

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

BLOOD PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

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Gaithersburg, Maryland

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Welcome, Statement of Conflict of Interest,
3 Announcements

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Good morning. Welcome to
5 the 75th meeting of the Blood Products Advisory
6 Committee, the longest running series in the FDA
7 history.

8 I am Linda Smallwood, the Executive
9 Secretary. At this time, I will read for you the
10 Conflict of Interest Statement that applies to this
11 meeting.

12 This announcement is part of the public
13 record for the Blood Products Advisory Committee
14 meeting on December 12th, 2002.

15 Pursuant to the authority granted under
16 the Committee Charter, the Director of FDA's Center
17 for Biologics Evaluation and Research has appointed
18 Dr. Liana Harvath as a temporary voting member.

19 Based on the agenda, it has been
20 determined that there are no products being
21 approved at this meeting. The committee
22 participants have been screened for their financial
23 interests. To determine if any conflicts of
24 interest existed, the agency reviewed the agenda
25 and all relevant financial interests reported by

1 the meeting participants.

2 The Food and Drug Administration has
3 prepared general matter waivers for the special
4 government employees participating in this meeting
5 who required a waiver under Code 18, Section 208.

6 Because general topics impact on so many
7 entities, it is not prudent to recite all potential
8 conflicts of interest as they apply to each member.
9 FDA acknowledges that there may be potential
10 conflicts of interest, but because of the general
11 nature of the discussions before the committee,
12 these potential conflicts are mitigated.

13 We would like to note for the record that
14 Dr. Toby Simon is participating in this meeting as
15 the Acting Non-Voting Industry Representative
16 acting on behalf of regulated industry.

17 With regard to FDA's invited guests, the
18 agency has determined that the services of these
19 guests are essential. There are interests that are
20 being made public to allow meeting participants to
21 objectively evaluate any presentation and/or
22 comments made by the guests.

23 For the discussions on bacterial
24 contamination, Dr. James Aubuchon has reported that
25 he is a researcher on bacterial contamination. He

1 has spoken on behalf of Pall Corporation and he is
2 a member of the Medical Advisory Board for Verax.

3 Dr. Stephen Wagner is the Director of Cell
4 Therapy, American Red Cross, Holland Laboratory.
5 He also received a research grant from Organon
6 Technika for the detection of bacteria in
7 platelets.

8 In addition, there are speakers making
9 industry presentations and speakers giving
10 committee updates from regulated industry and other
11 outside organizations. These speakers have
12 financial interests associated with their employer
13 and with other regulated firms. They were not
14 screened for these conflicts of interest.

15 FDA participants are aware of the need to
16 exclude themselves from the discussions involving
17 specific products or firms for which they have not
18 been screened for conflicts of interest. Their
19 exclusion will be noted for the public record.

20 With respect to all other meeting
21 participants, we ask, in the interest of fairness,
22 that you state your name, affiliation, and address
23 any current or previous financial involvement with
24 any firm whose products you wish to comment upon.

25 Waivers are available by written request

1 under the Freedom of Information Act.

2 At this time, I would like to ask are
3 there any declarations that need to be made before
4 we proceed with this meeting.

5 Hearing none, I would just make a brief
6 announcement that outside you should have found a
7 sheet that listed the tentative dates of the Blood
8 Products Advisory Committee meetings for the year
9 2003.

10 I hope that you will make a note on your
11 calendar to hold these dates, but we will advise
12 you when we have confirmed them.

13 At this time, I would like to introduce to
14 you the members of the Blood Products Advisory
15 Committee. As I call the names of the members,
16 would you please raise your hand.

17 Dr. Kenrad Nelson, Chairman. Dr. Lori
18 Styles. Dr. Paul Schmidt. Dr. Harvey Klein. Dr.
19 Liana Harvath. Dr. James Allen. Dr. Sherri
20 Stuver. Dr. Robert Fallat. Dr. Toby Simon. Dr.
21 Donna DiMichele. Dr. Mary Chamberland. Dr. Samuel
22 Doppelt. Dr. Fitzpatrick. Dr. Judy Lew.

23 As you may have noticed, we have a very
24 full agenda today, very full. We will try to keep
25 on time and we will ask everyone's cooperation in

1 doing so.

2 At this time, I would like to turn the
3 proceedings of the meeting over to the Chairman,
4 Dr. Kenrad Nelson.

5 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Smallwood.

6 The first item on the agenda are some
7 committee updates.

8 First, Dr. Hira Nakhasi is going to
9 summarize a Workshop on West Nile Virus that was
10 held in November.

11 Committee Updates

12 Summary of Workshop on West Nile Virus

13 November 4-5, 2002

14 Hira Nakhasi, Ph.D.

15 DR. NAKHASI: Good morning. Thank you,
16 Dr. Nelson. Since Linda said there is a full
17 schedule today, it will be 6 o'clock is the regular
18 time, I don't know how long we will be here, but I
19 will try not to contribute to the delay and go
20 right away into giving my update.

21 [Slide.]

22 This update is on the workshop which we
23 held on November 4th and 5th, and many of you
24 attended that workshop, and this was on the
25 Development of Donor Screening Assays for West Nile

1 Virus.

2 This workshop was in response to the
3 recent epidemic in the epidemic 2002, and we wanted
4 to see how we could understand what the epidemic is
5 and how we can get the methodologies in testing
6 soon developed and to screen the blood for the West
7 Nile Virus.

8 [Slide.]

9 The goals of this workshop were as such,
10 as pointed out here, we wanted to know what is
11 going on with the current status on the West Nile
12 pathogenesis and epidemiology in the U.S., and
13 wanted to know what are the methodologies suitable
14 for blood and tissue donor screening, and wanted to
15 know from the industry perspective are they ready
16 for testing in a large-scale screening mode.

17 Also, we wanted to hear from the
18 manufacturers about the inactivation process in the
19 blood products. We also wanted to hear from the
20 proposed studies on prevalence and donors, and how
21 this test would be licensed and FDA's expectation
22 from that, and issues relevant to the
23 implementation of the West Nile Virus.

24 It was a two-day full agenda, very
25 interesting. There were a lot of discussions, but

1 before I go to what we achieved from that meeting,
2 I just want to give you a little bit of background
3 for the people who may not know about West Nile
4 Virus.

5 [Slide.]

6 The West Nile is a mosquito-borne
7 flavivirus. It has a positive strand RNA and
8 primarily infects birds, but horses and humans are
9 incidental hosts.

10 About 80 percent of the infected persons
11 remain asymptomatic, and the rest, 20 percent,
12 develop mild febrile illness, flu-like symptoms.
13 In that, approximately 1 in 150 infected people
14 develop meningitis or encephalitis.

15 The viremic period can occur up to two
16 weeks, but it is sometimes a very short period, but
17 can also last for almost a month.

18 [Slide.]

19 Blood transmission of West Nile has been
20 confirmed in the recent U.S. outbreak, and I will
21 go into a little later about the cases. However,
22 the magnitude of the risk of West Nile from
23 transfusion is unknown at this time.

24 Again, the problem with this virus is that
25 it is a very low titer virus compared to other

1 viruses like HIV and HCV, 103 copies/ml. It is, as
2 I said, viremia is transient, however, in some of
3 these encephalitis patients, the viremia can be as
4 high as 106 copies/ml.

5 The viremia resolves rapidly after
6 seroconversion to IgM, and IgM can persist as long
7 as one year. West Nile infection does not become
8 chronic.

9 [Slide.]

10 The current status of West Nile as of last
11 week, what we saw from the CDC/MMRW report, in
12 2002, the total number of West Nile cases reported
13 was 3,775, of which 216 deaths have occurred.

14 The whole of the U.S. is practically
15 endemic except in a few states in the West even
16 though one case was found in L.A., but the majority
17 of the United States is endemic.

18 [Slide.]

19 Viremia begins one to five days before the
20 onset of symptoms and can last an average of six
21 days. As I said earlier, you can go up to two
22 weeks or 14 days.

23 The estimated risk at this time, Lyle
24 Peterson from CDC had published a paper this year
25 of one and two infections per 10,000 donations

1 nationwide, however, in highly endemic regions
2 where the activity is very high, 16 at the peak of
3 the epidemic, was 16 per 10,000 with a mean of 68,
4 because as I will say here, it can go from late
5 August to late September, and that is the range
6 there.

7 So far, 47 possible
8 transfusion-transmitted cases have been reported.
9 Out of that, 13 have been confirmed, 14 were not
10 transfusion related, the rest are under
11 investigation still going on at CDC.

12 [Slide.]

13 Then, people presented, researchers
14 presented data on the methodologies which are
15 suitable for blood and tissue donor screening.

16 Both serological and nucleic acid based
17 tests were discussed. Basically, the serological
18 or IgM antibody assay, people have used recombinant
19 antigen, but these are all research assays at this
20 time, so mind you that they are not being used in a
21 clinical setting, in a trial setting.

22 Some of these serological assays use
23 recombinant antigen, can cross-react with other
24 cousins of West Nile, like St. Louis encephalitis,
25 dengue, and Japanese encephalitis, that is what we

1 heard, however, this test could be used in a high
2 throughput assay, low specimen volume, and can be
3 multiplex, short turnaround, and can be adapted to
4 the platforms which are existing already for
5 serological testing for other components.

6 The nucleic acid tests, there are many PCR
7 based, there are standard PCR, Taqman PCR, and
8 NASBA, but what came out of the meeting, that
9 Taqman, real-time PCR is the most sensitive at this
10 time and equal to NASBA.

11 It could be used in the high throughput
12 setting and detection limits are 15 plaque-forming
13 units/ml to 15,000, however, in some of the cases,
14 we heard also it can go 0.1 plaque-forming
15 units/ml.

16 The caveat here is these tests so far,
17 what we have is the human viremia is around 18 PFU.
18 It is basically towards the tail end, and the lower
19 limit of it, but then we recently heard, which I
20 will maybe talk about down the road, that CDC has
21 come up with a much more sensitive test, which is
22 10-fold sensitive and can, by making such a
23 modification concentrate, increase the volume of
24 the sample and also making other changes in
25 extraction.

1 But we heard that minipool NAT, detection
2 rate is only 50 percent, and need to adapt smaller
3 pools. Sue Stramer and ARC pointed out that even
4 smaller, eight pools could be better, but maybe it
5 may go to the usual NAT also.

6 [Slide.]

7 Again, there were some other issues. I
8 don't want to go into detail of these things
9 basically, because what we were told earlier, what
10 we knew, that the West Nile Virus, once the virus
11 is resolved, the antibody comes out, the viremia is
12 resolved, but there are cases where RNA can be
13 detected in the presence of antibody.

14 Again, under the caveat is that West Nile
15 IgM can remain positive for one year longer without
16 any infective, and whether there is infective,
17 people do not know.

18 It looks like NAT could be the preferred
19 choice for testing, however, IgM assays have also a
20 role to play, the serological assays may have a
21 role to play in confirmation of NAT results or
22 seroconversion studies.

23 Also, it was discussed that if we screen
24 blood, it will have a strong impact on tissue and
25 organ donation and screening it.

1 Again, there was emphasis, which I will
2 talk a little later, that we may have to have
3 developed tests which are suitable for cadaveric
4 samples. Then, there are some activities going on
5 in the panel development, I will talk a little bit
6 later.

7 [Slide.]

8 The industry presented their data, which
9 was basically plan and not much information. NGI
10 presented some data where they have a NAT test
11 which has sensitivity of 100 copies/ml with the
12 range of 10 to 200 copies.

13 We heard that they had screened a large
14 number of some samples, and the prevalence rate was
15 1 in 8,000, and one of the samples was very high
16 titer donation and could result in pools of 64 and
17 512.

18 We also heard from GenProbe that they have
19 a test development validating their tests using
20 synthetic RNA, and the detection was 7.6 copies/ml.
21 They are still working, we may hear maybe they have
22 some information during the open discussion, that
23 they are working on selecting the primers where
24 they can use it. They are still in that mode.

25 Roche presented some data, which is

1 basically the plan, no data, and then basically the
2 development of tests, everybody agreed that it will
3 be IND/BLA mechanisms. The validation of these
4 tests will be at the beginning of 2003 and IND by
5 the middle of 2003.

6 [Slide.]

7 We heard about the virus inactivation
8 process strategies and several manufacturers
9 presented data on using the currently used
10 inactivation processes like psoralen, riboflavin,
11 Inactine treatment of various blood components, and
12 they also tested in West Nile, inactivation in that
13 process, and they could inactivate more than 4
14 logs.

15 Therefore, on that basis, some people felt
16 that they may not need to demonstrate West Nile
17 Virus specific inactivation, however, other people,
18 an equal number have held that it will be having
19 showing West Nile Virus specific inactivation would
20 also add a layer of safety similar to like HIV and
21 HCV.

22 It is known that whenever there is an
23 agent which we can culture and show that it can be
24 specifically inactivated, it is FDA's understanding
25 that we should use and show specific virus,

1 specific inactivation.

2 However, there are caveats to these
3 inactivation processes, such as adverse events
4 which will be due to the products have been treated
5 with such, such as immunological reactivity,
6 increased sensitivity of blood cells to other
7 drugs, specificity of inactivation between
8 pathogens and hosts.

9 It was agreed upon that studies are needed
10 to assess the risk of this inactivation process on
11 blood products.

12 [Slide.]

13 Then, we heard about the proposed studies.
14 There were several studies talked about, and there
15 have been changes going on since we heard about
16 studies. Now, we have heard that the ARC is
17 conducting a linked study of a large number of
18 samples, of 85,000, out of which 7,000 are going to
19 be tested under the CDC, and will be tested by
20 CDC's sensitive method which I described just a few
21 moments ago.

22 Then, those samples will be tested by
23 GenProbe's test, and these samples are linked.

24 Also, there is a research study under
25 RADAR, which is REDS/TRIPS, but the samples are

1 small. This is mostly going to be IgM sero problem
2 studies, and finding out from that, sero problems
3 in their samples, those seropositive samples will
4 be tested for NAT using several NATs.

5 Then, the other study is the Roche
6 samples. Roche has a large number of samples again
7 collected through moderate, low, and high epidemic
8 areas, and we have not heard anything about what is
9 going on with that.

10 But the objective of all these studies was
11 to really see the prevalence of viremia, compare
12 minipool versus individual NAT, confirm viremia by
13 IgM and RNA testing of donor follow-up samples, and
14 then develop analytical-sensitive panels, compare
15 West Nile, RNA, and IgM assays, and also incidence
16 rate of transfusion-transmission of West Nile, and
17 exposure to recipients by testing autologous
18 donations for IgM reactivity.

19 These prevalence studies, we were told
20 that it will be done in two phases, Phase I, where
21 the performance of candidate West Nile RNA assays
22 will be validated against the benchmark, which is
23 the CDC NAT (50 geq/ml at 50 percent detection
24 limit), which will be 100 geq/ml at 100 percent
25 detection levels. We were told that the completion

1 will be in the first quarter of 2003, that is to
2 perform validation of these tests.

3 Then, Phase II is testing the samples by
4 the middle of 2003 under IND.

5 [Slide.]

6 Here, we at CBER-FDA also have some effort
7 going on with, first of all, there is several
8 efforts actually, not some, several efforts going
9 on. One is the development of reference panels for
10 lot release testing, and these we are taking the
11 virus from the CDC, culturing that, and then
12 spiking into the naive blood and then that panel
13 will be distributed among different groups and
14 tested to see how these tests will perform.

15 Then, we are also developing an in-house
16 Taqman PCR and IgM assays to basically compare with
17 CDC's, because many times we have to do
18 investigational tests in-house, too, so we want to
19 have the capability of the testing in-house, too.

20 The objective is basically to study viral
21 dynamics, infection dose, distribution in the blood
22 components, viral tropism, correlation between
23 viral strains and infectious outcome.

24 [Slide.]

25 Then, we discussed about the regulatory

1 pathway for these assay developments, and a few of
2 these slides are directly stolen from Jay's
3 presentation to AABB. The donor screening and
4 supplemental tests will be reviewed as biological
5 products under the PHS Act, and will be through
6 IND/BLA process.

7 The instrument part and the software
8 portion of this application will require separate
9 510(k) submission. You have heard in a couple of
10 BPAC's earlier that a licensed test used for
11 screening donors has been determined to be a major
12 level of concern, so we need whatever is necessary
13 for the submission to 510(k) has a major level of
14 concern which is given in this guidance, has to be
15 part of that.

16 Also, last October, we used an FDA
17 guidance, which talks about the current thinking on
18 management of donors and products.

19 [Slide.]

20 Obviously, to the audience, I don't have
21 to teach all this, what is needed for the
22 validation of these tests, and also what are the
23 needs for the clinical tests, so I don't want to go
24 into detail there.

25 [Slide.]

1 There has been transmission through organ
2 donations. There was quite a bit of discussion
3 about what tests would be needed and how would we
4 protect the organ donations. Again, this slide has
5 been taken from Jay's slides.

6 The screening of tissue donors will come
7 under FDA regulation after publication of a final
8 rule on donor eligibility as proposed FDA rule
9 would require approved donor screening tests for
10 organ donations, and therefore, a need exists to
11 show the effectiveness of West Nile Virus screening
12 in the cadaveric blood samples.

13 Even though the solid organs and bone
14 marrow are regulated by HRSA, FDA approves the
15 tests which are commercially available.

16 [Slide.]

17 So, FDA's current thinking is to recommend
18 routine use of licensed donor screening tests to
19 detect donor infections, possible use of donor
20 screening tests under IND. It would be built on
21 existing platforms, validation in donor screening
22 environment, adequate sensitivity to detect low
23 level of viremia, and possible need for individual
24 unit NAT.

25 Again, will encourage the technologies,

1 such as viral concentration, which CDC is doing,
2 because as I told you, the virus load is much, much
3 lower, so to increase the sensitivity and then the
4 development of reference panels to standardize
5 different tests.

6 [Slide.]

7 Then, there was quite a bit of discussion
8 on the implementation, rightfully so, from
9 industry, how would we implement these tests, and
10 there are a lot of issues which are relevant to
11 that, logistic issues, and again, some of these
12 have been taken directly from ARC's, Sue Stramer's
13 presentation, which she described that there is the
14 need to SOP modification, process qualification,
15 space is a problem because there has to be enough
16 room for other tests by medical information
17 systems, which transfers the information, it is
18 getting overloaded, how do we do that, and impact
19 on the scheduled release of other tests because
20 there are also other tests, which you will hear
21 this afternoon, Parvo B19, Chagas, and other tests,
22 individual NAT, so how are we going to implement
23 all this on top of the other things.

24 The other issues that were discussed, the
25 testing, how will the testing be done, because we

1 heard this epidemic is during certain period of the
2 year, and will testing be done seasonal versus
3 year-round, geographical versus national testing,
4 individual versus minipool, do we need to test
5 other related viruses because SLE, JE, and other
6 infections have been also shown to occur and are
7 related, transmitted through the blood, do we need
8 to test those guys, and what have we learned from
9 the past, for example, St. Louis encephalitis
10 epidemic and what happened, can we think about that
11 model and applied to this one.

12 Those are all hypothetical questions and
13 we need to think about it and apply estimated risks
14 to determine the need for donor screening. So,
15 these were the issues in the implementation
16 section.

17 [Slide.]

18 So, the general conclusions obviously were
19 that we need to have specific tests, we need to
20 determine what is the infectious dose of the virus.
21 We need to know what components of the blood
22 transmit this infectivity. We also need to know
23 how these infectious agents survive in blood
24 banking storage conditions.

25 We also need to have confirmatory tests

1 because this will be screened, we need to have a
2 confirmatory test. How does it cross-check with
3 other flaviviruses, or if there is a cross-check,
4 do we need that type of test, multiplexing of these
5 tests.

6 We also need to find out the estimated
7 risk and then the cost of implementation.
8 Obviously, FDA is not obligated regarding the cost,
9 but obviously, we need to think in that direction,
10 too.

11 [Slide.]

12 So, the general conclusion was that
13 really, you know, I was very much impressed by the
14 close cooperation between FDA, PHS, device
15 manufacturers, and blood organizations, which they
16 came all together in a very positive way to say
17 that we need to develop NAT screening tests for the
18 West Nile Virus, whether it is nucleic acid based
19 or whether it is serological.

20 Testing will start under IND by the next
21 West Nile Virus epidemic, I hope so, and meanwhile,
22 the safety of the blood supply can be ensured in
23 procedures which are in place in blood banking
24 practices, and currently, FDA has issued a guidance
25 for current thinking on management of donors and

1 products.

2 Hopefully, we will see an outcome in the
3 middle of next year about this testing.

4 Thank you very much.

5 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Nakhasi.

6 Any questions, comments? Judy.

7 DR. LEW: I just wanted to ask, can you
8 clarify when you say 1 in 150 infected persons
9 develop meningitis or encephalitis, is that 1 in
10 150 symptomatic or overall?

11 DR. NAKHASI: Yes, 150 infected people.

12 DR. LEW: Well, infected is different from
13 symptomatic.

14 DR. NAKHASI: I think it's symptomatic, is
15 that correct - no, infected, yes.

16 DR. SIMON: On the presentation that we
17 heard at the last meeting from the CDC, they
18 indicated that we were, at that time, thought to be
19 about halfway through this particular epidemic, and
20 I wonder, is there consideration that we might be
21 at a point when this test is introduced that the
22 risk has fallen to a low level, and how do you
23 assess that risk going forward?

24 In other words, we will be introducing the
25 test after the time period during which it might

1 have been useful.

2 DR. NAKHASI: I am sorry, I didn't get the
3 exact question.

4 DR. SIMON: What I am wondering is by the
5 time the test is introduced, will we have passed
6 through the period of risk and be at a point where
7 the risk is so low, that there will be little value
8 to the test.

9 DR. NAKHASI: If we are aiming at around
10 maybe hopefully in June or so, and I think the
11 epidemic which we had, the peak is between late
12 August to late September, so I think the test, if
13 it is introduced around that time, if we have a
14 test available, it will not be past that time, so
15 it will be before that even though there are some
16 cases as early as in May sometimes. I believe that
17 we will have a test which may be before that.

18 Jay, do you want to say something?

19 DR. EPSTEIN: Toby, I think you are
20 suggesting that we may have had our epidemic, but
21 no one can really predict what will happen in the
22 next mosquito season, but the expectation is that
23 we may see another epidemic of West Nile Virus with
24 human infections in 2003, so the whole concept is
25 to try to have a test available at least at the

1 investigational level prior to or at the onset of
2 that season, but no one can predict what that
3 season will look like.

4 DR. NAKHASI: I hope that there is not,
5 you know, we will see how the things are going, but
6 if the predictions are that, you know, since 1999,
7 the epidemics have ranged in the summer months, so
8 even though in 1999, it was much more localized in
9 the New York area, but then, 2000 and 2001, it was
10 less, but in 2002, it took off. Who knows what
11 will happen?

12 Again, that is the reason I suggested that
13 we need to think about from our past experiences,
14 like SLE epidemics, it was 1977 or 1976, there was
15 a higher epidemic than the following year, there
16 was very little, so you are right, we hope, we
17 think that if the trend continues, at least we have
18 a test available at that time.

19 DR. ALLEN: In your background
20 information, you pointed out, as the CDC did
21 earlier, in your presentation, that the viremia is
22 fairly low, only about 103 copies/ml. Then, under
23 the Review of Methodologies with NAT testing, you
24 noted under the caveats that the average human
25 viremia is 18 plaque-forming units/ml.

1 Can you reconcile those?

2 DR. NAKHASI: The plaque-forming units and
3 the copies, you know, the data is not really very
4 well established at this time, so we and our
5 laboratory and CDC is also really trying to figure
6 out exactly how one plaque-forming, how many
7 copies/ml, so the copy numbers we do not know
8 exactly the numbers yet.

9 DR. NELSON: I guess the point is it is
10 probably too low to just simply add this test to
11 the current pool, minipools or maxipools.

12 DR. NAKHASI: Exactly.

13 DR. NELSON: Whatever the exact numbers of
14 virus are in the average case.

15 DR. SCHMIDT: Thank you for your very
16 complete report. One piece of information that is
17 not in there, is in a CDC publication, saying that
18 the incubation period of the disease can be as
19 short as two days.

20 When we are dealing with something with an
21 incubation period of two days and talking about the
22 viremia one day after, we just have to look at this
23 differently, I think, in our planning from our
24 look-see at other diseases that we are used to
25 dealing with.

1 DR. NAKHASI: Yes, I just actually in one
2 of the slides, I mentioned it can range from one to
3 five days, so you are right, I think that is very
4 important.

5 There are a couple of things. One, the
6 viremia is very low, and the second, the duration
7 can be short, so it is a very tricky situation.

8 DR. KLEIN: Do we know whether antibody
9 confers long-term protection or can you be
10 reinfected two years from now with variant viruses?

11 DR. NAKHASI: I don't know. Any West Nile
12 expert around here? I don't know how long the
13 protection is. Mary?

14 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I think the sense is
15 that there is long-term protection, that once you
16 are infected, you are likely not susceptible, but
17 how well that has been studied, I don't know.

18 DR. KLEIN: And that may have implications
19 for the overall epidemic, not just the seasonal
20 epidemic.

21 DR. NAKHASI: Also, there have been some
22 reports which I remember that there is some
23 cross-protection from other infectives, you know,
24 like if you have some other infections, you may
25 have some cross-protection.

1 DR. FITZPATRICK: You did say in your
2 presentation that the whole of the U.S. is endemic,
3 but there are states where there is neither animal
4 or human evidence of West Nile, so I think it might
5 help if you would clarify those states that are
6 non-endemic or those areas that might be as opposed
7 to. That statement might be construed as being a
8 bit misleading.

9 DR. NAKHASI: Maybe from AABB
10 presentation, you may hear that there are some
11 states which are non-endemic and which are endemic,
12 but actually Lyle Peterson's chart, which showed
13 the last time, there were some of the states which
14 were not, but I think the AABB presentation will
15 clarify that.

16 DR. ALLEN: I think the problem with
17 trying to clarify is we don't know what is going to
18 happen in the future. If we had tried to predict
19 based on what happened in 1999, what would happen
20 in 2001, we probably would have been quite wrong.
21 I think we just haven't looked at the spread yet.

22 So far Arizona hasn't had any cases except
23 imported cases, but we are absolutely certain that
24 within the next year or two, we definitely will.

25 DR. FITZPATRICK: I agree. I think it

1 would be more truthful to say it is most likely
2 that the whole U.S. will become endemic, but it
3 isn't yet.

4 DR. ALLEN: Right, and what is going to
5 happen in terms of endemicity five years from now
6 in terms of an established recurrent pattern once
7 this first burst of it, the epidemic has passed
8 across the nation, I think is anybody's guess at
9 this point.

10 DR. NELSON: Yes. I guess that deals a
11 little bit with Toby's concern. The St. Louis
12 encephalitis epidemic in '75 was a large epidemic,
13 equivalent to the current West Nile, but
14 subsequently, there were just handfuls of cases in
15 the subsequent years, even decades.

16 But I think the way West Nile is sort of
17 spreading and the fact that the West has been
18 spared so far except for one case in Los Angeles
19 and an isolate I guess from Washington and Montana,
20 the likelihood is that the West well could have an
21 epidemic next year, but it is hard to predict.

22 We could put all this effort into
23 developing a test and then have 10 cases next year.
24 This is such a complex disease that it is hard to
25 predict accurately.

1 I think AABB wanted to make a statement.

2 Kay Gregory.

3 AABB, ABC, and ARC

4 Kay R. Gregory

5 MS. GREGORY: Thank you. Actually, this
6 is a statement on behalf of the American
7 Association of Blood Banks, America's Blood
8 Centers, and the American Red Cross.

9 As of December 10, 2002, we know that 13
10 persons have been identified who acquired West Nile
11 Virus infection from infected blood components from
12 eight blood donors. These eight donors resided in
13 states where mosquito-borne West Nile Virus
14 infections to humans was documented by surveillance
15 during the 2002 epidemic.

16 Transfusions of red blood cells,
17 platelets, and fresh frozen plasma have been
18 implicated. Persons with transfusion-associated
19 West Nile Virus infection were aged 7 to 75 years
20 with a median of 47 years.

21 Four persons had hematological or other
22 advanced malignancies; three had stem cell or organ
23 transplantation; and four persons, all 70 years or
24 older, received transfusions associated with other
25 medical problems or a surgical procedure.

1 In addition, transfusion-related infection
2 was documented in two women who received
3 transfusions post-partum, and transmission to a
4 breast-feeding infant from one of these women was
5 documented. Nine patients developed West Nile
6 Virus meningoencephalitis and three died.

7 As a result of this information, the
8 American Association of Blood Banks, America's
9 Blood Centers, the American Red Cross, and the
10 Department of Defense are recommending a voluntary
11 market withdrawal of selected frozen transfusable
12 in-date products in inventory in an effort to
13 mitigate the risk of transmission of West Nile
14 Virus through blood transfusion.

15 The frozen products affected are products
16 that were collected in areas experiencing
17 mosquito-borne transmission of West Nile Virus to
18 humans in 2002. This withdrawal includes both
19 products that were in the blood collect facility
20 and products that have been shipped to hospitals
21 for transfusion.

22 The identified periods at issue will vary
23 from state to state and were developed in
24 consultation with the Centers for Disease Control
25 and Prevention after review of the relevant

1 epidemiologic and national surveillance data. The
2 Food and Drug Administration has been briefed on
3 this issue and is fully aware of this industry
4 recommendation for the voluntary withdrawal of
5 these products.

6 First, quarantine of frozen products
7 collected during the defined risk periods.

8 Blood Centers and hospitals should
9 immediately quarantine all frozen products
10 collected during the defined risk period. The risk
11 period is generally defined as seven days prior to
12 onset of symptoms of the first reported
13 meningoencephalitis case and ending with the
14 seventh day after onset of the symptoms of the last
15 reported meningoencephalitis case in the respective
16 state. We are providing a table listing this
17 information for each state.

18 Blood collection facilities will inform
19 their hospital customers of the applicable defined
20 risk period, including the peak incidence reached
21 and expiration dates of the products involved.
22 Blood collection facilities and hospitals should
23 assess the available supply of frozen products as
24 soon as possible after the initial notification.

25 Next, we considered the replacement of

1 quarantined frozen products. As soon as feasible,
2 and consistent with the need to maintain
3 inventories critical for patient care, blood
4 collection facilities will prioritize replacement
5 of units collected during the week of peak
6 incidence, followed by replacement of units
7 collected during the antecedent and subsequent
8 weeks.

9 This voluntary market withdrawal is
10 intended to apply to all at-risk frozen product
11 inventory collected in 2002, with the exception of
12 frozen rare red cell products, which are to be
13 handled in conformance with existing protocols for
14 emergency release and transfusion of red cells.

15 Finally, prioritization of use of the
16 quarantined product. To the extent that
17 quarantined products must be transfused during this
18 time period due to medical need, transfusion
19 services are strongly advised to manage inventories
20 in a manner that avoids transfusion of blood
21 products collected during the peak incidence week
22 for each applicable state.

23 If it becomes necessary to transfuse
24 quarantined products, a prudent strategy would be
25 to use those products that were collected as near

1 as possible to the beginning or the end of the
2 defined risk period.

3 Transfusion services are also advised
4 whenever possible to avoid transfusion of products
5 collected during the entire risk period for each
6 relevant state to any of the following groups:

- 7 1. Immunocompromised patients
8 (particularly organ and stem cell transplant
9 recipients, patients on immunosuppressive drugs,
10 and patients with hematological malignancies and
11 myelodysplasia and other advanced malignancies);
- 12 2. Patients over 65 years of age; and
- 13 3. Pregnant, immediate post-partum and
14 breast-feeding women.

15 Transfusion services may also want to give
16 special consideration to neonates.

17 Let's talk about supply. To the extent
18 possible, all blood collection facilities will make
19 every effort to assure that adequate supplies of
20 frozen products with lesser or no ascertainable
21 risk are provided to areas where frozen products
22 are at higher risk for West Nile Virus transmission
23 through transfusion.

24 Under existing regulations, withdrawn
25 plasma prepared from collections of whole blood may

1 be relabeled as recovered plasma. Blood centers
2 with existing short supply agreements may continue
3 to ship recovered plasma for further manufacture
4 under their existing agreements, provided that
5 temperature storage requirements are met.

6 However, blood collection facilities that
7 wish to convert frozen plasma collected by
8 apheresis during defined risk periods to recovered
9 plasma prior to the frozen plasma out-date, must
10 request a variance from the FDA. We want to stress
11 that FDA will need to act on these variances
12 expeditiously.

13 It is anticipated that cryoprecipitate,
14 and frozen plasma converted to recovered plasma,
15 that cannot be shipped for further manufacture
16 under existing agreements will be destroyed.

17 Blood collection facilities have committed
18 to make and stockpile frozen blood components
19 during non-endemic months to minimize the need to
20 make these products during defined risk periods for
21 human West Nile Virus, until such time as a
22 licensed test for West Nile Virus or other
23 intervention (including testing under IND) is
24 introduced.

25 We also have provided a list of states for

1 which product retrieval is not necessary because
2 West Nile Virus is not considered a problem for
3 those states.

4 Then, we provided a list of all other
5 states that are considered to have periods of risk
6 for transmission of human West Nile Virus for 2002.

7 Thank you.

8 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Kay.

9 Comments or questions?

10 DR. DiMICHELE: I was wondering if you had
11 an estimate of what percent of transfused patients
12 your deferral requirements comprise. In other
13 words, prioritization of the use of quarantine
14 product under that, you have actually prioritized
15 groups of patients who should not receive these
16 products.

17 MS. GREGORY: That is correct.

18 DR. DiMICHELE: What percentage of
19 patients who are transfused would this group
20 comprise, do you have any idea?

21 MS. GREGORY: No, I really don't.

22 Celso, do you have any idea?

23 DR. BIANCO: No, we don't have an exact
24 idea how many patients will be affected. We do not
25 have an idea how much product is still available in

1 hospitals at the present time, but there was a lot
2 of thought into that and we were trying to do the
3 best and to predict that in some situations, we may
4 have to prioritize. Hopefully, most of it will be
5 replaced by product outside.

6 This will be more difficult for states
7 where the epidemic has been very intense and very
8 long - Louisiana, Michigan, and in Texas, and we
9 hope we will be able to replace that product as
10 soon as possible.

11 DR. DiMICHELE: The reason I was asking is
12 that one group that is not included here is the
13 chronically transfused group of patients, the
14 patients who are receiving blood every two weeks.

15 Is there any reason that they were sort of
16 excluded from this prioritization list?

17 DR. BIANCO: The prioritization, Donna,
18 was made, they don't seem to be immunosuppressed,
19 was based on the cases that were observed. There
20 was a lot of transfusion during the period, so
21 probably a lot of infected units were transfused,
22 but those were the cases that were identified and
23 reported, and that constituted the patient
24 population. There were no neonates, but it was
25 thought that it was prudent to do that.

1 DR. DiMICHELE: Thank you.

2 DR. PAGE: Peter Page, American Red Cross,
3 Arlington, Virginia.

4 Pertinent to your first question, one
5 could say that for every 100 units of whole blood
6 collected, almost 100 red cell units are prepared
7 and transfused, but only about 20 of them result in
8 a plasma product for individual transfusion to a
9 patient. The rest are essentially fractionated.

10 So, on the average, as far as number of
11 units, not number of patients, it is about 20
12 percent has got red cells.

13 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

14 Next, is Dr. Mary Elizabeth Jacobs talking
15 about medical device user fees.

16 Medical Device User Fee and
17 Modernization Act Of 2002 (MDUFMA)

18 Mary Elizabeth Jacobs, Ph.D.

19 DR. JACOBS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
20 good morning.

21 I am here today to tell you about the
22 Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of
23 2002, which was signed by the President on October
24 25th.

25 [Slide.]

1 I would like to cover an overview of
2 MDUFMA, the law itself and how it was developed,
3 the user fee provisions, the performance goals that
4 are related to the user fees, third-party
5 inspections, which is one of the major provisions
6 in the law under the modernization part of MDUFMA,
7 some additional provisions, and then
8 implementation, where we are now.

9 I have titled this part MDUFMA and CBER
10 because there is one provision that applies to CBER
11 in particular that I want to mention and another
12 provision which as a practical matter applies less
13 to us.

14 However, I want to emphasize that all of
15 these provisions apply to any center in FDA that
16 regulates medical devices. CBER has been very
17 committed to making this work and we have been
18 involved in all stages of the analysis and
19 negotiations.

20 First of all, we regulate at CBER up to 10
21 percent of the device workload in any given year.
22 That comes primarily under blood-related devices,
23 such as the blood screening tests which are used to
24 screen donated blood.

25 We also are involved in combination

1 products, which is specifically mentioned in the
2 law, and combination products are products that
3 have a combination of a biologic, a drug, and a
4 device, two or three of those. For example, there
5 are hemostatic agents which include device
6 components and thrombin.

7 We are in a very active implementation
8 state and you are going to be able to get
9 information as it is developed, and I want to tell
10 you the two places you can get that.

11 First of all, most of you probably know
12 that our web site is fda.gov. You can then go to
13 the Biologics Center or you can go to the Device
14 Center. We anticipate having one web site for all
15 FDA centers related to devices, however, right now,
16 as an interim measure, you can go for general
17 information to the Devices Center, which is CDRH,
18 and go to their web site, and you can send general
19 inquiries to them at mdufma@cdrh.fda.gov.

20 For CBER-specific information, you can go
21 to our web site, which is CBER under the FDA web
22 site, go Devices, and under that, MDUFMA, and you
23 can send in inquiries, as you always can to us.
24 For manufacturers, it is matt@cber.fda.gov. For
25 consumers and health care professionals, it is

1 octma@cber.fda.gov.

2 [Slide.]

3 First, what is the background? The law
4 was developed in consultation with the industry,
5 the Congress, FDA, and with input from other
6 organizations including consumers and patient
7 groups.

8 The two major industry groups are AdvaMed,
9 which used to be HEMA, and MDMA, Medical Device
10 Manufacturers Association, and it had bipartisan
11 House and Senate support.

12 In addition, during the negotiations, we
13 invited in all the people who belonged to our BPAC
14 mailing list. That includes the AABB, ARC, ABC, and
15 all the consumer and patient groups, and we had a
16 separate session with them. Most of them came, and
17 we went through all the provisions with them.

18 The law explicitly recognizes the need for
19 additional medical device resources, and the basic
20 idea behind user fees is that FDA will commit to
21 faster review times than we are required to under
22 the law.

23 This represents approximately 25 percent
24 improvement in our review times. It isn't 25
25 percent for every single kind of application. For

1 example, the expedited, which are very novel
2 products, have a greater improvement time than some
3 of the ones in which we had better times.

4 In exchange for this, the firms agreed to
5 pay user fees, which will give them greater
6 predictability. FDA, prior to having this, has
7 already had 10 years of successful experience with
8 what is called PDUFA, which is user fees for
9 prescription therapeutic drugs. So, this MDUFA is
10 building on that experience although it differs in
11 certain ways.

12 It explicitly recognizes the need for
13 additional resources and this has an appropriations
14 piece. This law is not just user fees, it also has
15 appropriated funds from the Congress, and it was
16 signed, as I said, by October 26th, so the
17 implementation clock is ticking.

18 [Slide.]

19 What are the key provisions? First of
20 all, there are medical device user fees and, as I
21 said, additional appropriations from the Congress.
22 It includes third-party establishment inspections,
23 which I will discuss, and that is covered by
24 approximately 25 percent of the law.

25 It has greater oversight of reprocessed

1 single-use devices, and this is the provision which
2 I mentioned which doesn't, as a practical matter,
3 come through CBER. These are primarily surgical
4 instruments which are manufactured by what we call
5 OEMs, original equipment manufacturers.

6 They are labeled for single use. They
7 then are frequently reprocessed and resold and
8 redistributed. As far as we know now, those will
9 go through CDRH. It has provisions for supplying
10 labeling electronically.

11 It has modular review of PMAs in the law,
12 and we at CBER have already had modular reviews of
13 PMAs, but that has been a matter of policy, and
14 this is the first time it has been in the law.

15 Then, it has oversight by the
16 Commissioner's Office of the combination products
17 to which I referred.

18 [Slide.]

19 Now, what are the user fees? First of
20 all, they apply to the major classifications of
21 submissions, but not to all of them. For example,
22 for PMAs which are the more novel devices, for the
23 BLAs which would be the licensed tests for blood
24 screening, and to 510(k)s which, for those of you
25 who know these, these are in general lower risk

1 products in which you deal with the substantial
2 equivalence to products which were originally on
3 the market.

4 However, we have committed to maintain our
5 performance on other kinds of submissions for which
6 there are no user fees. For example, the
7 investigational device exemptions in which we have
8 30 days to tell a firm no, you cannot start a
9 clinical trial. We are maintaining our performance
10 on those.

11 The structure is that we anticipate that
12 there would be, beginning in 2003, this is the
13 first year, \$25.1 million in fee revenues, rising
14 to \$35 million in FY 2007. Then, there are workload
15 compensations and other things which I would refer
16 you to the law on those.

