The case for reconsidering the FDA
restriction on the use of cells, tissues and tissue products
from individuals having resided in Europe for 5 or more years
In
May 2004 the FDA finalized its Guidance on Human Cells, Tissues and Tissue
Products in relation to the risk of contracting variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (vCJD). The WHO
subsequently held a Consultation in September 2005 and issued a document in
July 2006 entitled ÔWHO Guidelines on Tissue Infectivity Distribution in
Transmissible Spongiform EncephalopathiesÕ.
vCJD
tissue risk is a function of: 1) geographic location of donor; 2) tissue
infectivity level;
3) tissue processing; 4) route of administration; and 5) total amount of
administered tissue. However, the
FDA Guidance essentially addresses only the issue of geographic location,
as a measure of the risk of exposure to BSE, and recommended exclusion of all
tissues from individuals with a residence of 3 or more months in the UK, and 5
or more years in all countries of continental Europe. As a consequence, these criteria exclude
the use of tissues and tissue products from the entire European population.
One
example of an excluded tissue is sperm from European donors, including sperm
collected by Nordisk Cryobank, located in Denmark. Taking the above-mentioned risk factors in order, we make
the following observations:
1)
Geographic source. Denmark has
had a systematic active surveillance of BSE for 7 years and of CJD for 10
years. During this time, a total
of 14 cases of BSE have been identified, with decreasing numbers each year (and
none in 2006), and among 54 cases of CJD, none have had the variant form of
disease. In fact, there are only 5
non-French cases of vCJD in all of continental Europe, and to consider France
and other European countries as a single group is illogical. It is also worth noting that Canada
during this same period (and with far less systematic surveillance) has
identified 9 cases of BSE, including one in 2006, and as in Denmark, no cases
of vCJD, yet the FDA has not thought it necessary to restrict tissue donations
from the Canadian population.
2)
Tissue infecivity level. The
WHO expert panel constructed a table of infectivity and prion protein
distribution summarizing the current state of knowledge for human TSEs, BSE,
and scrapie, from which the section on reproductive tissues is attached. All experimental attempts to transmit
disease from reproductive tissues, including semen, in cattle with BSE and
sheep with scrapie have failed, as have limited attempts to transmit disease in
humans wtih TSE; and disease-associated prion protein has been undetected in
both animal and human forms of disease.
Epidemiological observations provide further impressive support for the
absence of infectivity in sperm, as several decades of searching have failed to
reveal a single incident of vertical transmission of TSE in either humans or
animals. Interestingly, the USDA
permits the importation of bovine sperm, even from the UK, if several criteria
are met that minimize the possibility of an infected donor: these do not
include travel histories.
3)
Tissue processing. In blood,
leukocytes have been consistently shown to contain the highest concentration of
infectivity, and there is some experimental evidence (Rohwer, 2006) that simple
washing significantly reduces the infectivity associated with leukocytes. The protocol for extracting sperm from
semen includes a density gradient step that reduces the white cell population
from 1-2 million/ml to undetectable levels (under 10,000/ml). The collected fraction
is then subjected to a wash in culture medium.
4)
Route of administration.
Venereal transmission of disease has not been adequately studied
experimentally, but epidemiological evidence indicates that it does not occur.
5)
Total amount of administered tissue.
Infectious tissue can be administered by a peripheral route in a single
dose that is too small (or too diluted) to transmit disease, although repeated
sub-transmissible doses have been shown to overcome this failure. A typical insemination uses one sixth
(0.5 ml) of the semen processed from a single donation.
A
consideration of all of the above information leads to the conclusion that
sperm donated from healthy young individuals living in Denmark does not pose a
risk of vCJD transmission, and that its exclusion from use in the US is
unwarranted, and should be reconsidered by the FDA.
Table 1C. Tissues with no detected infectivity
|
Tissues |
Human
TSEs |
Cattle |
Sheep
& goats |
|||||
|
|
vCJD |
Other
TSEs |
BSE |
Scrapie |
||||
|
|
Infectivity |
PrPTSE |
Infectivity |
PrPTSE |
Infectivity |
PrPTSE |
Infectivity |
PrPTSE |
|
Reproductive tissues |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Testis |
NT |
- |
(-) |
- |
- |
NT |
- |
NT |
|
Prostate/
Epididymis/ Seminal vesicle |
NT |
- |
(-) |
- |
- |
NT |
- |
NT |
|
Semen |
NT |
- |
(-) |
- |
- |
NT |
- |
NT |
|
Ovary |
NT |
- |
NT |
- |
- |
NT |
- |
NT |
|
Uterus
(Non-gravid) |
NT |
- |
NT |
- |
- |
NT |
- |
NT |
|
Placenta
fluids |
NT |
NT |
(-) |
NT |
- |
NT |
NT |
NT |
|
Fetus14 |
NT |
NT |
NT |
NT |
- |
NT |
- |
- |
|
Embryos14 |
NT |
NT |
NT |
NT |
- |
NT |
? |
NT |
NT = Not Tested; parentheses indicate limited data