Planning.
Lofsvold: For planning the programs for the...
Kedzior: For the field.
Lofsvold: For enforcement.
Kedzior: Yes, for the enforcement field and acquired also eventually the equivalent of BDAC in there, Lew Lasher and Karadimos.
Lofsvold: That would be the unit that was overseeing the fields activities in policing the drug sales...
Kedzior: Illegal sale of prescription drugs.
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: So I worked as Chief of that branch from that time until 1966, it was about September of 1966. In the meantime of course there had been some changes. Harvey retired in November or October of 1965. Larrick retired right after him and Rayfield retired right after him. Goddard came in in January of 1966, but in the meantime Shelby Grey's office was converted to the Bureau of Education and Voluntary Compliance and General Fred J. Delmore became the director of that bureau. And poor Shelby retired.
Lofsvold: When they organized, I believe Shelby was named as Deputy but was acting for a year or more before the General arrived.
Kedzior: Well, that could be I don't know when BEVC was organized.
Lofsvold: I think it was organized in that reorganization of 1964.
Kedzior: Well, it could be then. But he was heading it up until the General came on board you mean?

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: Okay.

Lofsvold: I think that he...

Kedzior: Oh that was a tough one for Shelby.

Lofsvold: Yes.

Kedzior: It should of never have been done to him, it should never have been done to him, that was too bad.

After Rayfield retired, we had a new change in our Division, our Bureau. Barnard became the Bureau Director, came over from BDAC and Garfield went to BDAC at that time. So this was sometime early in 1966. When Goddard came on board and Barnard came on board, the tendency was to get people who were familiar with management systems which required you to have some knowledge of data processing, automation and whatever. It was not for me. So one day when... Incidentally when the General first came on board he came up to see me, he said, "John how would you like to work for me?" This was while Rayfield was still on board. And the General came on board in I think it was about April or May of 1965. And I said, "Fred, I'm very happy in the job I got, I enjoy the work." I said, "No, I'm going to stay here". He said, "Okay, just thought I'd ask."
So then in August of 1966, Frank Clark comes over to see me. Frank was a deputy under Delmore. So Frank comes over to me and he said, "John how would you like to come over and work for the General?" I said, "Oh I don't know." he said, "The General really needs you." He said "The program is going to expand and we need you there." So I said, "Are you sure?" He said, "Yes." And I said, "Well, I'll think about it." So I thought about it and the more I thought about it the more I wanted to get out from under Barnard for one thing. And also to get out from under because he wanted to get rid of me so he could put somebody in there that Goddard wanted, and I couldn't blame him, he's the boss. He should have somebody that he wants because his boss wants him there. So I went over to see Barnard and I said, "Al, they want me to go over to BEVC and I know you'd like to get rid of me over here so if you don't mind I'll go over there." He said, "John, it takes a big load off my shoulders. Go with my blessing. You don't know how much this is helping me out." I said, "Well, I think I know how you feel and what you gotta do." So I went to the General and worked for him.

This probably was the best move I made. Those years that I spent in that aspect of FDA work were probably...next to my work at Seattle, were among the most enjoyable and fruitful years of my life. I mean here I have this opportunity to go from the enforcement side to the other side to help industry
meet these requirements without being an adversary in the deal. And I said...and I felt that there was a place for this in the administration which hadn't been explored enough. It hadn't been given a chance really and I had a good head-man in the General to do this. So I felt that this is going to be better. I was getting a lot of tension in the Program Branch. Recalls, the undercover work and things going wrong in the field and you get booted in the behind because you didn't handle it right, or didn't let Rayfield know about it and so forth and so on. So you always had crises. Every day something was not going right. So I felt that it was time to go to a place where it's going to be a little bit quieter and do something instead that you'll enjoy in a different way. So I took the job with Fred and I was never sorry. That's where I spent the last, what was it, I went there in 1966 and I left in 1974 so I had 8 good years over there.

Lofsvold: That was about when Delmore came in. Was that when you started the work with the pharmaceutical industry on good manufacturing practices or did that come a little later?

Kedzior: Well, I don't remember when the GMP's for the drug industry came out.

Lofsvold: I was thinking of the Zero Defects Program.