17 Then, we have \$15 million in additional
18 appropriations, to bring the total by the end of
19 2007 up to \$50 million.

20 Now, one of the questions we are asked is
21 do you have that appropriations passed yet, and the
22 answer is not yet passed, the Congress will be
23 coming back after the first of the year, however,
24 we are actively implementing this and assuming it
25 is going to be passed.

1 [Slide.]

2 The first year fees range from \$154,000
3 for a premarket application, to \$2,187 for a
4 510(k). There are reduced fees to protect small
5 businesses, "small" meaning sales and receipts less
6 than or equal to \$30 million.

7 For small businesses, the fees are 38
8 percent of a standard fee for a PMA, except for
9 510(k)s, in which case they are 80 percent. The
10 small business fee for 510(k) starts in 2004, and
11 it sunsets October 1, 2007.

12 The device industry includes a wide range
13 of corporations, some of which are extremely large
14 global corporations, and some of which are almost
15 amazingly small corporations. This was to have a
16 structure that was appropriate to all of them.

17 The sunseting in five years is similar to
18 PDUFA. That also has had two, five-year cycles. We
19 are now in the third cycle PDUFA 3, so this will
20 sunset in five years unless it is renewed in some
21 form as MDUFA 2.

22 [Slide.]

23 There are some waivers. There is no fee
24 if the applicant is a Federal or State Government,
25 unless it is going to be marketed. The first

1 premarket application by a small business is free.

2 The first premarket report for a
3 reprocessed device is free. There is no fee if
4 there is a third-party review of a 510(k). We do
5 have a provision in which certain third parties can
6 review 510(k)s. That is actually not very widely
7 used. They are then submitted to FDA for
8 concurrence or nonconcurrence. Finally, there is
9 no fee if the device is solely for pediatric use.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, what are the performance goals?
12 Overall, we are aiming to improve our performance
13 by 25 percent. These goals are defined in a letter
14 from the Secretary of HHS, Secretary Thompson, to
15 the Congress.

16 It differs from PDUFA in this. We have a
17 combination of cycle goals, which means a firm
18 sends us a submission and we respond to them. That
19 is one cycle. For PMAs and 510(k)s, decision
20 goals, meaning the time in which FDA finished its
21 review and telling a firm it is approved, it is
22 denied, or what it has to do exactly to get
23 approved. That could be a nonapprovable or
24 approvable decision.

25 The goals are measured in FDA days, so

1 they are independent of the time that it takes for
2 a firm to respond to us.

3 [Slide.]

4 The performance goals are very detailed,
5 but I want to just go through with you what is the
6 basic structure on all of these performance goals,
7 so that when you read the goals letter, it will be
8 more clear.

9 First of all, for BLAs, the licensed
10 screening tests, as we said, the law takes effect
11 October 26, 2002 for Fiscal Year 03. The first
12 goals start in 2005, and that is because the
13 initial funds are going to be used to hire
14 additional people. That is why the goals are
15 starting in 2005.

16 However, we are having an annual report
17 with our stakeholders. We fully intend substantial
18 progress on these, but formally, the goals come in,
19 in 2005.

20 Secondly, the goals ramp up from 2005 to
21 2007, so for BLAs, the goals would go from 75
22 percent in 2005, to 90 percent in 2007.

23 The third thing is, as I said, we are
24 reducing the time frame which is in the law for all
25 of these categories. For example, for the initial

1 submission on a BLA, which we call our response
2 review and act on, which includes the complete
3 review, the inspection, and going to an advisory
4 committee if that is necessary, instead of doing
5 those in 12 months, we will be doing the goals in
6 10 months. That is the basic structure.

7 Secondly, for BLAs, we now have a new
8 category of resubmission. That means after we
9 respond to you from your first cycle, the firm then
10 responds to us unless they are licensed in the
11 first cycle.

12 If their response has a substantial amount
13 of data, for example, a completely new study, we
14 have six months to respond. If they have less, for
15 example, if they are providing updated stability
16 information, we have two months to respond.

17 Those categories have already been used in
18 PDUFA and I would anticipate the criteria we would
19 use would be very similar to those that are used
20 for the PDUFA guidance which is on our web site.

21 Finally, our manufacturing supplements
22 again will go, instead of being done in six months,
23 they will be 75 percent to 90 percent of the
24 manufacturing supplements, that is, after
25 licensing, would be done in four months.

1 [Slide.]

2 Let's go to PMAs, which would be used for
3 the HIV diagnostics, which have been handled by
4 CBER because of all of our work with HIV as it
5 relates to the blood supply. These are handled by
6 PMAs again. The target goals go from 2005 to 2007.
7 They have cycle goals and they have the decision
8 goal.

9 For example, a cycle goal would mean your
10 first letter would be if you have major
11 deficiencies, you would get what we call a major
12 deficiency letter. Instead of doing that in 180
13 days, the goal is for 70 to 90 percent, ramping up
14 again from 2005 to 2007, you would get the letter
15 in 150 days.

16 For PMAs, the decision goal, when we
17 finished our review, the goal is that by 2007, we
18 would have 50 percent completed in 180 days. That
19 is quite a challenging goal for FDA.

20 Another provision in the law, which
21 applies to this, and the next category I am going
22 to talk to you about, is that because that is such
23 a challenging goal for us, we have a provision in
24 the law that says we will notify the Congress
25 following a public meeting in 2006 if we think that

1 that would be a problem for FDA to meet that goal.

2 [Slide.]

3 Let me now go to 510(k)s. The 510(k)s are
4 the ones that are the more abbreviated kinds of
5 applications which we call "substantially
6 equivalent."

7 Here, we have instead of 90 days for our
8 first letter, which we call "additional
9 information," it is like a deficiency letter, you
10 would get that in 75 days instead of 90 days, again
11 changing the statutory deadline.

12 This also has a total time for the
13 decision of 75 percent within 90 days, again a very
14 challenging goal for FDA, and because of that, we
15 again have the structure of a public meeting and a
16 report to Congress if we believe that we can't meet
17 that by 2007.

18 [Slide.]

19 The next provision is for third-party
20 inspections. I mentioned to you that we do have a
21 provision for third-party reviews for what are
22 called "510(k)s."

23 Third-party inspections, I am only hitting
24 a few of the points, 25 percent of the law covers
25 third-party inspections. There was interest by a

1 number of firms which market globally and which
2 have inspections for other standards, for example,
3 ISO, to be able to schedule all of their
4 inspections together by paying a fee.

5 There was also some interest because at
6 times FDA inspectors, because of the international
7 situation, cannot go into certain countries
8 although European inspectors are there. So, this
9 would potentially solve some of the problems of
10 companies which are in those countries.

11 These have the most complex provisions.
12 In order to be accredited, the third party has to
13 have the same conflict of interest provisions as we
14 do internally at FDA. For example, people who would
15 be third-party inspectors for medical devices
16 cannot own stock in companies that are regulated by
17 FDA, for example, food companies. So, they are
18 just as stringent as those for FDA employers. That
19 is only one of those.

20 These are all going to be spelled out in
21 guidance to you, but there are already many of them
22 in the laws. The inspections are permitted only
23 for quality systems in GMP. If it is pre-approval,
24 BiMo, which is our monitoring of studies, and "for
25 cause," those are exclusively for FDA.

1 [Slide.]

2 We must publish our accreditation criteria
3 by next April. Those will, of course, be on the
4 web site. They will cover establishments that
5 market in the U.S. and abroad and where the other
6 country accepts FDA inspection results.

7 The most recent FDA inspection must be
8 classified as No Action Indicated or Voluntary
9 Action Indicated, which means that the firm is
10 already in good compliance before this happens, and
11 FDA must periodically inspect, and this is
12 anticipated to be one out of three.

13 Again, I have only hit some of the major
14 points in this. If you are interested, please
15 refer to the law and to our web site.

16 [Slide.]

17 Here are some additional provisions which
18 would be of interest to our group here.

19 First, combination products. Those
20 reviews are going to be coordinated by a new office
21 in the Office of Commissioner. This is because
22 firms were concerned because frequently, one center
23 is the lead, another firm is very active in
24 consultation. They want to make sure that there
25 are adequate tracking systems, so we are going to

1 be having and are developing new tracking systems
2 for this.

3 We already have a courier system between
4 the centers. We had a meeting on November 25th,
5 which we call a Part 15 hearing, which means we
6 solicited input from firms and from other groups,
7 and they made a number of provisions.

8 I already mentioned to you that under some
9 circumstances, there will be electronic labeling.

10 Finally, I want to mention the provision
11 which is specific to CBER, but could be also for
12 the Center for Drugs if they have device reviews.
13 Under Section 205, there will be a one year report
14 to Congress on the timeliness and effectiveness of
15 premarket reviews by centers other than the Center
16 for Device and Radiological Health.

17 That means CBER will be developing a
18 report which will go to the Commissioner's Office
19 and to the Department about our timeliness and
20 effectiveness, and our regulation of these devices.

21 [Slide.]

22 Next, let's go to implementation. We are
23 very actively working on this now. We are
24 developing the basic reference materials. You can
25 look on the web site. We have a kind of plain

1 language version of the Act and frequently asked
2 questions.

3 We have implementation teams for all of
4 these major provisions and CBER is very actively
5 involved in those. I just want to mention to you
6 that there is one specific to stakeholder
7 education. We have active training, for example,
8 tomorrow, we have required training for everyone
9 involved in reviewing these.

10 [Slide.]

11 Finally, I want to mention how can you
12 make your views known to FDA. I already mentioned
13 that we are opening a docket. That means you can
14 send them in there. There will be annual public
15 meetings starting in FY 2004 to review our
16 progress.

17 The law specifically mentions consultation
18 on certain specific policies including bundling of
19 submissions and modular PMA.

20 Please look at our web site, send in your
21 questions, and I would be happy to address any
22 questions you have.

23 Thank you.

24 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Jacobs.

25 Any questions?

1 DR. FITZPATRICK: I just had one. You
2 exempted State and Federal agencies. What about
3 nonprofit corporations?

4 DR. JACOBS: That is a good question. I
5 would have to go back and check the law to see if
6 that is in there, and let me bring that to people's
7 attention. I am not sure if that has been
8 addressed.

9 Thank you.

10 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

11 Next, is an update on the approval of the
12 OraQuick Rapid HIV-1 Antibody Test.

13 Approval of the OraQuick Rapid HIV-1 Antibody Test

14 Elliot P. Cowan, Ph.D.

15 DR. COWAN: Thank you, Dr. Nelson.

16 [Slide.]

17 The purpose of this update this morning is
18 to inform you that on November 7th of this year,
19 FDA approved the OraQuick Rapid HIV-1 Antibody
20 Test.

21 The intended use of the OraQuick Rapid
22 Test is to detect antibodies to HIV-1 in
23 fingerstick whole blood specimens, as a
24 point-of-care test to aid in the diagnosis of
25 infection with HIV-1, and this test is intended to

1 be suitable for use in multi-test algorithms
2 designed for statistical validation of rapid HIV
3 test results when such algorithms have been
4 evaluated and approved.

5 [Slide.]

6 OraQuick is approved as a restricted
7 device. Sale is restricted to clinical
8 laboratories, number one, that have an adequate
9 quality assurance program including planned
10 systematic activities to provide adequate
11 confidence that requirements for quality will be
12 met; number two, where there is assurance that
13 operators will receive and use the instructional
14 materials.

15 It is approved for use only by an agent of
16 a clinical laboratory.

17 [Slide.]

18 The test subjects must receive the
19 "Subject Information" pamphlet prior to specimen
20 collection and appropriate information when test
21 results are provided.

22 The test is not approved for use to screen
23 blood or tissue donors.

24 In addition, a customer letter will be
25 included with all kits that are shipped, which has

1 the provision that "By purchasing the device, you
2 are doing so as an agent of a clinical laboratory
3 and agree that you or any of your consignees will
4 abide by the...restrictions on the sale,
5 distribution, and use of the device."

6 [Slide.]

7 What I would like to do now is just run
8 through the device, to describe it for you and how
9 the test is performed.

10 It consists of several components
11 including the main device itself, as well as a vial
12 of buffer solution, the stand to hold the buffer
13 solution, and a specimen collection loop.

14 [Slide.]

15 The first step in the procedure is to
16 provide the test subject with a Subject Information
17 pamphlet. This information pamphlet, it is a
18 multi-page pamphlet containing such information
19 items as what are HIV and AIDS, how does someone
20 get HIV, to what is the OraQuick device, to the
21 interpretation of the results, to where can I get
22 more information about HIV and AIDS.

23 [Slide.]

24 A fingerstick is performed and the sample
25 is collected within the specimen collection loop.

1 [Slide.]

2 That is then added to the vial that
3 contains the test developer solution. The sample
4 is mixed in the vial.

5 [Slide.]

6 The device is then inserted into the vial
7 and then a time period of 20 to 60 minutes later, a
8 result is read.

9 [Slide.]

10 The last step of the procedure calls for
11 following CDC guidelines to inform the test subject
12 of the test result and its interpretation.

13 Let me just show you what some of these
14 results look like. Before I do that, let me just
15 point out that there are two lines that could
16 appear on this test. Number one, there is a line
17 at the C position, which is the control, and at the
18 T position, which is the test.

19 The C position will detect antibodies to
20 human immunoglobulin. Therefore, this serves as a
21 procedural control to ensure, number one, the
22 specimen has been added, and, number two, that all
23 the components of the test are working properly.
24 All valid tests will have a line at the C position.

25 The T position, on the other hand,

1 contains peptides to HIV-1, and a line here will
2 indicate a reactive result. So, in this case, I am
3 showing you a nonreactive result which is
4 interpreted as negative for anybody as to HIV-1.

5 [Slide.]

6 Here are some examples of reactive
7 results. The intensity of the lines may vary
8 relative to one another, but any appearance of
9 color at the T position is considered to be a
10 reactive result. Reactive results are interpreted
11 as preliminary positive according to CDC
12 guidelines.

13 [Slide.]

14 Finally an invalid result will occur if
15 there is no line at the C position for the control.
16 Even in the presence of a line at the T position,
17 this would be considered an invalid result also.

18 This is invalid because of high background
19 and the inability to see lines, this is considered
20 invalid because the line does not appear in the
21 proper position. Invalid test results should be
22 repeated.

23 [Slide.]

24 OraQuick kit controls consist of a
25 negative and a positive sample. The positive is

1 low reactive. These are provided separately as an
2 accessory to the kit.

3 In the product package insert, it is
4 stated that kit controls should be run under
5 several situations, number one, by each new
6 operator, prior to performing testing on patient
7 specimens, whenever a new lot of OraQuick is used
8 for the first time, if there is a change in the
9 conditions of testing, for example, new location,
10 lighting, temperature, that sort of thing, and also
11 a periodic interval specified by the quality
12 assurance program of the laboratory doing the
13 testing.

14 [Slide.]

15 I would like to now run through some of
16 the clinical trial data used to support the
17 approval of this test. For sensitivity, there were
18 three groups of specimens that were studied, AIDS,
19 known HIV-1 positives, and high risk specimens, a
20 total of 1,146 specimens, of which 538 of those
21 were determined to be true positives.

22 The OraQuick correctly identified 536 of
23 these. Two specimens from known HIV-1 positive
24 patients were not detected.

25 The sensitivity in these studies, it was

1 therefore determined to be 99.6 percent with a 95
2 percent confidence interval of 98.5 percent to 99.9
3 percent. I would like to point out that this is
4 within our minimal performance criteria for the
5 performance of a rapid HIV test for sensitivity,
6 which is 98 percent as lower bound of the 95
7 percent confidence interval, and that criterion was
8 discussed at several BPAC sessions.

9 [Slide.]

10 Also, in support of sensitivity,
11 analytical sensitivity studies were done looking at
12 11 seroconversion panels and 2 low titer panels.
13 The performance of OraQuick was similar to licensed
14 EIAs for the specimens.

15 In addition, unrelated medical conditions
16 and interfering substances specimens were spiked
17 with an HIV-1 positive specimen to give low
18 positive reactivity. Again, in this case, all
19 spiked specimens gave reactive results.

20 [Slide.]

21 For the specificity, a total of 1,250 low
22 risk specimens were looked at, as well as
23 non-reactive specimens from the high risk study,
24 making a total of 1,856 true negative specimens
25 that were examined. OraQuick correctly identified

1 all of them. There were no false positive
2 specimens in this study.

3 So, again, in these studies, specificity
4 was determined to be 100 percent with a 95 percent
5 confidence interval of 99.7 percent to 100 percent.
6 Again, these are in line with our minimal criteria
7 for performance for specificity as discussed at
8 BPAC for a rapid HIV test, which is also 98 percent
9 is the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence
10 interval.

11 [Slide.]

12 Also, in support of specificity, unrelated
13 medical conditions were examined, a total of 321
14 specimens, as well as 119 specimens with
15 interfering substances. There were a few specimens
16 that gave false positive results in this case, but
17 the caveat here is that all of these specimens or
18 most of these specimens were frozen repository
19 specimens.

20 I would like to remind you that the
21 intended use specimen type for OraQuick is a fresh
22 fingerstick whole blood specimen. If anything, a
23 repeatedly frozen and thawed specimen would be
24 expected to give a false positive result if there
25 is a problem at all.

1 [Slide.]

2 For reproducibility, reproducibility
3 studies involved three sites, three lots, three
4 different days, and three operators per site,
5 making a total of nine operators who examined the
6 blind-coded panel of five contrived whole blood
7 specimens. Four of these were anti-HIV-1-positive
8 and one was anti-HIV-1 antibody-negative.

9 The results for the 20-minute read time
10 were 99.8 percent agreement, and at 55 to 60 minute
11 read time, 100 percent agreement.

12 [Slide.]

13 I would also like to touch just very
14 briefly on CLIA issues since this is something that
15 we have talked about at BPAC before.

16 This test on approval was categorized as
17 moderate complexity. The Company stated publicly
18 on September 11th of this year that they will apply
19 for CLIA waiver.

20 On November the 7th, at the time of the
21 approval, Secretary Thompson made a statement at
22 the OraQuick approval press conference, "I strongly
23 encourage OraQuick to ask the FDA for a CLIA
24 waiver... if the company's data prove that the
25 OraQuick test is safe and easy to use, it can get a

1 CLIA waiver."

2 [Slide.]

3 Finally, I would like to point out that
4 there are a number of things on the CBER web site.
5 The approval letter for OraQuick is listed, as well
6 as the package insert, the summary basis of
7 approval, and an FDA talkpaper. I have listed the
8 web site for you here. That could give you some
9 more detailed information.

10 I would like to close by saying that we
11 are continuing to actively work with additional
12 manufacturers to approve more rapid HIV tests, so
13 that we can move toward multi-test algorithms.

14 Thank you very much.

15 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

16 Questions or comments?

17 I noticed it is not approved for use in
18 blood banks at this time, and it may not be
19 terribly useful in that setting in the U.S., but I
20 think in many developing countries where it is very
21 difficult to follow and recontact donors once they
22 leave the blood banking system, I know that it can
23 be a real horrendous problem.

24 I can see where in some settings and at
25 some blood banks, a rapid test could be very

1 useful.

2 DR. COWAN: We have actually approached
3 the company to provide us with data to support the
4 use of OraQuick in this country as an emergency
5 blood donor screen. In the absence of any data,
6 though, we couldn't do that at this time.

7 DR. NELSON: I imagine that maybe Celso or
8 somebody knows that there is probably very close to
9 100 percent success in finding a positive donor
10 once all the tests results are available in this
11 country, but it may not be 100 percent everywhere.

12 When that result goes down to, as in
13 Northern Thailand, maybe 50 or 60 percent, that can
14 be a real problem.

15 Thanks very much.

16 The next topic is Bacterial Contamination.
17 We will start with Dr. Alan Williams.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: I would just like to
19 inform you that there is an electrical problem in
20 the surrounding area, and Pepco is working on that,
21 so we may have some intermittent interruptions, but
22 I hope it won't be permanent.

23 I. Bacterial Contamination

24 A. Background and Introduction

25 Alan Williams, Ph.D.

1 DR. WILLIAMS: Thank you and good morning.

2 What I would like to do with this
3 introduction is give a very brief overview of what
4 is admittedly a very complex topic, and in the
5 course of that, try to emphasize some of the key
6 points that are in need of discussion and
7 deliberation and emphasize those that are the
8 topics for this meeting and others that might be
9 appropriate for future discussion just to help
10 provide focus.

11 I will then finish up by outlining the
12 list of speakers for this session and the questions
13 that are being posed to the committee.

14 [Slide.]

15 The first slide deals with the frequency
16 and importance of bacterial contamination in the
17 transfusion setting. Sepsis is, in fact, the
18 second leading cause of transfusion-related
19 fatalities. It follows a group in type and
20 compatibility fatalities. It is the second cause
21 in transfusion-associated acute lung injury is the
22 third cause.

23 There are actually five to nine recognized
24 fatalities per year associated with sepsis.

25 The most comprehensive study documenting

1 clinical cases is the CDC-sponsored multi-center
2 bacterial contamination BACON study published
3 recently which documented that for single-donor
4 platelets, clinical case rates were 9.98, close to
5 10 per million, of which 1.94 per million were
6 fatal.

7 Among random donor platelets, the rate is
8 just slightly higher, 10.64 cases reported per
9 million random donor platelets, 2.2 per million
10 fatal.

11 Among red blood cells, refrigerator
12 temperatures, case rates were 0.21 per million, of
13 which 0.13 were fatal.

14 A conclusion was made that among the
15 fatalities, most of them appeared to be related to
16 gram-negative organisms and also related to units
17 containing high levels of endotoxin.

18 Those are clinical cases. A different
19 consideration is the amount of contamination in
20 units that may result in a spectrum of outcomes in
21 the recipient from no effect up to fatality.

22 The generally accepted figure for platelet
23 units which are stored at room temperature is
24 between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 2,000 contamination
25 risks per unit, but reports vary widely among

1 institutions and among different studies that are
2 published.

3 I think relevant to this is a study by Dr.
4 Leiby with the Red Cross which looked at outdated
5 platelets, studying close to 5,000 units. They
6 found 4 to be positive, for a prevalence of 0.08
7 percent in that published study.

8 [Slide.]

9 Where does the contamination come from?
10 In many cases, it simply isn't known, but due to
11 the nature of the organisms and other criteria, it
12 is known that skin contamination logically is the
13 source of much of the product contamination.

14 This can occur by bacteria that are on the
15 surface and are incompletely disinfected by the
16 pre-phlebotomy decontamination process or because
17 blood units are drawn with a large needle, there
18 can, in fact, be a tissue plug that is caught up in
19 the needle and makes its way into the collected
20 blood product.

21 There also can be occult bacteremia in a
22 donor who appears otherwise healthy, but may, in
23 fact, be circulating bacteria in the blood. As
24 mentioned, the contamination prevalence and
25 incidence as measured by patient outcomes varies by

1 site.

2 I think it is important that because this
3 does vary, there may be room to control some of
4 these extrinsic control points. One would expect
5 that bacteremia in a donor for the most part might
6 be a static level and that extrinsic contamination
7 may contribute to some of the different levels of
8 contamination that have been reported.

9 [Slide.]

10 A brief description of platelet
11 components. Apheresis components, this is where
12 the donor is hooked up to a machine for a period of
13 time and one or more components is removed. It is
14 also known as single donor platelets.

15 These products may, in fact, be split and
16 the split units are then counted to make sure that
17 they contain a minimum platelet count. In the
18 country, about 6 million units per year are
19 transfused, and these products had a five-day shelf
20 life.

21 The other class of platelet products are
22 pooled random donor platelets. There are the
23 products derived from whole blood collections.
24 Approximately, 3 million units per year are
25 transfused, and these are pooled together from

1 individual platelet concentrates derived from the
2 whole blood units in different quantities,
3 typically 4 to 6 platelet concentrates from
4 allogeneic donors are pooled to make a dose of
5 random donor platelets.

6 This pooling procedure, because it
7 involves connecting up to individual platelet
8 concentrates, currently requires a four-hour hold
9 after the pooling procedure, and this is typically
10 done in the transfusion service.

11 [Slide.]

12 Detection methods that are currently
13 available. Clearly, the most sensitive and most
14 widely available at this point is culturing, and
15 there are variables related to the time the culture
16 is taken, the volume, and source of the sample, how
17 long the culture is incubated, and what type of
18 detection system is used to monitor the culture.
19 You will be hearing a lot more of that in the
20 course of the session.

21 There are other techniques available. For
22 the most part, without going into great detail,
23 they tend to be considerably less sensitive than
24 the culture mechanism, but may serve as a very
25 quick read on an individual unit of platelets prior

1 to transfusion as to whether there is moderate to
2 gross contamination.

3 These other methods include urine
4 dipsticks to measure pH less than 7 or a glucose
5 level, Gram or other types of stains, swirling, and
6 a technique that shows promise in terms of
7 sensitivity, but needs further development is
8 actually doing polymerase chain reaction looking at
9 RNA content of different bacteria.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, two automated or semi-automated
12 culture devices were recently cleared by the FDA
13 for quality control purposes, and I think a major
14 issue that we will be dealing with today is that
15 they are cleared for quality control, not for
16 pre-release testing. This is not a screening test
17 which allows labeling of the product.

18 These two tests are the Biomerieux
19 BacT/ALERT System, which is cleared for quality
20 control of leukoreduced apheresis platelets, and
21 there is a specific labeling indication in there
22 that it is not designed for pre-release testing.

23 This system detects both aerobes and
24 anaerobes although the latter appear to be
25 infrequent causes of clinical sepsis in recipients.

1 The system produces continuous monitoring and it is
2 a calorimetric sensor.

3 The second system, made by Pall Medical
4 Corporation, is a bacteria detection system, or
5 BDS. It is cleared for the quality control of both
6 leukoreduced random and apheresis platelets. The
7 system detects primarily aerobic bacteria, and the
8 sample could be taken as early as 24 hours after
9 the platelet unit collection.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, two issues are going to be recurring
12 throughout the discussions today, but I want to
13 point out that these are areas where there are data
14 needed, and FDA is very interested in reconsidering
15 the issues based on available data, but not
16 specific topics for today's question consideration
17 to the committee.

18 The first is the four-hour hold for pool
19 random donor platelets, should that be extended and
20 particularly should it be extended if we have
21 procedures for culturing these units to determine
22 sterility.

23 This is actually a regulation CFR 606 122.
24 It raises a concern in terms of platelet pools in
25 terms of trying to culture or do quality control

1 because of the four-hour hold with the pool, it
2 provides insufficient time for sampling that pool
3 and developing a culture result before the pool
4 actually would be transfused.

5 The techniques used for creating pooled
6 random donor platelets are typically sterile dock
7 welding of the individual platelet concentrates.
8 There has been a lot of experience with this
9 procedure. As you will hear today, there is one
10 paper published in Europe in I think 1997, which
11 called into question the sterility of the tube
12 welds and whether, in fact, when the sterile
13 docking device is used to create pooled platelets,
14 whether sterility of the final product could be
15 compromised. There will be specific discussion
16 about that.

17 Also, FDA feels that to extend the
18 four-hour hold, it would also create considerations
19 beyond contamination, such as measuring in vitro
20 platelet function, in vivo efficiency, and
21 concerning the fact that mixed leukocyte response
22 to the set may take place when allogeneic units are
23 pooled may stimulate cytokine release.

24 The second issue is extending the five-day
25 platelet storage. This is based on an FDA memo

1 issued in June of 1986. Clearly, extending
2 platelet storage would be dependent on an approved
3 pre-release bacterial detection system, not upon
4 the QC systems currently cleared, and also would
5 require data related to platelet efficacy when held
6 seven days.

7 [Slide.]

8 Now, the four key elements that we are
9 going to focus on in today's session regarding
10 reduction of bacterial contamination risk is
11 effective arm preparation, an update on the
12 diversion pouch. This would be an integral pouch
13 that would potentially capture the first 30 ml or
14 so of blood, as well as any skin plug and hopefully
15 pull off any bacteria that might be associated with
16 that early volume.

17 It would be a discussion of FDA current
18 thinking in terms of quality control mechanisms and
19 data that might be needed to establish pre-release
20 screening approval.

21 [Slide.]

22 On the arm preparation subject, which will
23 be next, there will be a background review of the
24 literature by John Lee in our Division of Blood
25 Applications.

1 There is a question associated with this,
2 and I will note that all of the questions are going
3 to come at the end of the session because of the
4 need to integrate the public hearing.

5 The first question is: Do available
6 scientific data support preferential use of an
7 isopropanol/tincture of iodine procedure for
8 preparation of the donor's phlebotomy site?

9 [Slide.]

10 The second subsection will be an update
11 from Dr. Jaro Vostal of the FDA on the diversion
12 pouch and current FDA thinking. There is no
13 question associated with this.

14 [Slide.]

15 The third subsection is the discussion of
16 quality control. I am going to introduce some
17 concepts, as well as current FDA thinking, on a
18 quality control approach. There will be a data
19 presentation by Dr. James Aubuchon from Dartmouth
20 University on sterility of plastic tubing welds, as
21 well as transfusion service experience with
22 universal bacterial culturing of apheresis platelet
23 units. We are representing published experience
24 with these two procedures.

25 [Slide.]

1 Thirdly, data on the sterility of the
2 plastic tubing weld by Tracy Manlove with Terumo
3 Medical Corporation.

4 [Slide.]

5 Questions related to quality control.

6 Question No. 2. Do available data on the
7 sterility of the sterile connecting device
8 procedure support the use of this procedure to
9 collect samples for bacterial detection from
10 in-date platelet products?

11 Question No. 3. Does the committee concur
12 with FDA's proposed statistical approach to
13 providing quality control for platelet
14 contamination?

15 [Slide.]

16 The final subsection, a discussion of data
17 that might support pre-release screening. There
18 will be a presentation by Dr. Steve Wagner with the
19 American Red Cross Holland Laboratory on design of
20 clinical trials for clearance of devices intended
21 for screening of platelet products prior to
22 transfusion, so it will be a background talk.

23 Again, Dr. Jaro Vostal will then present
24 FDA's current thinking about a study design.

25 [Slide.]

1 A question related to this.

2 Question No. 4. Does the committee concur
3 that data derived from FDA's proposed clinical
4 trial design would be appropriate to support
5 clearance of devices for pre-release screening of
6 platelet products for transfusion? Yes or No.

7 So, it will be a packed session. I tried
8 to establish some context for you. You will hear
9 more about each of these topics as the session
10 proceeds, but with that in mind, I would be happy
11 to entertain questions.

12 DR. NELSON: Toby.

13 DR. SIMON: As some people may be aware,
14 there is two prevalent systems in the laboratory
15 industry for doing these kinds of cultures with
16 rapid results - one, the BacT/ALERT, which you have
17 approved for quality control of platelet screening,
18 and the other, the Bactec system manufactured by
19 Becton Dickinson.

20 My understanding is that as a result of
21 litigation between the two companies, BD is unable
22 or has agreed not to sell the Bactec system to
23 blood centers.

24 Is the fact that you have cleared two
25 devices for the quality control of platelets mean

1 that non-cleared systems, such as the Bactec, could
2 not be used on any FDA scheme for quality control
3 by licensed and registered organizations?

4 DR. WILLIAMS: I am going to defer the
5 answer on that to someone else if I can.

6 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, use of those systems
7 would be off-label use because they are not
8 indicated for quality control monitoring of
9 platelets, so it becomes an issue of enforcement
10 discretion. I can't tell you that that is
11 permitted.

12 DR. NELSON: Any other questions?

13 DR. FITZPATRICK: Alan, it might be a
14 little confusing. You used the term "four-hour
15 hold" for the pooled random donor platelets.
16 Actually, it is a four-hour expiration after
17 pooling meaning that they have to be transfused
18 within that four-hour period, right?

19 DR. WILLIAMS: That is correct. I think
20 "four-hour hold" is kind of a term in common use,
21 but that is correct, they do expire after four
22 hours.

23 DR. NELSON: The next presentation is by
24 Dr. John Lee on Skin Preparation of Phlebotomy.

25 B. Skin Preparation of Phlebotomy

1 temperature, the higher the risk, and this is due
2 to the fact that bacteria, unlike viruses, multiply
3 within the collected blood after a brief lag phase.

4 When these causative organisms are
5 identified, they turn out typically to be--well, I
6 wouldn't say typically--but they often turn out to
7 be a member of the skin flora. So, it is a
8 reasonable conclusion that inadequate donor skin
9 antiseptics is a major contributor to bacterial
10 contamination of blood.

11 [Slide.]

12 The current most widely used technique in
13 the U.S. in preparing the donor arm is the method
14 outlined in the AABB Technical Manual. This is a
15 two-stage procedure where at least an 8 cm diameter
16 area is selected for phlebotomy.

17 As a Stage 1 procedure, that area is first
18 scrubbed with a 0.7 percent iodophor preparation
19 for at least 30 seconds. That area might be wet.
20 It is actually written in the manual that you need
21 not wait for it to dry and move on to the second
22 step, where the second step consists of applying a
23 10 percent povidone-iodine, which has a 1 percent
24 availability of free iodine.

25 This is to be applied beginning with the

1 site of phlebotomy, the needle entry point, and
2 move outward in a concentric spiral. After
3 covering all of the at least 8 cm diameter area,
4 that area should be allowed to stand for a minimum
5 of 30 seconds.

6 [Slide.]

7 Now, this method has been in use at least
8 in the U.S. widely for many years. There has been
9 a recent challenger to that method, and that method
10 has been described by two authors, the studies by
11 those authors I will describe in a few minutes.

12 This is a method I believe widely used
13 currently in Canada and also in UK. I will refer
14 to this as the IPA/TI method, isopropyl alcohol,
15 tincture of iodine method, but in the literature,
16 it is more commonly referred to as the "Medi-Flex"
17 method, because it comes in as a kit manufactured
18 by a company as a Medi-Flex kit.

19 That also is a two-stage procedure where
20 the first stage consists of applying 70 percent
21 isopropyl alcohol in an up and down motion. The
22 second stage is to apply 2 percent tincture of
23 iodine again starting at the point of needle entry
24 and moving outward in a concentric spiral. This
25 should also be allowed to let stand for an adequate

1 time for drying.

2 You notice that in both methods, two
3 stages are involved. This is consistent with sort
4 of the general accepted thinking in the surgical
5 literature where if you apply two different
6 antiseptics, they may work by two different
7 mechanisms and therefore have a complementary, if
8 not synergistic effect, in knocking out the
9 bacterial flora on the skin.

10 Although that has been a general thinking,
11 first of all, it is not clear whether that is true,
12 and secondly, it is not clear whether that thinking
13 applicable to patient care is necessarily
14 applicable to phlebotomy at blood collection.

15 The second point that I would just like to
16 insert at this point is that tincture of iodine
17 itself is an alcohol solution. By "tincture," what
18 we mean is iodine dissolved in alcohol, and to
19 increase solubility of iodine, an iodine salt is
20 added, something like potassium iodide, and it is
21 suspended in roughly a 50 percent alcohol solution.
22 Most typically, it is the ethyl alcohol for
23 increased solubility.

24 [Slide.]

25 Now, this method has been a recent

1 challenger and the reason for that is because of
2 two out of the three available studies on donor arm
3 preparation for blood collection.

4 The first of these studies was performed
5 by Goldman et al. It is entitled, "Evaluation of
6 Donor Skin Disinfection Methods," and it appeared
7 in *Transfusion* in 1997.

8 The second of these studies was performed
9 by McDonald et al in the UK. The Goldman study was
10 performed in Canada. McDonald's study is entitled,
11 "Evaluation of Donor Arm Disinfection Techniques,"
12 a very similar title. It appears in *Vox Sanguinis*
13 in 2001. Both of these studies focused on the
14 IPA/TI method, in other words, the Medi-Flex
15 method.

16 The third study did not address the
17 effectiveness of the Medi-Flex method, however, it
18 is a study of a somewhat larger scope and relevant
19 to this discussion, and again only the third
20 available study in this area, so I included it
21 here.

22 That study is entitled, "Impact of Donor
23 Arm Skin Disinfection on the Bacterial
24 Contamination Rate of Platelet Concentrates." It
25 also appeared in *Vox Sanguinis* in 2002.

1 Each of these studies recognized the
2 previous study. Dr. McDonald built on the results
3 produced by Dr. Goldman, and Dr. Lee built on
4 results obtained by Goldman and McDonald although
5 he did not study the Medi-Flex kit per se. Dr.
6 Lee's study was performed in Hong Kong.

7 [Slide.]

8 To describe these studies in a little more
9 detail, Dr. Goldman compared four methods in three
10 paired experiments.

11 The povidone method, which is the AABB
12 method, that method was used in all three
13 experiments as the common comparator to which the
14 next three methods were compared, the first being
15 the Medi-Flex IPA/TI, the second being a sponge
16 followed by an ampule application, both of those
17 applications involving 0.5 percent chlorhexidine in
18 70 percent isopropanol, and the last method being
19 green soap followed by 70 percent isopropanol.

20 I might as well just point out that green
21 soap is a method recognized in the Technical Manual
22 by the AABB at this point as a method to use if
23 donor proves to be allergic to iodine.

24 Dr. Goldman transferred the residual skin
25 bacteria after arm preparation to culture plates by

1 direct skin contact, so this was not a study about
2 actual units collected or any kind of a clinical
3 study. She simply enumerated bacteria in colonies
4 appearing on culture plates after that culture
5 plate has been directly pressed onto the donor's
6 skin after arm preparation.

7 [Slide.]

8 These are the results that she obtained.
9 In the first of these studies, a comparison between
10 the AABB method, povidone-iodine, and the Medi-Flex
11 method, IPA/tincture of iodine.

12 She did not produce a quantitative
13 estimate of the relative effectiveness, but more of
14 a qualitative result in that the Medi-Flex method
15 resulted in a significantly higher number of
16 procedures where the bacterial colonies, residual
17 bacteria as measured by colony count was reduced
18 either to zero or 1 to 10 in a significantly higher
19 proportion of donors than with povidone-iodine
20 method, the AABB method.

21 Conversely, the percent of donors with a
22 high residual bacterial count was associated with
23 the AABB method in a higher percentage of donors
24 than with the Medi-Flex kit. So, this gave you
25 some indication in a qualitative sense that the

1 Medi-Flex kit method might be more effective than
2 the currently used AABB method in the U.S.

3 [Slide.]

4 In a similar way, she compared the other
5 two agents to the povidone method, and in somewhat
6 smaller studies the comparison between AABB method
7 and the Medi-Flex method was performed in 126
8 subjects with a high statistical significance.

9 The povidone method was compared to the
10 green soap, in other words, the AABB standard
11 method was compared to the AABB back-up method, and
12 that also indicated that the standard method is
13 more effective than the back-up method with a high
14 level of significance.

15 When the chlorhexidine method was compared
16 to the povidone method, statistical significance
17 was not achieved, and she concluded that the two
18 methods are about comparable.

19 [Slide.]

20 So, based on these results, Dr. McDonald
21 performed the next study, which also concentrated
22 on the Medi-Flex kit. In this study, five
23 techniques were compared, actually, five techniques
24 were expanded to 12 variations.

25 The isopropanol/tincture of iodine method

1 had four variations associated with it, and then
2 also the standard AABB method was compared. The
3 povidone-iodine method followed by 70 percent
4 isopropanol was compared to it. A Cliniswab
5 Alcohol method, which is a one-step method
6 involving 70 percent isopropanol, that was studied.

7 Then, the North London method, which
8 happened to be the prevailing method up to the
9 point of performing this study, was also studied,
10 and that involved applying 0.5 percent
11 chlorhexidine in a 70 percent alcohol solution.

12 After arm preparation, instead of direct
13 skin contact plating of culture plates, the
14 investigator used moist saline swabs to transfer
15 the residual skin bacteria from the prepared donor
16 arm to the culture plates.

17 Which of these enumeration methods are
18 better, it is difficult to say.

19 [Slide.]

20 These are the results that were obtained
21 by that study. The Medi-Flex adapted method, and
22 by "adapted," it is adapted because the second
23 stage application of tincture of iodine is applied
24 in a straight up and down motion rather than a
25 concentric spiral, and that proved to be or at

1 least appeared to be the most effective, resulting
2 in 99.8 percent reduction in 29 subjects.

3 The next best was the povidone method or
4 the AABB method which had an effectiveness of about
5 90 percent reduction, and this was comparable to
6 iodophor application followed by alcohol of again
7 approximately 90 percent effectiveness.

8 The Cliniswab alcohol method was close
9 behind with 87.4.

10 Now, it is difficult to say if the
11 differences among these results are all that
12 significant, particularly among the last three.

13 [Slide.]

14 Based on that initial study, a higher
15 number of subjects were selected for a more
16 in-depth study, comparing the existing North London
17 method at that UK blood center to two variations of
18 the Medi-Flex method which appeared to be
19 promising.

20 One is the adapted method where the
21 tincture of iodine is applied in straight up and
22 down motion rather than spiral as the kit
23 originally intended, and another variation being
24 the IPA/TI Medi-Flex method as a two, double
25 alcohol application variation where the isopropanol

1 component is applied twice rather than once. You
2 would expect that to be a high performer, as well.

3 The results actually indicated that
4 applying the alcohol once is as good as applying it
5 twice, maybe even better, and applying the tincture
6 of iodine suspended in 50 percent alcohol is
7 applied in a straight up and down motion rather
8 than in a concentric spiral.

9 Again, the significance of these results
10 is difficult to make a statement about, but it
11 seems clear that both of these variations are more
12 effective than the then existing North London
13 method, which only reduced to about 78.5 percent of
14 the donor skin flora.

15 [Slide.]

16 So, these are very suggestive results and
17 basically, that is all there is. Because of the
18 lack of data in the blood collection literature,
19 that became a major challenger to the existing AABB
20 method, but several points need to be further
21 considered before we widely accept that as the
22 replacement method.

23 First of all, in the ways that the
24 investigators counted the amount of residual skin
25 flora, the way that they collected the sample

1 either by moist saline swab or direct skin contact
2 of the culture plate, certainly it was targeted at
3 identifying the surface, but not the resident
4 bacterial skin flora.

5 It is well accepted that the skin flora
6 consists of basically two components, a transient
7 component which resides in the skin surface which
8 can easily be removed by simple hygiene and washing
9 methods, and a more deeper resident flora which is
10 down in between epithelial cells, which is
11 difficult to remove mechanically, but has to be
12 sterilized by an antiseptic method.

13 So, the enumeration method is targeted at
14 the surface, a transient flora only. Further, it
15 has been a concern that with every phlebotomy at
16 blood collection,
17 there is a small core of skin that may be generated
18 by the needle that is difficult to remove and just
19 stays with the blood component.

20 Certainly, that core of skin will contain
21 the resident flora in deeper layers of the skin
22 which has not in any way been measured by these two
23 studies.

24 [Slide.]

25 Even if these counts truly reflected the

1 skin flora levels, it is difficult to say what it
2 means in the clinical arena. This is a laboratory
3 study using culture plates. What it means in terms
4 of contamination of the actual platelet units is
5 only to be speculated about.

6 Even if the correlation were to prove to
7 be present with the correlation between the
8 laboratory results and the clinical outcome, one
9 has to bear in mind that neither of these studies,
10 at least to my knowledge, through a close reading
11 of the published articles, has been blinded in any
12 way, and you might suspect that the care with which
13 the arm was prepared with a particular agent might
14 have great result on the results of obtained, as
15 well as the care in setting up the cultures with
16 either agent.

17 So, even though both investigators
18 concluded a high statistical significance with the
19 results obtained, it is difficult to say whether
20 the studies had been set up in a way to allow an
21 interpretation of high statistical significance, so
22 it is not clear how to interpret the results
23 despite the p-values obtained.

24 [Slide.]

25 Also, even if all of these prove to be

1 concerns only, and not real worries to ponder over,
2 you have to keep in mind that there are other
3 intervention mechanisms being considered, such as
4 the diversion pouch, such as the QC system, and
5 such as the unit release testing system.

6 So, in the context of a multi-pronged
7 approach to reducing bacterial contamination, what
8 changing from one agent to the other agent means,
9 that is difficult to know.

10 On the other side of evaluating a
11 potential switch from one arm preparation method to
12 another, what about the down side of things. The
13 currently available method seems to be well
14 accepted by donors. Will the tincture of iodine be
15 similarly well accepted?

16 It causes more of a skin irritation and
17 staining than does the povidone. In terms of
18 tincture of iodine, it is more readily available
19 for absorption into the system at circulation.
20 Now, where this is probably not much of a concern
21 in the donor setting, it has been a concern in the
22 patient setting.

23 So, all of these, how will it translate to
24 donor acceptance and ultimately the effect on donor
25 availability or blood availability, that has not

1 been addressed at all.

2 [Slide.]

3 Further, the multiple variations of the
4 Medi-Flex method that Dr. McDonald studied, it is
5 difficult to say much about the small differences
6 obtained in the results.

7 Furthermore, the tincture of iodine
8 component is a high alcohol solution to begin with
9 and what kind of results would you obtain with the
10 same study if you were to include one more
11 antiseptic solution of simply applying 70 percent
12 isopropanol multiple times? That is another
13 question to think about.

14 Lastly, the results obtained in these two
15 blood collection studies conflict with results,
16 parallel results available in the patient care
17 literature where two investigators, Little and
18 Wilson, studied that particular antiseptic kit, the
19 Medi-Flex, consisting of the same components, 70
20 percent isopropanol and 2 percent tincture of
21 iodine.

22 They compared that to the povidone methods
23 and other methods, but povidone being one of them,
24 for their effectiveness in reducing contamination
25 of blood cultures at patient sepsis workup, and

1 either the results were only marginally better with
2 the Medi-Flex kit or actually comparable as studied
3 in the patient care sector.

4 So, these seemingly conflicting results
5 have to be at least reconciled.

6 [Slide.]

7 Now, those are some critiques on these two
8 studies supporting a transition over to the
9 isopropanol/tincture of iodine method.

10 A third study is available in the blood
11 collection literature, as I mentioned earlier, and
12 this involved a comparison between 0.5 percent
13 cetrimide and 0.5 percent chlorhexidine followed by
14 70 percent isopropanol application.

15 That method was compared to a
16 povidone-iodine method, which is not the AABB
17 method, but it is a method of applying
18 povidone-iodine with 1 percent available iodine,
19 which is like the prep solution of the AABB method,
20 but that is used more as a scrub rather than a
21 prep, and the actual prep solution in this case was
22 the 70 percent isopropanol.

23 What they did was just a study, not
24 performed as an experiment, but tacked onto the
25 actual transfusion service requirements. Over two,

1 10-month periods, these two studies were compared
2 one after the other.

3 Over these two, 10-month periods, over
4 170,000 platelet units were cultured. The samples
5 from these platelet units were injected into an
6 aerobic bottle of the BacT/ALERT system culture
7 bottle, and results were obtained that way.

8 So, although this does not address the
9 Medi-Flex kit, currently, the one that has raised
10 the whole point about potentially switching to a
11 different solution, it does point out that it is
12 possible, readily doable to generate data that is
13 more applicable to a clinical interpretation.

14 As obtained by Lee et al, the cetrимide-
15 chlorhexidine followed by isopropanol method
16 resulted in 0.072 percent contamination rate.

17 When that was switched to povidone-iodine
18 and isopropanol, in other words, basically, the
19 scrub component of the method was switched from
20 cetrимide-chlorhexidine to povidone-iodine,
21 obtaining the same prep solution component
22 isopropanol, when that switch was made, the
23 contamination rate fell to 0.042 percent, for
24 approximately a 42 percent reduction. But again, I
25 present this only to point out the possibility of

1 performing more studies in this area.

2 [Slide.]

3 At this point, I would like to present
4 five points to consider and show you some examples
5 of supporting evidence from the clinical care
6 literature.

7 Point No. 1 is that the following
8 antiseptics listed here may be comparable in their
9 ability to reduce skin bacterial flora - 10 percent
10 povidone-iodine, 2 percent iodine tincture, 2
11 percent chlorhexidine, 70 percent isopropanol
12 alcohol, or any combination of these, one step or
13 two step.

14 [Slide.]

15 Why would this be? This is based on my
16 reading of the literature. A study performed by
17 Calfee et al, the article entitled, "Comparison of
18 Four Antiseptics in a Randomized Trial," published
19 in the Journal of Clinical Medical Biology in 2002,
20 a very recent large-scale clinical study, where
21 four antiseptics were compared in over 12,000 blood
22 cultures - 10 percent povidone-iodine, 2 percent
23 tincture of iodine, 70 percent isopropanol and
24 povidone- iodine, and 70 percent ethyl alcohol or
25 the kit called Persist.

1 No significant differences were seen in
2 the contamination rates of the obtained blood
3 cultures using these four different arm preparation
4 methods.

5 The contamination rates ranged from 2.5
6 percent to 2.9 percent, and the preparations that
7 contained an alcohol component tended to be more
8 effective although no statistical significance
9 could be derived.

10 [Slide.]

11 I list three additional studies here. The
12 Calfee study I just described is listed in the
13 first slide, a randomized study in over 12,000
14 blood cultures, but there are other smaller studies
15 which support a similar conclusion - Trautner's
16 study in 2002 where 2 percent tincture of iodine
17 was compared with 2 percent alcoholic chlorhexidine
18 or 2 percent chlorhexidine suspended in a high
19 concentration of alcohol. In a blinded, 215 paired
20 blood culture study, there was no significant
21 difference between the two preparations.

22 Wilson's study in 2000, an
23 iodophor/alcohol method was compared to the
24 Medi-Flex method, isopropanol followed by a 2
25 percent tincture of iodine in over 12,000 blood

1 cultures. Again, no significant difference.

2 An interesting study by Shahar in 1990
3 where this investigator was not convinced that the
4 arm preparation methods of any kind made much of a
5 difference, and he compared 70 percent isopropanol
6 followed by 10 percent povidone-iodine, and this is
7 sort of the state-of-the-art at the time accepted
8 method of collecting blood cultures or maybe you
9 might call it good clinical practice before
10 obtaining a blood culture sample.

11 That method was compared to a method used
12 for just obtaining a blood sample for laboratory
13 measurement, such as obtaining a CBC, where you
14 take an alcohol swab, just briefly wipe the patient
15 arm one or two times, blow on it a bit, and go
16 right to needle insertion.

17 He compared the results, after comparing
18 these two studies, in 181 paired blood cultures,
19 and there was no significant difference. Something
20 to think about.

21 A second point to consider. Washing with
22 soaps is effective in removing transient surface
23 skin flora, but has little effect on reducing the
24 resident flora in the deeper layers of skin. In
25 fact, the soap residue, if not completely removed

1 at washing, may interfere with the activity of
2 subsequently applied antiseptic.

3 [Slide.]

4 This is based largely on a close reading
5 of an article published by Lilly, et al, where the
6 article is entitled, "Detergents Compared with
7 Each Other and with Antiseptics as Skin Degerming
8 Agents."

9 The authors used the word "degerming" to
10 indicate removal of both surface bacteria and
11 removal of the more deeper layers of skin bacteria
12 since the surface bacteria is felt to be more of a
13 mechanical removal and the deeper layer removal
14 being more of an actual microbial killing.

15 This was published in the Journal of
16 Hygiene in 1979. Basically, this was an
17 enumeration of hand bacteria before and after hand
18 washing with a particular degerming agent in six
19 subjects.

20 The way they measured the residual
21 bacteria on hands was much more elaborate than was
22 performed by either Goldman or McDonald, where what
23 was described as a standard method was used.

24 A hand was first washed in some kind of
25 basically a saline solution. The washing was

1 performed and then also, subsequent to that, a hand
2 washing was performed in the identical solution and
3 an aliquot of that solution is then incorporated
4 into a culture medium, into pour-in culture plates.
5 Then, the bacterial colonies are enumerated.

6 So, it was more than a simple transfer of
7 saline swab, more than a direct skin contact
8 plating, was much more elaborate and felt to be
9 superior in that it better measures the overall
10 skin flora, not just the surface.

11 In any case, basically, the investigators
12 compared three types of degerming procedures - one
13 using a combination of antiseptic and a detergent,
14 which the one used here was Hibiscrub, which is 4
15 percent chlorhexidine gluconate in a detergent
16 base.

17 That was compared to detergent alone. For
18 that, only the detergent base of the Hibiscrub
19 solution was used, without the 4 percent
20 chlorhexidine gluconate. Those two were also
21 compared to an antiseptic, which was 0.5 percent
22 chlorhexidine gluconate in 95 percent ethanol.

23 There are all kinds of critical comments
24 that can be made about the enumeration methods, and
25 so forth, but the results are rather largely spread

1 out in that the antiseptic method, which she
2 achieved 96 percent reduction--I think I switched
3 the numbers here--the antiseptic method achieved
4 96.0 percent reduction, whereas, the detergent
5 alone achieved 4.6 percent. A combination of
6 antiseptic and detergent achieved 81.2 percent.
7 So, the first two figures under the column Percent
8 Reduction is switched. I apologize for that.

9 Basically, it tells you that antiseptic is
10 much more effective than soap, and that is
11 consistent with common sense, but what is somewhat
12 surprising is that if you were to use a combination
13 of soap plus antiseptic, it may be no better, and,
14 in fact, probably worse than applying the
15 antiseptic alone.

16 [Slide.]

17 This Lilly study in 1979 is consistent
18 with the results obtained by the Goldman study,
19 which I described earlier, where the results
20 obtained with the green soap method as compared to
21 the standard AABB method of using two different
22 concentrations of povidone-iodine, when that was
23 compared with the green soap followed by
24 isopropanol alcohol, it was clear that the
25 povidone-iodine method, which did not involve a

1 detergent, was superior to the green soap method,
2 green soap being a soap.

3 [Slide.]

4 A third point to consider is the
5 following. In the donor setting, iodine and
6 chlorhexidine may not offer an advantage over
7 isopropyl alcohol. These are the reasons why.
8 Iodine and chlorhexidine is felt to be advantageous
9 in the clinical care setting because, although it
10 achieves antiseptics more slowly than does alcohol,
11 it maintains it for a longer duration.

12 So, for instance, if you are concerned
13 about catheter sepsis where the catheter will
14 remain in the patient for prolonged periods of
15 time, it is much more important how well maintained
16 the initial site is. It is just as important to
17 maintain it as to achieve antiseptics to begin with.

18 Of course, the same applies for any
19 surgical procedure. So, maintenance of antiseptics
20 is important in clinical care, but in the donor
21 setting for blood collection, rapid antiseptics is
22 probably much more important than maintenance of
23 antiseptics since phlebotomy is initiated and
24 terminated quickly and there is no reason to really
25 maintain antiseptics, and donors are probably not

1 willing to stick around for long periods of time,
2 and probably being able to achieve antiseptis
3 rapidly is probably much more important.

4 Most of all, isopropanol is readily
5 available, is inexpensive, and is well accepted by
6 donors and patients alike. The same cannot be said
7 about tincture of iodine.

8 [Slide.]

9 Two more points to consider. Repeat
10 application of 70 percent isopropanol may be more
11 effective than a single application. This is
12 contrary to the result obtained by McDonald, et al,
13 where the double alcohol variation of the Medi-Flex
14 method proved no better and suggestively slightly
15 worse than the standard method, than the adapted
16 method where the tincture of iodine was applied in
17 a concentric circle, in a straight up and down
18 method rather than a concentric circle.

19 The second of these two points is that
20 two-page antiseptis is not necessarily more
21 effective than a single-step procedure. The reason
22 for that comes from the following.

23 [Slide.]

24 Lilly et al also performed a second study
25 entitled, "Limits to Progressive Reduction of

1 Resident Skin Bacteria by Disinfection," that
2 appeared in the Journal of Clinical Pathology in
3 1979, where two experiments were performed under
4 this study.

5 First, the effect of repeat applications
6 of an antiseptic and an effect on limits to
7 progressive disinfection, where 12 hand
8 disinfections were performed over four days,
9 bacterial counts were measured after each
10 handwashing and 4 different solutions were compared
11 - soap, Hibiscrub, 0.3 percent chlorocresol, and 95
12 percent ethanol.

13 Also, a second experiment for evaluating
14 the effect of a two-phase disinfection. Six hand
15 disinfections were performed over two days with 95
16 percent ethanol as the first agent, and then an
17 immediate seventh disinfection was performed after
18 the sixth with a phase 2 agent.

19 The agents compared there were Hibiscrub
20 base and Hibiscrub, 95 percent ethanol alone, and
21 0.5 percent chlorhexidine in 95 percent ethanol.
22 So, 95 percent ethanol was the first scrub, first
23 phase in all of these methods followed by different
24 second phase methods.

25 [Slide.]

1 These are the results obtained. This is
2 for repeat application of an antiseptic or what the
3 author described as "progressive limit" to
4 disinfection.

5 With 0.3 percent chlorocresol, there was
6 some initial reduction in bacterial count. That
7 continued to be true to about seven or eight
8 washings, but then it leveled off and no further
9 benefit was derived from continuously repeatedly
10 washing with this solution.

11 Hibiscrub, which is again a
12 chlorhexidine/detergent combination, performed
13 better than that. There was a more rapid initial
14 reduction after first hand washing and good
15 additional benefit was obtained by subsequent hand
16 washing to about six procedures, but then it also
17 began to level off and no benefit was derived
18 beyond about seven or eight washings.

19 With 95 percent ethanol, achieved the
20 greatest benefit with the first washing. Then,
21 although there are some blips there, you generally
22 get the sense that you got additional benefit from
23 each hand washing, all the way down to 12 washings.
24 It is not clear whether the benefits stop there.
25 It is possible that additional washings could even

1 produce more favorable results.

2 So, by this experiment, it appears that at
3 least with repeated washing, 95 percent ethanol
4 works best. Now, the reason for the 70 percent
5 isopropanol being the most commonly used alcohol
6 based antiseptic rather than a higher
7 concentration, is that it is a balance between
8 concentration and volatility, so the higher
9 concentration, the better antiseptics, but it
10 evaporates on the skin quicker than at lower
11 concentration and the duration of contact is
12 important for antiseptics, as well as the
13 concentration itself.

14 So, 70 percent concentration appears to be
15 the best compromise between strength and
16 volatility. As a single application agent, 70
17 percent is most appropriate or most effective, but
18 if you are evaluating multiple washings, then, a
19 higher concentration could also be used.

20 [Slide.]

21 The second experiment, which evaluated the
22 role of the two-phase method, which was generally
23 accepted in the patient care arena, two phase more
24 effective than one phase presumably because it used
25 different mechanisms of pathogen reduction.

1 Whether or not that is true was looked at
2 in the following way. When a Phase 1 solution was
3 used, 95 percent ethanol, you got a certain
4 reduction. Then, when it was immediately switched
5 to a second phase agent, presumably having
6 different mechanism of action, the results obtained
7 were rather surprising.

8 With a Hibiscrub base, which is actually
9 the detergent-only component of the Hibiscrub
10 solution, the reduction obtained by 95 percent
11 ethanol was reversed in that the bacterial count
12 actually rose.

13 With Hibiscrub or the detergent/antiseptic
14 combination, the results were largely maintained,
15 but were not improved. That was also true for 0.5
16 percent chlorhexidine and 90 percent ethanol. It
17 was maintained, but not substantially improved.
18 With 95 percent ethanol alone, you seem to get a
19 further reduction.

20 So, the differences between Hibiscrub,
21 chlorhexidine and ethanol, and ethanol, they are
22 rather small, so again it is difficult to say much
23 about that, but it seems clear that a soap is not a
24 good thing to use after using an antiseptic.

25 The authors made the following comments

1 about these results. They postulate that there is
2 kind of a balance when you remove the surface
3 bacteria, the bacteria residing in deeper layers of
4 skin somehow make its way up to the top, and with
5 repeated washing, you continuously knock that off.

6 An effective solution will knock it off
7 every time used to the full potential of that
8 particular solution, so if 95 percent ethanol is
9 able to reduce it to a certain level, it will keep
10 knocking it toward that level with repeated
11 washing.

12 But if you stop using the most effective
13 solution, but use a less effective solution, then,
14 the emerging flora from the deeper layers of skin
15 are now faced with a less effective solution, so it
16 is able to maintain a slightly higher count on the
17 surface. This seems to be a reasonable postulate,
18 but whether or not that is true is debatable, but
19 at least these were the results obtained.

20 [Slide.]

21 As a summary, I have these five points to
22 consider in evaluating whether or not the
23 isopropanol/tincture of iodine method is more
24 effective than the double povidone- iodine method,
25 and/or points to consider in possibly selecting a

1 most effective, most practical agent method to use
2 for donor arm preparation and perhaps points to
3 consider in designing further experiments to arrive
4 at that information.

5 First, the major antiseptics appear to be
6 rather comparable. Second, the use of soaps may
7 interfere with antiseptics. Third, in the donor
8 setting, iodine and chlorhexidine may not
9 necessarily offer an advantage over simple
10 isopropyl alcohol.

11 Fourth, repeat application of 70 percent
12 isopropanol may be more effective than a single
13 application. Lastly, two-phase antiseptics is not
14 necessarily more effective than a single-step
15 procedure.

16 [Slide.]

17 So, with those points in mind, I will
18 present you with this question to be voted on and
19 discussed about.

20 Do available scientific data support
21 preferential use of an isopropanol/tincture of
22 iodine skin preparation procedure for preparation
23 of the donor's phlebotomy site?

24 I thank you for your attention.

25 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Lee.

1 Questions or comments?

2 DR. STYLES: You mentioned early in your
3 report that the Medi-Flex system is already being
4 used in Canada and the United Kingdom.

5 Is there any data on their relative
6 contaminated unit incidence compared to ours,
7 and/or is there any data--they must have changed at
8 some point--if the change for them resulted in any
9 reduction in contaminated units in their blood
10 supplies?

11 DR. LEE: If it exists, I am not aware of
12 it. There may be someone in the room that may be
13 more current on that topic than I am. It hasn't
14 been that long that the switch was made in their
15 centers, so the data is probably accruing, but I
16 don't think those studies have been performed or
17 published.

18 DR. STYLES: I would just imagine that
19 they would have that same kind of surveillance
20 data. I would hope that they would have that, just
21 like we would, so that you might be able to get
22 some indication in a "real world" setting of, you
23 know, what sort of benefit that is going to give
24 you.

25 DR. LEE: I agree.

1 DR. NELSON: Mary.

2 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Do you even know if
3 these data are being collected in these countries,
4 because I don't think we can assume that it
5 necessarily is?

6 DR. LEE: That is quite true, no, I don't
7 know that.

8 DR. SCHMIDT: Certainly, some of the
9 complexity of this has to do with the human
10 element, and you were only able to mention the care
11 in arm preparation, and investigators of these
12 studies I think don't see.

13 It has certainly been my experience in
14 inspecting many, many blood collections to see
15 often, frequently, no numbers, that the
16 phlebotomist performs the correct preparation of
17 the site and then, at the last minute, the index
18 finger goes out to make sure that the vein is still
19 there.

20 Now, these people are doing repetitive
21 things, over and over again, but each one is kind
22 of different because each site is different, each
23 vein is different, et cetera.

24 If you ask the person who has been doing
25 this for two weeks or two months why they did it,

1 they will say, well, I just touched the edge of the
2 site. If you ask the person who has been doing
3 this for maybe two years or 20 years, they would
4 say I didn't do it. In their minds, they didn't do
5 it because they actually don't know that they are
6 doing it.

7 Some of this I think is influenced now by
8 the fact that they may be wearing gloves, and there
9 is this instinctive thing that although they are
10 not wearing the gloves for that purpose, that it is
11 giving some protection.

12 I think that those of you who have
13 hospital samples drawn for friends or yourself, if
14 you pay attention to that, it is a different
15 setting and they are drawing the sample for a
16 different person, but in the hospital, this happens
17 very frequently in the outpatient lab.

18 I have talked to hospital pathologists
19 about it, and they think it is fine. Maybe it's
20 fine, but we are not talking about that.

21 The second point I would like to make is
22 with the tincture of iodine, I think nowadays it
23 comes in prepared individual cellophane-wrapped
24 swabs. The old problem, which I would think would
25 exist in developed countries and maybe some

1 undeveloped states, is the jar of 50 percent
2 alcohol/iodine sitting out there for hours and
3 days, and sometimes a week, is certainly no longer
4 50 percent. That was one of the reasons everybody
5 was so happy to see the other things come along.

6 The final point I would like to make,
7 because maybe we won't come back to it, is the
8 problem of pooling the platelet concentrates, of
9 course, happens because of the timing in the
10 hospital setting, the hospital blood bank or
11 hospital transfusion service, and those people I
12 don't think are exposed to many of the things we in
13 this room are exposed to, and the care and
14 attention given the training of the hospital
15 technologist person in performing the pooling, how
16 much space, what the facility is that the hospital
17 administrator has given them to do this properly is
18 something we don't see, but I can assure you it is
19 not managed with the same care as we look at the
20 preparation of the drugs, as we call them.

21 Thank you.

22 DR. ALLEN: I know we have got a very
23 packed day, but let me ask one question and than
24 make a couple of comments.

25 I was intrigued as I went through the

1 papers that you provided at the difference between
2 the observed rate of platelet contamination which
3 generally is well below 1 percent and the false
4 positive blood culture rates in the studies cited,
5 which often were somewhere in the range of 2 to 4
6 percent.

7 Do you have any explanation? I mean I
8 have got several hypotheses as to why that may be.

9 DR. LEE: I think it depends on the care
10 with which you perform the procedure, and blood
11 cultures are likely to be obtained by multiple
12 people whereas, in blood collection, the same
13 trained staff is repeatedly doing the same thing.

14 What is measured is different. In blood
15 cultures, you are measuring blood cultures, but in
16 other studies, at least the Goldman and McDonald
17 studies, you know, they measured something quite
18 different, so the contamination rates are not
19 really transferrable from one area to the other.

20 DR. ALLEN: Similar types of hypotheses.

21 It has been a number of years since I have
22 looked at this kind of literature although at an
23 earlier point in my career, I looked at it fairly
24 intensively. I am a little surprised at the
25 relative paucity of data just looking at actual

1 skin culture results.

2 There was a little bit presented here and
3 there, but I think that this difference that you
4 talked about between the transient or the surface
5 bacteria, which are relatively easily removed and
6 killed, versus the residual flora is extremely
7 important.

8 Another of the issues that hasn't been
9 adequately discussed is the extent of the
10 scrubbing. As I remember from earlier literature,
11 too intensive scrubbing may actually promote the
12 release of some of the residual flora shortly after
13 the completion of the cleansing process, which goes
14 on for perhaps a minute or so, and that if one were
15 to sample immediately after the antiseptic has
16 dried and then 10 to 15 later you would find
17 actually a very sudden rebound of the release of
18 some of the deeper residual flora that is there,
19 that if you don't have a residual antiseptic agent,
20 may not then be killed at that point.

21 So, I disagree a little bit with the point
22 that you made that donation is a fairly short-term
23 process and you may not need a residual agent.
24 Certainly, you don't need it to the extent that you
25 do when you have an intravascular device, but

1 certainly, donation can go on for 15 to 30 minutes
2 or so, and I would just question whether perhaps
3 having some degree of residual activity may not be
4 preferable.

5 DR. LEE: Actually, apheresis donations go
6 on for hours, so your point is well taken.

7 DR. ALLEN: I also would have liked to
8 have seen much more study of 2 percent
9 chlorhexidine and 70 percent isopropanol. It was
10 mentioned in three of the papers, Calfee, Trautner,
11 and Mackey, and to me, that certainly seems like a
12 very promising alternative combination.

13 Finally, I think we do need some
14 information about donor acceptability of iodine and
15 chlorhexidine in the donation process, and that
16 hasn't really been addressed at all.

17 DR. LEE: I don't know if there is much
18 information other than experience type anecdotal
19 information. I don't know if there is any
20 published information about donor acceptance of
21 those agents.

22 DR. DAVIS: In my own practice, which
23 involves indwelling catheters, we prepare the skin
24 using alcohol first, then, the povidone-iodine, and
25 then we wipe off the iodine with alcohol again.

1 That may address some of the donor concerns about
2 residual iodine on the skin. It works very well
3 for us.

4 DR. FITZPATRICK: John, first, I want to
5 thank you for a really extensive review. We still
6 seem to be needing to know what the source of the
7 contamination is, whether it is the skin plug or
8 the residual flora on the skin. You addressed the
9 flora on the skin. Previously, we have heard about
10 the skin plug as the source.

11 In your opinion, which do you think is
12 better to address?

13 DR. LEE: I tend to look at skin plug as
14 an extension of the flora depending upon how you
15 define flora. It is well accepted that there is a
16 surface flora and a deeper flora, and if you make
17 the deeper flora go pretty deep, then, you have a
18 skin plug.

19 So, I think it is probably a continuum and
20 not a separate skin plug issue to consider.

21 DR. FITZPATRICK: Just one other. Back in
22 ancient history, we were required to culture a
23 number of prep sites monthly in order to meet
24 quality control criteria, and the recommendations
25 were that you culture individual technicians, so

1 that you could identify those techs that prepared
2 the site properly as opposed to those that did not.

3 Personally, I found that very beneficial
4 in my sites because we were able to identify
5 individual phlebotomists who were the core of the
6 problem and not doing the prep properly.

7 I think if we go to root cause, maybe we
8 should relook at what we were trying to determine,
9 which is who is doing the prep properly and who
10 isn't, and maybe more of a recommendation to
11 examine the technique of each phlebotomist might
12 even be beneficial.

13 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I just had a couple of
14 sort of historical background questions. As I
15 understand it, currently, what is out there is an
16 industry standard, namely, the AABB standard, extra
17 skin prep?

18 DR. LEE: That is my understanding, too.

19 DR. CHAMBERLAND: So, there is no
20 FDA-related guidance in this area?

21 DR. LEE: True.

22 DR. CHAMBERLAND: With the release of
23 these two studies and with the Medi-Flex procedure
24 in two countries, adaptation or adoption of these
25 methodologies, has there been any utilization of

1 this methodology in the United States or are
2 collection agencies pretty much committed to the
3 AABB standard?

4 DR. LEE: I see some hands in the
5 audience. I think Dr. Dodd might be more--

6 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I guess what I am trying
7 to get is an appreciation of what is driving this,
8 posing this question to the committee. Maybe in a
9 subsequent presentation, this will become clearer,
10 but is AABB, is FDA signaling that you are going to
11 try and have a role in this vis-a-vis guidance
12 development?

13 I guess I am just trying to get a better
14 understanding of these data are out there, so what
15 is driving the question to the committee and what
16 might happen.

17 DR. LEE: I think I understand your
18 question.

19 I think it occurred like this. There has
20 been a number of national and international
21 meetings about bacterial safety of collected blood.
22 In every workshop/conference, skin site preparation
23 is an issue, and in every one of those settings,
24 these two studies by Goldman and McDonald are
25 described either directly or by the investigators

1 themselves.

2 There has been little critique at these
3 workshops as to why not to adopt or switch to
4 something that looks better, and there doesn't seem
5 to be a huge down side. So, if there isn't a huge
6 down side to this, and there is some reason to
7 believe that it is more effective, then, shouldn't
8 we move ahead and adopt this on a precautionary
9 principle rather than wait until all data are
10 available.

11 That is the concern that was raised within
12 the FDA. We are hearing information that this is
13 better, we are not hearing much information about
14 why not to do it, then, shouldn't we move ahead.

15 DR. DODD: Thank you very much. Roger
16 Dodd speaking right now as AABB president.

17 In fact, the method that is being
18 discussed is not an AABB standard. It appears in
19 the Technical Manual, which is recommendations.
20 But, in fact, as you will hear later, the AABB is
21 proposing a standard to move to a tincture of
22 iodine approach with chlorhexidine as a backup.

23 At that point, it would become mandatory
24 on the membership to employ that method, so that
25 may muddy the waters, but it is important to

1 recognize that povidone-iodine is a commonly used
2 procedure which is recommended, but isn't listed as
3 a standard.

4 DR. NELSON: We are going to discuss this
5 further in the questions for the committee. If
6 there aren't any other questions for Dr. Lee, I
7 wonder if we could take a break now.

8 Other questions or burning comments? We
9 will come back to this I guess at the end when we
10 consider the questions.

11 Let's take a 20-minute break until 11:20.

12 [Recess.]

13 DR. SMALLWOOD: We have a very full agenda
14 and we are grossly behind. That is an
15 overstatement. However, we are going to try to do
16 the best that we can to move forward quickly, and
17 we are going to be enforcing the time frames for
18 speakers.

19 We know that a lot of you are here because
20 you wanted to participate in this meeting fully and
21 particularly this afternoon's presentation on
22 parvo. I also am aware that some of the committee
23 members will have to leave, so we will have to make
24 an adjustment and sacrifice, and I will ask your
25 cooperation.

1 Thank you very much.

2 DR. NELSON: Continuing on Bacterial
3 Contamination, Dr. Vostal.

4 C. Update on the Diversion Pouch

5 Jaro Vostal, M.D., Ph.D.

6 DR. VOSTAL: Thank you very much. I will
7 try my best to sacrifice myself.

8 I will just give you a very brief update
9 on an issue that was discussed with BPAC about a
10 year and a half ago, and that is the issue of
11 having a diversion pouch in the blood collection
12 sets.

13 [Slide.]

14 As has been already mentioned a couple
15 times during the day, the needle cutting through
16 skin can make a skin plug, and this skin plug could
17 be contaminated due to a poor skin prep or due to
18 passing through a pocket of bacteria that is hidden
19 under scar tissue.

20 The thought has been that if you could
21 take the skin plug that probably is in the first
22 couple cc's of the blood that is coming through and
23 divert it away from the main product bag, you might
24 be able to reduce some of the contamination rate.

25 [Slide.]

1 When we were here the last time, we
2 presented two studies that sort of addressed this
3 option. One study was done by Steve Wagner, and
4 this was a model of how a diversion pouch or
5 diversion concept would work.

6 What he did was he intentionally
7 contaminated a sample site coupler of a blood bag.
8 He then sampled that with a large bore needle and
9 collected the 7 ml fractions and looked at the
10 bacterial content of these fractions.

11 He observed that within the first 21 ml,
12 he was able to recover about 88.5 percent of the
13 bacteria, and if he collected up to 40 ml, he was
14 able to recover 95 percent of the total bacteria
15 that he collected.

16 So, this in vitro model demonstrated that
17 this concept would be possible.

18 [Slide.]

19 The second study we talked about last time
20 was a clinical study done by Dr. Bruneau. They
21 were collecting actual blood samples and then they
22 had a special collection set which had two small
23 pouches, each one holding 15 cc, and they diverted
24 the initial blood, first, 15 cc in the first one,
25 and then the second one, and then collected the

1 main product.

2 They measured the contamination rate in
3 the bag 1 and bag 2. They found out that in 76 out
4 of 3,300 donations, that both bags were positive,
5 either bag 1 or bag 2 were positive, and that was a
6 contamination rate of about 2.2 percent.

7 They also noticed that the first sample
8 was positive and the second sample was negative in
9 55 out of the 76, so a potential reduction of
10 contamination of 1.6 percent. So, they argued that
11 you could reduce the contamination rate from 2.2
12 percent to 0.6 percent.

13 [Slide.]

14 Those were the studies that we discussed
15 last time. This is a study that has been published
16 since then, and it is a study by Dr. de Korte, and
17 he actually measured contamination rate in standard
18 collection sets. He has a relatively large number
19 of units collected.

20 He compared the standard collection to a
21 collection where the first 10 cc of the blood was
22 diverted away from the final container. Under
23 these conditions, he had 7,000 collections.

24 They observed a reduction from 0.35
25 percent contamination rate down to 0.21 percent, a

1 reduction of about a third was achieved using only
2 10 cc diversion. Of interest was specifically
3 contamination by Staph species. In the standard
4 collection, they had a 0.14 percent contamination
5 with Staph, and if they diverted the 10 ml, they
6 had 0.03 percent contamination due to Staph.

7 This is an actual clinical study that
8 shows that using this diversion approach, you can
9 actually reduce the contamination rate of the final
10 product.

11 [Slide.]

12 So, when we were here last time, we talked
13 about the kind of design that we would like to see
14 for a product that is coming to the U.S. market.
15 We stressed that it should be a closed system, that
16 the diverted blood is separated from the final
17 blood product by a unidirectional flow, and this
18 would be usually achieved by kind of a breakaway
19 closure.

20 First, the blood would flow into the bag.
21 This would then be sealed permanently. Then, this
22 would be opened, so the blood can flow into the
23 final bag. Finally, that the volume of diverted
24 blood would be sufficient to achieve the potential
25 benefits that were sort of suggested by those

1 clinical trials.

2 [Slide.]

3 In summary, what we discussed last time,
4 we came to the conclusion that there do not appear
5 to be any negative aspects of using a diversion
6 system to collect blood. The preliminary trial
7 suggested that a diversion of a small volume of
8 blood away from the main storage bag may be
9 beneficial in decreasing the contamination rate.

10 An additional benefit could be of using
11 the diverted blood for testing, and this could save
12 units that are lost to inadequate sample collection
13 at the end of phlebotomy. For example, if you
14 collect a full unit and you lose the venous access
15 at the end and you cannot collect the testing
16 samples, that unit will usually be discarded, so
17 collecting those samples upfront may be able to
18 avoid this problem.

19 [Slide.]

20 The question that the FDA asked the BPAC
21 Committee back then was whether manufacturers could
22 claim a significant reduction in bacterial
23 contamination of the blood product if the diversion
24 pouch was included in the collection set.

25 The committee concluded that the available

1 data did not support such a labeling claim,
2 however, the committee supported the FDA position
3 that a diversion pouch would be beneficial because
4 of the potential reduction in bacterial
5 contamination and reduction of lost products due to
6 inadequate sample collection.

7 [Slide.]

8 So, to bring you up to date where we are
9 right now, several manufacturers have submitted to
10 the FDA blood collection sets. They are modified
11 with a diversion pouch. These submissions are
12 currently under review and we are hoping to clear
13 these in the near future.

14 Thank you very much.

15 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

16 Questions?

17 DR. ALLEN: Of the manufacturers that have
18 submitted products that are under review, do they
19 provide clinical data that document the reduction
20 in bacterial contamination similar to the studies
21 that you presented, or is that proprietary
22 information?

23 DR. VOSTAL: They actually do not provide
24 clinical data. They provide the design that we
25 suggested, and we have taken that as being

1 sufficient.

2 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

3 Dr. Williams is next. Quality Control
4 Approaches for Detection of Bacterial
5 Contamination.

6 D. Quality Control Approaches for Detection
7 of Bacterial Contamination
8 Alan Williams, Ph.D.

9 DR. WILLIAMS: Thank you.

10 [Slide.]

11 I think in understanding this situation,
12 there needs to be some understanding of the current
13 environment. As mentioned, bacterial sepsis is
14 recognized as a second leading cause of
15 transfusion-related fatalities.

16 Now, with the availability of automated
17 culture devices which are cleared for quality
18 control testing as early as 24 hours after
19 collection, there is sort of a tug between trying
20 to put out the safest products possible, as well as
21 stay within the labeling associated with those
22 cleared products.

23 It has been well publicized that there are
24 industry initiatives to, in fact, test all in-date
25 platelet products for evidence of contamination.

1 With the apheresis platelets, the cleared
2 products will allow this to be done with the
3 semi-automated systems as soon as 24 hours after
4 the product is collected and have a culture result
5 possibly before issue, so as not to hold up the
6 product and make it done on a pre-release type
7 situation, there potentially are mechanisms for
8 retrieving that product should a problem be found
9 with it.

10 As mentioned earlier, random donor
11 platelets are a little more difficult or a lot more
12 difficult because of the pooling procedure which
13 takes place at the transfusion service and
14 necessarily any monitoring of these products needs
15 to be done by the less sensitive methods.

16 [Slide.]

17 In considering the first two issues, the
18 first is just to ensure that no harm is done by
19 undertaking quality control schemes that may be
20 statistically based or might be done universally on
21 all products.

22 Sampling of in-date platelet components
23 for culture requires use of either a closed system,
24 i.e., an integrated satellite bag which one can
25 then clamp off and use to collect the sterile

1 sample or a tubing weld made through the use of a
2 sterile connection device.

3 Sterile connecting devices are considered
4 functionally closed systems and obviously, with the
5 platelet component, if you draw the sample, you
6 want to be able to maintain a five-day shelf life.

7 [Slide.]

8 Now, the sterile connection procedure
9 itself, there are a lot of data, particularly in
10 the U.S. supporting the sterility of that procedure
11 when the weld is, in fact, intact. This normally
12 would include as part of the blood center's SOPs a
13 visual inspection for leakage of the weld joint.

14 The data that exist include the original
15 data submitted for the device review. A study,
16 which will be described by Dr. Aubuchon in a few
17 moments, published in Transfusion, and I think an
18 observation, although not specifically reflecting
19 data collection, an acknowledgment that the sterile
20 docking procedure is, in fact, commonly used on
21 platelet products because when a platelet product
22 is split, a sample needs to be drawn to actually
23 count the content of the splits.

24 It would be potentially feasible to look
25 at contamination for split platelet, apheresis

1 platelet products versus non-split products, but I
2 have not seen data that looks at that, but, in
3 fact, the procedure is in place for a room
4 temperature product.

5 [Slide.]

6 The reason for bringing the subject to the
7 attention and a vote is, in fact, there is a single
8 study of pooled platelet concentrates that reported
9 15 of 1,105 contaminated units among pools that
10 were connected by tubing welds. As a control, they
11 looked at cultures on 378 apheresis platelet
12 concentrates.

13 The 15 contaminated units, in fact, they
14 went back to the buffy coats of those products and
15 did not find evidence of contamination, and the
16 study concluded that quite possibly those
17 contaminations were due to the sterile docking
18 device itself. This was published in 1997 from the
19 Belgian Red Cross.