Kedzior: Oh well, the General was Zero Defect from the time he walked into the administration. We've got to remember that.
Lofsvold: It was something he learned in the military.
Kedzior: It was something that the military had adopted and with which he was involved very closely in his Fort Dietrich operation, Chemical Warfare Service.
Lofsvold: Wasn't he chief of the Chemical Warfare Service?
Kedzior: Oh yes. I mean he's a man, he's no dummy, he's a man who went as high as anybody that I know of from a reserve position, reserve unit position.
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: He was a reserve officer.
Lofsvold: A non-West Pointer.
Kedzior: Right!
Lofsvold: A reservist to boot.
Kedzior: Oh he did all right. You can't say the General didn't know what he was doing, he knew what he was doing. He was a smart man. The zero defects, of course, was not something that we took to very kindly. First of all it was not something that you could really implement with an industry over which you did not have that much control. The nearest thing that came to it, obviously, was when Goddard came in and he started on this self-certification. And Goddard pushed it because he felt it was something that the industry could look at and be proud of doing on their own. The only thing that they didn't get is the satisfaction that they could put it on their product. And I think Goddard when he initially started
this felt that maybe they would be able to do that because he
wasn't that familiar with the rigmarole within FDA, the red
tape within FDA.

Lofsvold: Also a section of the statute that said you can't
do that.

Kedzior: Well, I don't think that bothered him. That didn't
bother him, really. Statutes were made to be broken as far as
he was concerned. So the program worked well for a while and
I think the industry uses something essentially similar to
that now. But without as much interruption or interference on
our part. It was something that was started and it's
something that industry has followed under different names and
different procedures, but it basically leaves the monkey on
their backs and insures that they do it right the first time
and have the right procedures for doing it and checks and
balances so that things will come out right. So what they're
doing now is the hazard analysis, and the self-certification
which are now called quality assurance programs. These
industries...I don't think industry is ever going to give it
they're up, I think they're going to continue along that line and maybe
refine them even more as they go along. That aspect of it was
something that was started and given a big boost by Goddard, I
have to give him that much credit because without him we would
never have started them.
Lofsvold: Well, I think it squared with his general philosophy that we shouldn't rely on enforcement, in fact, as I remember, his stated philosophy was that if we did the education job properly eventually there would be no need for enforcement.

Kedzior: Well, it's just like the CDC, the basic philosophy behind PHS was to inform these people, health departments and so forth, to prevent; their codes, their standards that they were setting up were to prevent problems. That is their basic reasoning. It is good reasoning if you can get the industry to do it. It takes a long time for industry to accept it and do it.

Lofsvold: I always felt that you also needed the other side of the stick too...

Kedzior: Well, you've got to keep after them.

Lofsvold: Because certain ones would never be educated...

Kedzior: That's right, you can't let them alone. You have to, you might say, supervise, delegate and supervise.

Lofsvold: Push them, push them hard.

Kedzior: Get the old plank out, 2 x 4! Get their attention. Of course we got a big boost, as far as the bureau was concerned, when the salmonella in dry milk got going. That's what really got Goddard started. Because right after that when we had our annual meeting and all the directors were there and he made sure... He said, "You guys are going to go
out there and you're going to conduct these workshops and you're going to do this and I don't want to hear any ifs, ands or buts about it." He rammed it down their throats. You were there weren't you?
Lofsvold: Yes.
Kedzior: He rammed it down their throats. I think that's one reason they didn't like it.
Lofsvold: I was fortunate because we didn't have any dry milk manufacturers in our territory.
Kedzior: Oh yes. But that's where it got started and from then on we were doing very well and I felt that there were many industries that eventually became interested in developing good warehousing practices and good sanitation practices, for their elements in the business. I know the warehousemen did it, the pest control operators did it. When I worked with Phil Spear, and the warehousemen people, the NAWGA people in New York, the American Warehousemen Association in Chicago, they set up a program on their own. We worked with four major associations in the country, Grocery Manufacturers of America, National Canners Association, the American Frozen Food Institute and the National Fisheries Institute to prepare a slide series on basic sanitation and what could happen to your business if you didn't pay attention to good sanitary practices. Quaker Oats developed a film which was exceptionally good. It was all brought on as a result of all these activities that we
were pushing with industry, to do the job themselves, we would help them, but do the job.

Lofsvold: The bureau was mostly preparing the materials and suggested programs, although I think people from your office did sometime, usually in the initial ones for a particular industry, your people participated. After that it was kind of left up to the field people to take the material...

Kedzior: We participated initially and then...the reasoning at headquarters was that the field should become more involved in putting these programs on. We would coordinate and we would give assistance to the field but the field should take the major brunt of designing the program. We'd give them help, but the field would design the program, participate in the program, send out the invitations or whatever, give it the publicity and we would coordinate and assist in any way we could from headquarters. We would provide speakers from headquarters if they needed them. So that's how it worked, yes.

Lofsvold: How about the self-certification, was that run out of that bureau too?