20 I think subsequent speakers including Dr.
21 Aubuchon and probably the Terumo speaker will have
22 further comments about that study.

23 I think the bottom line in terms of policy
24 development is that any extrinsic contamination
25 rate of this magnitude would clearly negate any

1 benefit of large-scale culturing.

2 [Slide.]

3 The other aspect of quality control is to
4 identify strategies that facilitate the direct
5 reduction of bacterial risk given that no current
6 detection systems are approved for pre-release
7 testing, and balance that with what is typically
8 considered quality control, reducing bacterial risk
9 by assuring that blood collection and processing
10 procedures conform to a defined standard of some
11 sort.

12 [Slide.]

13 There is a proposal currently under
14 consideration by the Council of Europe, and I
15 believe public comments have been received, and
16 modification of this represents FDA's proposed
17 current thinking on a statistical quality control
18 procedure.

19 What this would involve, would be at least
20 5 percent or depending on facility size, a minimum
21 of 1,500 platelet products annually are subject to
22 quality control testing for bacterial contamination
23 at 24 hours or later when the product meets a
24 labeling criterion for which one of the automated
25 devices could be used, that is a possibility for

1 random donor platelets or products that could not
2 be used within the labeling requirements, it might
3 be reasonable to use outdated products or other
4 criteria to produce the culturing to meet this
5 quality control method.

6 The second portion of this is that
7 standard statistical methods should be used to
8 identify significant deviations from a baseline
9 contamination rate, and we are proposing that
10 baseline contamination should not exceed 0.2
11 percent. So, in other words, 0.2 percent is the
12 standard. The implementing facility needs to
13 predefine a scheme which will establish a trigger
14 point when that standard is surpassed on a
15 statistical basis.

16 [Slide.]

17 The chosen method should be based, as I
18 mentioned, on a predetermined level of confidence
19 to exclude a maximum tolerated contamination rate,
20 and an action limit should be established.

21 Now, there is an example in the handout
22 that you received. I am not going to go into that
23 in detail, but basically, the scheme that is laid
24 out is that this represents the activities of a
25 small collection facility that is doing the 1,500

1 cultures per year.

2 In the course of the year, if they realize
3 three cultures for 400 attempts at culturing, it
4 would, in fact, put the background prevalence of
5 contamination over the action level, but the
6 statistics wouldn't be supportive of the fact that
7 this sample accurately represents that level of
8 contamination in the entire process.

9 However, if that site designated that
10 within the annual sampling period, they found 7
11 positive units, this would not only constitute an
12 action level that was exceeded simply based on the
13 prevalence of the contamination, but also
14 statistically within defined confidence and power
15 limits would be shown to exceed that 0.2 percent
16 standard.

17 This is based on a binomial distribution.
18 Other statistical considerations may apply, but I
19 think this is one fairly straightforward way to
20 reach that sort of statistical control scheme.

21 So, the bottom line take-home message is a
22 facility would be required to test either 5 percent
23 or 1,500, whichever was greater, assign inaction
24 limits on a statistical basis that would call for
25 investigation and revalidation if that limit was

1 exceeded.

2 [Slide.]

3 A second element of that is as with any
4 good quality control system, any instances of a
5 positive culture should be investigated promptly to
6 facilitate identification of a correctable cause.
7 As discussed earlier, this could be related to arm
8 preparation procedures, an individual phlebotomist
9 who had unacceptable technique, or things that
10 might be occurring in the component preparation
11 laboratory.

12 Simply by trending some of these results,
13 one might get a clue as to what problem exists in
14 the processing procedures.

15 There are other actions which are not
16 specifically part of current thinking, but, for
17 instance, if culturing is being done and a product
18 is released, there are issues related to whether
19 the individual contaminating bacteria should be
20 identified, whether sensitivity testing should be
21 done, and whether the recipient physician should be
22 notified.

23 Clearly, this has implications if the
24 product has been received. Some of this is easier
25 to decide than if it is to be done on a routine

1 basis without knowing the actual disposition of the
2 final product.

3 [Slide.]

4 The FDA recommendation regarding quality
5 control would incorporate examples of what would
6 constitute an acceptable quality control strategy,
7 such as what was mentioned earlier for a small
8 facility, could also give examples for large
9 facilities which would be done on a similar
10 statistical basis.

11 The current thinking is that the FDA
12 recommendations would not inhibit what might be
13 occurring at the industry level, but would actually
14 serve as a minimal standard and that industry
15 standards may well be defined to be more stringent.
16 As you will hear, some of this is currently being
17 proposed by the American Association of Blood Banks
18 for culturing at a somewhat higher level.

19 So, FDA's thought is just to institute a
20 minimal standard that can be exceeded.

21 That basically outlines the quality
22 control issues. Again, you will hear more about
23 the European study and the sterile connecting
24 device from the next two speakers.

25 DR. NELSON: Questions or comments?

1 DR. ALLEN: Since the committee will be
2 considering the question about the proposed
3 statistical approach, do you have any other
4 information from blood centers or other published
5 literature that suggests that that kind of quality
6 control mechanism is useful in terms of keeping the
7 contamination rate low, that it is a good check on
8 procedures in use at all steps of the collection
9 and processing?

10 DR. WILLIAMS: Within the blood center
11 environment and specifically culturing related to
12 contamination, I am not aware of practical data.

13 I know to suggest a statistical approach
14 to quality control, this is the first attempt to do
15 this was with respect to leukoreduction and
16 residual white cell content, and it has, in fact,
17 been a rather difficult scheme to reach balance
18 between what is practically possible in an
19 individual collection site and what would meet a
20 statistical criteria. So, I think those are
21 considerations.

22 As far as the actual practicality of a
23 sampling approach, I am not aware in a blood center
24 situation.

25 DR. ALLEN: Going back to the other use in

1 terms of the leukoreduction, how easily has it been
2 adapted by QC staff in blood collection centers as
3 you have worked with them to implement this?

4 I am saying this simply because for most
5 physicians and others who aren't coming out of a
6 manufacturing background, this kind of statistical
7 quality control, it is a foreign concept, and is
8 part of the issue one of education and training, do
9 current QC managers at blood collection centers
10 have that kind of skill and facility, or what are
11 some of the obstacles here?

12 DR. WILLIAMS: I think my observation
13 would be in most circumstances, probably not. The
14 best way to approach it is in the context of FDA
15 guidance to propose schemes that the FDA would
16 consider appropriate, and if a center has more
17 sophistication, can make other quality control
18 approaches that might be distribution dependent,
19 for instance, they can propose those and have them
20 reviewed for prior approval.

21 But it appears that the best way to
22 approach the issue is to be as prescriptive as
23 possible in defining the simplest system to be put
24 into place and work with that as a minimal system.

25 DR. NELSON: Did you want to make a

1 comment?

2 DR. KUNERT: Yes. Matt Kunert at the CDC.

3 First, I just wanted to say I think any
4 step forward is a good step. I do have a question
5 about what essentially looks to be a benchmark of
6 0.2 percent contamination was determined.

7 In my experience with health care
8 facilities and looking at, say, nosocomial
9 infections, usually, benchmark is determined after
10 looking at what the overall rate is among a group
11 of facilities, for instance, and this, I think is
12 more based on previous studies, but I am just a
13 little concerned that it seems high, 1 in 500 seems
14 a little higher than, although there is variation,
15 what I have seen in the literature, in some of the
16 real-time data, for instance, some data forwarded
17 on from Japan where they looked at 10,000 units and
18 got 1 positive.

19 Aubuchon had a paper where they had a
20 bunch of false positives, at least that is what
21 they have determined them to be. But I didn't have
22 any positives in two years, so I am just a little
23 worried that this might be a little high to use as
24 a benchmark.

25 The other comment I had is considering

1 about those positives that you might see, might not
2 be those that are pathogenic, and how that will be
3 addressed, because you mentioned about clinician
4 notification.

5 You have something like a corynebacterium
6 species that is very different from a Klebsiella
7 species, say, in terms of clinical significance,
8 and whether you might want to consider having
9 different benchmarks for different clinical
10 significance as the numbers of organisms that have
11 questionable clinical significance are likely to
12 overwhelm those that are really significant, and
13 those are the ones you really want to prevent, like
14 the gram negatives.

15 DR. WILLIAMS: I agree. Again, I think
16 there is a balance to be reached between working up
17 those that are clinically significant and those
18 which, while maybe not clinically significant, do
19 represent some breach in procedure, and that has
20 value in the workup itself, but clearly, you need
21 to reach an approach that is realistic and
22 feasible.

23 As far as the 0.2 percent, Jay may wish to
24 comment further since this is part of the European
25 standard. From my approach, I think it is felt to

1 be a standard that can be reached and reasonably
2 approximated by a statistical approach. If you get
3 too much more ambitious than that, you simply can't
4 get there with a sampling approach.

5 I guess one final comment is that
6 statistical approaches in sampling really don't
7 come under consideration if you are doing universal
8 culturing because clearly, then you have the
9 results, 0.2 is the standard and optimally, you
10 would want to stay within that.

11 DR. EPSTEIN: First, let me just reiterate
12 that the number was based on a literature review of
13 current practices in competent centers, but also
14 let me emphasize that if you set a standard of 0.2,
15 a center would need to achieve something lower than
16 that in order to be able to repeatedly produce a
17 statistical assessment showing it was no greater.

18 So, it, in fact, implies a more stringent
19 actual performance.

20 DR. KUNERT: If I might ask a point of
21 clarification. Are you going to be discussing
22 later as far as when, at what time, either during
23 storage or at out-date, that the products are going
24 to be sampled, because I had a comment on that, as
25 well, and I can wait on it if that is going to be

1 discussed later.

2 DR. WILLIAMS: I think it will be probably
3 addressed in some of the subsequent talks, but it
4 is not a specific decisional issue for the meeting.

5 The devices that are cleared for quality
6 control are cleared for as soon as 24 hours after
7 collection. Clearly, if you are simply doing
8 quality control, not using the product, the best
9 time to sample it is probably after 48 hours or
10 ideally at out-date.

11 Basically, we are looking for harmony
12 between what the labeling permits and what would
13 suffice as a quality control program.

14 DR. KUNERT: I was going to just make the
15 comment, because it does relate to the statistical
16 methodology, I wanted to clarify, on the BACON
17 data, there was a reference in the Aubuchon paper
18 that was based on an abstract, and I just wanted to
19 clarify that those cases that were associated with
20 serious clinical sepsis were associated actually
21 not necessarily with long storage times, I mean
22 they were associated at day 2, day 3, infrequently
23 day 4, overall, true, day 4 or day 5, but the ones
24 that caused the greatest clinical impact were the
25 ones that actually grew very quickly.

1 So, I would urge that there was a strategy
2 or an option was to look at culturing at release,
3 that that would be preferable to those done at
4 out-date because you want to get as many units as
5 possible because the incidence of these fatalities
6 and these very serious events are very, very low,
7 so it is important to get as many as possible at
8 the time of release, I think. That was my third
9 comment.

10 Thank you.

11 DR. FITZPATRICK: I am trying to put this
12 in the perspective of how I manage from a practical
13 standpoint when I see that I might have a trend or
14 I have a couple positive units, I am moving toward
15 or above the 0.2 percent range.

16 I have data, but now I have to go back and
17 figure out the root cause in order to make an
18 intervention. So, now I have to from what I have
19 heard, I am going to have to culture my welds, I am
20 going to have to culture my arm preps, I am going
21 to have to look at the training and methods used by
22 my phlebotomists and my technologists in that.

23 I also have to look at the nursing staff
24 and administration. That also is going to take
25 time and effort and a lot of work, and I am not

1 sure that you are going to find a root cause to
2 intervene and make an improvement on.

3 The end outcome that we want here is to
4 try to reduce that 5 to 9 fatalities per year. I
5 am worried about the focus of the data collection.
6 I think the data collection should be focused on an
7 attempt to find the root cause of the problem and I
8 am not sure we are doing that.

9 I don't have an answer for that, but I
10 think we need to look at the work and effort
11 involved and is there a way to focus the data
12 collection on attempting to identify the root cause
13 as to just confirming what we know, which is that
14 we have a problem with platelet contamination and
15 that there needs to be a way to intervene. That is
16 my concern overall.

17 The other question is if you look at
18 applying the QC effort to current practices, and if
19 you evaluate the fatalities that have occurred over
20 the past few years, one, have you looked at that,
21 and, two, do you think that there is an impact that
22 would be made on those fatalities by applying the
23 QC method?

24 DR. WILLIAMS: I think it is a good point.
25 It would be an extensive undertaking to look at

1 each of those cases in that context, so it is a
2 fair question, but, no, it hasn't been looked at
3 specifically.

4 DR. SIMON: Maybe following up on that,
5 asking that a different way, let us assume you did
6 this, every blood center in the country met this
7 requirement, is it more likely than not that the 5
8 to 9 fatalities would continue.

9 DR. WILLIAMS: Well, I guess I would again
10 go back to the differing prevalence of
11 contamination between sites. I mean what is being
12 argued is there is a certain low level of
13 contamination that you can't identify a cause, and
14 is constant, and you simply need to culture to
15 identify those units.

16 I think where the quality control gets you
17 is where there are variations between prevalence of
18 contamination between sites and there are extrinsic
19 factors, that you allow some control over those
20 factors, so that you can identify them, eliminate
21 them, and reapproach that baseline level.

22 DR. NELSON: My guess is that if we had
23 data on all blood collection centers, that they
24 wouldn't be totally homogeneous, that there might
25 be outliers, and that might be useful.

1 DR. SIMON: Historically, the discovery of
2 this problem came from well-known academic centers,
3 Johns Hopkins, Cleveland--

4 DR. NELSON: We are probably an outlier.

5 DR. SIMON: Yes, which presumably had no
6 history of poor technique problems like this. It
7 appears to me that this problem as it has appeared
8 around the country is not related to the kinds of
9 root causes that Dr. Fitzpatrick would be looking
10 for.

11 DR. KLEIN: Since we know that up to half
12 of these are actually from the donor, circulating
13 in the blood, are not going to be corrected by
14 correcting the arm prep and probably not
15 effectively by diverting blood either.

16 This is an approach that I believe we are
17 trying to take to do something, and I am not
18 against it. What we would really like is a release
19 criterion. The more we culture, the more that we
20 will eliminate because they are positive, but what
21 we are left with is an in-process test which is not
22 ideal, and I think we simply have to recognize that
23 and move on.

24 DR. EPSTEIN: I think a distinction has to
25 be made here. The proposal for a quality control

1 strategy is not a proposed method for eliminating
2 the residual risk. It is a strategy designed to
3 ensure that all centers are operating in compliance
4 with current standard procedures.

5 What we are reacting to is the finding
6 that if you start culturing, there have been
7 reports in the literature of as much as 2 and 3
8 percent positive cultures, and we think that if all
9 appropriate procedures are followed, that shouldn't
10 be happening.

11 So, we are really not suggesting that this
12 is the cure for the current, you know, residual
13 rate of sepsis and fatality, but we want to at
14 least assure that all centers are able to
15 demonstrate that they are operating to current
16 standards. So, they are separable issues is what I
17 am trying to argue.

18 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

19 Next, is Dr. Aubuchon, Experience with
20 Plastic Tubing and Universal Bacterial Culturing.

21 E. Experience with Plastic Tubing and Universal
22 Bacterial Culturing

23 James Aubuchon, M.D.

24 DR. AUBUCHON: Thank you very much and I
25 appreciate the opportunity to address the committee

1 again on this subject. This is an area that we
2 have been involved with, with various research
3 projects over a number of years.

4 [Slide.]

5 Clearly, as you have heard this morning,
6 there are many uses for sterile connecting devices
7 in conjunction with platelet units, particularly
8 for QC sampling, to dock on filters in order to
9 leukoreduce the unit, to pool either before
10 storage, as is done in Europe, or after storage, as
11 is done in this country, to sample for bacterial
12 detection, and to remove an aliquot for transfusion
13 to a neonate, for example.

14 [Slide.]

15 Units can become contaminated in a number
16 of ways and certainly the welding or the sterile
17 connections that are conducted on the unit is a
18 potential site for contamination.

19 [Slide.]

20 For those of you on the committee who have
21 not ever used one of these devices, let me just
22 walk you through briefly how they operate. This is
23 my attempt to explain how it operates, and I don't
24 understand all the inner workings. Possibly
25 someone from Terumo can give you the details.

1 But the two pieces of tubing that are to
2 be welded are placed in a metal chuck adjacent to
3 each other. Beneath that chuck is a copper wafer.
4 It looks like just a piece of copper, but there is
5 actually an integrated circuit inside that piece of
6 copper.

7 Before the instrument can be used, the
8 prior wafer has to be ejected, so you are using a
9 new wafer each time. The wafer then heats and comes
10 up and slices through by melting the tubing. As
11 the two pieces of tubing have been melted, seen
12 here from on top, then, the chuck moves. The chuck
13 is actually in two halves, and this part of the
14 chuck moves backwards, so it drags this piece of
15 tubing and aligns it with this piece of tubing.

16 The outcome then is a new piece of tubing
17 that is connected together in two pieces which are
18 discarded. The weld then has to be opened by
19 squeezing it with your finger after you remove it
20 from the chuck.

21 [Slide.]

22 There is another device on the market by
23 Haemonetics. I have not used it, I am not familiar
24 with how it works. I presume it is something
25 similar, but I don't know the details of that.

1 The device which we have been using most
2 widely in this country and our laboratory has
3 experience with was initially marketed by duPont
4 and is now marketed by Terumo.

5 [Slide.]

6 To show you some pictures of how this
7 works, you see the two-piece chuck opened here with
8 the two pieces of tubing. Here is a platelet unit
9 with tubing coming across the chuck, an aliquot bag
10 over here that we are going to weld sitting in the
11 other set of slots.

12 [Slide.]

13 First, the wafer from the previous weld is
14 ejected by moving this handle forward. Here, it is
15 coming out. You remove that, and a new wafer
16 automatically comes into position at that point
17 from the cartridge of wafers. The wafers are
18 designed to be used only once.

19 [Slide.]

20 The wafer then heats, comes up, cuts the
21 tubing. You see here that this part of the chuck
22 has moved backward, now aligning this platelet unit
23 tubing with the aliquot tubing and opening it up.
24 You see the two are now connected.

25 [Slide.]

1 We became interested in this several years
2 ago while doing some research in bacterial
3 contamination. In the spirit of good manufacturing
4 practices, good laboratory practices, we sought
5 information to validate that the sterile connecting
6 device did what it was supposed to do sterilely.

7 We did find one piece of information in
8 the literature using spore contamination. We
9 proceeded then to do some testing with some real
10 life stressors, and I will also comment on the
11 European study that was mentioned in comparing the
12 various culture results.

13 [Slide.]

14 What we found in the literature was
15 presented at the American Society of Microbiology
16 in 1983, and it took a fair amount of hunting to
17 find this. What these investigators did was to
18 contaminate a segment of tubing with spores of
19 *Bacillus circulans* and then connect that piece of
20 tubing with another segment of tubing that had been
21 filled with trypticase soy broth.

22 The weld was opened and the broth was
23 allowed to cover the area of the weld, and it was
24 maintained at 35 degrees for four days and then
25 cultured in order to see if any of the spores had

1 gotten into the interior of the tubing.

2 They conducted 758 welds on 17 different
3 instruments and all of these experiments showed the
4 contents of the tubing after welding to be sterile.

5 [Slide.]

6 We conducted a study in three different
7 phases. I should note that the study was not
8 funded by the sponsor. We did this in our own
9 laboratory just to show that the technique did
10 indeed work.

11 In the first phase, we used a
12 leukocyte-reduced single donor platelet product
13 aliquotted 4 ml each into 64 small bags. In the
14 second phase, we used trypticase soy broth
15 aliquotted at 5 ml into 80 small bags.

16 These bags were then joined with other
17 empty bags after having dipped the tubing for both
18 halves of the welding sides in a liquid suspension
19 of either Staph epi, Flavobacterium odoratum, or E.
20 coli, and note that the concentration of bacteria
21 in this aqueous suspension was 40,000 to 3 million
22 bacteria per ml. This wasn't just a small amount
23 of contamination, this was heavy contamination.

24 A total of 10 ml between the two bags was
25 then created. The weld was opened and the contents

1 were moved back and forth several times in an
2 attempt to pick up any bacteria that may have
3 gotten into the weld. A culture was conducted
4 immediately and also after seven days.

5 [Slide.]

6 The tubing itself was not always dry as
7 the manufacturer would expect the instrument to be
8 used. In some cases, the tubing was allowed to be
9 wet and in other cases the contamination was
10 allowed to dry before the dock was conducted.

11 In some cases, the tubing was filled with
12 the trypticase soy broth or the platelet unit, in
13 other cases it was empty, so we had multiple
14 combinations of approaches here in these different
15 phases.

16 [Slide.]

17 In the third phase of the study, we used a
18 trypticase soy broth bag that we docked
19 repetitively to a series of empty bags, 100 times
20 in all using I believe 10 different initial bags
21 here.

22 Each time we docked on another small bag,
23 we were lengthening this tubing and the broth was
24 moving through successive weld sites in order to
25 again stress the system and to pick up any

1 contamination that may have occurred.

2 Here, we used the Staph epi or
3 enterobacter solution of bacterium at 100,000 again
4 to 3 million per ml as the contaminant and using
5 either wet or dry tubing. So, we felt that this
6 was really a stress of the system far beyond what
7 would be seen in normal practice.

8 [Slide.]

9 The results are shown here. In the first
10 phase, we performed 64 welds, 63 of them were
11 evaluable. We found that we had actually
12 contaminated one of the bags with a different
13 organism. This organism did not come from the
14 weld, so we had 63 units that could be evaluated.
15 All were sterile.

16 In Phase 2 of the trypticase soy broth,
17 two of the welds were incomplete. That is, when we
18 took it took out of the chuck and went to open it,
19 we could clearly see that the weld was defective
20 and was not complete. That is not surprising when
21 you are trying to weld wet tubing. It doesn't
22 always melt and reseal properly.

23 So, of the 78 evaluable, complete welds,
24 all 78 were sterile. In Phase 3 with the multiple
25 lengthening of the tubing, trypticase soy broth,

1 all 100 welds were complete, evaluable, and were
2 sterile.

3 So, we had a total of 241 evaluable welds
4 in all were sterile.

5 [Slide.]

6 What does this really mean in terms of
7 safety? We would have loved to have done 10,000
8 welds, but my techs were about ready to hang me
9 after doing 240.

10 Looking at this statistically, with 241
11 negative welds, we can say that this implies that
12 the rate of positivity is not greater than 0.004,
13 or if you combine these 241 observations with the
14 758 published previously, it means that the rate of
15 the weld not being sterile is not greater than 1 in
16 1,000. So, we are able to document then that the
17 rate, if you have a successful weld, the rate of
18 contamination does not exceed 1 in 1,000.

19 [Slide.]

20 Just to tell you some experience about how
21 frequently welds may not be complete, I pulled data
22 from the first 10 months in our Transfusion Service
23 of this year. We performed 5,636 welds. Each one
24 of these is documented by unit number and
25 documented that the tech has looked to see that the

1 weld is indeed complete and not leaking.

2 There were 4 failures in those 5,600 welds
3 or about 1 failure every 1,400 welds, so this has
4 not occurred very frequently, but it does occur
5 often enough that we do indeed need to look at it,
6 as the FDA guideline indicates that we should.

7 In a Belgian study we will be talking
8 about in a minute, they noted that the failure rate
9 of welds was about 1 in 3,000, so it is not a
10 common problem and it is important then to look at
11 the weld carefully when you go to open it and to
12 check for leaks.

13 [Slide.]

14 Now, we have been using this welding
15 technique in many ways, but certainly as part of
16 our ongoing study of using bacterial culturing
17 routinely on all of our units of platelets.

18 We use apheresis products at our center
19 and on day 2 we perform a sterile weld with a small
20 aliquot bag and move some of the platelet unit into
21 this bag, which is then removed by heat sealing and
22 entered by syringe and needle, transferring 5 ml
23 into an aerobic culture bottle of the bacT/ALERT
24 system, and placed in the bacT/ALERT cabinet.

25 The units are available for release at any

1 time that they are needed for transfusion unless or
2 until we receive a report from the microbiology
3 laboratory that indicates that there is something
4 growing in that unit, and then obviously we
5 quarantine it.

6 [Slide.]

7 In the first three years of doing this, we
8 are now at about 3 1/2 years, but in the first
9 three years we cultured almost 4,000 units in this
10 manner. We found 23 that were initially positive,
11 14 could not be confirmed on repeat culture, and 5,
12 we didn't have anything retained to culture. That
13 was early on in the protocol.

14 It is important to note that all of these
15 which we believe are false positive occurred
16 shortly after a new tech learned the procedure and
17 began doing it.

18 [Slide.]

19 This procedure in our laboratory is
20 performed in the open Transfusion Service
21 laboratory by all techs in rotation, and there
22 clearly is a training curve even beyond initially
23 showing that the technologist knows what needs to
24 be done, and you can see the falling rate of false
25 positivity over time.

1 Dr. Mark Brecher at the University of
2 North Carolina has been using this technique in his
3 laboratory since late February of this year. He is
4 performing it more in a research setting using a
5 biological safety cabinet that is a laminar flow
6 hood, and he tells me that in at least 2,000 units
7 that he cultured, he did not have any false
8 positives.

9 So, it would appear that if you take
10 additional efforts to prevent contamination at the
11 time of inoculating the individual bottles, you may
12 reduce the false positive rate.

13 We did have four confirmed positives in
14 the first three years or a rate of positivity at
15 about 1 in 1,000, or in this era of low viral risk
16 where we are expressing risk now as occurrences per
17 million, I would just note that that is 1,000 per
18 million while we are talking about HIV and HCV risk
19 where we use fractions per million, both a much
20 larger risk.

21 [Slide.]

22 Now, how did we actually determine that
23 some of these were false positives rather than true
24 positives? This was done through repeat culture of
25 the unit or a retained aliquot from that unit. So,

1 of the 23 units that have initial growth, we did
2 have something that we could reculture in 18 of
3 those.

4 In 14 of those 18 recultures, the units
5 had no growth on repeat culture. Four units, we
6 were able to detect the same organism a second
7 time, and we assume those were the true positives
8 while we called the other 14 false positives. One
9 could argue with the attribution, but we feel this
10 is approximately correct.

11 It is important to note also that the time
12 to a positive culture being reported was very
13 different between these two groups.

14 If we could find the same organism again
15 in that unit or an aliquot from that unit, the
16 initial report was received by our laboratory in
17 under 14 hours, where in those cases that we feel
18 were false positive, where we could not identify
19 the organism on repeat culture from that same unit,
20 we were receiving a report at greater than 24 hours
21 and often greater than 30 hours.

22 So, that would imply again that we are
23 dealing with very different situations
24 biologically.

25 [Slide.]

1 Where is this false positive contamination
2 coming from? We feel it is most likely coming from
3 either taking the sample from the small aliquot bag
4 by needle or placing the 5 ml actually in the
5 culture bottle. Of course, this is despite
6 cleansing the septum before placing the needle
7 through it.

8 Again, if this were done in a laminar flow
9 hood, we might reduce the probability of this
10 happening.

11 [Slide.]

12 Now, it was mentioned earlier that there
13 is a report from the late 1990s, from Europe,
14 suggesting that welding potentially caused
15 bacterial contamination. In this study, they
16 looked at 1,100 buffy coat pools, which were
17 created from 6,100 welds of individual units.

18 They found 15 positive cultures from those
19 pooled 1,100 buffy coat pools, and they went back
20 to the individual units that were involved in each
21 one of those pools and cultured them.

22 In 10 of those 15 occurrences, they
23 identified the same organism in one of the units,
24 and they concluded that in those 10 circumstances,
25 the pool was indeed contaminated, they have a

1 contaminated unit as part of the pool.

2 On 5 occasions, they were not able to grow
3 the organism on reculturing each one of the
4 individual units. Now, where could those 5 come
5 from? It is an important number because that is 1
6 in 1,200, and this is approximately the same rate
7 of positivity that we are seeing overall, and are
8 we indeed contaminating as frequently as we are
9 detecting true positives.

10 Well, I would question where these 5
11 incidences of growth came from. They could have
12 come from a contaminated weld as these authors
13 contend. It could also have come from a
14 contaminated culture, a possibility they did not
15 consider. It could be that on repeat culture of
16 the bag when they went back to the initial units,
17 they may have missed the organism.

18 [Slide.]

19 You might say, well, that is not likely,
20 but let me share a case with you that occurred
21 several months ago in our laboratory. We cultured
22 a unit on day 2, as we usually did, and in 9 hours,
23 we had reported to us growth in that bottle. The
24 short time to detection implied to us that this was
25 a true positive.

1 However, we went back to the same unit,
2 which was still in inventory the next day, and on
3 day 3, we cultured it again, and that culture
4 remained sterile out to a week after beginning the
5 culture. So, we were not able to find any organism
6 on growing it and culturing it again on day 3.

7 This raised a question, was this day 2
8 culture then a false positive. We cultured the
9 unit again on day 6 and we got growth, and
10 importantly, we found the identical organism. It
11 was a Staph epi which happened to have an unusual
12 antibiotic sensitivity pattern, therefore, we were
13 comfortable in identifying the two organisms found
14 at day 2 and day 6 were indeed the same organism.

15 So, with the European study not finding an
16 organism on going back to the bags, it may have
17 been that they just missed it, and they didn't
18 happen to take the right milliliters that happened
19 to have the bacterium present.

20 [Slide.]

21 I think it is more important that we and
22 the authors of this paper focus on the 10 pools
23 that had contamination that were noted. One out of
24 110 transfusions that would otherwise have been
25 given were cultured positive and contaminated with

1 bacteria. That is a very high number that even
2 exceeds the statistical rate that Dr. Williams was
3 mentioning previously.

4 [Slide.]

5 So, is it safer to weld in culture, which
6 I feel is the question that is being proposed here.

7 The current standard in the U.S. is not to
8 do any welding to do any culturing because we don't
9 routinely do cultures. Only a few centers are
10 beginning that or considering it.

11 So, if you were to transfuse, for example,
12 a million units of platelets or performing a
13 million platelet transfusions, 1,000 units of those
14 million would carry along bacterial contamination.
15 That is the current state of practice in the United
16 States today.

17 If culturing were performed with perfect
18 welds, with welds that never contaminated either
19 the culture or contaminated the unit, and if that
20 culturing were 90 percent sensitive, which I feel
21 culturing is probably greater than 90 percent
22 sensitive, but even if you only assume 90 percent
23 sensitivity, the million units with 1,000 of them
24 being contaminated, the contamination would be
25 detected in 900 of them, and 100 units only would

1 be transfused with the contaminating bacteria.

2 In order for the sterile connecting
3 process to decrease safety, if we were to go ahead
4 and weld and culture, the sterile connecting
5 process would have to cause contamination at a rate
6 of 900 per million or 1 in 1,100, and we already
7 have data that shows that the rate of contamination
8 in welding, even in very stressful circumstances,
9 is less than 1 in 1,000.

10 [Slide.]

11 So, I think the answer to the question is
12 yes, it is safer to weld and culture than not to
13 weld at all, and I will not quote Shakespeare.

14 [Slide.]

15 So, there are several alternatives that I
16 think could be considered in approaching this
17 problem. The European practice is to pool, what
18 they use usually is buffy coat platelets, but to
19 pool the platelets on day 1 to leukoreduce them at
20 that time by attaching a filter, and to draw a
21 culture at that point, and to put the units into
22 inventory.

23 [Slide.]

24 Another approach would be to culture on
25 day 1 or day 2, sometime after an initial period to

1 allow the small inoculum to grow up to be
2 detectable. We are now talking about the common
3 American practice of using individual platelet
4 units from whole blood units, thinking of 6 units
5 that would be transfused to a patient, we would
6 have to aliquot 6 individual units and create 6
7 individual cultures, and to store those units
8 individually because the FDA does not allow us to
9 pool and then store the units for a prolonged
10 period of time.

11 This would be very expensive, because the
12 culturing cost would be multiplied by 6 and you
13 would have to keep those 6 units together to make
14 sure that they were going to the same pool
15 ultimately, I would think, as well.

16 Another approach would be to take aliquots
17 from 6 units and put them in one culture and then
18 store them as separate units, another possibility.

19 In any of these cases, you are going to be
20 taking a substantial volume from the individual
21 platelet concentrate units. If one needs to take a
22 volume to culture, it needs to be an appropriate
23 volume to detect the bacteria, so we are probably
24 looking at, at least 2 ml, if not 5 ml from each
25 one of the bags. These bags are, in general, about

1 50 ml, so that is 10 percent reduction in efficacy
2 of the platelet transfusions.

3 Of course, you could perform these
4 cultures using sterile connecting devices or have a
5 pre-attached sampling bag on a platelet pooling
6 bag, and most blood bankers I think in this country
7 would be very happy to be able to pool and then
8 store.

9 It would take the pooling out of the hands
10 of the hospital, allow it to be conducted in a
11 standardized fashion, matching essentially the
12 European practice, but possibly the idea of using
13 an additional pre-attached sampling bag might be
14 another approach that manufacturers might want to
15 consider.

16 [Slide.]

17 So, in my way of looking at the world, I
18 think this problem indeed warrants intervention
19 although it is relatively infrequent, say, 1 in
20 1,000, it really is too infrequent to be
21 appropriately addressed by a statistical quality
22 control approach.

23 It is certainly large enough to warrant us
24 doing something about it, and I believe that
25 bacterial detection can be accomplished with an

1 overall reduction of the risk of platelet
2 transfusion.

3 Thank you very much.

4 DR. NELSON: Thanks, Dr. Aubuchon.

5 Toby.

6 DR. SIMON: I assume with the culture on
7 day 2, so that is at 48 hours, is that right? You
8 can assume the day of draw day zero?

9 DR. AUBUCHON: The day of draw is day
10 zero. We usually culture mid-morning, so I would
11 say that the shortest time period is probably about
12 40 hours, and some units may be out to 50 hours by
13 that point.

14 DR. SIMON: I wanted to just make sure I
15 understand the data. It is still true that you
16 have a higher rate of false positives than you do
17 true positives, and those units would be
18 interdicted in your system and not transfused.

19 DR. AUBUCHON: That is correct.

20 DR. SIMON: And you also have instances
21 where you examine the welds and find them to be
22 defective, and those units would not be transfused.

23 DR. AUBUCHON: I don't know if you saw the
24 technique that we use at our institution where we
25 clamp off the tubing, and we do not release the

1 clamps on either side of the new weld until we
2 document that the weld is a good weld.

3 DR. SIMON: Okay. So, if the weld is
4 defective, you do not lose the units.

5 DR. AUBUCHON: That is correct. You seal
6 it off and do another weld.

7 DR. SIMON: So, you just have to have a
8 good examination procedure. Have you calculated
9 the loss to the country in units from the false
10 positivity? It would be greater than the ones we
11 are interdicting for true positivity, right?

12 DR. AUBUCHON: Yes. The predictive value
13 of a positive is not very high because we do have a
14 number of false positives. We are running now a
15 false positive rate of about 1 in 500, and the true
16 positive rate of about 1 in 1,000.

17 DR. SIMON: So, for every true positive,
18 you would have two--

19 DR. AUBUCHON: I have two false positives,
20 that is correct.

21 DR. SIMON: Thank you.

22 DR. FITZPATRICK: Testing for pre-release
23 is, of course, what we want to do, and that is what
24 you are doing. The question I have is, has anybody
25 looked at the impact on the whole of the inventory

1 in the country on wastage if we are holding
2 products until the third or fourth day to
3 transfuse?

4 DR. AUBUCHON: Certainly, the longer that
5 you hold the platelet before distributing it to the
6 hospital, the shorter its useful life span and the
7 potential increases for outdating, that is
8 certainly true.

9 I believe that most facilities are not
10 labeling until sometime late on day 1 anyway
11 because it takes that long to get the nucleic acid
12 testing results.

13 So, with the current approach as approved
14 by the FDA for use of the bacT/ALERT or the Pall
15 BDS, where 24 hours after collection has to elapse
16 before drawing the sample, that could probably be
17 obtained without any delay to preclude release.

18 Now, a unit could be released before a
19 result was obtained in the Pall BDS system 30 hours
20 later or certainly would have to occur before the
21 final culture was reported out five or seven days
22 later from the microbiology laboratory as being
23 negative.

24 Blood centers develop systems for
25 notifying hospitals quickly in case of NAT

1 positivity in Phase I of the NAT IND clinical
2 trial, and that is the common practice in Europe,
3 as well, where as soon as a positive is found, the
4 hospital is contacted.

5 It doesn't happen very often obviously
6 even at a false positive rate of 1 in 500, so it is
7 not like the blood center is going to be calling up
8 two dozen hospitals every day to recall units of
9 platelets, but a retrieval mechanism probably would
10 have to be instituted in order to allow platelets
11 to be distributed at the normal time in order to
12 prevent an increase in the outdating.

13 Of course, if we are able to convince the
14 agency of the wisdom of culturing and then
15 extending the storage period to seven days,
16 something this committee considered at a previous
17 meeting, then, if we were to use one of those two
18 additional days by holding the unit in the blood
19 center until we got the final result, it would
20 simplify the system without causing an increase in
21 outdating. Sorry to editorialize.

22 DR. CHAMBERLAND: In the Merten's paper,
23 looking at their methodology, they apparently used
24 both new and reused welding wafers, which is a
25 difference compared to the methodology that you

1 used.

2 Now, this was published in 1997, so maybe
3 over time these wafers, it has been determined that
4 they should be single use, and they indicated that
5 of the 15 contaminated pools, six were made with
6 new and nine were made with reused welding wafers,
7 and this was not a statistically significant
8 difference.

9 I am quickly skimming, but they don't
10 indicate in the five contaminated units if a reused
11 wafer was used for those five units, and I was
12 curious as to your thoughts about the role that
13 reuse of wafers might potentially have played here.

14 DR. AUBUCHON: I don't have any data
15 directly addressing that. I certainly do know that
16 reuse of wafers is not according to manufacturers'
17 directions, and the manufacturer has always
18 stipulated that the wafers are to be used once and
19 once only.

20 There are other blood centers outside the
21 United States that do use them more than once.
22 They clean them and reload the little cartridge
23 packs, but that does not meet the manufacturers'
24 requirements.

25 DR. NELSON: A brief comment because we

1 are way behind.

2 DR. KUNERT: Okay. Matt Kunert, CDC.

3 You had some data here that wasn't in your
4 excellent paper. I guess you went for two years
5 and didn't have a true positive, and then in the
6 third year, had four positives. I wondered if
7 there was a difference between the organisms in the
8 true positives and the false positives.

9 My other question is I didn't quite get
10 whether all of these were stopped from being
11 transfused or whether any were transfused, and if
12 there were, sort of what the results were.

13 DR. AUBUCHON: All of the true positives
14 are Staph epis. The first true positive unit was
15 actually a split unit, which happened to be
16 positive in the 25th month, right after the end of
17 the second year.

18 I believe we have had two instances in
19 which units have had the culture turn positive
20 after the time of transfusion. One of those
21 occurred very early on when we had not retained any
22 aliquots for later culture, and that prompted us to
23 do exactly that, so we could resolve the question.

24 In that case, the patient was cultured
25 extensively, nothing was ever grown from the

1 patient's bloodstream, and the patient had no ill
2 effects. On that basis, we concluded that it was a
3 false positive.

4 The second occasion, we did have an
5 aliquot. We recultured it and it was negative. We
6 did culture the patient, as well, and as you would
7 expect, the patient did not have any blood culture
8 positivity.

9 DR. KUNERT: My final question is, of the
10 four, the Staph epi cases when you did root cause
11 analysis, did you have any revelations?

12 DR. AUBUCHON: No, we did not because we
13 do keep track of our phlebotomists. We collect
14 almost all of our own platelets, and we do keep
15 track of our phlebotomists' technique, and
16 periodically audit that, and we had not seen any
17 deviation from the way that they were preparing the
18 arms. We were using tincture of iodine and alcohol
19 actually on the skin at that time in any case, and,
20 of course, the welds were all complete and good
21 welds, and we had the documentation for that.

22 So, I would agree with the comment before,
23 that doing a root cause analysis is not likely to
24 identify the source of the problem.

25 DR. VAUGHN: Evise Vaughn [ph].

1 Just one question. Seeing as the
2 direction is to move towards testing for bacteria,
3 is it not possible to use the pre-donation sampling
4 bag to take the sample and grow from that instead
5 of at the later stage?

6 DR. AUBUCHON: You certainly could. The
7 difficulty is that there could be some
8 concentration of the bacteria as the component is
9 made. In addition, there is no guarantee that any
10 particular aliquot is going to have the bacteria in
11 it, and that is the reason, of course, that we wait
12 for two days or at least one day to allow the
13 culture to grow up to a point where we can take a
14 small aliquot and culture it reliably.

15 I would be a little concerned about only
16 culturing the small diversion segment. We would
17 probably get many more positives and probably would
18 end up throwing out some platelet units that we
19 didn't need to throw out because the platelet unit
20 itself was not contaminated.

21 Certainly, it appears that the rate of
22 positivity is much higher in those diversion bags
23 than in the culturing of the final product.

24 If we are going to culture it as a release
25 criterion, I would rather actually culture what is

1 being held and then going to be transfused.

2 The next speaker is Tracy Manlove from
3 Terumo Corporation.

4 We are running very far behind. I notice
5 you have got quite a few slides. I wonder if you
6 could do it in 15 minutes?

7 MS. MANLOVE: I will do my best.

8 F. Data Presentation

9 Ms. Tracy Manlove

10 MS. MANLOVE: I guess I would like to
11 begin by saying good afternoon since we have
12 reached that point in the day and thank the FDA for
13 the invitation and the opportunity to discuss this
14 very important topic.

15 I do have a number of slides, but Dr.
16 Aubuchon has provided a great introductory to this,
17 so we may be able to speed through quite a lot of
18 them.

19 [Slide.]

20 I am Tracy Manlove and I am speaking on
21 behalf of Terumo Medical Corporation. We are the
22 manufacturer of the sterile tubing welders.

23 [Slide.]

24 I would like to begin by reviewing some of
25 the terminology that we have been using. The

1 sterile tubing welders, STWs, are also known and
2 commonly referred to in the literature as SCDs or
3 sterile tubing connection devices, and they are all
4 referring to the same pieces of equipment.

5 The outline of my discussion was to go
6 over a brief background and history, the cleared
7 uses of the devices, and then to review the
8 description of operation, weld integrity
9 inspections, and general considerations in making
10 welds, the device release testing criteria, some
11 supporting data, which is I think what we are
12 really interested in, and then to summarize, as
13 well.

14 [Slide.]

15 The sterile tubing welders were originally
16 developed by the duPont Company in the early
17 1980's. The device was conceived to join two
18 pieces of polyvinyl chloride tubing while
19 maintaining the sterile fluid pathway.

20 [Slide.]

21 The original SCD device was developed for
22 use in the dialysis patients that were on home
23 continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis or CAPD.

24 In the traditional CAPD procedure, the
25 patient was required to aseptically connect an

1 indwelling catheter to a bag of dialysis solution,
2 and they had to do this four or five times daily.
3 This contributed to an increased incidence of
4 peritonitis in this patient population.

5 With the advent of the SCD, the risk of
6 contamination was eliminated.

7 [Slide.]

8 Presently, the device product line
9 consists of three devices - the SCD312, the TSCD,
10 and the SCD IIB.

11 [Slide.]

12 The SCD312 that you saw pictures in Dr.
13 Aubuchon's lab and the TSCD are utilized in the
14 blood bank and transfusion medicine industries.

15 [Slide.]

16 While the SCD IIB is utilized in the
17 biotechnology industry. Applications include cell
18 culturing, fermentation systems, and bioreactors.

19 [Slide.]

20 The sterile tubing welders have been in
21 use in these industries for over 15 years, and all
22 devices within the product line function under the
23 same principle of operation which Dr. Aubuchon has
24 already described, and I will, as well, a little
25 bit later in the presentation.

1 The field application differences of the
2 devices are only due to the size of the tubing that
3 the device can accommodate.

4 [Slide.]

5 Quickly, there are eight cleared uses for
6 the sterile tubing welders, which are published in
7 the FDA guidance, which I have referenced here.
8 This guidance was originally published in 1994 and
9 was recently updated and reissued in November of
10 2000.

11 Uses include adding a new or smaller
12 needle to a blood collection set, uses in component
13 preparations, such as adding a third storage
14 container to a plateletpheresis harness and
15 connecting additive solutions to red blood cells,
16 of special interest to today's conversation, the
17 pooling of blood products, and I have included the
18 verbiage in your handout that is directly from the
19 guidance document.

20 [Slide.]

21 Also, to prepare aliquots for pediatric
22 use and divided units, and this is particularly
23 important in minimizing donor exposure in the
24 pediatric population, as well as maintaining blood
25 inventories.

1 Other uses and then, finally, with the
2 removal of samples from blood product containers
3 for testing, such as QC testing, and as we have
4 been discussing, is currently done in Europe to
5 remove a sample for the bacterial culture, and as
6 is currently done in the U.S., to obtain platelet
7 counts for the split apheresis products that Dr.
8 Williams had mentioned and others earlier.

9 [Slide.]

10 Dr. Aubuchon already briefly described the
11 device operation, but I would like to reiterate and
12 emphasize what we feel, as the manufacturer, are
13 some important operational points. So, I have
14 included some diagrams, as well. They will
15 hopefully assist in the visualization of the
16 process.

17 It is a unique thermal process where the
18 PVC tubings are set parallel to each other in what
19 we refer to as holders, and Dr. Aubuchon referred
20 to as chucks.

21 The welder wafer here, as he mentioned, is
22 a copper wafer and it is positioned in a
23 perpendicular plane to the tubing. The wafer is
24 heated to a temperature of approximately 500
25 degrees Fahrenheit.

1 [Slide.]

2 When this temperature is achieved, the
3 wafer is then raised and crosses the plane of the
4 tubing. As it does this, the tubing is melted.
5 The wafer remains stationary with the melted ends
6 of the tubing adhering to the wafer.

7 [Slide.]

8 Then, also, as Dr. Aubuchon mentioned, the
9 holders undergo some movement, so that the left
10 hand tubing is moved to the rear and put into
11 alignment with the right hand tubing, so these are
12 the two pieces of tubing that we are connecting.

13 [Slide.]

14 When they are directly opposite each
15 other, the wafer is then lowered. As the wafer
16 recedes, the melted tubing is fused together and
17 form a weld that has maintained the internal tubing
18 sterility.

19 Once this cools, because it was heated to
20 500 degrees Fahrenheit, after the cooling process,
21 the welded tubing can be removed from the device
22 and handled.

23 [Slide.]

24 This is a very critical step in the
25 process because it is at this point that the

1 operator must conduct an inspection of the weld
2 integrity.

3 Each weld must be visually inspected.
4 This can be accomplished by once the tubing is
5 removed from the device, rotation of the welded
6 tubing in a 360 degree fashion and visually
7 inspecting the weld.

8 If the weld is acceptable, it will appear
9 as in Diagram A, where you can see that the two
10 pieces of tubing have fused together and are in
11 alignment. If it is unacceptable, it will be
12 visually recognized as what appears in View B,
13 where you can see that there is a gap in the
14 alignment of the two tubing pieces.

15 Also, during this visual inspection, if
16 any leaky welds are detected, they should be
17 treated as air contaminated and handled
18 accordingly, so that their out-date should change
19 or that there should be a discontinuation of
20 processing of those units.

21 [Slide.]

22 As we have discussed previously, the weld
23 integrity inspection is so critical that it is
24 noted in both the FDA Guidance for Industry, and
25 here are the specific wordings from that document,

1 as well as the AABB's 21st edition of their
2 standards.

3 Again, two standards addressing the need
4 for completeness of the weld and appropriate
5 actions to take if the weld is not intact.

6 [Slide.]

7 Once the operator verifies the weld
8 integrity, the weld is opened, as Dr Aubuchon
9 said, by simply rolling the tubing between your
10 thumb and forefingers and the weld will open.

11 [Slide.]

12 This is a picture of an open and
13 acceptable weld. Right here is the welded site.
14 These were two separate pieces of tubing prior to
15 the weld. You can see at the connection site that
16 they are perfectly aligned and there are no
17 leakages.

18 [Slide.]

19 I would like to discuss from the
20 manufacturer's viewpoint and from an operator's
21 viewpoint some general considerations when making a
22 weld.

23 It is an automated process once the tubing
24 is placed in and the new wafer is advanced, and we
25 are going to talk a little bit later about the

1 reuse of wafers and the single use, and hopefully
2 will answer the question that the committee posed.

3 This entire process occurs in
4 approximately 30 seconds once the tubing is placed
5 and the Start button is initiated.

6 [Slide.]

7 A new wafer is used for each weld
8 connection and this has always been the policy in
9 the United States. Again, a picture of the
10 cartridge of wafers and just for scale
11 representation, an individual wafer in a hand.

12 [Slide.]

13 The sterility of the component and the
14 system is maintained by key features of the welder.

15 Number 1 is that the heated wafer kills
16 any bacteria or spores encountered on the outside
17 of the tubing, and I will show you some studies to
18 substantiate this claim.

19 Number 2 is that the melted tubing adheres
20 to the wafer and forms a seal which prevents any
21 atmospheric contamination from entering the system.

22 [Slide.]

23 Sterile tubing welders are semi-automated
24 devices with built-in checks to monitor the proper
25 welder function and user operation. These include

1 clamp interlocks, wafer checks, audible alarms, and
2 indicator lamps.

3 When there is a problem detected by the
4 device, an audible alarm occurs and indicates the
5 process failure to the operator.

6 [Slide.]

7 Preparing a good weld is
8 operator-dependent in a number of areas. The
9 devices are intended for use by trained individuals
10 in settings, such as blood banks, hospitals, and
11 laboratories, but the devices are easy to use and
12 the operating instructions are very straightforward
13 and simple.

14 [Slide.]

15 One of the operator-dependent instruction
16 in areas is, as we described with the operation, is
17 that the tubing clamps begin in an aligned
18 position, but at the end of the welding cycle,
19 there is a different positioning of the tubing
20 clamps, so in order to initiate the welding
21 process, the operator must take an action to return
22 that to an aligned position.

23 The operator must also verify proper
24 placement of the tubing. It is indicated on each
25 of the devices on the deck of the devices where the

1 dry tubing goes, which would be such as to the
2 leukoreduction filter, or the wet product, such as
3 would be coming from the blood component.

4 This is dictated by the manufacturer
5 through testing that we have done to demonstrate
6 that this proper positioning verifies sufficient
7 weld strength to guarantee the integrity of the
8 weld. Only PVC tubing should be utilized.

9 [Slide.]

10 Other considerations the operator must
11 take into consideration is that the tubing length
12 must extend beyond the tubing holders. The tubing
13 must be properly seated. You can imagine if you
14 are trying to align two things, if you don't have
15 them on the same plane, it is never going to
16 happen, and that the clamp covers play an integral
17 role in keeping that alignment, and that they must
18 be properly locked into place before beginning the
19 welding process.

20 Again, there are audible alarms that will
21 alert the operator if this has not occurred.

22 [Slide.]

23 Hopefully, getting to the question here.
24 Failure to advance a new wafer prevents the weld
25 cycle. Again, an audible alarm and/or a visual

1 indicator will alert the operator to this.

2 The wafers are single use only and reuse
3 of wafers is in direct opposition to the operating
4 instructions, and voids any and all device
5 warranties.

6 [Slide.]

7 In 1993, there was an abstract presented
8 at the AABB by Hawker and others from the UK, where
9 they conducted a study with repeatedly used wafers.
10 What they were able to demonstrate was that the
11 wafers became contaminated with the solidified PVC
12 from the tubing. The welds demonstrated low
13 tensile strength, and we will talk about what that
14 means later on.

15 The contamination resulted in misalignment
16 of the welded tubing and ultimately, they had weld
17 porosity, and that is to say that they had leaky
18 welds.

19 [Slide.]

20 Other things that the operator needs to
21 consider when they are making the weld to ensure
22 the integrity is to not touch the clamps, not open
23 the clamps, and to not pull on the tubing. These
24 are all important in maintaining the integrity of
25 the weld.

1 With each of the devices, we do have bag
2 supports that are provided to help elevate and
3 support the bags, so that everything can remain on
4 the same plane and move freely.

5 [Slide.]

6 In speaking about the devices, they are
7 manufactured, as I said earlier, by Terumo Medical
8 Corporation. We are an ISO 9001 facility located
9 in Elkton, Maryland.

10 Each device that is manufactured there is
11 subjected to what we consider as rigorous release
12 criteria, and this includes 10 dry to dry welds
13 being made on every device, and 20 wet to dry
14 welds.

15 [Slide.]

16 All of these welds, 30 welds in total,
17 must meet the following criteria. Tensile strength
18 or the force that can be exerted on the weld before
19 it will break must be demonstrated to be equal to
20 or greater than 15.3 pounds for wet to dry welds
21 and greater than or equal to 15.9 pounds for dry to
22 dry welds.

23 The minimum tensile strength of any of
24 those 30 welds must be demonstrated to be above or
25 equal to 11.2 pounds.

1 All of those welds must be aligned and
2 easy to open, and they are subjected to an air
3 pressure leak test with pounds per square inch of
4 compressed air.

5 These five criteria combined assure the
6 weld strength and the integrity of every weld made
7 on that device before it is released.

8 [Slide.]

9 Turning to some data that supports the
10 sterile connection abilities of the devices, I
11 would like to look at our 510(k) submissions. This
12 is the reference here to the submissions.

13 The performance testing that was supplied
14 in these submissions included sterility testing and
15 weld strength testing, as well as four other tests
16 that demonstrated acceptable test parameters, and
17 that is on file with the device applications, but
18 won't be discussed in this presentation as it is
19 not relevant to the discussion.

20 [Slide.]

21 For the TSCD, the study design for the
22 sterility testing is what I believe Dr. Aubuchon
23 modeled his test off of, so we are going to discuss
24 a couple of tests, and they are all very similar in
25 design.

1 In this case, the exterior of the tubing
2 was coated with Bacillus subtilis. This was chosen
3 because these spores demonstrate a high resistance
4 to dry heat. There were 1,215 total welds prepared;
5 405 were test welds with the coated tubing.

6 But then there were two additional welds,
7 that is, 810 welds that were made to each of these
8 test welds, and that was to dock on the bag with
9 the growth media on one side of the weld and a
10 transfer bag on the other side of the weld, and
11 then the fluid traversed the weld site.

12 There were three devices tested. There
13 were multiple manufacturers tubing encompassed,
14 both dry to dry and wet to dry welds were utilized,
15 and when wet tubing was used, it was filled with 5
16 percent human serum albumin.

17 [Slide.]

18 The conclusion of this study demonstrated
19 that there was no growth in any of the 405 cultures
20 after 14 days and that the interior tubing
21 sterility of both the dry to dry and the wet to dry
22 combinations was not compromised by the welding
23 process.

24 There was positive growth exhibited in the
25 control tubing which verified the viability of the

1 organism chosen for the test system.

2 [Slide.]

3 The SCD312 underwent similar sterility
4 studies. In this case, the exterior of the tubing
5 was coated with either Bacillus circulans spores or
6 Staph epidermidis, so again a heat resistant spore
7 and a commonly found skin contaminant that might be
8 found in a real-life application of this device.

9 Six hundred welds were made with the B.
10 circulans tubing, 50 with the Staph epi, and 6
11 devices were utilized.

12 The conclusion in this test was also that
13 the interior tubing sterility of the welds was not
14 compromised by the welding process.

15 [Slide.]

16 Also published in an article by Nicholas
17 in the American Biotechnology Laboratory in July
18 and August of 1987, is a study entitled, "A Sterile
19 Connection Device for Cell Culture and Fermentation
20 Systems."

21 In this study, Nicholas had two aspects to
22 the study. She looked at sterility studies, as
23 well as airborne contamination studies.

24 The lengths of tubing were sterilized by
25 ethylene oxide gas prior to any welding or

1 manipulation. Then, the tubing exteriors were
2 coated again with the B. circulans. A
3 microbiological growth medium was present in the
4 tubing, this was the medium, and there was also a
5 bacterial growth indicator. 758 welds were made.

6 [Slide.]

7 At the conclusion of the sterility
8 studies, it was ascertained that there was no
9 microbiological growth after 96 hours in the test
10 system, while the control tubing exhibited growth
11 at 48 hours.

12 They made the conclusion that under the
13 correct operating procedures, all welds were shown
14 to be sterile.

15 [Slide.]

16 As I mentioned, they also looked at the
17 airborne contamination studies. So, they designed
18 this study similarly to the previous protocol
19 described except that they did not coat the tubing
20 with spores at this point. They placed the device
21 into a spore-laden atmosphere with an average spore
22 density of 260 spores per liter of air, and they
23 performed 114 welds.

24 At the conclusion, they found that all of
25 these 114 welds were sterile and the sterility of

1 the system was maintained.

2 [Slide.]

3 So, the Nicholas study does offer us some
4 practical evidence that the impact a sterile tubing
5 welder can have in a fermentation of cell culture
6 lab. When the study was published in 1987, the
7 sterile tubing welder had been implemented in their
8 laboratory and at that time they had performed 400
9 welds and 5,000 connections were made with no loss
10 due to system contamination.

11 Prior to the implementation of the device,
12 they were losing approximately 10 percent of the
13 runs due to contamination.

14 [Slide.]

15 They also did greater than 1,500
16 connections to bioreactor systems, and they did not
17 have to abort any runs because of the contamination
18 when using the device. Again, prior to
19 implementation of the device, they were losing
20 approximately 10 percent due to contamination.

21 [Slide.]

22 I think I can go through this without
23 anything. I think Dr. Aubuchon has provided us a
24 very good overview of his study. The only point
25 that I would like to make is, as I said, the tubing

1 is still coated with organisms and as he had
2 alluded to, in a very, very high concentration, it
3 is a very, very vigorous test for the device to be
4 challenged with.

5 [Slide.]

6 Again, as he had described, he did three
7 phases of the study, passing the liquid across the
8 weld, incubated at room temperature, and showed
9 that all cultures were sterile at the end of the
10 time.

11 [Slide.]

12 I would like to emphasize, as Dr. Aubuchon
13 did, as well, that they had two incomplete and
14 leaky welds, but they were doing some innovative
15 procedures there where they were leaving the tubing
16 wet and making welds to provide an additional
17 stress and challenge to the system.

18 So, it would be interesting to know if
19 that wasn't done, if any of those two incomplete or
20 leaky welds would have occurred.

21 His conclusions, as he already described,
22 but again to emphasize, the fact that he is
23 advocating visual inspection is in agreement with
24 the manufacturer's instructions, the FDA, and AABB
25 guidance documents.

1 [Slide.]

2 At the AABB in 2001, we presented a study
3 that we had done at Terumo Medical Corporation,
4 myself and some associates had looked at the weld
5 quality with various tubing combinations from
6 multiple manufacturers.

7 We utilized two TSCD's and two SCD312's.
8 We were looking at wet to dry welds, and we made a
9 total of 320 welds.

10 [Slide.]

11 What we saw is summarized here. This is
12 for the TSCD. Again, these were the tubing
13 combinations that we were looking at, the wet
14 tubing noted first, followed by the dry tubing, the
15 average tensile strength release criteria, which I
16 mentioned earlier, and the minimum tensile
17 strength, and you can see that all the values are
18 well above both of those minimal requirements, and
19 we had no air pressure leaks.

20 [Slide.]

21 The results for the SCD312 are very
22 comparable. Again, no air pressure leaks, no leaky
23 welds.

24 [Slide.]

25 So, the overall results of our study show

1 that all the welds were aligned, there were no
2 leaks. The weld strength exceeded the minimum
3 strength requirements, and we achieved acceptable
4 weld integrity with each of our 320 welds.

5 [Slide.]

6 Recently, Terumo Medical Corporation has
7 undertaken another internal study where we are
8 looking at an expanded number of tubing types and
9 manufacturers in conjunction with sterile tubing
10 device.

11 Again, we are looking at two TSCD's, two
12 SCD312's. Here, we looked at dry to dry and wet to
13 dry welds, and a total of 2,400 welds were made.

14 [Slide.]

15 Here are the tubing combinations as
16 expressed only as dry to dry or wet to dry, but you
17 can see again the average tensile strength is well
18 above the minimums, and the minimum tensile
19 strength for the dry to dry welds, the minimum that
20 we encountered was a weld strength of 15.3 pounds,
21 and for the wet to dry, a minimum of 11.7. This is
22 out of 1,200 welds. Again, no air pressure leaks
23 in 2,400 welds.

24 DR. NELSON: I wonder if you could
25 summarize because we are way behind and we need to

1 have time for the questions for the committee. If
2 we don't do this, we are not going to have time.

3 MS. MANLOVE: Absolutely. Okay.

4 [Slide.]

5 This is just a graphical representation
6 again to see that everything is well above the
7 minimum, which is demonstrated by the red line.

8 [Slide.]

9 So, we feel that these two studies show
10 that the sterile tubing welders consistently
11 prepared welds that exceeded the minimum tensile
12 strength regardless of the manufacturers type and
13 combination of tubing used.

14 [Slide.]

15 I wanted to briefly show you some data
16 from our QA Department. They are responsible for
17 tracking and trending our Quality Assurance
18 Department.

19 Since January of 2000, these reports have
20 described unacceptable welds, which are misaligned,
21 leaky, or hard to open welds occurring at a rate of
22 3 for every 200,000 welds or 0.0015 percent. This
23 number is derived based upon these reports as the
24 numerator and the number of wafer sales in that
25 same time period as the denominator.

1 The low incidence of unacceptable welds,
2 we believe further supports the performance and
3 reliability of the device.

4 [Slide.]

5 Dr. Aubuchon has discussed the Merten's
6 paper. I think the only thing that we feel
7 incumbent upon us to comment is that there were two
8 blatant author recognized areas where they were not
9 in compliance with the manufacturer's instructions.

10 They were reusing wafers and, as I
11 mentioned earlier in the discussion, the Hawker
12 group was able to accurately identify what that did
13 to welds. Despite the visualization of the one
14 leaky weld that they saw, they continued utilizing
15 that unit in the pooling and storage process. Our
16 guidance documents in the U.S. would not have
17 permitted that.

18 DR. NELSON: I wonder if you could just
19 conclude or summarize.

20 MS. MANLOVE: Summary.

21 DR. NELSON: There, you are. Okay.

22 [Slide.]

23 So, in summary, I would like to remind the
24 committee that the Terumo sterile tubing welders
25 have been in use for over 15 years. In that time

1 period, there has been no reports of transfusion
2 reactions or contaminated units.

3 The rigorous sterility testing studies
4 that I have put forth here and that Dr. Aubuchon
5 has put forth approximate 3,000 welds that were
6 made that demonstrate consistency and reliability
7 of the devices and indicate that there were no
8 incidents of contamination in any of the successful
9 welds.

10 We consider that these studies are
11 scientifically sound and controlled studies, and
12 that they, coupled with the years of use and the
13 quality assurance data that I have presented, offer
14 confirmation of the ability of the sterile tubing
15 welder to safely prepare the sterile welds for
16 products stored at room temperature.

17 [Slide.]

18 Furthermore, we feel that the use of the
19 sterile tubing welders to pool and store platelets
20 for greater than four hours, when combined with a
21 bacterial detection system, is appropriate.

22 We believe that the available data on the
23 sterility of the sterile connection device
24 procedure supports the use of this procedures to
25 collect the samples under debate for bacterial

1 detection from in-date platelet products.

2 [Slide.]

3 We are confident that the sterile tubing
4 welders maintain the integrity of closed systems
5 when used according to the manufacturer's
6 instructions and in accordance with FDA and AABB
7 guidance and standards.

8 Thank you.

9 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

10 Questions?

11 Okay. The next speaker is Dr. Steven
12 Wagner from American Red Cross.

13 G. Design of Clinical Trials for Clearance of
14 Devices Intended for Screening of Platelet
15 Products Prior to Transfusion

16 Steven Wagner, Ph.D.

17 Background

18 DR. WAGNER: Hi. My name is Steve Wagner.
19 I am with the American Red Cross. My stomach is
20 grumbling, so I am going to try to go as quickly as
21 I can.

22 [Slide.]

23 I am going to talk today about blood
24 culture methods for screening platelet components.
25 I am going to provide a background for Jaro

1 Vostal's talk on potential designs for clinical
2 trials for release of platelets as a function of
3 culturing.

4 [Slide.]

5 Just a very quick comment. Sepsis is
6 probably the first recognized infectious disease
7 risk of transfusion that has clearly been indicated
8 in the times around World War II. The frequency of
9 transfusion-associated bacterial sepsis was greatly
10 reduced with the advent of closed systems for
11 collection and storage for blood and with the
12 dramatic improvements in safety realized by viral
13 testing, bacterial sepsis remains as the most
14 frequent infectious disease adverse event in
15 transfusion medicine.

16 [Slide.]

17 We have seen these numbers before. I
18 don't really need to go over them. I do want to
19 make a point in terms of fatalities that are
20 reported to the FDA, that between 1990 and 1998,
21 16.7 percent--sometimes that is misquoted as 10
22 percent--of the reported fatalities to FDA were due
23 to sepsis.

24 [Slide.]

25 From the BACON study, we know that in

1 platelet components, sepsis or fatalities from
2 sepsis is measured in about 1 in 450,000 units. In
3 red cells, it is much less infrequent because of
4 their cold storage, about 1 in 7,700,000 units, and
5 because of that, most people are focusing on trying
6 to intervene with culturing platelets.

7 [Slide.]

8 In plasma, to my knowledge, no observed
9 fatalities from sepsis have yet been observed.

10 [Slide.]

11 There are two systems that have been
12 cleared by the FDA for screening of platelets for
13 bacterial contamination. One uses a color change
14 or a rate of a color change in a pH-sensitive disk
15 or sensor area, and it is presumably by
16 bacterial-generated carbon dioxide evolution, and
17 the other, from another manufacturer, involves the
18 detection of a reduction of blood gas oxygen caused
19 by bio-oxygen consumption.

20 [Slide.]

21 This is just a comparison of the two
22 systems that I alluded to. One system is the
23 bact/ALERT. The cleared component is for apheresis
24 platelets. It involves 4 ml that is cultured in
25 aerobic bottle and 4 ml that is cultured in

1 anaerobic bottle.

2 The sampling time that is permitted is
3 greater than 24 hours. This allows the bacteria to
4 grow to a level where, when you take a sample that
5 there is a more likely event that bacteria will be
6 present.

7 The incubation time after inoculation into
8 the culture bottles should be greater than 24
9 hours. The number of evaluations of the culture is
10 continuous.

11 Another system that has been cleared, that
12 is marketed by Pall, has been cleared for both
13 leukoreduced random donor platelets, as well as
14 apheresis platelets. The volume required in the
15 pouch where the oxygen is sensed is 2 ml, but in
16 actuality, it uses 6 to 7 ml of a platelet
17 concentrate simply because filling the tubing,
18 going through a filter requires some volume of
19 platelets.

20 The sampling time that is recommended is
21 48 hours, but it is permitted for sampling to occur
22 after 24 hours. The incubation time is recommended
23 to be 30 hours in this system, but again is
24 permitted to be after 24 hours, and the number of
25 evaluations for a platelet component is once.

1 [Slide.]

2 Culture systems are quite sensitive and by
3 definition they are able to detect one viable
4 organism that is capable of growth if that sample
5 is inoculated into a culture medium. That
6 requirement is dependent on, of course, first, the
7 initial bacterial load in the component.

8 Most people who work in this area believe
9 that the initial bacterial load is quite low. From
10 essentially one organism in an entire platelet
11 component to 10 organisms per ml. The rate of
12 growth in the platelet component also determines
13 whether you get a sample in your syringe for
14 inoculation into a blood culture instrument and
15 also the volume of the sample.

16 [Slide.]

17 For fast-growing organisms, it is pretty
18 clear that if you wait greater than 24 hours to
19 take your sample and you wait longer than 24 hours
20 to incubate your sample, that you are going to have
21 a very, very high level of detection.

22 In the two studies cited here, one through
23 my lab, which was, by the way, sponsored by Organon
24 Technika, which is the manufacturer of one of the
25 devices, and also through another lab, which is an

1 industrial lab in Gambro BCT, it showed 100 percent
2 detection of fast-growing organisms.

3 [Slide.]

4 But slow-growing organisms and low
5 bacterial loads represent the most stringent
6 conditions for evaluating culture conditions. In
7 these sorts of systems, Staph epidermidis is
8 probably the most frequently implicated
9 slow-growing organisms identified in clinical cases
10 of transfusion-associated sepsis.

11 [Slide.]

12 From our laboratory, we were able to show
13 if you sample immediately after culture, using a
14 very low inoculum, a tenth of an organism per ml,
15 you don't detect anything, and after around 24
16 hours, you can detect around 67 or so percent of
17 the cultures as culture positive.

18 If you are less stringent and inoculate
19 with 1 organism per ml or 10 organisms per ml, the
20 67 percent detection actually goes up to 100
21 percent detection. If you wait longer than 24
22 hours and sample at 48 hours, you essentially
23 detect everything.

24 [Slide.]

25 So, how large should the sample volumes

1 be? The answer depends on when you sample. If you
2 sample at day zero or an early time, before 24
3 hours, it turns out that the larger the sample
4 volume, the better the frequency of detection.

5 If you wait for one or two days before you
6 take a sample, and during that time, of course, the
7 bacteria will be proliferating in the platelets
8 components, we were able to find that both a half a
9 ml sample, as well as a 2 ml sample yielded
10 identical frequencies of bacterial detection.

11 [Slide.]

12 I also wanted to address a question of
13 whether anaerobic culture really is needed. The
14 partial pressure of oxygen and platelet components
15 is between 40 and 100 ml of mercury.

16 There have been two cases where strict
17 anaerobes have been associated with clinical cases
18 of sepsis, and the two cases both involved
19 *Clostridium perfringens*. In one case there was a
20 fatality, and in another case there was morbidity.
21 One case was in a red cell unit, another case from
22 a pooled platelet unit.

23 The microbiological textbooks indicate
24 that *Clostridia* cover an entire range and the need
25 for anaerobicist, and many are not fastidious, so

1 many of them you would pick up in an aerobic
2 culture bottle anyway.

3 This compares to many scores more bacteria
4 that have been implicated in transfusion-associated
5 bacterial sepsis that have been able to grow up in
6 non-anaerobic conditions.

7 [Slide.]

8 How long to incubate? In these very
9 stringent conditions, we found that the incubation
10 time was inversely related to the time when you
11 initially sampled, so if you waited a day for
12 sampling, it could take you a little bit over a day
13 for detection with this sample volume and with 2
14 ml, that didn't change. If you wait 48 hours, it
15 takes about a half a day.

16 [Slide.]

17 There has been some talk about 100 percent
18 QC of platelet components. This would be done on
19 day 1 or 2 sampling, and after sampling, sometime
20 soon after sampling, the platelets would be
21 released.

22 There would be adequate platelet
23 availability through the week as long as the
24 shipping was less than one day and in most cases,
25 we can get our platelets to hospitals within a day,

1 but it does require a failsafe, real-time
2 communication between the blood collection center
3 and the hospital.

4 This has been done before as has been
5 indicated or mentioned for NAT testing. What are
6 the ramifications when a contaminated product is
7 infused, that is later to be determined to be
8 culture-positive?

9 I really can't answer that question, but I
10 imagine that would be of great importance to both
11 the blood providers, as well as the recipients.

12 [Slide.]

13 The implications of using culture in terms
14 of platelet release are a bit different. My
15 analysis is that hospitals probably wouldn't
16 receive platelets until day 3 because it takes some
17 shipping time, there is some time until sampling,
18 and there is some incubation time.

19 This has been studied by Chang Phang at
20 the American Red Cross. Assuming that all centers
21 do not collect on weekends, what that would mean is
22 that there would be no platelets available on
23 Thursdays. With no collection on a Friday, for
24 example, there was a long weekend, that would mean
25 that there would be no platelets available on

1 Wednesdays.

2 On a long weekend with a Monday holiday,
3 that would mean that there would be no platelets
4 available on Fridays. So, I guess what I am trying
5 to address is there are some availability issues
6 involved with a culture release model where the
7 hospitals don't get the platelets until day 3.

8 There conditions would require either
9 uniform weekend collections, which is possible, but
10 quite a change for the blood providers, or an
11 extension of platelet storage time.

12 [Slide.]

13 In terms of the extension of platelet
14 storage time, Jim Aubuchon hasn't presented his
15 data, but there is an abstract out indicating that
16 platelet properties and survival look initially
17 good after seven days of storage, the data are
18 encouraging.

19 An extension of storage might offset the
20 cost of testing by reducing the percentage of
21 outdated platelet components, so that is good for
22 the blood providers, but microbiological data needs
23 to be collected to support extension of the
24 platelet storage time with the introduction of a
25 particular bacterial test.

1 [Slide.]

2 So, after introducing bacterial culture,
3 the development of a seven-day platelet component
4 would be facilitated by demonstrating that the
5 frequency of repeat culture-positive units is
6 similar after five and seven days, and I think that
7 would probably form the basis for determining
8 whether a seven-day product is safe or not.

9 [Slide.]

10 In conclusion, bacterial culture is a
11 sensitive method for detecting bacteria in blood
12 components, aerobic cultures should detect a great
13 majority of clinically important organisms.

14 The choice of sampling and incubation
15 times are an important determinant of detection
16 frequency with sampling and incubation times chosen
17 for acceptable detection frequencies. A 100
18 percent QC culture release notification model
19 should be compatible with adequate platelet
20 availability.

21 A quarantine release model for bacterial
22 culture would require weekend platelet collection
23 or an extension of the platelet storage time.
24 Studies suggest that seven-day-old platelets
25 maintain their in vitro and in vivo properties and

1 data need to be collected on the microbiological
2 risk of storing platelets for five compared to
3 seven days following the introduction of bacterial
4 culture.

5 Thank you very much.

6 DR. NELSON: Thanks very much.

7 Questions?

8 It seems like, as opposed to two days
9 after collection, one day after collection, the
10 problem is I guess you would have to have longer
11 incubation times to make up for the earlier
12 collection, so the time at which the platelets were
13 released would not be shortened by earlier
14 culturing.

15 DR. WAGNER: That's right. I think the
16 reason for that is bacteria grow in the culture
17 about as well as they do in the bottle, so you
18 still need the same amount of time whether you
19 slice it one way or the other.

20 DR. KLEIN: But in point of fact, the
21 agents that are the ones we were really most
22 worried about are the ones that grow faster, so
23 clearly, what you did was the way to do the
24 experiment with those that grow most slowly in the
25 lowest concentrations.

1 Maybe we could calculate in terms of
2 reactions and deaths what the interdiction would be
3 if we sampled, for example, at 24 hours and then
4 released at 24 hours after culture.

5 DR. WAGNER: I agree. I think that is
6 worthy of study. I think that the bad actors are
7 the gram-negatives that are fast growers.

8 DR. ALLEN: Two questions. Let me ask the
9 first to you and perhaps Dr. Klein could comment
10 also.

11 Given the information available now, would
12 you recommend the culture release notification
13 model or a quarantine release model, or do you
14 think we need more study?

15 DR. WAGNER: I am with the Red Cross, so I
16 am biased in this a little bit. I believe that
17 logistically, right now, what we can handle is a
18 culture release model and I think that we would
19 need a longer platelet storage time greater than
20 five days to be able to handle a quarantine release
21 model.

22 DR. KLEIN: I would just comment that I
23 think you can make the culture release model work.
24 It is not going to be perfect, but it is going to
25 be much better than what we have now without

1 worrying about having a lack of availability of
2 platelets.

3 DR. ALLEN: The second question. You
4 commented on the paucity of any data suggesting
5 that anaerobic bacteria, by and large, are a
6 significant problem in terms of platelet
7 contamination.

8 Can you do an aerobic culture only, would
9 you recommend that, or do you think you still need
10 to follow the recommended model of the aerobic and
11 anaerobic bottles?

12 DR. WAGNER: My answer is I believe
13 anaerobic culture would detect the great majority,
14 a vast majority of clinically relevant cases of
15 sepsis.

16 However, in the product insert for the
17 bact/ALERT, it said it was recommended that both
18 aerobic and anaerobic cultures be performed. I
19 wanted to bring this up because personally, I
20 disagree with that.

21 DR. SIMON: I know the FDA has not put
22 before us the question of a culture release model
23 for discussion, but I think you raise the issue
24 tangentially, but certainly the liability issue is
25 going to be on the minds of any blood center that

1 adopts such a bottle or considers adoption of such
2 a model whereby they would release the unit once
3 they have taken the culture and not wait at least
4 for a 24-hour result.

5 The Blood Centers of America are very risk
6 averse for obvious reasons. I think that could
7 result in a significant impact on availability of
8 platelets for patients in need. So, I just bring
9 that up as something that is in the background.

10 DR. WAGNER: There are alternative ways of
11 looking at it that are, as I think of it, shades of
12 gray where you took a sample at 24 hours, kept it,
13 and did not send it out of your facility for 10 or
14 12 hours, but you are not really doing release from
15 a quarantine and then let the units out.

16 That would interdict most of the fast
17 growing organisms and then the slow growers, you
18 would have to call on later.

19 So, I think that it is difficult to look
20 at something as dynamic as culturing in kind of a
21 digital system. It is more of an analogue type of
22 system.

23 DR. NELSON: In order to have time for
24 lunch, I wanted to have Dr. Vostal talk about a
25 proposed study design for evaluation.

1 H. Proposed Study Design

2 Jaro Vostal, M.D., Ph.D.

3 DR. VOSTAL: Thank you very much.

4 I will try to sprint to the finish and get
5 us to lunch before the lunchroom closes.

6 What I would like to start off with by
7 saying that this is our current thinking about
8 clinical trial design and we are really open to
9 suggestions and discussion about how this should be
10 designed.

11 Dr. Wagner has done a very nice
12 introduction for me, so I will actually be able to
13 skip some slides in the beginning.

14 [Slide.]

15 The issue of 100 percent QC of platelet
16 products was raised. We think that we still need a
17 clinical trial of automatic bacterial culture
18 devices or ABC devices even though there will be
19 100 percent QC of platelet products because the QC
20 monitoring will not assure that products are
21 culture negative at the time of transfusion either
22 day 5 or day 7 because the devices have not been
23 validated for this issue.

24 So far no clinical data is available on
25 whether a negative culture early in the storage

1 period is predictive of a negative culture at day 5
2 or at day 7.

3 [Slide.]

4 So, the intended use of these devices is
5 to screen bacterial contaminated platelet products
6 prior to transfusion. The evaluation process that
7 we will be looking at will be laboratory testing,
8 as Dr. Wagner covered, and we think we require a
9 clinical trial.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, if you do go through a clinical trial
12 or if the device goes through a clinical trial,
13 what kind of label can you put on your product if
14 you have been screened by a device such as that.

15 We think the appropriate label would be
16 bacterial culture negative for up to five days of
17 storage for five-day-old platelets or a bacterial
18 culture negative for up to seven days of storage,
19 and the asterisk here is this requires that the
20 storage must be under conditions validated to
21 adequately store platelets up to seven days.
22 Actually, that is a separate issue from the
23 contamination rate.

24 [Slide.]

25 In the laboratory testing of these

1 devices, as has been already described, you spike
2 in bacteria at a certain concentration and you can
3 then follow the growth of bacteria in the platelet
4 product over the storage period.

5 With your device, you can sample at
6 different time points and culture to get a result
7 either 24 or 48 hours later, and with this design,
8 you can also determine the sensitivity at the point
9 of collection and CFUs per ml at the time of
10 sampling. So, this would be a design of the
11 laboratory type studies.

12 [Slide.]

13 Actually, this slide just briefly talks
14 about the different organisms that we recommend
15 that are tested during the laboratory studies, and
16 these are described by Mark Brecher's paper in
17 Transfusion in 2001.

18 [Slide.]

19 The information you get from laboratory
20 studies is the approximate level of sensitivity and
21 this is a moving target. It is based on when you
22 sample and it is based on the device.

23 We think for day 1 sampling, sensitivity
24 should be on the order of 10 to 100 CFU per ml.
25 The other things you get out of the laboratory

1 study is the optimal sampling time, the length that
2 you keep it in culture, and the optimal sampling
3 volume.

4 [Slide.]

5 So, moving on to the clinical trial, we
6 think that the trial should demonstrate that a
7 second culture taken at the end of the storage
8 period confirms the results obtained from a culture
9 taken early in the storage period.

10 So, a comparison study where you have a
11 culture early on in the culture, later in storage,
12 to see if the results agree. This is just a
13 graphic demonstration of what a study could look
14 like.

15 This would be an ideal study where you
16 actually take your sample early on and then you
17 wait until the full length of the storage, right
18 now it would be day 5, and then take your second
19 sample and see if you get agreement.

20 The reason it is ideal is because this
21 would be a high-risk day for platelet
22 contamination. The problem with the study is you
23 actually have to wait to out-date and you lose the
24 ability to transfuse these platelet products, which
25 is probably not good for the clinical community.

1 [Slide.]

2 This just runs through the ideal study.
3 Basically, you collect your first sample time point
4 at a time point that is identified by laboratory
5 studies and which has the optimal chance of
6 assuring that the product is culture negative at
7 day 5.

8 The second culture is collected at
9 out-date. The primary endpoint of these studies
10 would be agreement between the first and second
11 culture, and we can discuss the level of confidence
12 that we want for this type of agreement.

13 As I mentioned, the design is not
14 practical because you lose someone's transfusion
15 products, however, this design could be modified to
16 look at platelets that are going to be outdated
17 anyway.

18 Let's say if you screen all of your
19 platelets with the first culture, and then only
20 culture the platelets that are going to be outdated
21 at day 5, and even you could hold those up to day
22 7, so you could do a study like that if you only
23 looked at the outdated platelet products.