Kedzior: It was run out of that bureau, yes. Early in the self-certification it was done by a special unit, I think out of the Commissioner's office. I think Frank Clark was involved in it early.

Lofsvold: Wasn't Curtis Joiner also, while he was there in headquarters?
Kedzior: Well yes, yes he did.
Lofsvold: I think that really...
Kedzior: Well, there was...and Hart.
Lofsvold: Sam Hart.
Kedzior: Sam Hart, out of Chicago, he was involved in it early. Then later on Kleks was in L.A. and he, I think he was in with Nat Geary. But anyway then when it went out of the pilot stage, it would begin to develop the programs within the bureau. The bureau was given responsibility to then carry the ball, once General Foods got it under way, got the kinks out of it and everything, then we had a special unit, self-certification unit they called it, installed in our group and Nat Geary was heading it up. And then we got Majorak. The General hired Majorak from Heinz to be a part of that, and then it became the Quality Assurance Branch. And Nat went over to another office for a while and then he came back and he ended up...we had a Division of Industry Programs or something like that which handled industry compliance and then eventually they broke that up. We were then under the Division of Programs, under Mary Dolan.
Lofsvold: Well, that was after the reorganization.
Kedzior: Oh, yes.
Lofsvold: In '69 we created the Bureau of Foods and the function was kind of spread among the bureaus then.
Kedzior: Yes.
Lofsvold: John, in these interviews one of the things that we've been asking everyone is to give us some of their thoughts on people who ran the organization at various times during their time, Commissioners and other top officials. Something about their personalities, their management style, anything else that kind of shed some light on what kind of people they were, could you do that with some of the Commissioners first?

Kedzior: Well, my contacts with the Commissioners were relatively minimal, so that my appraisal of their management style or their personalities wouldn't be really a good appraisal, it wouldn't do justice to the individuals. Having seen or been in anyway in contact with them for short periods. For instance Harvey, I saw maybe two or three times other then just seeing him in the corridors.

Lofsvold: Jack Harvey, the Deputy Commissioner under Larrick.

Kedzior: Yes, seeing him in the corridors. I played in the poker games that he played in, one time, and obviously he enjoys poker and he's a good poker player. A lot better than I am. But he made a presentation at one or two of our meetings when I was a Chief Inspector and they were very good. I mean a great speaker, his material was excellent. He impressed me as being a very knowledgeable individual. Now with respect to any other asset or facets to his personality I have no idea. He had to be very good to get where he was.
Now Larrick, I met him a few times. My impression of him was that he may not have been as assertive as Harvey but I got the feeling for him to become Commissioner he had to have either some clout somewhere or he had to have some high degree of intelligence, in terms of managing things, to become a Commissioner. And he probably had to have some political pull somewhere along the line, to get where he was.

Now the Commissioners that came later, like Goddard, Ley, Schmidt, Edwards and Schmidt.

Well, Goddard was... I guess I saw him a few times and heard him speak to us several times more than some of the other Commissioners really. But my impression of Goddard basically was that Jim was Goddard-for-Goddard. That's all I can say. I mean everything that he did was to promote himself within the organization for something better, later on. It didn't work out that way but that was what he intended to do.

Dr. Ley was well he was the beneficiary of whatever Goddard left for him. I found Dr. Ley to be a very fine man. I guess I had more contact with him than with the others and I found him to be a very intelligent and very fair. And he was willing to listen to your program needs and so forth. In fact he was the only Commissioner, of those that I had over there, that actually sat down with each group, within a bureau, and had a session with them. He was the only one who did that. He listened to your programs and what you do, what
you think about them, what you think you need and so forth. He didn't last very long, but he was the only one who did it.

Edwards was more or less interested in promoting himself and I had very little contact with him.

Schmidt wasn't there very long and a lot of people didn't think very much of him, but I considered Schmidt an exceptionally fine person, personally. I wanted to see him when I was retiring. He had an office over in the building at 200 C Street, the old Food and Drug building. I called his secretary to ask her if I could see him for a while and she said, "Yes, come on up, he'd be glad to see you." So I actually had a chance to see a Commissioner, sit down in his office and tell him that I was retiring and that I wanted to wish him well in his job and so forth. I enjoyed working for him. He actually spent 1/2 hour with me, I mean what can you think of a man who does this, he's got to be a fine individual, regardless of what you think about him in terms of his knowledge of the organization or other things he did. He was like an old shoe! You could be comfortable with him. I couldn't feel that way with any of the others, not really.

Dr. Virgil Wodicka was another one I enjoyed very much. He was the Bureau Director, Virgil Wodicka.

Lofsvold: Director of the Bureau of Foods.