24 [Slide.]

25 Another way to do this would be to

1 actually transfuse the products during the study,
2 and you can transfuse them up to day 5, and collect
3 your second culture at the point of transfusion.

4 Because the risk would be with longer
5 storage, it would be better to have sort of a
6 waiting of the data towards the later end of the
7 storage, so we have suggested here that day 5 makes
8 at least 25 percent of the total samples, but at
9 least in this type of design, you would be able to
10 transfuse your products, which would make it lot
11 more cost effective than the other study.

12 [Slide.]

13 We are calling this a realistic study.
14 You have the confirmatory sample at a time point
15 day 2 to day 5, and day 5 samples should represent
16 a high percentage of the collected data. Again,
17 you are looking for agreement between the first and
18 the second culture.

19 Now, as has been pointed out, if you could
20 extend the storage out to 7 days, you would
21 actually have an added benefit from these
22 transfusion products, so you could actually offset
23 the cost of doing these studies.

24 So, we are considering that such a study
25 would be possible, and we think it should also be

1 designed in a similar way that you have a first
2 sample early on and then the second sample would be
3 at the point of transfusion, just like it was in
4 the day 5 study, and then you would do this at day
5 6 and day 7, as well.

6 Since these products are the ones that
7 have the highest risks, since that was the reason,
8 bacterial contamination was the reason they were
9 taken off the market, we would like to see a high
10 percentage of the second culture be done on day 6
11 and day 7 platelets.

12 [Slide.]

13 Now, how to get around the question of
14 transfusing these products at day 6 and day 7,
15 since they are at high risk for bacterial
16 contamination, we thought that maybe it could be
17 screened by yet a third culture of a third
18 bacterial detection method, for example, after day
19 5, could transfuse products if a bacterial
20 detection screen is done before transfusion, just
21 to make sure that you don't have a highly
22 contaminated unit that you are going to transfuse
23 because you second culture done on this product
24 would come back 24 hours later.

25 So, it is screened by bacterial culture,

1 then sampled at day 5. If you decide to use a
2 culture as the third detection mechanism, if you
3 sample at day 5, then, you can transfuse that if
4 it's negative by 24 hours.

5 If you use a non-culture detection method,
6 such as Gram stain or dipstick or something else
7 that is less sensitive, but may be appropriate for
8 units that would be highly contaminated with the
9 bacteria, you could transfuse as soon as these
10 tests come back negative.

11 Again, the confirmatory second culture
12 needs to be taken at the point of transfusion for
13 comparison with the first culture.

14 [Slide.]

15 This is again a graphic demonstration, so
16 you would be taking your first sample, your second
17 sample at the time of transfusion, and you would
18 guarantee the safety or you would attempt to
19 guarantee the safety of these day 6 and day 7 units
20 by a bacterial screen either by culture method or
21 by some other bacterial detection method.

22 [Slide.]

23 So, what would be the size of this
24 clinical study? Well, it is actually very difficult
25 to estimate this because it depends on the expected

1 contamination rate of the platelet products.

2 We have heard several numbers mentioned
3 today. It could be 1 in 1,000, 1 in 2,000, 1 in
4 3,000, and also the size of the study depends on
5 the level of certainty that the first culture would
6 be predictive of a culture-negative platelet
7 product at the end of the storage. You can choose
8 your level of comfort at 99, 95 percent or less.

9 [Slide.]

10 So, I have had some help with my
11 biostatistician colleagues. They actually pointed
12 out that this should be more in agreement between
13 sensitivities, similar sensitivities at the 99 or
14 95 or lower level.

15 If you choose this type of agreement, you
16 would need to screen or at least collect 300
17 contaminated units, and your expected contamination
18 rate is 1 per 1,000, you have to screen about
19 300,000 units.

20 If you decrease your agreement level, this
21 number goes down, and we feel actually that
22 probably 95 percent agreement would be appropriate,
23 so it may be somewhere in the order of screening
24 60,000 units, but again this depends on what the
25 expected contamination rate is.

1 So, this is sort of a rough draft of a
2 clinical study proposal. We welcome any comments
3 or discussion that you would have.

4 Thank you.

5 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Vostal.

6 Questions, comments? It sounds like a big
7 study.

8 Yes, Mary.

9 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Given the difficulty
10 that you alluded to, the ideal example of actually
11 being able to culture units that truly were on the
12 shelf for five days or seven days, would another
13 possible variation be the day that they are
14 actually going to be transfused?

15 Let's say it's day 3 that they are
16 selected to be transfused, and you take the sample,
17 could you just incubate, you know, maintain that
18 sample out for a total of five or seven days and
19 then culture? You know, maintain the sample at
20 similar conditions to which the platelets are
21 normally maintained.

22 Obviously, there is big volume differences
23 and whether that would preclude that as being a
24 valid approach, but I was just curious about that.

25 DR. VOSTAL: That is an interesting

1 suggestion. I guess the problem with that would be
2 that the growth of the bacteria may be different in
3 this new environment that you put them in, you
4 know, the smaller volume, less gas permeability,
5 then what actually would be going on in the bag
6 itself. So, it might not represent the growth
7 curve that you would see in the actual product.

8 DR. FITZPATRICK: I think one of the goals
9 needs to be the earliest point of detection that
10 correlates to the five and seven day level of
11 contamination, so if you sample only at day 1 and
12 then at the point of transfusion, you miss a block
13 of time that may be important.

14 So, I think you would want to sample at a
15 24-hour interval up until the point of transfusion,
16 so that you can determine if day 1 didn't work, and
17 didn't correlate, now you have got to repeat the
18 study and try it at day 2 or try it at day 3.

19 So, if you don't see a correlation between
20 day 1 and day 5 or day 7, you haven't collected the
21 data you need to determine when that correlation
22 occurs. I just would support what Mary said.

23 I think if you worked with the
24 manufacturers, while you couldn't find a perfect
25 way to collect an aliquot at the time of

1 transfusion, you could find a way to prepare a 10
2 ml pouch or a 15 ml pouch that approximates the
3 conditions, that you could store until day 5 or day
4 7, that would help give you that information
5 without wasting the products.

6 DR. NELSON: You might also have to vary
7 the incubation times based upon when the culture
8 was taken, so it is a bit of a complex experiment,
9 but I can see that it would be useful.

10 How solid do you think the 1 to 1,000
11 estimate is, because if that is way off, then, all
12 of a sudden you are talking about an astronomically
13 larger--I mean if it is much lower than that, to
14 get the results might be even more of a problem.

15 Is that pretty solid, the 1 in 1,000, do
16 you think?

17 DR. VOSTAL: Actually, I don't that is
18 very solid. I mean nobody really knows what the
19 true contamination rate is. It will be pretty much
20 a guess.

21 DR. SIMON: See if my interpretation is
22 correct, but from what Dr. Williams said, I gather
23 that if the industry wishes to exceed a quality
24 control standard and actually test all units, do a
25 culture on all units and use it as a release

1 criteria, either culture release or wait for the
2 results and release, then, the practical impact of
3 your clinical trial would just to allow the company
4 to make a claim.

5 We could already have actual culture of
6 all units before the clinical trial was done.

7 DR. VOSTAL: Right. I guess it depends on
8 when you take your culture. If you take your
9 culture early on, we are not really sure right now
10 whether that culture will be predictive of what
11 will happen at the end of storage. I mean that is
12 why we need the study.

13 If you take your QC like at day 3, and you
14 are willing to wait for the results, so you
15 transfuse at day 4, that probably would work, but I
16 think you would lose three or four days of
17 transfusion.

18 DR. SIMON: You are saying that you are
19 dubious about the whole concept of the 24-hour
20 culture as eliminating almost all of this problem?

21 DR. VOSTAL: Oh, you mean taking sampling
22 at 24 hours. Well, I think as Steve pointed out,
23 the longer you wait, the higher your sensitivity
24 gets because the bacteria grow to a higher level.

25 So, I think it's a tradeoff. If you

1 sample early on, you might miss some, and the
2 question is how many do you miss and will that be a
3 risk.

4 DR. NELSON: From a practical standpoint,
5 five days is the limit now, but how many platelets
6 are actually released, you know, one, two, three,
7 four days earlier than that?

8 Somebody has those data, I guess, but
9 given "never on Thursday" scenario that Dr. Wagner
10 presented, it seems a little bit complicated.

11 Do you have a comment?

12 DR. KUNERT: I just had a quick question.
13 On your sample sizes, was that assuming the two
14 cultures or was that assuming three cultures
15 lengthening out to day 7?

16 DR. VOSTAL: It would be looking at the
17 two cultures. The third culture is actually just
18 to provide safety if you plan to transfuse the day
19 6 and day 7 product.

20 DR. KUNERT: What data are there to
21 suggest that you wouldn't have cultured it out at,
22 say--I am not sure what the assumption is on the
23 second culture--but if it is day 3 or 4, that you
24 would then culture it on day 5?

25 Staph epi would be the biggest example,

1 but I don't know even know with Staph epi that--I
2 mean you should be able to culture it at day 3 or
3 4, so is it the concern mainly fastidious organisms
4 or is there any particular scenario you had in mind
5 for that?

6 DR. VOSTAL: I guess if you are saying
7 that if we culture at day 3, that should be
8 sufficient to cover day 4, 5, and 6, out day 7,
9 right?

10 DR. KUNERT: As Dr. Wagner pointed out, it
11 depends on the time of sampling to the time of
12 culture, but there could be some point where there
13 should be a level of confidence where you might not
14 need to culture at day 5 depending on those
15 parameters.

16 DR. VOSTAL: You have to optimize it, I
17 guess, because if you culture at day 3, are you
18 going to not transfuse day 1, 2, and 3 platelets,
19 or are you going to transfuse them or hold them.

20 I think you have to play around with the
21 logistics of the study and logistics in the blood
22 bank to try to optimize it.

23 DR. NELSON: Yes.

24 DR. SNYDER: Ed Snyder, New Haven.

25 Do you have a similar approach that might

1 be useful for random donor platelets? I mean that
2 could be used, but you would have to sample each
3 bag. We use a four-unit pool, so that would be a
4 fair amount of sampling.

5 I assume you wouldn't let us pool and
6 store the pool before release and testing at
7 various times.

8 DR. VOSTAL: Well, I think we are actually
9 having discussions about pooling upfront and
10 storing pools, however, we need more data on that
11 in terms of at least platelet efficacy and also in
12 terms of whether these devices can--you know, if
13 the growth of bacteria in the pools is different
14 and whether the devices can pick up that
15 contamination.

16 So, we would expect a separate study done
17 on the pools themselves.

18 DR. STYLES: I was just going to suggest
19 that if you are going to undertake such a large
20 study, that you want to incorporate DNA-based
21 screening techniques within that study instead of
22 having to go back and repeat it with the advent of
23 PCR and all. I mean you are going to avoid the
24 whole need to wait after culture if those
25 techniques come to fruition. Just a thought.

1 DR. VOSTAL: I mean these studies are
2 designed to look at culture devices and, you know,
3 the sensitivity and the time you have to wait to
4 get a readout, but if there is a screening method
5 that would be immediate, I think that would be a
6 lot better.

7 DR. NELSON: Here is the dilemma. We have
8 got four people that wanted to make statements in
9 the open public hearing and then we have to
10 consider the questions, and the lunchroom closes in
11 about 15 minutes.

12 I propose that, of the three alternatives,
13 lunch is a higher priority at this time. Why don't
14 we break now. Let's come back at 2:30.

15 DR. UNDERWOOD: Those people that are
16 speaking in the open public hearing after lunch,
17 you know my rule is five to seven minutes. It is
18 now five and half each, so please be prepared.

19 Thank you.

20 [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the proceedings
21 were recessed, to be resumed at 2:30 p.m.]

1 AFTERNOON PROCEEDINGS

2 [2:30 p.m.]

3 I. Open Public Hearing

4 DR. UNDERWOOD: This is the open public
5 hearing for the bacterial contamination. As I
6 admonished those speakers prior to lunch, if you
7 can make your presentation as brief as possible.

8 We have four scheduled speakers for the
9 open public hearing on bacterial contamination:
10 T.J. Smith from Medi-Flex Hospitals, Dr. Roger
11 Dodd, Kay Gregory, Dr. Bianco. Are those people
12 here in the room?

13 Those that will not need to use the slide
14 projector, if you can proceed and perhaps use the
15 mike in the center aisle, please.

16 Kay R. Gregory

17 MS. GREGORY: My name is Kay Gregory. At
18 this time I am representing the American
19 Association of Blood Banks.

20 The American Association of Blood Banks
21 (AABB) is the professional society for over 8,000
22 individuals involved in blood banking and
23 transfusion medicine and represents approximately
24 2,000 institutional members, including blood
25 collection centers, hospital-based blood banks, and

1 transfusion services as they collect, process,
2 distribute, and transfuse blood and blood
3 components and hematopoietic stem cells.

4 Our members are responsible for virtually
5 all of the blood collected and more than 80 percent
6 of the blood transfused in this country. For over
7 50 years, the AABB's high priority has been to
8 maintain and enhance the safety and availability of
9 the nation's blood supply.

10 The AABB believes that bacterial
11 contamination of platelets is the most significant
12 current infectious threat from blood transfusion
13 and appreciates the opportunity to comment on this
14 issue. For decades, bacterial contamination has
15 been recognized as a significant risk associated
16 with room temperature storage of platelets. The
17 AABB believes the time has now come to take action
18 on this issue.

19 As other infectious risks of transfusion
20 have been reduced, the magnitude and relative
21 importance of bacterial contamination of platelets
22 has become more pronounced. Various innovative
23 strategies have been and are being developed to
24 address this risk.

25 Although no single method or strategy

1 provides a perfect solution, the AABB believes that
2 multiple approaches may be appropriate for
3 consideration. Methods to prevent and detect
4 bacterial contamination in both apheresis and
5 pooled platelets made from whole blood have been
6 implemented in other countries.

7 These methods have undergone clinical
8 evaluation in this country, demonstrating the
9 ability to detect some bacterially-contaminated
10 units. The AABB notes that the FDA has recently
11 approved two culture-based bacterial detection
12 systems for quality control testing of
13 leukocyte-reduced platelets.

14 At this critical juncture, the AABB sees a
15 valuable opportunity for cooperation between the
16 transfusion medicine community and FDA.

17 The AABB reviews its voluntary Standards
18 for Blood Banks and Transfusion Services on a
19 planned basis. The next edition of these
20 Standards, the 22nd edition, has just been
21 published for public comment and proposes two
22 significant changes with regard to decreasing the
23 risk of bacterial infection for recipients of
24 platelet transfusions.

25 The first focuses on prevention of

1 bacterial contamination of the donated unit, and
2 involves changes to the skin preparation method.
3 Based on the data reviewed, AABB has recommended
4 that alcohol/tincture of iodine be the method of
5 choice, with chlorhexidine being acceptable for
6 individuals who are allergic to iodine. On the
7 basis of the data reviewed, the Standards Committee
8 has concluded that green soap is not acceptable for
9 skin preparation.

10 The second change the AABB has proposed is
11 a draft standard requiring that facilities have
12 methods to detect bacterial contamination in all
13 platelet components. In light of the fact that no
14 single system or method is effective in eliminating
15 the risk of bacterial contamination in all
16 components, the AABB has declined to be specific as
17 to the method of bacterial detection required in
18 this proposed standard.

19 There are a number of logistical and
20 scientific issues to be resolved prior to
21 implementation of any detection system, but the
22 AABB believes it is critical to begin to address
23 these issues now. The AABB recognizes that some
24 facilities may opt to use a method that gives
25 immediate results, while others may be able to

1 adopt culture technologies.

2 It is also relevant to note that this
3 proposed standard would require screening of all
4 platelet components. If the goal is to reduce
5 infections in recipients, it is essential that all
6 platelet components be evaluated. A statistical
7 sampling approach runs the risk of not effectively
8 decreasing the rate of bacterial infection.

9 It is much more feasible and practical
10 from both a logistical and a product loss
11 standpoint to perform bacterial detection,
12 especially using culture methods, on apheresis
13 platelets. However, the entire need for platelet
14 transfusion is not currently, nor will it be in the
15 foreseeable future, met by single donor apheresis
16 platelets.

17 Whole blood derived platelets are
18 necessary to ensure an adequate supply of
19 platelets. The potential application of culture
20 methods to detect bacterial contamination in
21 apheresis platelets cannot be allowed to render
22 platelets from whole blood an undesirable
23 component.

24 To this end, the AABB recognizes that
25 detection techniques such as Gram's or Wright's

1 stain, or dipstick monitoring may initially need to
2 be used for whole blood derived platelets.

3 The AABB believes that the FDA can
4 facilitate bacterial detection of whole blood
5 derived platelets by reexamining its current
6 thinking under which platelets pooled in either the
7 blood collection facility or the transfusing
8 facility, regardless of the use of sterile methods,
9 cannot be used beyond four hours after pooling.

10 The FDA's current thinking makes the
11 culture of pooled platelets impossible. In the
12 interim, alternative, albeit less ideal, methods,
13 including microscopy with acridine orange, Wright's
14 or Gram's stains, or dipstick monitoring of glucose
15 and/or pH with appropriate thresholds are available
16 for use at the time pooled platelets are released.

17 The FDA appears to have indicated that it
18 would require in vivo studies of platelet
19 effectiveness before considering extending the
20 storage of platelets pooled using sterile methods
21 to five days, as is currently allowed for
22 non-pooled product.

23 However, such in-vivo studies are
24 difficult to perform, expensive, require the
25 enrollment of large numbers of patients from

1 multiple institutions, and are difficult to analyze
2 due to multiple, unavoidable confounding factors.

3 In light of existing in vivo data from
4 Europe concerning the five-day storage of pooled
5 platelets derived by the buffy coat method and in
6 vitro data showing the similarity between
7 platelet-rich plasma derived platelets and buffy
8 coat platelets, the AABB urges the FDA to examine
9 ways in which it could expedite approval of the
10 extended storage of a pooled platelet product.

11 The AABB urges the FDA to act quickly to
12 consider what data will be required to extend
13 platelet storage to seven days, provided that an
14 acceptable bacterial detection system is used.

15 In light of the challenges and tremendous
16 opportunity for improving the safety of the blood
17 supply through the implementation of the bacterial
18 contamination methods described above, the AABB
19 requests the following assistance from FDA:

20 1. Regulatory support towards
21 accomplishing AABB's current goal of requiring
22 bacterial detection and interdiction of
23 contaminated products.

24 2. Regulatory support in developing
25 consensus on arm preparation solutions and

1 techniques, with a specific emphasis on prohibiting
2 the use of green soap.

3 3. Discussion of data required to
4 increase the storage time for random pooled
5 platelets with a particular focus on whether in
6 vitro data on platelet bacterial growth rates is
7 acceptable.

8 4. Discussion of the data needed to
9 extend the out-date of platelets to seven days.

10 As has been the case relating to the
11 development of new tests for emerging infectious
12 diseases, the blood banking and transfusion
13 medicine community and the FDA must understand the
14 need to implement less than perfect solutions,
15 while we work to improve the available methodology
16 and technology, recognizing that such incremental
17 steps will improve the safety of the blood supply.

18 Thank you.

19 DR. NELSON: Thanks very much.

20 Roger.

21 Roger Y. Dodd, Ph.D.

22 DR. DODD: Thank you very much, Ken.

23 My name is Roger Dodd. I am the Executive
24 Director, Biomedical Safety at the American Red
25 Cross. At the moment I am representing the

1 American Red Cross, which collects about half of
2 the blood components used for transfusion in the
3 United States.

4 One of our strategic priorities is: "To
5 provide high quality, safe products." The American
6 Red Cross thanks the Food and Drug Administration
7 and the Blood Products Advisory Committee for this
8 opportunity to address a topic of great importance
9 to platelet recipients in the United States. We
10 applaud the FDA for its attention to the issue of
11 bacterial contamination of platelet components.

12 The Red Cross agrees with the AABB
13 statement relating to the serious nature of
14 bacterial contamination and recognizes that
15 measures should be taken to reduce or eliminate the
16 occurrence of transfusion-related sepsis.

17 We recognize that an immediate, single
18 solution is not currently available and acknowledge
19 that attention to aseptic practice and to
20 appropriate skin preparation continue to be a
21 critical foundation for maintenance of bacterial
22 safety.

23 We further agree that it is highly
24 desirable to implement means to detect bacterially
25 contaminated platelet units and recognize that some

1 approach to diversion of the initial collection
2 volume may complement such detection.

3 We challenge researchers and manufacturers
4 to develop rapid, highly sensitive tests that may
5 be used to assure their platelets are bacterially
6 safe; ideally, such methods could be used prior to
7 release of products. In the meantime, we recognize
8 that FDA's approval of two culture-based methods
9 for platelet quality control is a step in the right
10 direction.

11 The Red Cross is in the process of
12 determining the feasibility of implementing
13 procedures to assure quality control for bacterial
14 contamination of all apheresis platelets and will
15 discuss with the FDA available options to assist
16 hospital customers in reducing the risk of
17 transfusing any components that fail to meet
18 bacterial QC requirements.

19 In common with the AABB, the Red Cross is
20 concerned about the ability to complete such QC on
21 random donor platelets without compromising their
22 availability and efficacy.

23 We hope that the FDA will be willing to
24 consider the concerns expressed by the AABB and
25 thus to assist the Red Cross in fulfilling its

1 mission.

2 Thank you for your attention.

3 DR. NELSON: Thank you.

4 Celso.

5 Celso Bianco, M.D.

6 DR. BIANCO: I am Celso Bianco. I am

7 speaking for America's Blood Centers.

8 America's Blood Centers (ABC) is a
9 national network of locally-controlled,
10 not-for-profit community blood centers that provide
11 nearly half of the U.S. blood supply from volunteer
12 donors.

13 Collectively, America's Blood Centers'
14 total blood collections exceeded 7 million
15 donations in 2001. ABC members operate in 45
16 states and in Quebec, Canada, and serve more than
17 half of the 6,000 hospitals in the U.S.

18 Members of America's Blood Centers thank
19 the FDA for the opportunity to participate in this
20 public discussion about the reduction of the
21 incidence of bacterial contamination of blood
22 components. Bacterial contamination is the second
23 cause of transfusion-related fatalities reported to
24 FDA, representing 10 percent of the cases with an
25 average of five reports a year.

1 Only hemolytic reactions due to errors
2 cause more fatalities--an average of 18 a year and
3 half of the reported transfusion-associated
4 fatalities (Jong-Hoon Lee, M.D., CBER, FDA
5 September 1999).

6 ABC members also agree that measures to
7 reduce the incidence of bacterial contamination of
8 blood components should be implemented. However,
9 they believe that a number of unresolved issues
10 must be considered by this committee and by FDA
11 before the agency issues any specific requirements.

12 Bacterial contamination of blood
13 components is a far more complex problem than viral
14 contamination. Substantial reduction of
15 transmission of HBV, HCV, and HIV by transfusion
16 has been achieved by screening assays that are
17 specific for each virus, as well s by donor
18 history questions and donor deferrals.

19 Viruses do not replicate during component
20 storage; what is in the donor is in the blood
21 sample collected for testing and is in the blood
22 bag.

23 Bacteria, on the other hand, are
24 everywhere. There are thousands of species that
25 may contaminate blood products, and they replicate

1 during storage. They may be present in minuscule
2 amounts in the donor's circulation, they may
3 survive skin disinfection, and there are no
4 specific tests.

5 The sensitivity of disinfection and
6 detection systems varies according to the type of
7 bacterium. Thus, while everyone agrees that
8 something should be done, there is no clear
9 agreement about what should be done.

10 The American Association of Blood Banks'
11 Standards Committee is proposing new standards for
12 skin disinfection in the next edition of AABB's
13 Standards. The Standards Committee has also
14 proposed the implementation of bacterial detection
15 systems (without specifying how this should be
16 done).

17 We all agree that disinfection of the
18 venipuncture site should be performed using the
19 most effective method possible. Recent studies
20 suggest that tincture of iodine would be better
21 than current methods.

22 A second approach to reducing the
23 incidence of bacterial contamination adopted in
24 some European countries, e.g., The Netherlands, is
25 attaching a diversion pouch to the collection bag.

1 The first several ml of collected blood are
2 diverted to the pouch and used for testing.

3 This prevents skin contaminants and the
4 skin plug often generated by penetration of the
5 needle from entering the collection bag. These
6 diversion pouches are available in some apheresis
7 sets, but are not yet approved for whole blood
8 collection systems.

9 Unfortunately, skin disinfection and
10 diversion pouches only reduce skin and
11 environmental contaminants. Several bacteria of
12 importance are in the donor's circulation and are
13 not affected by these measures. Detection systems
14 appear, at first sight, to be the solution.

15 In theory, bacterial culture and detection
16 of bacterial growth could resolve the problem of
17 bacterial contamination of blood components, and
18 FDA has approved two such systems in recent months.
19 However, the approval is specific for quality
20 control, not for release of blood components as
21 free of bacterial contamination.

22 Concerned about bacterial contamination,
23 European blood agencies have decided to adapt
24 clinical laboratory culture systems to their
25 operations. In The Netherlands, platelets from

1 whole blood are prepared by the buffy coat method,
2 pooled, and a sample from the pool is placed in a
3 culture system with automated detection of
4 bacterial growth.

5 After 24 hours, if the culture is
6 negative, the platelets are released to hospitals.
7 If growth is observed in subsequent days, the
8 hospital and physicians are notified. This method
9 for the preparation of pools of platelets from
10 whole blood is not approved in the U.S.

11 Hema-Quebec, our Canadian member, has
12 implemented bacterial detection systems for
13 platelets collected by apheresis and is studying
14 the adoption of the buffy coat method for
15 preparation of platelets from whole blood.

16 Among the 75 ABC member centers, 8 have
17 decided to implement bacterial detection systems in
18 the near future. They plan to use the ones
19 currently approved for QC of apheresis platelets,
20 in a way similar to that used by the Dutch. These
21 systems are complex and expensive; moreover, they
22 cannot be applied in a practical manner to
23 platelets derived from whole blood.

24 Current FDA regulations prevent us from
25 pre-pooling platelets from whole blood. When

1 pooled, they must be transfused within four hours,
2 even if the pooling is performed in a closed
3 system, using sterile connecting devices.

4 For this reason, the implementation of
5 bacterial detection systems threatens the survival
6 of platelets from whole blood. Members of this
7 committee should be aware that there aren't enough
8 platelets collected by apheresis to supply the
9 needs of the U.S. healthcare system.

10 Last year, ABC members distributed about
11 550,000 platelets by apheresis and 1.5 million
12 units of platelets derived from whole blood, and it
13 would take several years to reach sufficiency if we
14 were to convert entirely to platelets by apheresis.

15 In addition, many hospitals are resistant
16 to the conversion, because of the substantial cost
17 differential between the two components.

18 Some less cumbersome and less expensive
19 approaches have been proposed for the screening of
20 random donor platelets for bacterial contamination.
21 One is the use of a reagent dipstick for pH and
22 glucose; a pH lower than 7 and/or a glucose level
23 of less than 250 mg/dl would be considered
24 indicators of bacterial contamination.

25 The sensitivity and specificity of

1 dipsticks is not yet fully assessed. In the past,
2 some centers have screened platelets with a Gram
3 stain immediately before transfusion. However, we
4 know that these two methods are much less sensitive
5 than systems based on bacterial culture.

6 In our opinion, a number of practical
7 issues need to be dealt with before restrictive
8 standards or regulatory mandates are issued for
9 interventions designed to reduce the incidence of
10 bacterial contamination.

11 The mode of application of the systems
12 approved for quality control is still unclear for
13 us. What would be the corrective actions triggered
14 by the finding of an occasional component with
15 bacterial growth? We can think of personnel
16 retraining and very little else. How should we
17 interpret these findings from the QC point of view?

18 Where should bacterial detection be
19 performed? At the blood center where the
20 components are prepared, or at the hospital, closer
21 to the transfusion event? The requirements for the
22 two approaches are quite different.

23 Detection at the collection facility
24 requires high sensitivity, and results obtained at
25 the time of release of the platelets (consider the

1 five-day out-date) may not be predictive of the
2 bacterial load at expiration. On the other hand,
3 there are no reliable systems for testing close to
4 the transfusion event, when platelet concentrates
5 are pooled.

6 One of the approved systems (Pall) focuses
7 mainly on aerobes; the manufacturer of the other is
8 recommending cultures for aerobes and anaerobes
9 (BioMerieux). Are cultures for anaerobes
10 warranted, considering that platelets are stored in
11 gas permeable bags in an oxygen-containing
12 atmosphere?

13 Recognizing that anaerobes are rare causes
14 of clinical bacterial contamination, and sometimes
15 not detected in vitro until beyond the expiration
16 of the product, we do not think that use of
17 anaerobic media is a key initial part of this
18 initiative.

19 What inoculation systems should we use to
20 prevent false positive results? Do we need to use
21 laminar flow hoods? How do we deal with false
22 positives?

23 The Pall BDS is an endpoint system.
24 Specimens are inoculated 24 hours after collection
25 and the cultures read at least 24 hours later. In

1 contrast, the BioMerieux bacT/ALERT is a continuous
2 system, raising the question of when cultures
3 should be considered negative.

4 Then the BioMerieux system is used and the
5 cultures continue to be followed after release of
6 the platelets to a hospital, if subsequently
7 positive, what should physicians be told (since in
8 many cases the platelets will have been
9 transfused)?

10 To what level should centers or contract
11 microbiology services identify positives? Is there
12 a need for performance of antimicrobial
13 susceptibility assays? Probably yes.

14 Could cultures be inoculated at the
15 collection facility and read at the hospital that
16 received the component? If so, how would specimens
17 be identified? What software modifications are
18 needed to assure correlation between components and
19 culture results? In this case, how should reports
20 of positive results be handled?

21 How do we validate these systems? What
22 are the positive controls? How can we measure the
23 efficacy of the detection procedures in light of
24 the low frequency of events?

25 Finally, should a recommendation be made

1 for implementing these very expensive new
2 procedures, there should be a consistent message to
3 hospitals and insurers explaining that their
4 benefit far exceeds their cost.

5 Considering these and many other issues
6 that need to be reviewed, we respectfully request
7 that this committee and FDA consider the following:

8 Support collection facilities that
9 implement methods to reduce the risk of bacterial
10 contamination by skin contaminants in blood and
11 blood components.

12 Facilitate the licensure of bacterial
13 detection systems for component release, allowing
14 claims such as "negative for bacteria at time of
15 release."

16 Support collection facilities that decide
17 to implement 100 percent Quality Control for their
18 apheresis platelets. Their experience will be
19 invaluable for progress in this area. Regulatory
20 actions could have serious inhibitory effects and
21 delay the implementation of procedures that will
22 certainly increase the safety of transfusion.

23 Encourage the development of alternative
24 technologies for bacterial detection that are less
25 laborious, less expensive, and can be applied at

1 the hospital level, closer to the transfusion
2 event. This is essential for the survival of whole
3 blood derived platelets and for the fulfillment of
4 patient needs.

5 Speed the regulatory process for the
6 extension of the expiration date of platelets to
7 seven days if negative for contamination.

8 Allow pre-pooling of platelets from whole
9 blood using approved sterile connecting devices,
10 based on the long and successful European
11 experience with buffy coat platelets.

12 We strongly believe that these actions
13 will encourage the implementation of means to
14 reduce bacterial contamination of platelets and
15 hence increase the availability of safer platelets
16 for transfusion. When we reach this stage of
17 development, we will welcome FDA regulation.

18 Thank you very much for the opportunity to
19 present our point of view.

20 DR. NELSON: Thanks, Celso.

21 T.J. Smith?

22 MS. CROSBY: T.J. Smith has asked me to
23 give the presentation.

24 Cynthia Crosby

25 MS. CROSBY: I am Cynthia Crosby.

1 As we go forward, I am going to skip
2 through these slides really fast, but I want to
3 challenge the FDA Advisory Committee to understand
4 the modes and mechanisms of antimicrobial solutions
5 in choosing what I am hearing a plea from your Red
6 Cross, the ABC to adequately assess skin
7 preparation prior to the venipuncture.

8 [Slide.]

9 Understanding antiseptic agents is very
10 easy and readily available in the texts that are
11 out there. I am with Medi-Flex. We have been in
12 the business for 17 years of providing aseptic
13 tools to deliver antiseptic products to the donor
14 site.

15 Our bread and butter is in the donor prep
16 market outside the United States by them using
17 alcohol followed by tincture of iodine. Our bread
18 and butter in the United States is blood culture
19 kits that provide alcohol followed by tincture of
20 iodine.

21 [Slide.]

22 Why is tincture of iodine superior to your
23 current AABB recommendation of povidone-iodine?
24 Povidone-iodine is complex with an inert polymer
25 that must dry for the polymer, must dry for the

1 iodine to decomplex, to have a kill mode.

2 [Slide.]

3 With tincture of iodine, you have readily
4 available iodine. It is there in the position to
5 have an immediate effect prior to your
6 venipuncture.

7 [Slide.]

8 We have had great demand from the blood
9 donation facilities for a chlorhexidine type based
10 product whether it be tincture or aqueous. We are
11 hearing that every day if this product has been
12 approved by the FDA to be used for blood donation.

13 Right now we have several facilities that
14 are running validations. The National Blood
15 Authority in the UK is in the mode right at this
16 time of implementing a
17 chlorhexidine/alcohol/tincture for blood donation.

18 Carl McDonald presented at the
19 International Blood Banking Conference in Canada
20 that stated that there was an equivalence to the
21 tincture of iodine two-step procedure, alcohol
22 followed by tincture of iodine.

23 In this, there was 2.76 log reduction with
24 tincture of iodine versus a 2.6 log reduction with
25 the chlorhexidine/tincture. Over 99 percent of the

1 bacteria were killed at the time of the
2 venipuncture.

3 [Slide.]

4 What makes chlorhexidine ideal is its
5 affinity to bind to the skin surface. Ideal
6 antiseptics should be broad spectrum, they have to
7 be rapid.

8 [Slide.]

9 They have to be rapid because of one key
10 component, and that is convenience and compliance
11 to protocol. As our staffing nurses are reduced,
12 our average age nurse is now 47 years old in our
13 facilities, and as phlebotomy teams are reduced,
14 compliance and convenience to protocol is
15 necessary.

16 Industry has met that demand by combining
17 products that will have a quick dry time, a quick
18 kill.

19 [Slide.]

20 As of July 2000, there was an NDA approval
21 for a new chlorhexidine/tincture product, 2 percent
22 chlorhexidine and 70 percent isopropyl. It has
23 been demanded from the health care worker or
24 clinician for the care of catheter insertion and
25 catheter lines.

1 In 10 years, we have heard the data over
2 and over again in the 50 percent reduction to
3 catheter-related bloodstream infections. We see it
4 now in the studies that are followed in the data
5 that I gave you as a package that shows the 50
6 percent reduction by going to use a
7 chlorhexidine/tincture prior to a vascular
8 procedure.

9 [Slide.]

10 Povidone-iodine is your current prep.
11 It's a two-step procedure. Tincture of iodine and
12 CHD are far superior in the clinical and in the in
13 vitro data to povidone-iodine. Tincture of iodine
14 is a two-step procedure. It is proposed for the
15 standards of blood banking and transfusion.

16 Two percent chlorhexidine based products
17 that are currently available, which only happens to
18 be one, is a one-step procedure. It is equivalent
19 to the two-step tincture of iodine. It is proposed
20 as an alternate prep.

21 One thing I can state is that we see huge
22 compliance to protocol in the hospital community.
23 New CDC guidelines for the prevention speaks I
24 think, and I am going to go out on a limb here, to
25 your donation facilities, that is, educated and

1 dedicated resources are necessary to reduce your
2 contaminations.

3 Maximal barriers and the understanding of
4 maximal barriers are necessary in reducing
5 contamination, and 2 percent chlorhexidine-based
6 antiseptics are preferred, they are the preferred
7 antiseptic of choice by the CDC, and they have
8 superior efficacy compared to povidone-iodine.

9 [Slide.]

10 Preventative measures are the highest
11 quality in medical treatment and the most cost
12 efficient. They are simple. We just have to make
13 the decision to use those preventative measures.

14 Thank you.

15 DR. NELSON: Thank you very much.

16 Pall Corporation also had a statement to
17 make, but they have decided to submit it for the
18 record rather than to read it or present it at the
19 meeting at this time.

20 We are no longer in the open public
21 hearing.

22 Maybe we can go to the questions. John.

23 Questions for the Committee

24 DR. LEE: I guess I will just read the
25 question one more time regarding donor arm prep.

1 Do available scientific data support
2 preferential use of an isopropanol/tincture of
3 iodine procedure for preparation of the donor's
4 phlebotomy site?

5 I guess I would just comment that some of
6 the comments we heard during open public hearing
7 session just now didn't really refer back to some
8 of the material that I presented in the morning.
9 The fact that isopropanol/tincture of iodine is
10 proven to be superior in the donor setting seems a
11 bit of an overclaim in view of what I presented.

12 DR. SIMON: Is it appropriate to start the
13 discussion? I guess it is an interesting topic
14 because I have a long-standing interest in it, and
15 actually, data that were not presented here, but
16 there was a study done, the United Blood Services
17 in 1993-94. It was only presented in abstract form
18 and it is referred to in the Goldman paper, and it
19 showed that tincture of iodine was superior in
20 eradicating organisms from the skin.

21 I actually wrote the AABB at that time and
22 proposed that we make the change then, and that
23 obviously did not occur. So, I think that there is
24 data and I think there is data in the blood culture
25 literature, as well, to indicate that looking

1 strictly at data, it would appear that tincture of
2 iodine is superior to the povidone and that, in
3 addition, chlorhexidine is also superior.

4 Actually, we use chlorhexidine in our
5 laboratory for our blood cultures, but when I
6 questioned our microbiologist on why we made that
7 choice instead of tincture of iodine, it was
8 because we have a lot of these cultures drawn by
9 non-dedicated personnel, not personnel that we
10 control, intensive care, emergency room nurses, and
11 so one-step procedure, which the chlorhexidine is,
12 is superior or we feel we get superior compliance
13 and went with that instead.

14 I think there is data to support the
15 change as AABB plans. I must say that I was
16 impressed with your presentation and I think from
17 the common sense point of view, one could well
18 raise the question, does it really make a
19 difference in the donor setting where you have so
20 many other things going on, and you have sort of a
21 multifactorial situation.

22 But I would guess if we are this concerned
23 about this subject to be willing to move to some of
24 these other steps that we are going to discuss, I
25 would think, as a first step, that we would want to

1 have the most effective removal of organisms from
2 the arm to begin with when the unit is drawn.

3 I think that the tincture of iodine, as
4 AABB has proposed, with the chlorhexidine as the
5 backup for iodine-sensitive individual, that would
6 be the step to go, so I would support this.

7 I would put into that statement, however,
8 that I don't think the plasma industry should be
9 required to go this direction because none of their
10 products are stored are either refrigeration or
11 room temperature. They are frozen, and they have
12 not had a problem with bacterial infection in that
13 industry.

14 So, I would think that they should be okay
15 to go with either one, but I would support the AABB
16 position at this time.

17 DR. ALLEN: Thank you, Toby. I think that
18 is a good introduction to the discussion. I have
19 been mulling over, given the way in which the
20 question is worded, whether I would vote yes or
21 abstain.

22 My feeling is that there is some evidence
23 that tends to lean towards tincture of iodine in
24 isopropanol, or the combination, the two step, as
25 clearly the preferred way to go although I would

1 have real trouble given the broader view of 2
2 percent chlorhexidine in isopropanol as an equal
3 alternative.

4 I guess my question is what is the
5 implication of voting yes for this in terms of
6 action that the FDA might take given that the AABB
7 already has revised proposed standards out that use
8 this with the chlorhexidine as an alternative.

9 So, if we vote yes for this, what are the
10 implications in terms of how the FDA is going to
11 use this information?

12 DR. LEE: That's a million dollar
13 question. Dr. Epstein, would you like to field
14 that question?

15 DR. EPSTEIN: The question before the
16 agency is whether we should issue a regulatory
17 guidance recommending preferred use of
18 isopropanol/tincture of iodine. It has occurred
19 from time to time that we disagree with an industry
20 voluntary standard, and then we may take a
21 regulatory position to override it.

22 So, in this case, our options would be to
23 remain neutral and let the preference be voluntary
24 or to endorse it through a regulatory
25 recommendation.

1 DR. ALLEN: I would certainly feel
2 comfortable and I would vote yes if it is to be a
3 voluntary recommended standard. I am much less
4 comfortable I think to take it to the regulatory
5 level.

6 DR. EPSTEIN: Well--okay.
7 [Laughter.]

8 DR. NELSON: Actually, this committee
9 doesn't exactly make regulations. We are supposed
10 to help the FDA evaluate data and evaluate what is
11 there and what is missing. So, I don't think you
12 need to consider yourself a judge or a congressman
13 at this point, I guess.

14 DR. KLEIN: I appreciated Dr. Lee's very
15 thorough review, but I must say I sort of
16 discounted the studies that simply showed that you
17 can't culture something or you culture something
18 less frequently from the site, because that really
19 isn't a good demonstration of what might be the
20 risk in the bag.

21 Actually, I think you could be fairly
22 badly misled by those studies. What you really
23 want to know is what the risk is of contaminating
24 the component. We don't have those studies
25 unfortunately, and I think the best that we have

1 are the blood culture studies which by and large
2 show that all of these preps are just about the
3 same, I guess, with the exception of soap, which I
4 don't think anyone supports.

5 The problem with those studies, of course,
6 is that the background level is so high that it
7 could mask slight differences between different arm
8 preps.

9 So, I don't have any problem with saying
10 that this is a good preparation, I guess as the
11 AABB is suggesting in its standard. I would hate
12 to see anything regulated based on that, however.
13 I don't think the data support it.

14 DR. NELSON: In these studies, apparently
15 what happened, the way they did it is they cultured
16 before the preparation and then they applied the
17 material and then recultured. It was stated as a
18 percent reduction of flora.

19 DR. LEE: Well, many of the blood culture
20 studies were comparisons.

21 DR. NELSON: Not the blood cultures, the
22 McDonald.

23 DR. LEE: The blood collection studies,
24 yes, it was cultured before and after. Again, when
25 represented as percent reduction, the values don't

1 strike out at you as much, the difference between
2 99 and 98, I don't know what that really means.

3 DR. NELSON: Mary.

4 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I guess I am puzzling
5 over this, too, because I guess what are the
6 criteria, what is the level or rigor that is going
7 to demonstrate that one of these preparations is
8 "preferential."

9 I agree with Dr. Klein's comments that log
10 reduction of bacteria skin contaminants is not
11 necessarily at all the whole story. I just wanted
12 to make sure because it was a quite a load of
13 literature that the committee was given to review
14 in advance, in a relatively short period of time,
15 so I think it is really hard for us to basically
16 digest all of this.

17 I do want to commend you because I think
18 you did really put together a really nice, critical
19 review. As I understand it, there are no data for
20 this proposed prep that look at contamination rates
21 in bags of platelets, that is correct, it is just
22 all skin studies.

23 DR. LEE: That is my understanding. The
24 thing that comes closest is the third study that I
25 described, within which cultures of actual platelet

1 units were done, but that study did not include the
2 tincture of iodine/isopropanol method.

3 DR. CHAMBERLAND: So, as a surrogate,
4 then, you brought up in some of your slides some
5 reviews of literature that is available on looking
6 at blood culture data.

7 DR. LEE: Right.

8 DR. CHAMBERLAND: And the various preps.
9 Again, I want to make sure I have got the bottom
10 line here straight, but in looking at the blood
11 culture data, were there any clear winners here?
12 This isopropanol/tincture of iodine did not emerge
13 in the blood culture studies as showing a
14 preferential--

15 DR. LEE: No, it did not. There are some
16 conflicting results. Some showed marginally better
17 performance, but there were many others, equally as
18 many, that showed no difference.

19 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I think it comes down
20 to--again, this is what I am struggling with--if
21 FDA is signaling that they are potentially
22 considering guidance, then, you usually have to put
23 forward what your criteria are that you are going
24 to evaluate.

25 I guess a fair question is if the only

1 data for this new prep are skin culture data, is
2 that adequate, is that the whole story, would you
3 require more rigorous data.

4 In the end, at the end of the day, how
5 much of a difference is it going to make.

6 DR. LEE: I see Dr. Epstein at the mike.

7 DR. EPSTEIN: Maybe I can shed some light.

8 I think Dr. Lee said this earlier. What has
9 happened here is we have had a series of workshops
10 over a period of years. At every single workshop
11 or symposium, someone shows the studies on the
12 isopropanol alcohol/tincture of iodine prep and
13 says, look, this reduces bacterial contamination of
14 the skin.

15 We all agree that we don't have a good
16 endpoint study in platelets, and the FDA has not
17 come forward in the face of that with a
18 recommendation for preferred use of that procedure
19 because we keep taking a look at the larger
20 literature and scratching our heads and saying we
21 are not ready to do this.

22 On the other hand, the AABB has now,
23 listening to the same workshops, the symposiums,
24 reading the same literature, has decided to make
25 this a voluntary standard.

1 Now, there are two positions that the FDA
2 could take. One is we agree, so we will make it a
3 regulatory standard, or we are not so sure, but we
4 are not opposed to the industry voluntary standard.

5 Again, and I guess this comes back to you,
6 Jim, we are not asking you to decide the regulatory
7 position. We are just asking you whether you are,
8 in effect, in agreement with the FDA that the
9 science is too soft for us to take a regulatory
10 position, because after all, the pressure on us has
11 been to do just that.

12 DR. SIMON: I just will say a few more
13 words in support of my position, I guess, for a yes
14 vote on the question. I think we have to remember
15 that what we used to cleanse the skin was based on
16 this kind of analysis. That is, we wouldn't have
17 any prep at all as far as I know if we had as an
18 endpoint, the desired one, of the infection of the
19 unit.

20 So, we have sort of empirical choice of
21 agents that remove bacteria from the skin, because
22 that is what we want to do with this step of the
23 procedure, and the data would indicate that
24 tincture may be superior.

25 I was a little surprised at the skepticism

1 about the blood culture studies because the reason
2 we did the study at UBS back in 1994 was the
3 literature on the blood culture studies, which
4 indicated that povidone was inferior.

5 I might be somewhat influenced by this
6 1999 study by my former mentor at medical school
7 from Barnes-Jewish, which showed tincture of iodine
8 to be superior, and I don't believe that we would
9 use povidone in our laboratory for blood cultures
10 at this time. We would use either chlorhexidine or
11 tincture of iodine.

12 So, I think that there is enough data
13 there given that what our objective is with this
14 step of the procedure is to remove bacteria from
15 the arm. We may have to do other procedures to
16 make sure that the platelets are absolutely
17 sterile, but that would seem to be the most
18 reasonable first step.

19 DR. FITZPATRICK: I would agree with Toby,
20 but prior to making regulation, because really the
21 only data we have for regulation is from the Vox
22 Sang article, and since the tincture of iodine
23 wasn't in that, there isn't a comparison to use, so
24 you would need a comparison.

25 But as far as just surface contamination,

1 I think there is ample evidence, and we did used to
2 use tincture of iodine, and the biggest complaint
3 was that techs and nurses were getting cut in their
4 fingers when they broke the ampule initiative the
5 tincture of iodine swab that was used to prepare
6 the arm, and now there is a method where you don't
7 have to break a glass ampule to do that.

8 Since it just says preferential, it is
9 pretty soft as it is.

10 DR. LEW: I think maybe to be fair, to be
11 more specific, though, because everyone is
12 struggling with the fact, I think, that there is no
13 good studies looking at many different types of
14 preparations and saying that this is The superior
15 with a capital T.

16 But if you can just say preferential, the
17 tincture compared to what is used now as a
18 recommended standard, I don't think anyone would
19 have a major problem with that. It is just trying
20 to imply this is the best overall. The data is not
21 there, and it is not appropriate to I think
22 regulate based on no data.

23 DR. NELSON: Are we ready to vote on this?
24 It is now an open public hearing, but if you have
25 got something critical that we haven't considered.

1 DR. WAGNER: Just a cautionary note, and
2 that is of placing too much emphasis on whole blood
3 cultures done at hospitals on patients who may
4 already, some fraction of which would be
5 bacteremic, to compare two different skin
6 preparation methods.

7 The bacteremia in the population may
8 overwhelm the differences.

9 DR. NELSON: The difference of
10 differentiating a contaminant from a real
11 infection. We have recorded that.

12 DR. ALLEN: Would the FDA consider an
13 amendment, if we add at the end of this, the
14 sentence as written, "for preparation of the
15 donor's phlebotomy site compared with the current
16 procedure using povidone-iodine"?

17 That compares this one versus that one
18 without making a statement about any other
19 preparation.

20 DR. LEE: We could do that, interpret the
21 question in that light.

22 DR. NELSON: Right, since that is what is
23 used, I guess. Okay.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Would you repeat that?

25 DR. ALLEN: Do available scientific data

1 support preferential use of an isopropanol/tincture
2 of iodine procedure for preparation of the donor's
3 phlebotomy site compared with the current standard
4 procedure based on povidone-iodine preparation?

5 DR. SMALLWOOD: Voting will be by roll
6 call as required.

7 The question as amended reads: Do
8 available scientific data support preferential use
9 of an isopropanol/tincture of iodine procedure for
10 preparation of the donor's phlebotomy site compared
11 with the current standard procedure based on
12 povidone-iodine preparation?

13 Allen.

14 DR. ALLEN: I vote yes and I think we need
15 to look at other preparations, and we need to study
16 the donor acceptability of the tincture of iodine.

17 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

18 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I am going to vote no.

19 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

20 DR. DAVIS: No.

21 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

22 DR. DiMICHELE: No.

23 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

24 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

25 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

1 DR. FITZPATRICK: Yes.

2 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

3 DR. KLEIN: No.

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

5 DR. LEW: Yes.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

7 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Stuver.

9 DR. STUVER: No.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

11 DR. FALLAT: No.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

13 DR. HARVATH: No.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

15 DR. NELSON: Yes.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon, you would--

17 DR. SIMON: Yes.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of the voting.

19 There are 6 yes votes, 7 no votes, no abstentions,

20 the acting non-voting industry representative

21 agrees with the yes vote.

22 DR. NELSON: Now that we have solved that,

23 do we have a second question?

24 DR. WILLIAMS: Just a very brief

25 clarification. Like this question, several of the

1 other questions deal with issues in which there is
2 a developing industry standard, as well as a
3 potential developing regulatory policy.

4 Several of these initiatives are draft
5 standards. They need to go through a membership
6 comment period and final acceptance, so just to
7 clarify, these are not existing industry standards
8 at this time.

9 Committee Question 2. Do available data
10 on the sterility of the sterile connecting device
11 procedure support the use of this procedure to
12 collect samples for bacterial detection from
13 in-date platelet products?

14 DR. NELSON: Discussion? Yes.

15 DR. SIMON: I think the data were fairly
16 overwhelming to answer this yes, however, just with
17 the caveat that we are introducing another
18 complexity into the system, which at a breakdown at
19 some point, could lead to more bacterial infections
20 than what we have now, but I think certainly the
21 data we are presented support it and obviously, the
22 FDA has approved this for products that remain
23 in-date and can be infused.

24 So, I would think that we would vote yes
25 on this one.

1 DR. NELSON: When it breaks down, that
2 will lead to another question later on.

3 Are we ready to vote?

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question No. 2. Do
5 available data on the sterility of the sterile
6 connecting device procedure support the use of this
7 procedure to collect samples for bacterial
8 detection from in-date platelet products?

9 Allen?

10 DR. ALLEN: Yes.

11 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

12 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Yes.

13 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

14 DR. DAVIS: Yes.

15 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

16 DR. DiMICHELE: Yes.

17 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

18 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

19 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

20 DR. FITZPATRICK: Yes.

21 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

22 DR. KLEIN: Yes.

23 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

24 DR. LEW: Yes.

25 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

1 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.

2 DR. SMALLWOOD: Stuver.

3 DR. STUVER: Yes.

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

5 DR. FALLAT: Yes.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

7 DR. HARVATH: Yes.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

9 DR. NELSON: Yes.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon?

11 DR. SIMON: Yes.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: We have unanimous yes on
13 the vote for the second question.

14 DR. WILLIAMS: Does the committee concur
15 with FDA's proposed statistical approach to
16 providing quality control for platelet
17 contamination?

18 DR. NELSON: Discussion? Toby.

19 DR. SIMON: Well, I have a real problem
20 with this, but in a way I think Dr. Epstein
21 clarified it as a method for the agency to be
22 certain that the regulated entities are performing
23 their functions as they should. I guess it is
24 something to go along with.

25 I just don't think that this kind of

1 approach will ultimately improve safety, and it is
2 going to cost a lot and small organizations will
3 have to wind up culturing all their units. So, I
4 think it probably logically leads you to what the
5 AABB is proposing, which is a release criteria, but
6 I don't see anything wrong with what the FDA has
7 proposed other than I think it is going to be a lot
8 of data collection without a lot of value from it.

9 DR. FITZPATRICK: A comment and a
10 question. I think Toby's comment about the small
11 facilities having to culture every unit is very
12 valid. In the past, FDA has attempted to find a
13 means of providing those smaller facilities an
14 alternate method, and I think it is essential that
15 there be an alternate method for them especially if
16 they demonstrate they are in control over a period
17 of time.

18 The other question I have is when a
19 facility finds itself above the 0.2 percent level,
20 are they then to restrict the release of products
21 until they sample enough products to come below the
22 0.2 percent level, and what is the impact on supply
23 of that.

24 DR. WILLIAMS: That is a good question.
25 If a process is deemed out of control, I think

1 under normal circumstances, one would basically
2 curtail production, reassess, and revalidate all
3 the processes and continue, revalidate and resume
4 production as soon as possible.

5 But I think to continue manufacture of
6 product for a procedure that is significantly not
7 meeting a current standard, it would probably be
8 arguable that production should continue.

9 There is a supply issue and I think
10 probably in that situation, approaching FDA for a
11 potential solution is probably the best impact.
12 Jay may wish to comment, as well.

13 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, typically, industry
14 establishes alert levels and action levels, and I
15 think the discussion hasn't gone that far. It may
16 depend what measure you get. You know, if the
17 estimated rate is 0.4 percent, that is not the same
18 thing as if it was 0.25.

19 I don't think we have all the answers
20 there, but I think that Alan's answer is the
21 correct one, a system that is clearly out of
22 control shouldn't continue, and it does throw into
23 question the quality of the products released.

24 But that said, more work is needed, more
25 thought is needed to figure out what the

1 appropriate actions are at any given level.

2 DR. SCHMIDT: I was struck by Dr. Bianco's
3 comment about what do you do with the information,
4 and the thing I thought back to is a recent event
5 where a patient who had multiple transfusions,
6 suffered from I think it was a Klebsiella, and the
7 result of this, I just read the newspaper account,
8 was shutting down the blood for the whole state
9 more or less, and some strange things were said in
10 the press.

11 I guess what I am saying is when you get
12 to this type of iffy things and you are looking at
13 the quality of the entire place based on something
14 that may or may not relate, this can be a pretty
15 dangerous situation.

16 DR. FALLAT: I was impressed with the fact
17 that there is such a variation in the literature
18 and you really can't give a standard right now, so
19 I am not sure how we can set up an industrywide
20 standard when we don't know what the standard is.

21 I was also impressed with the comments
22 made by the CDC representative that said that there
23 may be several questions that need to be answered,
24 and I think it would be much more reasonable that
25 this be done as a pilot or a study to see what your

1 response is with a certain number of centers that
2 might be willing to cooperate in such a study
3 rather than making it an industrywide quality
4 control approach at this time.

5 DR. ALLEN: Thank you for saying that. I
6 concur. I like this approach. It is certainly one
7 that is analogous to what is used in industry for
8 quality control. I think it ought to be pursued.
9 As Dr. Epstein said, there is still a lot to be
10 worked out on it, and I guess I am struggling how
11 do I vote to encourage the further development of
12 this and perhaps a pilot testing of it without
13 indicating that I think it is anywhere close to
14 being ready to be put into a regulatory mode.

15 DR. KLEIN: I don't think that this in any
16 way as described is going to improve public health.
17 First of all, we don't know what the right number
18 is, and it is more likely that it is less common,
19 which would put the facilities at risk of being out
20 of compliance for no reason of their performance.

21 Second, as I stated earlier, a high
22 percentage of the endpoints that we are looking at
23 are not going to be addressed by what we do when we
24 prepare platelets. They are from organisms that
25 are circulating in the donor.

1 Point three, I think, is that what we are
2 really looking for is a release criterion, and you
3 obviously can't do that because the testings are
4 not licensed for that, but I think that this is not
5 a good compromise.

6 I think it will be laborious and
7 potentially affect supply, and not improve public
8 health in terms of bacterial contamination of
9 platelets.

10 DR. NELSON: Is the Red Cross going to
11 uniform culturing of platelet donors? If so, that
12 could end up being a pretty good database to decide
13 what the level should be.

14 DR. DODD: Ken, I take it I can comment on
15 this?

16 DR. NELSON: Yes.

17 DR. DODD: The Red Cross is considering
18 whether or how it could engage in 100 percent
19 quality control of apheresis platelets. That
20 doesn't mean that we are actually going to do it
21 although I think there are other blood agencies
22 that are moving down that track, and I think it
23 would give an opportunity for collecting
24 appropriate data.

25 Ultimately, if and when we do that, we

1 would like to do it in some way that prevented the
2 usage of a bacterially contaminated product.

3 But I did want to take the opportunity of
4 asking either the agency or the committee if it
5 considered the fact that as of today, the two
6 methods that have been approved for quality
7 control, they are approved only for leukoreduced
8 platelets. I wonder what impact that might have on
9 answering this question.

10 DR. VOSTAL: I can actually address the
11 question about leukoreduced platelets. The reason
12 those devices are approved for that product is that
13 is because that is the only type of data we saw
14 when we were clearing the device.

15 DR. FITZPATRICK: I have Dr. Allen's same
16 dilemma as to how do we answer this question. As I
17 understand Dr. Epstein's desire for a way to
18 measure compliance and encourage compliance, but we
19 need a stepwise approach to that.

20 One of the key elements that I think came
21 out today was the pooling random donor platelets
22 and being able to maintain them as a pooled
23 product, and then test them. I think that would
24 add to what we can do to ensure and reduce
25 bacterial contamination for the patient, if we have

1 a way of quarantining and release or testing prior
2 to release.

3 As Dr. Epstein said, there are a number of
4 unanswered dilemmas here with this, and the
5 approach taken for the leukoreduction guidance, I
6 think applies here, but because of the low
7 incidence of positive units, the N becomes so large
8 that it is very difficult to apply that statistical
9 model to this.

10 I think future exploration and an
11 alternative method to find a way to establish
12 compliance and standards, and then monitor on a
13 periodic basis might help, but I find it really
14 difficult to say I concur with this as the
15 appropriate approach at this point.

16 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I just find myself in
17 the same dilemma. I would hope that the committee
18 really wants to signal their strong endorsement as
19 has been echoed by industry that the time is now to
20 really take bacterial contamination seriously and
21 to take steps in that direction to prevent and then
22 appropriate monitoring.

23 I don't feel at this point comfortable
24 enough that this proposed approach, exactly what it
25 will accomplish, and will it incur any real risk

1 related to supply, et cetera, so I am concerned
2 that if I vote no, that that might be viewed as not
3 feeling that this is an important problem.

4 We are being asked to really vote on a
5 really detailed, specific plan, and I think it
6 takes a bit of time to sort of model that and work
7 that out, and I just wonder if maybe you have all
8 done that and done some real live kind of testing
9 of this from a modeling perspective to see what
10 might happen, but I just a little bit uncomfortable
11 that a yes vote and develop a guidance and it's out
12 there without thoroughly understanding the
13 implication.

14 So, I feel somewhat caught here a bit.

15 DR. SIMON: I guess a question and a
16 comment. Alan, could I ask, you are proposing this
17 or FDA is proposing this for both apheresis and
18 random donor, that is correct, isn't it?

19 DR. WILLIAMS: That's correct.

20 DR. SIMON: One other possibility, and I
21 don't know how FDA feels about this, would be to
22 table this question for now and at the next
23 meeting, discuss this issue of quality control and
24 the release issue together, and see which is the
25 best direction to go to reduce risk, because I

1 understand that AABB had some of these same kinds
2 of discussions when they came up with their
3 proposal.

4 Since industry is moving towards a sort of
5 different approach for release, and since it raises
6 all kinds of implications, and I think there,
7 really where the supply issues get raised, both in
8 terms of units being held and also in terms of what
9 happens to random donor platelets in this setting,
10 and are blood centers going to consider it too
11 hazardous to provide these because they are not
12 amenable to the same approach, so it has become a
13 very complicated issue.

14 Although I don't see anything wrong with
15 what FDA has proposed, it appears that it may need
16 a more comprehensive discussion and taking into
17 account both this approach and the release
18 approach.

19 DR. DiMICHELE: I just wanted to echo the
20 comments of several of the committee members. It
21 seems to me, although I certainly defer to those
22 members of the committee who are blood bankers and
23 have had tremendous experience with this, but it
24 seems to me that the issue of how we document
25 sterility of platelets is still unclear.

1 So, therefore, it becomes very difficult
2 to embark on this type of a study if we are really
3 not clear on how we are really to measure platelet
4 sterility in the first place.

5 I would agree with those committee members
6 who suggest that maybe the next step is really to
7 develop a pilot study to really help us to
8 understand how to measure platelet sterility before
9 we embark on a widescale regulatory quality control
10 measure that actually attempts to do this.

11 I don't know again the best design for
12 this, but I know that there are many units of
13 platelets, for instance, that would get discarded
14 anyway because of hepatitis B core positivity, et
15 cetera, units that would not be used, and the
16 question is, is whether a study can actually be
17 designed using units that cannot be salvaged, to
18 start looking at this in kind of a pilot way.

19 DR. NELSON: There have been a few pilot
20 studies on cultures, and they are not large enough.
21 The issue is that to really get this number and to
22 figure out what is acceptable would take a
23 substantial size study I think.

24 DR. DiMICHELE: Well, that is if it were a
25 natural history study, but one of the things that

1 you can do with platelets that wouldn't be used
2 anyway would be spiking experiments and
3 manipulative studies that might be able to give you
4 data in a very different way.

5 Again, I certainly can't comment on being
6 an expert on the design of such a study, but it
7 might be considered.

8 DR. NELSON: Are we ready to vote on this
9 one?

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question No. 3. Does the
11 committee concur with FDA's proposed statistical
12 approach to providing quality control for platelet
13 contamination?

14 Allen.

15 DR. ALLEN: I abstain with strong support
16 for the FDA's continuing its work in this area.

17 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

18 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I also will abstain.

19 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

20 DR. DAVIS: No.

21 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

22 DR. DiMICHELE: No.

23 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

24 DR. DOPPELT: No.

25 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

1 DR. FITZPATRICK: No.

2 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

3 DR. KLEIN: No.

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

5 DR. LEW: No.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

7 DR. SCHMIDT: No.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Stuver.

9 DR. STUVER: No.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

11 DR. FALLAT: No.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

13 DR. HARVATH: No.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

15 DR. NELSON: No.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon?

17 DR. SIMON: I would abstain.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Results of voting on

19 Question 3. There were 11 no votes and 2

20 abstentions, and the industry representative took

21 an abstention position.

22 DR. VOSTAL: We will move on to Question

23 4.

24 The question reads: Does the committee

25 concur that data derived from FDA's proposed

1 clinical trial design would be appropriate to
2 support clearance of devices for pre-release
3 screening of platelet products for transfusion?

4 DR. NELSON: Discussion?

5 DR. FITZPATRICK: Of the many designs that
6 we were offered, which one would you like us to
7 endorse?

8 DR. VOSTAL: I think the basic concept of
9 whether we should require a clinical trial to
10 evaluate these devices and whether the clinical
11 trial should be of design where you have two
12 cultures and you are looking for agreement between
13 a culture early on in the storage period versus at
14 the end of the storage period.

15 DR. FITZPATRICK: So, would you rephrase
16 your question then?

17 DR. VOSTAL: I guess we could, if you
18 don't like that one.

19 DR. KLEIN: If we answer yes to this, is
20 it pretty nebulous. If you want to know if we
21 think there should be a clinical trial, designed
22 appropriately, I think that is a legitimate
23 question, but it is hard for us to pick the
24 appropriate design at this point from what you are
25 offering.

1 DR. VOSTAL: So, we could change it just
2 to say whether the committee would endorse that a
3 clinical trial is necessary, and the second part of
4 that question would be whether it should be of a
5 design with the two cultures.

6 DR. KLEIN: I think that that would answer
7 the question, and I think if you are going to do
8 it, you need to do it with two cultures. Having
9 said that and as a federal employee who looks at
10 our budgets, I think this is going to be a very
11 large study.

12 I think it is going to take a very long
13 period of time, and I think it is going to be a
14 very expensive study. I look at the culture
15 technology really as a transient technology. We
16 all want something that we can use at the endpoint
17 of issue, and my guess is that in three to five
18 years we are going to have something that we will
19 be able to do. Maybe by the time the study gets
20 done, and we have the results of the study, we
21 won't use this technology.

22 So, having said that I think you need a
23 study in order to license this for that use, and
24 that this study would be appropriate, I wouldn't
25 participate in the study and I wouldn't spend any

1 money on it.

2 DR. ALLEN: Thank you, Harvey, that's a
3 hard one to follow.

4 I certainly am strongly supportive of the
5 general concept. I think very definitely, clinical
6 trials of in-use situation, using real live
7 materials to the extent that that is possible is
8 very helpful to support the evaluation approval of
9 devices for this, as well a variety of other
10 purposes.

11 I think the study designs that were
12 presented were probably the purest in terms of
13 sampling at the beginning and at the end, and maybe
14 at a couple of mid-points, and I in general would
15 be supportive. I am not quite as negative as
16 Harvey on this. I agree that they will be
17 large-scale studies and possibly fairly expensive
18 and difficult to accomplish.

19 I think they could be important even in an
20 area where technology will be evolving rapidly.
21 Nonetheless, I think that the FDA, in terms of
22 putting out trial designs, needs to be flexible,
23 because I don't think that in every instance that
24 you have got to have exactly the same design and
25 all of the bells and whistles.

1 I am supportive of the general concept.
2 We did hear that there were many different clinical
3 trial designs that were proposed, and I would urge
4 flexibility on this, but I think the concept is one
5 that I certainly am supportive of.

6 DR. FALLAT: Am I correct in understanding
7 that one of the outcomes of this would be to get
8 more data on the five- to seven-day platelet
9 release and capability of release, and if so, I
10 would be very much in favor of that sort of study
11 design.

12 DR. VOSTAL: I think that it depends on
13 the intent of the study, whether you want to have
14 your device to be used for extension of the storage
15 period, so that it will be designed to look at day
16 7 platelets.

17 DR. SIMON: I would agree and being
18 supportive of clinical trials and design, but would
19 also agree that this is going to be, the kinds of
20 numbers we are talking about, it is going to be
21 very costly.

22 Unlike Dr. Klein, I would do it if
23 somebody gave me the money, but I think it would be
24 a major task to do. What I am concerned about,
25 because I think it would be advantageous to go to

1 seven-day platelets having done the studies in the
2 '80s to support that before the bacterial
3 contamination issue became in the foreground.

4 I would certainly like to see something
5 done that would support seven-day platelets. From
6 what I am gathering from your comments, somebody
7 would need to do this type of study to get
8 permission to do that extension or to get clearance
9 from the FDA to sell seven-day platelet or to label
10 their platelet product as being good for seven
11 days.

12 I would certainly like us to find a less
13 severe way to get to that point, because what I am
14 afraid is going to happen with AABB instituting a
15 voluntary standard for release of all products, and
16 if the manufacturers see that their devices are
17 being used on a national basis, they may not have
18 an incentive to move to do this type of study.

19 So, I have the same concerns the other
20 members of the committee have, but I certainly am
21 supportive of doing clinical trials. I would hope
22 that we could work through a model that wouldn't be
23 quite as expensive to do.

24 DR. DOPPELT: In regards to the cost, how
25 would this be funded? Would the banks be required

1 to sort of absorb the cost?

2 DR. VOSTAL: I think we would be looking
3 to the manufacturers to sponsor their studies
4 because it will be for their device.

5 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Jim, did you propose a
6 wording change, or it was just kind of--and I tend
7 to agree with you that the idea of a study is
8 something that I am in complete agreement with--but
9 I would say that I am not sure we have the design
10 that has been articulated and that there might be a
11 need for some flexibility?

12 DR. ALLEN: You could perhaps add one
13 word, the FDA's proposed clinical trial design
14 concept.

15 DR. VOSTAL: Sure, that would make it
16 plural.

17 DR. NELSON: Are we ready to vote on this?

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: I need to have the correct
19 wording.

20 DR. VOSTAL: Clinical trial design
21 concepts would be appropriate.

22 DR. DOPPELT: Is part of the proposed
23 study that would give data to extend from five to
24 seven, that is or is not included in the current
25 proposal, because that was one of the four choices,

1 so I just want to be sure what we are voting on.

2 DR. VOSTAL: There are several issues
3 there. One would be having a device for release of
4 platelets up to five days. Another one would be to
5 have a device for release of platelets up to seven
6 days. Or you could have a study that covers both,
7 pushing storage out of seven days.

8 So, I think it depends on what the
9 manufacturers want to have on their label and what
10 kind of study they are willing to sponsor.

11 DR. SIMON: I take it we can take it for
12 granted that somebody who came to you and asked to
13 have extension of platelets to seven days, which I
14 think people like Dr. Aubuchon are doing based on
15 the bacterial detection device, you would not
16 permit that with a culture at 24 days, and you
17 would have to have follow-up studies at seven days.

18 DR. VOSTAL: Right. I mean if you wanted
19 to be able to say that your device is capable of
20 detecting or making sure that you have a
21 culture-negative product at seven days, and you are
22 going to be sampling at 24 hours, we would like to
23 see data that supports that.

24 DR. FITZPATRICK: So, the key to the
25 design of the study and the concept would be that

1 you want a study designed to correlate the time of
2 sampling and the result of that sampling to the
3 bacterial condition of the product at the time of
4 its out-date.

5 DR. VOSTAL: Right.

6 DR. FITZPATRICK: I think I could support
7 that pretty well.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question No. 4 as amended.
9 Does the committee concur that data derived from
10 FDA's proposed clinical trial design concepts would
11 be appropriate to support clearance of devices for
12 pre-release screening of platelet products for
13 transfusion?

14 Roll call. Allen.

15 DR. ALLEN: Yes.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

17 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Yes.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

19 DR. DAVIS: Yes.

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

21 DR. DiMICHELE: Yes.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

23 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

25 DR. FITZPATRICK: Yes.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

2 DR. KLEIN: My answer to the question is
3 yes. My caveats are in the record.

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

5 DR. LEW: Yes.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

7 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Stuver.

9 DR. STUVER: Yes.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

11 DR. FALLAT: Yes.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

13 DR. HARVATH: Yes.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

15 DR. NELSON: Yes.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

17 DR. SIMON: Yes.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of voting for
19 Question No. 4, as amended, is a unanimous yes.

20 DR. NELSON: The next subject is Human
21 Parvovirus B19 NAT Testing for Whole Blood and
22 Source Plasma.

23 Dr. Yu will give an introduction and
24 background.

25 DR. SMALLWOOD: We are now approximately

1 an hour and 23 minutes behind. So, maybe if we
2 move quickly, we may be able to meet our goal of
3 6:30 in completing this. If not, we will have a
4 continued session regarding this discussion at a
5 later meeting that we will announce.

6 II. Human Parvovirus B19 NAT Testing for
7 Whole Blood and Source Plasma

8 A. Introduction and Background

9 Mei-ying W. Yu, Ph.D.

10 DR. YU: Hi. So, now the topics of the
11 discussion is Parvovirus B19 NAT for Whole Blood
12 and Source Plasma.

13 My name is Mei-ying Yu.

14 [Slide.]

15 I will provide the introduction and
16 background and then Dr. Kevin Brown, who is a B19
17 expert from NIH, will present the overview of
18 parvovirus B19 infection. Then, there will be
19 industry data presentations.

20 They will update data presented at the
21 December 2001 FDA NAT Workshop, and they will
22 provide data for NAT sensitivity, testing
23 algorithm, time to resolve to single donations or
24 donors, prevalence and levels of both B19 DNA and
25 anti-B19 antibodies and profile in serial bleeds,

1 if any.

2 The presentations will be made by, first,
3 Dr. Susan Stramer of American Red Cross, and then
4 will be NGI, Dr. Andrew Conrad. However, Dr.
5 Andrew Conrad is sick and he cannot make it here,
6 so I think the committee has all his slides, so
7 there will be no one to present his.

8 Then, there will be consolidated data
9 presentations organized by the PPTA. There are
10 three speakers: Dr. Barbee Whitaker, Dr. Steve
11 Petteway, and Dr. Ed Gomperts.

12 Then, I will come back to address the FDA
13 Perspective and Questions for the Committee.

14 [Slide.]

15 Now, I have a lot of background
16 information I need to cover. We have talked about
17 B19 NAT issues in quite a few meetings. They
18 include the BPAC held in September 1999, FDA NAT
19 Workshops, and NHLBI Parvovirus B19 Workshop both
20 held in December 1999, FDA NAT Workshops held in
21 December 2001 and then the BPAC in this year,
22 March, and another one is the ad hoc PHS Panel
23 Committee Meeting held in July 2002.

24 Parvovirus B19 has been extensively
25 discussed in September of 1999 BPAC. BPAC agreed

1 then that pending a policy on screening whole blood
2 donations, FDA need not require studies to validate
3 the clinical effectiveness of NAT for B19 DNA under
4 IND for plasma for further manufacturing.

5 So, parvovirus B19 NAT was considered as
6 an in-process test, so it is unlike HIV, HCV, and
7 HBV NAT, as a donor screen test, however, BPAC did
8 not recommend resolving to the single donation or
9 donor.

10 For S/D treated pooled plasma, the
11 reactive 20 unit subpools were discarded when tests
12 completed, labile components had expired.

13 [Slide.]

14 At that time, BPAC did recommend to
15 quarantine and destroy in-date units when possible.
16 So, FDA requires that the tests be reviewed under
17 biologic license application--that is called BLA
18 mechanism--for the manufactured product and that
19 the tests be validated as analytical procedures
20 with respect to sensitivity, specificity, and
21 reproducibility.

22 [Slide.]

23 At both the FDA NAT workshops and NHLBI
24 Parvovirus B19 workshop held in December of 1999, a
25 strategy for standardizing B19 NAT was outlined.

1 FDA also proposed a B19 DNA limit that is less than
2 104 geq/per ml for manufacturing pools.

3 This limit was mainly derived from the B19
4 transmission associated S/D treated pool plasma in
5 a Phase 4 study in healthy donors. In those
6 product lots that have less than 104 genome
7 equivalents, no B19 transmission in recipients.
8 These are in zero-negative recipients.

9 The residual virus will be complex or
10 neutralizing by anti-B19, always present in large
11 pooled products, and also the manufacturer
12 procedure, that is our viral clearance procedure to
13 remove the residual B19 infectivity.

14 I want to mention one more point.

15 [Slide.]

16 We subsequently revised the limit. The
17 limit was then set as 104 IU/ml because in year
18 2000, the WHO standard for B19 NAT and CBER working
19 standards for B19 DNA are all available, so we have
20 since then revised the limit to less than 104
21 IU/ml.

22 That limit seems to be technically
23 achievable by most manufacturers.

24 [Slide.]

25 Fractionators are performing high titer

1 B19 minipool NAT screening by in-house methods to
2 lower the viral load in manufacturing pools. In
3 the December 2001 FDA NAT Workshop, we learned
4 that the sensitivity of NAT assay used to exclude
5 donations ranged from 10⁵ to 10⁷ geq/ml. That is
6 per original donation.

7 The reactive minipools are resolved to
8 single donations. Testing results are used to
9 reject reactive donations. Now, today, you will
10 hear more the update by the industry speakers.

11 [Slide.]

12 Establishments collecting whole blood
13 units that are used to prepare the recovered plasma
14 and transfusable blood components would like to
15 implement high titer B19 NAT screening similar to
16 that used by source plasma fractionators.

17 So, Dr. Susan Stramer did present some
18 retrospective data and some study data, and she
19 described the Phase 1 approach that is not resolved
20 to single donations, labile components would have
21 expired, and in Phase 2 approach, that would
22 resolve to the single donations by a free-standing
23 test kit.

24 Now, Dr. Sue Stramer is going to update
25 the data later.

1 [Slide.]

2 In March 2002, BPAC, FDA's current
3 thinking on B19 NAT was presented. The
4 recommendations that FDA is considering are the
5 following. For plasma, when identified, high-titer
6 B19 reactive units should not be used for further
7 manufacturing into injectable products. This is to
8 ensure that the FDA proposed limits less than 104
9 IU of B19 DNA/ml for manufacturing pools can be
10 met.

11 Now, for whole blood, we say when
12 feasible, B19 reactive minipools should be resolved
13 to identify the individual reactive donors prior to
14 release of the component for transfusion, and units
15 from reactive donors should not be used for
16 transfusion.

17 For whole blood, when testing is done
18 subsequent to product release, in-date components
19 from potentially reactive donors should be
20 retrieved and discarded. Even when performing an
21 in-process test, testing and identification of the
22 individual reactive donors constitute medical
23 diagnostic testing, therefore, such testing would
24 require the use of an FDA-approved investigational
25 mechanism.

1 [Slide.]

2 Informed consent should be obtained from
3 blood and plasma donors subject to such high titer
4 NAT testing. Reactive donors should be identified
5 and be informed of their reactive status and be
6 provided with medical counseling.

7 Lastly, because of the transient nature of
8 the infection and rapid involvement of the immune
9 response, such donors would be suitable to donate
10 when they test nonreactive.

11 [Slide.]

12 So, in March 2002, BPAC, the discussion
13 largely focused on the apparent lack of the medical
14 benefits that might justify donor notification, so
15 consequently, FDA convened an ad hoc PHS panel in
16 July of this year.

17 The panel members include Drs. Harvey
18 Klein and Kevin Brown of NIH, Larry Anderson, Mary
19 Chamberland, and Bruce Evatt from the CDC, and CBER
20 representatives.

21 [Slide.]

22 The conclusion by the PHS panels are
23 regarding the donors, there is no medical benefit
24 in identifying high titer B19 NAT-positive donors
25 informing them of their reactive status and

1 providing them medical counseling.

2 Regarding close contacts of the high titer
3 B19 NAT-positive donors, there are potential
4 medical benefits to donors contact especially those
5 at risk, for example, persons with certain anemias,
6 pregnant women, and immune-suppressed or
7 compromised individuals.

8 Now, Dr. Brown will elaborate on these
9 medical benefits later in his talk.

10 [Slide.]

11 So, FDA is taking a stepwise approach in
12 resolving B19 NAT issues concerning whole blood and
13 source plasma. At this meeting, FDA is seeking
14 advice on the issues that are listed here.

15 The need to reduce the risk to transfusion
16 recipients by withholding high titer positive units
17 of whole blood and its components from use. The
18 need to temporarily defer the high titer donors and
19 whether potential benefits to close contacts of B19
20 infected donors warrant notifying high titer
21 donors, and if so, what would be the time frame for
22 notification.

23 Accordingly, we ask four questions.

24 Before you listen to Dr. Brown and industry
25 presentations, I would like you to bear in mind

1 these questions that we are going to ask.

2 [Slide.]

3 First, if donations of whole blood are
4 tested for the presence of human parvovirus B19,
5 are risks to transfusion recipients sufficient to
6 warrant withholding high titer positive units.
7 These are equal or greater than 106 geq/ml from use
8 for transfusion.

9 [Slide.]

10 The second question is, is temporary
11 deferral of positive donors warranted in the
12 setting of: (a) whole blood donation? (b)
13 Apheresis donation?

14 [Slide.]

15 The third question. Do potential medical
16 benefits to contacts of parvovirus B19 infected
17 donors warrant identification and notification of
18 positive donors?

19 [Slide.]

20 Finally, if yes to Question 3, should
21 donor notification be limited to settings where
22 testing and notification can be completed within
23 several weeks of donation?

24 Thank you.

25 DR. NELSON: We will come back to these

1 questions.

2 Dr. Brown.

3 B. Overview of Parvovirus B19 Infection

4 Kevin Brown, M.D.

5 DR. BROWN: I am going to give an overview
6 of parvovirus B19 infection, mainly concentrating
7 on the areas that I think you need to be able to
8 sort of answer the questions that Mei-ying posed to
9 you.

10 [Slide.]

11 So, what is parvovirus B19? It is a
12 small, 22 to 24 nanometer diameter icosahedral
13 virus. These are viruses by immune EM. They are
14 non-enveloped, so solvent detergents don't work too
15 well.

16 They are relatively heat resistant because
17 of the small genome, which is only 5,500
18 nucleotides of single-stranded linear DNA.

19 It has a high conserved genome and up
20 until a few years ago, it was said the variation
21 was less than 2 percent of the DNA level. There
22 have variants that have been described in the last
23 two years, but I am not going to say very much
24 more--I am not going to say anything more about it
25 because they have not been isolated from blood

1 except at extremely rarely, when we found them in
2 liver samples and other people have found them in
3 skin.

4 [Slide.]

5 So, the parvoviruses are divided into
6 three genera. They are the true parvoviruses of
7 which canine parvovirus or porcine parvovirus are
8 members. There are the dependoviruses, also known
9 as the adenoassociated viruses, but B19 comes into
10 the third genera, which are erythroviruses,
11 so-called because they are highly erythrotrophic
12 and they are only known to replicate in erythroid
13 progenitor cells.