Kedzior: Yes, I thought he was great and I would see him quite often, he would say, "How are you John, how's your
family?" I said, "How's yours?" and so forth. I saw him before I retired, too and he told me about his plans, what his plans were for retirement. So when you have people like that working, well you feel closer to the organization.

Well, as far as some of the other people I worked for. Rayfield, I guess I had mixed feeling about Rayfield initially when I began to work under him. And he was a hard taskmaster. One thing for sure he was very fair and he would do anything for his people, and he treated his girls especially well. His secretary would swear by him, she said, "Oh Mr. Rayfield is a wonderful person." And he apparently was very very nice, very attentive and very considerate of his immediate staff. It was those further up that he gave hell to. And he gave plenty of hell but in most cases they deserved it.

Oh yes, I enjoyed working in Washington, working under him, it was a trial, a tribulation but it was enjoyable.

Then, of course, I have to say a word about the General. He's a personal friend of mine, but besides that he's a very helpful individual, he's a very patient individual and to me he was the right man to serve as a liaison between the administration and industry in helping to bring them together and, not sort of, keep them apart. He was perfect for the job of instilling a cooperative attitude on the part of industry to work with FDA, to develop programs to assist them to a point.
Lofsvold: Do you think that he did that job better than say some...well like Shelby Grey?
Kedzior: Oh yes.
Lofsvold: Who had spent his entire time in enforcement?
Kedzior: Yes.
Lofsvold: Mr. Larrick made the right decision?
Kedzior: I think he did. There has to be a certain fundamental character in individuals that will permit them to work for one aspect of an operation which is an adversary aspect, and then to change and then be able to work the other aspect just as sincerely and effectively as he did the other one. There aren't very many individuals who can do that. And I know the General is one of them. He could do that. I think that I could do that. And that's why I enjoyed the work.

I enjoyed the investigative work tremendously. I enjoyed training inspectors to do it, to be investigators. I enjoyed the work that involved overseeing field investigations and I enjoyed doing work that said to the District offices, "Hey let's work with these guys. Let's see what we can get. See if they'll cooperate." I don't mean to say you just let them run on their own, but let's give them a chance, see what will work out. It may be a lot easier on us eventually, if we instill in them the desire to do the things that need to be done to keep from getting into trouble, that was it. Simple, but not everybody could do that, not everybody has the feeling that it'll work.
When I was working in Kentucky, as an example, we would work undercover drug deals. Kentucky was the first place... well New York I did a little bit but Kentucky I did it on my own, go out to make buys in pharmacies. Well, I received a kind of indoctrination in the Cincinnati District Office from the people there. One of the things they told me there, "Don't trust those bastards in Sarah Vance Dugan's office, they're not reliable, don't give them any information," and so forth and so on. So I thought to myself, how can I work with these people if I have the feeling that I can't trust them. Maybe I could be circumspect in not giving away information and maybe I need to find out if they can be trusted or not. But to make a statement like that about an organization made me feel like, well I can't work like that because my feeling from the time I came to work for FDA and went to work in Waterbury my feeling was that you've got to work with the cooperators that you're going to call on to help you. You can't just work a one way street, you got to help them if you expect help from them.

So when I worked with the people in Hartford for the state or for the city in New Haven or Bridgeport, I worked with them, not against them. Or had them work for me and I didn't do anything for them. This is the same feeling, unfortunately, a lot of the FDA people, from way back then, wouldn't trust the state people, or city people. Well, how
can you work with them. You can't. The same goes when you're working with industry you've got to have a certain amount of trust. Give them a chance and see what happens.

So back there in Kentucky I thought it was a rather, you know, narrow minded, narrow viewpoint and that viewpoint starts with the top man not with those underneath, it starts with the top man. Now mind you, Rayfield wouldn't trust these people, he wouldn't trust the state people in certain places and if he knew how I worked with some of these people he'd probably ream my rear. But he didn't know and yet when I left Connecticut they wrote a letter to the Administration telling them what great cooperation they had from me and they're sorry I'm leaving. You think it takes an effect on them. Well, that's the point. I used to tell Butch, "If they would only make me head of the Federal-State Relations Operations in the Administration they'd have an entirely different approach to enforcement and cooperation with the states." Of course they have gotten it now, they became a hell of a lot better after they got some state people in there. So that's, well that's my dissertation on personalities.

Lofsvold: John, if you have nothing further to record, I guess we can sign this off. It's been a rather exhausting day for you but I certainly want to tell you that your contribution is one of the best that we've had and I'm sure it will be very useful in this series of Food and Drug interviews.