14 So, the cells that the virus replicates in
15 are these cells here. The precursors are the red
16 cells, that is, the BFU-E and CFU-E.

17 [Slide.]

18 This is the virus itself. The virus
19 encodes for one non-structural protein and two
20 structural proteins. The two structural proteins
21 are encode VP1 and VP2. VP2 is the major
22 structural protein. It is 58 kilodaltons. There
23 is about 60 copies in the virus.

24 Ninety-five percent of the variant, as I
25 say, is VP2, and you can express this in

1 baculovirus and it self-assembles to form capsids.
2 These VP2 capsids hemagglutinate and it was using
3 this property that was able to go on and show that
4 the receptor for parvovirus B19 is globosidal,
5 known as Blood Group P antigen.

6 The VP1, which is a minor component, has
7 an additional 223 amino acids at the 5-prime end of
8 the VP2. If this is expressed, it does not
9 self-assemble, but it is thought to be the main
10 site of neutralizing epitopes.

11 This is again to show you what the virus
12 looks like, but also to make the point that it is
13 even quite different, not at the DNA level, but
14 even at the structural level, looks quite different
15 from the true parvoviruses.

16 [Slide.]

17 As I said, I was able to show that
18 parvovirus B19 uses globoside, that is a glucose
19 single lipid, demonstrated here as its receptor for
20 viral entry into cells. I was also able to show
21 that individuals that do not have P antigen on
22 their red cells or on their cell surface cannot be
23 infected by B19 either in vivo or in vitro.

24 [Slide.]

25 The discovery at the receptor for B19 does

1 go on to explain a few of the things that we didn't
2 know about B19, a lot of the pathogenesis of which
3 I am not going to say more about it, but globoside
4 is found on erythroblasts, as you would expect. It
5 is found on megakaryocytes, megakaryoblasts,
6 vascular cells, on the cells in the placenta, does
7 cause transplacental infection, which we will come
8 to, and it is found in the thecal hematopoietic
9 cells and myocardial cells.

10 [Slide.]

11 Turning to the epidemiology of the virus,
12 the virus is a very common infection. Everywhere
13 that people have looked, they have been able to
14 find it apart from some isolated communities in
15 South America and Africa.

16 Virtually, all countries where people have
17 looked, 50 percent of adults have B19 antibody with
18 seroconversion happening in childhood and also as
19 young adults. The calculations are that there is
20 an annual seroconversion rate in women in the USA
21 of about 1 percent. That is 1.5 percent per year.

22 [Slide.]

23 It shows classical epidemic behavior, with
24 temperate countries, increased peaks in the spring.
25 It also shows variability between the years, so

1 some years there is a much higher peak of virus
2 than others.

3 Looking at natural infection, the
4 incubation period has been calculated to be between
5 4 and 14 days depending on the presentation of the
6 infection, with a maximum up to 20 days.

7 [Slide.]

8 The major route of the natural infection
9 is by the respiratory route and it is actually
10 fairly infectious. In studies that have been done
11 in susceptible individuals, there is a 50 percent
12 attack rate in household contacts and 25 percent
13 attack rate in schools or nurseries.

14 There also is a high level of viremia and
15 blood products can have virus in them, and you have
16 already heard about how pooled products can be a
17 source of B19 infection, but there are cases of
18 single component, which I am going to come to in a
19 few minutes.

20 [Slide.]

21 The kinetics of B19 infection were really
22 well established by some volunteer studies which
23 were done in the UK in the 1980s. These were all
24 adult volunteers who had different concentrations
25 of virus dripped into their nose. They were then

1 followed to see what would actually happen to them.

2 There were a couple of individuals who had
3 pre-existing antibody to B19. They remained well,
4 there was no viremia, and as I say, they have no
5 symptoms. There were a couple individuals who had
6 low levels, which were called equivocal IgG levels.
7 They had a fever and chills, headache and myalgia,
8 only they didn't develop the second stage
9 infection. They also boosted their antibody
10 response.

11 However, in those that were
12 antibody-negative, and received more than 10⁸
13 genome copies into their nose, they had this
14 typical biphasic illness, so that there was this
15 level which was associated with viremia, with
16 fever, chills, headache, myalgia. At that time,
17 there was a drop in their reticulocyte count, and
18 then a second phase infection which resembled fifth
19 disease as the antibody came up and the virus
20 cleared.

21 However, it is important to note from this
22 that these assays were done really before PCR was
23 well established and the viremia was measured by a
24 dot blot, and the dot blot has a sensitivity of
25 between 10⁵ and 10⁶ genome copies/ml. So, although

1 the viremia could only be measured for about four
2 or five days, the fact that it goes back to normal
3 or back to the zero line doesn't mean to say there
4 is no virus actually present, and that will become
5 relevant in a few minutes.

6 Also, there were no infectious assays
7 performed. It is actually very difficult to grow
8 this virus, and there were no neutralization assays
9 performed, so we don't know whether these
10 antibodies actually are neutralizing or not.

11 [Slide.]

12 The virus can cause a wide range of
13 different disease depending on the host
14 characteristics, and I am just going to go through
15 and illustrate each of these.

16 [Slide.]

17 The majority of infections caused by B19
18 are asymptomatic and it has been estimated between
19 25 percent and 50 percent of infections are
20 asymptomatic even in an outbreak situation.

21 The commonest presentation of B19
22 infection is erythema infectiosum also known as
23 fifth disease, slapped cheek disease because of
24 this characteristic slapped cheek appearance that
25 children get, and also academy rash, because of the

1 outbreaks that are often seen in schools.

2 The prodrome, which is at the time of the
3 viremia, is usually missed or there may be just
4 mild symptoms, and the diagnosis is usually made at
5 the appearance of the rash. In children, it is
6 particularly the slapped cheek on the cheeks. In
7 adults, this stage is usually missed, but then
8 there is a second stage where you get this
9 reticular pattern on the limbs. It comes and goes
10 and pruritis is very common. There is no specific
11 treatment. It is usually a fairly innocuous
12 infection and often the parents are more worried
13 about the rash than the children are about the
14 symptoms.

15 [Slide.]

16 However, in adults, and especially in
17 women for reasons that we don't understand, it is
18 often associated with arthropathy or even a frank
19 arthritis. This is a peripheral distribution
20 especially in the small joints.

21 Again, it can persist for months. It
22 often lasts between two weeks to two months, but
23 can, in fact, last for six months or even up to
24 several years. The problem is that it may resemble
25 acute rheumatoid arthritis, especially as the

1 rheumatoid factor can be positive and also
2 autoantibodies are often present.

3 So, diagnosis, this is B19 as opposed to
4 acute rheumatoid, does have implications especially
5 for the management of these patients. These
6 patients respond to nonsteroidals.

7 [Slide.]

8 The first disease that was associated with
9 parvovirus B19 was transient aplastic crisis, and
10 this was seen in patients with increased red
11 turnover. Basically, there is a transient arrest
12 of erythroid production and in those who have a
13 high erythroid turnover or dependent on that
14 regular erythroid turnover, they develop this
15 aplastic crisis, which was originally described in
16 sickle cell disease, but it can be described, it
17 has been seen in many cases of hemolytic anemia, in
18 fact, any cases where there is increased
19 erythropoiesis including even in acute hemorrhage.

20 Often pronormoblasts, such as are
21 illustrated here, can be seen in the bone marrow,
22 sometimes in the peripheral circulation. It is a
23 self-limiting infection. As soon as the virus
24 clears, which is about four to five days, the
25 antibodies come up.

1 The reticulocytopenia results. There is a
2 single episode in a lifetime, and treatment is
3 supportive to get them through the aplastic crisis.

4 [Slide.]

5 However, in some individuals who can't
6 mount an immune response or can't neutralize the
7 virus, they will go on to develop a persistent B19
8 infection. This is being described in a variety of
9 different cases of congenital immunodeficiency. I
10 am going to illustrate a case of Nezelof's in a
11 minute.

12 In cases with iatrogenic immunodeficiency,
13 such as chemotherapy or immunosuppressed patients,
14 it is also quite commonly seen in patients with
15 AIDS.

16 [Slide.]

17 So, this is a chart with Nezelof's
18 syndrome who had dot blot positive instead of the
19 usual three to four days, actually lasted for many
20 months. This was associated with an anemia and a
21 reticulocytopenia.

22 This was despite the presence of low
23 levels of antibody. There was IgM and IgG present,
24 but the virus was there at high titers.

25 [Slide.]

1 These cases are often very well treated
2 and respond well to commercial immunoglobulin which
3 has high titers of neutralizing antibody. This is
4 a case of a patient with HIV infection who again
5 had high levels of B19 DNA present for many months
6 and was treated here with IVIG. There was a brisk
7 reticulocyte response peaking and then coming down
8 to normal and a response of the hemoglobin, and the
9 virus actually disappears.

10 It is interesting to note at the time that
11 the antibody responds, many of these patients have
12 the symptoms of fifth disease. They have the
13 arthropathy and they also have the rash.

14 [Slide.]

15 The next case I want to talk about is
16 where you have a combined, where you have an
17 immunocompromised or immunosuppressed individual
18 with high erythropoiesis, by which I mean the
19 fetus.

20 In fetal hydrops, there are many, many
21 case reports now in the literature that are very
22 similar. B19 can be found in all the tissues. In
23 some of these cases, this is associated with
24 myocarditis, globoside is actually found in the
25 fetal heart. Some of these spontaneously resolve.

1 [Slide.]

2 This is a combined study again in the UK
3 where they looked to see what the risk of B19 was
4 or the outcome was of confirmed B19 infection in
5 pregnant women. So, this is a stage that the
6 mothers have their B19 infection. You can see there
7 is an increased fetal risk due to B19 infection,
8 particularly in weeks 9 to 20, so the first half of
9 pregnancy. There is an excess of fetal hydrops at
10 this stage.

11 [Slide.]

12 The conclusion of this double study was
13 that both asymptomatic and symptomatic infection is
14 associated with hydrops or fetal loss. There is a
15 mean interval of about six weeks between the
16 maternal infection and the fetal symptoms, but 1 in
17 10 infections, confirmed B19 infections before week
18 20 will result in fetal loss due to B19.

19 The treatment for hydrops, if it is early,
20 and many of these cases have been treated with
21 intrauterine blood transfusion with positive
22 results.

23 There have been no studies that have
24 confirmed congenital abnormalities due to B19.
25 There is a few case reports. We have described

1 three cases of congenital anemia following a
2 maternal B19 infection. Different from what
3 happens with the persistent infection, these
4 congenital anemias did not respond to
5 immunoglobulin treatment.

6 [Slide.]

7 Despite those well attested associations
8 with B19, there are a number of different disease
9 associations that have been described in the
10 literature, often based on PCR results, and some of
11 these are controversial as to whether this is a
12 chance association.

13 Certainly, it is being proposed that B19
14 causes PCH. It definitely causes some cases of
15 hemophagocytic syndrome, ITP, vasculitis, Kawasaki
16 is more questionable, some cases of hepatitis have
17 been ascribed to B19. Recently, particularly in
18 Japan, there is a group that is claiming that B19
19 may cause rheumatoid arthritis.

20 [Slide.]

21 This is returning to the picture that I
22 showed earlier based on the data from the
23 volunteers, which has held up to be fairly good,
24 but as I say, the first studies were done in the
25 absence of PCR, but when PCR is now actually added,

1 instead of actually just being positive for three
2 to four days, the PCR actually remains positive for
3 months, if not years.

4 Again, these studies were done without
5 quantitation, so the question is how high is that
6 virus, is it infectious, and what is it doing. I
7 just want to make the point that the viremia that
8 people talk about in the old literature is
9 associated with this dot blot sensitivity of about
10 10⁶ genome copies/ml.

11 [Slide.]

12 The fact that that virus persists at low
13 level detectable by PCR, it is not really
14 surprising then that when people have gone back and
15 looked in blood donors, you can actually find
16 virus.

17 So, this is not supposed to be exhaustive,
18 but just to show some of the studies where people
19 have looked at healthy blood donors by a variety of
20 different methods, that do have different
21 sensitivities, so it is not surprising that you get
22 different prevalence rates with the highest
23 sensitivity those based on PCR have given you the
24 higher prevalence of the virus.

25 I am going to go and say more about this

1 study by Yoto, but I want to make the point that
2 these samples, 1,000 samples were taken at the time
3 of an outbreak in the community, which is why they
4 are probably higher than some of the other numbers
5 that people have. I could allude to the study by
6 Jordan.

7 [Slide.]

8 The fact that the virus is present, can go
9 up to 10¹², 10¹⁴ genome copies/ml, it can be a
10 problem in pooled products, and all these products,
11 there have been cases in the literature where B19
12 has been said to be transmitted from them.

13 But single components, it is much rarer.
14 There are some case reports, but there are not an
15 awful lot of them.

16 [Slide.]

17 I want to go through some of them, and
18 again this is not exhaustive, but it is supposed to
19 be I think for the solitary. This was actually a
20 study by Yoto, which is the group that did the
21 prevalence of B19 by PCR at the time of an
22 outbreak.

23 That was actually triggered by this case
24 that they found. This was 14-year-old boy who had
25 ALL, who was being well maintained on chemotherapy.

1 He received two units of red cells. They have no
2 additional information on the red cells, so they
3 went back and looked at 1,000 blood units to see
4 what the prevalence of B19 was, but they didn't
5 test these two units.

6 The child actually developed a profound
7 anemia. He actually went on and had a peripheral
8 blood stem cell transplant, was treated with IVIG
9 just as CMV prophylaxis, not actually because they
10 had recognized that he had the B19 infection at
11 that stage, but he had a viremia that lasted for a
12 month.

13 Certainly, I can't imagine that they would
14 have done a stem cell transplant if they had known
15 that he had an acute B19 infection going on at the
16 time, so this was an infection that was missed.

17 [Slide.]

18 This is a second case. This is a
19 22-year-old woman who had thalassemia major
20 diagnosed at the age of 15 months, so had been
21 receiving two units of red cells monthly, so
22 estimated actually received probably about 500
23 units of blood at this point.

24 She again developed a transient aplastic
25 crisis and severe heart failure. It turned out she

1 had received two units of red cells nine days
2 previously, and one of the donors that they were
3 able to show was IgM positive, DNA positive.
4 Unfortunately, there is no information given as to
5 what they mean by "positive."

6 This individual had an invasive esophageal
7 echocardiography, was misdiagnosed as having
8 subacute bacterial endocarditis, treated for a
9 month with antibiotics before they actually
10 realized what the diagnosis was.

11 So, again, a patient that was mistreated
12 because the diagnosis wasn't thought about.

13 [Slide.]

14 This is a third case which was again
15 picked up retrospectively. This was one of the
16 cases that was found by Jordan in that study of
17 looking at the prevalence of B19 in their blood
18 donors.

19 What they did was they identified positive
20 blood donors and then went back to see what
21 happened to the recipients of that blood. One of
22 the individuals had a severe anemia, and this was
23 the individual.

24 This was 49-year-old man who had a liver
25 transplant for chronic HCV. He received one unit

1 of red cells two days post transplant. The donor
2 was IgM negative, IgG negative, but DNA positive.
3 Again, unfortunately, they don't give a titer, but
4 it was strongly positive on their ELISA-based
5 assay.

6 Four months later, he was thought to have
7 recurrent hepatitis, he was found to be anemic,
8 found to have reticulocytopenia, was treated with
9 red cells. B19 wasn't even considered.

10 Eight months later when Jordan contacts
11 them to find out what happened to the recipient of
12 this blood, they find out that he had a B19
13 infection at this stage. He has, in fact,
14 seroconverted. He is IgM positive, IgG positive,
15 B19 and DNA negative.

16 [Slide.]

17 These were the 10 recipients that they
18 were able to follow up on. It is interesting to
19 note that this was the only patient that received
20 B19 DNA positive. Now, as I say, we don't know
21 what they mean by that titer, because they don't
22 actually give a titer. Had B19-like symptoms, so
23 was followed up.

24 Interestingly, this patient was IgM, the
25 donor was IgM negative and IgG negative, so

1 presumably this was an acute B19 infection that the
2 donor had, but was asymptomatic at the time.

3 [Slide.]

4 The last case I want to talk about is a
5 case where there was transmission by platelets.
6 This was a 36-year-old who had CML treated with
7 chemotherapy, received a bone marrow transplant,
8 had been tested before and was shown to be B19 IgG
9 prior to the transplant.

10 Over the next six months, he had
11 increasing anemia and eight months later, B19 was
12 diagnosed. The patient was treated with IVIG.
13 They were able to go back, and he had had blood
14 from 90 donors, and they were able to actually test
15 all of those.

16 Two of them had B19 DNA. One of them,
17 Donor A, it was greater than 106 genome copies/ml.
18 I can say that because it was dot blot positive,
19 and I used to work in this lab and I know the
20 sensitivity of the test that they use.

21 They also sequenced the donor's virus, and
22 he had the same B19 sequence as they found in the
23 patient. There was a second donor that was
24 positive. This had been given prior to the
25 transplant. This had less than 106 genome

1 copies/ml. It was only positive by PCR, not by dot
2 blot.

3 But again this diagnosis was only made
4 eight months after the event.

5 [Slide.]

6 So, what about levels of B19 DNA? As I
7 say, there are not that many studies where people
8 have published where they have looked at actual
9 levels, but this is a group from Italy where they
10 have taken blood.

11 I think it sort of makes the point they
12 divided them into those that were DNA positive, IgM
13 positive, and IgG negative at the early stage, and
14 you can see they have relatively high viremia
15 levels, those who were IgM positive and IgG
16 positive, so within the first couple of months,
17 following an acute B19 infection, lowered, but
18 there are still some that are above this cutoff of
19 10⁶, and then some that were IgG negative and IgG
20 positive, which suggests they had a B19 infection
21 more than two months earlier, and yet one of these
22 individuals had greater than a 10⁶ genome
23 copies/ml.

24 So, the question that I think that we
25 really don't know the answer is although we know

1 that B19 can persist for months even at relatively
2 high titers, if this level of B19 is infectious if
3 it is given as a unit of blood.

4 [Slide.]

5 The problem is that we really don't have
6 the answers to some of these questions. The virus
7 is very difficult to grow in the culture. It can
8 only grow in human bone marrow explants or thecal
9 livers as a source of hematopoietic cells.

10 There are a few cell lines that have been
11 described, but they really aren't that highly
12 permissive. You can detect virus either by looking
13 for inhibition of colonies, but it is very
14 insensitive looking by immunofluorescence for
15 capsid proteins or NS proteins.

16 Some people have described in real-time
17 PCR looking for DNA increase. We prefer to use
18 RT-PCR looking for viral transcripts to distinguish
19 replication RNA from viral DNA.

20 [Slide.]

21 I put this slide on really just to
22 illustrate that even if you have an infection
23 assay, this is using different concentrations of
24 virus at three different cell lines that are said
25 to be explicit for B19.

1 In the most highly sensitive, you can
2 detect down to 104, 103 genome copies per ml, but
3 in another cell line, you can't really detect
4 anything even at 106, so even the cell lines
5 themselves have problems in their sensitivity as to
6 what you call infectious, and there is obviously
7 limits to how much virus you can actually put in
8 there.

9 [Slide.]

10 So, coming back to the FDA questions, who
11 is at risk of parvovirus B19? Well, you could
12 argue anybody who is seronegative is at risk of B19
13 infection, but fifth disease is a relatively
14 innocuous disease and apart from the problems with
15 arthritis or arthropathy, the main problems in
16 these patient that have increased erythropoiesis,
17 patients who are immunosuppressed or
18 immunocompromised, and the pregnant woman and the
19 fetus.

20 By definition, these aren't going to be
21 your blood donors, but they may well be your
22 contacts of your blood donors.

23 [Slide.]

24 Is there any way that we can prevent B19?
25 Well, there is a vaccine that is in Phase 1 trials,

1 but it is going to be several years at the least
2 before we actually have a vaccine.

3 What about passive immunotherapy? The
4 only thing that we have is IVIG, we don't have any
5 antivirals that we know work for B19. Again, you
6 have got the problem with the time interval. If
7 you are trying to actually stop the viremia, you
8 have got four days to actually do anything about
9 it. So, time is limited.

10 [Slide.]

11 This is my last slide. This again shows
12 the time course of B19. What I tried to do here
13 was to put when you expect to see the symptoms at
14 the different risk presentations.

15 So, the transient aplastic crisis is
16 really at day sort of 4 to 7 following your
17 infectious exposure. You have not got a lot of
18 time to do anything there. The persistent anemia
19 starts probably just about the same time, but lasts
20 actually months, so even with the late
21 notification, you might actually be able to go in
22 and make a difference.

23 The fifth disease is usually at about sort
24 of 21 days, but the arthropathy can last for
25 several months.

1 So, what are the benefits of notification?

2 Well, you might be able to intervene. I did
3 mention pregnancy, but certainly in the pregnant
4 woman, you might be able to monitor and see what is
5 happening.

6 I think it is important for accurate
7 diagnosis and may be important for treatment
8 especially chronic infection and also for the
9 monitoring of pregnant women who might be at risk
10 of hydrops.

11 Thank you.

12 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Brown.

13 Questions? Mary.

14 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Thank you for that nice
15 presentation. I had a question. It seemed, and I
16 am sure this will come up in the discussion again,
17 that the benefits of notification are going to be
18 not so much with respect to the donor, but the
19 close contact.

20 That is clearly going to probably be
21 linked to the period of time over which
22 notification can take place after the unit has been
23 tested.

24 In your review article, which was
25 distributed to the committee, under Transmission,

1 it is stated that the case-to-case interval is 6 to
2 11 days irrespective of the type of B19 related
3 disease.

4 Now, if I understand that correctly, it
5 would suggest that let's say in a typical household
6 setting, a contact setting, that there is really a
7 fairly limited period of time in which you would
8 have to, if you will, inform a donor and
9 potentially interdict subsequent transmission.

10 Sort of tying that in with the other
11 comment in your slide, you say the slide that
12 looked at the titers of B19 DNA relative to IgM and
13 IgG, you ask the question is this level of B19
14 infectious if given as a unit of blood.

15 Actually, I think the sort of
16 complementary question is, is this level of B19
17 infectious through the traditional respiratory
18 route.

19 I am just wondering if you could comment
20 on that because I was quite struck by this
21 statement in your article about this fairly tight
22 time period.

23 DR. BROWN: It seems to have held us in
24 sort of fairly good stead, this sort of
25 illustration, because this time of the viremia does

1 seem to correlate well to the time of
2 infectiousness in close contacts. So, this seems
3 to be, as I say, a very good estimate.

4 So, as soon as the IgM and especially the
5 IgG starts to come up, then, you don't actually see
6 exposures continuing to happen.

7 Maybe that sentence is a bit ambiguous.
8 There is a slight difference in the time between
9 exposure and the disease itself, because the
10 transient aplastic crisis will appear earlier,
11 which is the first phase. If you are looking for
12 fifth disease, it's the second stage, and you see
13 the viremic stage is missed, so that usually sort
14 of comes up a little bit later. So, that is why
15 you have quite a wide range, but the infectious
16 time is actually very tight exactly.

17 DR. SIMON: If I put that in practical
18 terms, so if we detected someone, and I gather that
19 fairly insensitive techniques are being used
20 because we are looking for high titer, so we would
21 be likely to detect someone at about day 7 time
22 frame. So, the infectious period, you are going
23 back to day zero when you say 6 to 11 days?

24 DR. BROWN: Yes, these numbers are based
25 on having high titer virus dripped into your nose,

1 which is not really an every-day occurrence and
2 probably doesn't mimic what is happening either if
3 you get a unit of infected blood or if you are
4 living with somebody who is actually copping the
5 virus out.

6 DR. SIMON: So, unless we could get to
7 that donor within four or five days, it probably
8 would not have much utility.

9 DR. BROWN: Exactly. That is what I was
10 sort of trying to get to here. If you actually
11 want to actually go in and actually intervene
12 before this viremic stage, you have got a very,
13 vary narrow time cap, and I am not sure, quite
14 frankly, that it is realistic.

15 However, if you are trying to actually go
16 in and do something about patients who have
17 persistent anemia, now, you have got a much longer
18 time because they are being viremic, but they will
19 continue to be having symptoms, and they would
20 actually do well with actually being treated even
21 if it quite a bit later on in their disease.

22 DR. SIMON: Treated with what?

23 DR. BROWN: The only treatment that we
24 have is IVIG, and it actually works very well, as
25 in the HIV case.

1 DR. SIMON: I am told by our expert that
2 it is considered experimental therapy. I know it's
3 off label and that not everyone accepts that it is
4 beneficial particularly if you don't know the titer
5 of parvovirus antibody in the preparation.

6 DR. BROWN: It is the only treatment that
7 is available, there is nothing else. So, I think
8 when people have actually looked for neutralizing
9 antibodies in most commercial sources of IVIG, they
10 are actually at high titers. I don't know if
11 anybody else wants to comment on that.

12 DR. WU: I think we ought to let other
13 industry presenters to present and maybe they have
14 some data, and if not, we do have some data that we
15 can present later on to shed that light.

16 DR. DiMICHELE: I was really surprised to
17 see the number of people who get infected in middle
18 age and beyond. Is there any difference in the
19 morbidity from this infection in the middle age and
20 older age population compared to the younger
21 population?

22 DR. BROWN: None that I am aware of other
23 than the fact that women, and it doesn't seem to be
24 particularly old or young, but certainly from 20 up
25 would seem to be more likely to have the

1 arthropathy and the arthritis, but otherwise, there
2 doesn't appear to be any difference if you get your
3 B19 when you are 80 as opposed to when you are 20.

4 If you get it when you are 8, you will
5 probably have less symptoms and you will have the
6 slapped cheek. That is all I can say.

7 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Brown.

8 Dr. Stramer.

9 C. Industry Data Presentations

10 American Red Cross

11 Susan Stramer, Ph.D.

12 DR. STRAMER: Thank you very much.

13 This is a compilation of several
14 presentations. Firstly, most of the data that I
15 will present were presented at the AABB last year,
16 then presented as Dr. Yu referenced, at the
17 December 2001 FDA NAT Workshop, and I have added
18 some new data and comments at the request of FDA.

19 I also want to mention that I am not only
20 discussing B19, but I will be making some remarks
21 about hepatitis A virus, because we really can't
22 separate the two as we are trying to screen our
23 plasma derivatives for nonenveloped viruses. Parvo
24 is one, but so is HAV.

25 So, my presentation is contaminated with

1 some HAV material, and I will try to limit those
2 remarks.

3 [Slide.]

4 As we have heard, manufacturers of plasma
5 derivatives have implemented NAT for nonenveloped
6 viruses and such testing will likely be implemented
7 for recovered plasma.

8 Most parvovirus B19 NAT programs target
9 the elimination of equal to or greater than 1
10 million copies/ml as already referenced by Dr. Yu.

11 Studies of HAV and B19 frequencies in
12 recovered plasma are limited. Dodd and coworkers
13 at the 1997 AABB reported some results from
14 screening pools of 512 at NGI, and those results,
15 we had zero positives for HAV out of 20,000
16 donations screened, but a frequency of 1 in 1,400
17 for B19. This was using a very sensitive test and
18 as Dr. Brown referenced, the prevalence is very
19 dependent on the sensitivity of the test that is
20 used.

21 [Slide.]

22 Dr. Yu also mentioned solvent detergent
23 treated plasma and through the three-year
24 experience that has been reported at Vitex for NAT
25 screening of S/D plasma and final product, which is

1 2,500 donations, and that is at NGI for HAV, or by
2 their in-house testing for B19.

3 Now, they may screen pools of 100 that are
4 comprised of five subpools of 20, and if a pool of
5 100 is found positive, they resolve to the subpool
6 of 20, and if that subpool of 20 was found
7 positive, they discarded all 20 individual units.

8 But from their testing, their frequency
9 for HAV was about 1.5 million, and about 1 in 800
10 for B19 DNA. When we started to think about
11 developing programs for B19, we tried to recover
12 some of these positive units prior to discard, such
13 that we could research the frequency of B19, the
14 titers of B19, and try to get in-house some
15 positive materials.

16 So, what we were provided was greater than
17 1,000 units, and we have tested these representing
18 20 positive subpools of 20, but to our surprise, of
19 those subpools that we tested, the individual units
20 comprising those subpools, only 23 of greater than
21 1,000 units tested were B19 positive at NGI using a
22 standard test. Those were from 16 subpools.

23 So, of the 72 subpools tested, only 16
24 were positive. That indicated that we had a 77
25 percent false positive minipool test result using

1 the sensitivity of the Vitex procedure.

2 [Slide.]

3 When I presented these data at AABB and at
4 the FDA NAT Workshop, we only had a couple of
5 positives identified to that point, and this again
6 supports the data presented by the earlier
7 speakers.

8 Here, you can see, even though these are
9 separate units, if you align these by titer, and
10 then you look at the IgM and the IgG concentrations
11 or presence of those two antibodies, you can see
12 that only in this very high titer positive unit
13 there is no IgM or an IgG. Those that had lower
14 titers had the presence of IgM. As titers
15 decreased, IgM disappeared and then all were
16 positive for IgG.

17 [Slide.]

18 For the 23 that we have identified at the
19 conclusion of the study, we haven't completed the
20 IgM and IgG testing, but I just present to you the
21 titers of the positives of these 23 that we found.

22 You can see only five here of three years
23 of Vitex screening, only five represented very high
24 titer units. The rest were lower titers and they
25 do what you would expect here, maybe had a mix of

1 IgM, IgG, and perhaps some of these represented
2 further contamination as 5 of 16 of these pools
3 that contained these positives, contained multiple
4 low level positives suggestive of contamination.

5 [Slide.]

6 So, from the Vitex studies, we know that
7 HAV was infrequent, B19 NAT false positivity may be
8 an occurrence that we have to deal with, especially
9 when you are dealing with very high titer units.

10 Low level B19 DNA positive, IgG positive
11 samples do occur, and individuals with early acute
12 B19 infection have high viral titers and are likely
13 to be IgG negative.

14 [Slide.]

15 So, in order to prepare for some type of
16 screening program, which I should have said at the
17 onset we are not yet doing anything for parvo. We
18 have done a couple of pilot studies, and I am going
19 to present results from two of those.

20 We did the first study with NGI, and it
21 was an unlinked study to determine the frequency of
22 HAV and B19 in recovered plasma. The testing was
23 done from our surplus NAT negative tubes for HIV
24 and HCV our NAT negative PPTs that were sent to
25 NGI. Once at NGI, they were pooled and tested.

1 The testing used at NGI, and NGI won't be
2 here to present, they use a four-test reaction for
3 both HAV and B19. That is two different primer
4 pairs that they run each in duplicate. So, each of
5 the four tests, all four tests have to be negative
6 for them to report out a negative result. If any
7 of the primers or replicates to primers is
8 reactive, it is considered a reactive.

9 So, we took a half million donations that
10 we sent to NGI. They were pooled into 100 pools of
11 512, which is the standard matrix that NGI uses for
12 pooling. We tested HAV without dilution and if
13 there was a positive result, we would resolve to
14 the individual donation and quantify.

15 For B19, NGI's standard algorithm is to
16 take the pools of 512, perform a 1 to 1,000
17 dilution, and then test. So if we had a positive
18 pool, we then would resolve to the individual
19 donation, quantify, and look for antibody.

20 One point that we added to the study is if
21 a pool was negative at 1 to 1,000 dilution, we
22 wanted to see what would be in those pools that
23 they were tested undiluted. So, 1 to 1,000
24 dilution negative was further tested NEET.

25 NEET, that is the 512 pool was tested

1 without dilution, and if that was positive, the
2 same thing. Resolve to individual donation,
3 quantified, and IgM and IgG testing performed.

4 I do want to comment because this is in
5 your materials from NGI, that the sensitivity of
6 the testing that we used at NGI was 20 copies/ml,
7 actually 22.4 to be exact, and that is what is in
8 NGI's presentation.

9 If you then multiply that by a pool of
10 512, multiply that by 1 to 1,000 dilution, you get
11 a sensitivity for the donation of 1.2 times 10^7 , so
12 this is where we get the greater than or
13 approximately equal to 10^6 , but this is the
14 sensitivity of the NGI test.

15 [Slide.]

16 So, the results. For HAV, these were
17 easy. They were all negative. For B19 in
18 performance of the 1 to 1,000 dilution, we had 3
19 positive pools including 4 positive donations. Two
20 of the positive donations occurred in the same
21 pool. So, the 4 positives gives you a frequency in
22 the study of 1 in 12,800.

23 These are the 4 positives, the IgM
24 present, results of IgM testing. All were IgG
25 negative as you would expect from relatively high

1 titers especially in these two. No quantifiable
2 IgG.

3 One of the high titer ones was IgM
4 positive, and one of the lower titers was also IgM
5 positive. Interestingly enough, these two were
6 detected even though they were below the limit of
7 sensitivity of the tests we were using, perhaps
8 being in the same pool, there was some additive
9 effect.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, when we took the remaining 97 pools
12 that were negative at 1 to 1,000 dilution and ran
13 them without the 1 to 1,000 dilution, we had an
14 additional 34 positive pools including 95 positive
15 donations, which gave us really an unacceptable
16 yield of 1 in 528.

17 Again, if you look at the titer of the
18 samples found, IgM, IgG presence, and then this is
19 the number of samples within these various titers,
20 you see there are some high titer samples, actually
21 1, that probably should have been detected at the 1
22 to 1,000 dilution but wasn't, and that one was IgM
23 positive, and plus/minus for IgG.

24 The lower titers had IgM as you expect,
25 but also had IgG. The lower titer samples had a

1 mix of IgM and again most of them have IgG.

2 [Slide.]

3 We did a similar study with GenProbe
4 because since we are talking about a Phase 1 and
5 Phase 2 approach, the NGI would represent the Phase
6 1 approach where samples would be sent out for
7 testing, but we recognize in the future that
8 in-house testing may occur, so we wanted to look at
9 the GenProbe test.

10 So, what we did is we took NAT negative
11 pools, pools of 16, about 2,500 of them, and
12 representing April collections, and I should have
13 said in the NGI study that I showed previously,
14 those also represented springtime collections, and
15 that is important because it is the highest time of
16 reported parvovirus prevalence.

17 This represented about 40,000 donations.
18 They were tested at GenProbe using a combination
19 test for B19 and HAV, that had about 600 copies/ml
20 test sensitivity. This was about 100 percent
21 detection level, which in our pools of 16, was
22 about 9,600.

23 Of those 2,547 pools tested, 24, just
24 under 1 percent of these pools of 16 were reactive
25 for B19. There were no reactives for HAV once

1 again. If we assume that there was one B19
2 positive donation per reactive pool of 16, that
3 would give us a prevalence of the sensitivity that
4 we were using this test at 1 in 1,700 versus what I
5 showed you for the NGI study, which used a less
6 sensitive procedure, of 1 in 12,800. So, in this
7 case, it was 7-fold higher.

8 If you look at product loss, because again
9 at a pool of 16, if we have a positive, we have to
10 discard all products, due to discard of all members
11 of a reactive pool when dealing with 16, would be
12 about 1 in 100, which is unacceptable.

13 Based on the distribution of quantitative
14 results for those 24 positive pools, the addition
15 of the ones with 1,000 pre-dilution, which is what
16 NGI does, would result in a prevalence that was
17 comparable to NGI, of 1 in 13,000.

18 [Slide.]

19 If you look at the titers of the 24
20 positives that we got in the study, the vast
21 majority would be expected to be below the limit of
22 detection of the GenProbe test in the pool setting,
23 so those are unexplainable findings or due to
24 contamination, which is likely the outcome.

25 Here are some moderate level positives

1 that were detected. We don't have antibody signal
2 results on these. Again, we have 3, these are the 3
3 high titer positive samples.

4 [Slide.]

5 Currently, we are also doing--this is
6 moving on to something else--we are doing
7 manufacturing pool testing. That is where many
8 recovered plasma units are pooled, approximately
9 3,250 liters, and these manufacturing pools are
10 tested for virus prior to final manufacturing.

11 I don't want to dwell on this because this
12 is HAV, but again it shows you the type of result
13 output that you get from NGI. This is audio
14 radiogram, and I said that NGI performs two primer
15 pairs, they do them in duplicate, so here you see a
16 set of four results.

17 Lanes, all one are their positive
18 controls, 17 through 19 are all positives, so this
19 one they didn't have a positive. I mean there are
20 certain criteria, and these all met the validity
21 criteria.

22 But here you have an unknown and you can
23 see here that it may not be positive on all of the
24 four rafts, but in this case, it certainly was
25 positive on three, constituting a positive result.

1 So, that shows you the type of data output one
2 would get.

3 [Slide.]

4 So, the conclusions from the presented
5 studies is that blood collectors considering
6 implementation of B19 screening will have to
7 evaluate NAT methods that are relatively
8 insensitive to prevent issues from contamination
9 and detection of low level NAT positives.

10 The frequencies that I showed were 1 in
11 12,800 using the insensitive method at NGI. If you
12 consider only the two very high titer positives we
13 had, the frequency is 1 in 25,600, and those were
14 IgG negative.

15 The frequency, if we increase the
16 sensitivity, was 1 in 528 with moderate titer
17 samples that were plus/minus for IgG, but positive
18 for IgM. Now, if you compare the GenProbe methods,
19 we could get comparable results depending on
20 whether we do a dilution, which would yield a 1 to
21 13,500 result, or 1 in 1,700 frequency if we used
22 their sensitive method.

23 [Slide.]

24 High-titer screening methods may not
25 capture all infections B19 positive units, however,

1 the infectivity of antibody reactive, low-titer
2 positives is unknown, as has already been
3 referenced.

4 This study defines expected yields of B19
5 if sensitive and insensitive NAT methods are used.

6 This study also demonstrates the
7 infrequent occurrence of HAV in recovered plasma,
8 which is about 1.5 million to a million.

9 [Slide.]

10 So, where does that leave us? It leaves
11 us with a discussion of Phase 1 and Phase 2, and I
12 will try to answer some of the FDA's questions
13 here.

14 One mechanism to do Phase 1 testing that
15 the Red Cross will likely implement is the method
16 with NGI where we would outsource the testing to
17 NGI, and the process time for the testing would
18 exceed the dating of labile components.

19 So, by the time we got test results, the
20 only thing we would have are frozen components.

21 [Slide.]

22 Now, how do we limit this, so we are only
23 dealing with recovered plasma, and not the issues
24 surrounding FFP?

25 Following the completion of our current

1 HIV and HCV NAT testing, we would take our NAT
2 tubes and identify those that correspond to
3 recovered plasma. Those recovered plasma tubes
4 would be pooled into pools of 16. They would be
5 sent to NGI for further pooling, into pools of 512.

6 NGI would test for HAV and parvovirus,
7 following a 1 to 1,000 dilution for the parvovirus.
8 If negative, the product with the plasma would be
9 fractionated. If positive, we would resolve to the
10 pool of 16, and all in-date frozen products would
11 be discarded, and the good news here is that we
12 wouldn't have any FFP because they were never
13 tested to begin with.

14 So, the question is then how do we address
15 Phase 2, which would be testing in-house using a
16 commercial kit. This would represent real-time
17 testing in pools. Most likely in our scenario at
18 the Red Cross, we would maintain our current pools
19 of 16, and as I mentioned with the GenProbe
20 procedure, we could do a pre-dilution step as part
21 of the assay, whether that is a 1 to 1,000 dilution
22 to reach about a 10⁷ copy/ml per donation level or
23 1 to 100 dilution, so we get to 10⁶. That remains
24 to be determined.

25 Reactives would be resolved to the

1 individual donation within real time. So, what
2 does that mean? For product release, in reactive
3 pool resolution, for the latter involving usually 3
4 rounds of testing, we have anywhere from about a 10
5 to a 48 hour per donation turnaround time, and that
6 is really based on our current NAT testing now.

7 If pools are negative, our turnaround time
8 is about 10 hours. If a pool is reactive,
9 requiring resolution testing, and then if it is a
10 multiplexed test, discriminatory testing, final
11 results may not be available for 24 to 48 hours.
12 So, this really represents the range of when
13 results are available. In this model, no product
14 release would occur unless the units not only test
15 HIV/HCV negative, and in the future West Nile, but
16 also HAV and B19 negative.

17 [Slide.]

18 The B19 sensitivity level would initially
19 be set for the removal of high-titer units that is
20 greater than 10⁶ copies/ml. We really couldn't
21 make claims for labile products because we are not
22 removing all parvo, we are just removing high-titer
23 units.

24 Really, again, as reference, we would
25 really need to determine the needs for recipients

1 of labile products, what the level of sensitivity
2 should be, who should receive these products, et
3 cetera.

4 Donor notification, management of products
5 from NAT-reactive donors' previous donations and
6 recipient tracing, which we hope won't have to
7 occur, would have to be determined. But regarding
8 donor notification, as has been addressed in the
9 questions from Dr. Brown's presentation, is our
10 time required for donor notification, varies by the
11 marker, but it is generally two to three weeks and
12 for some markers where we outsource supplemental
13 testing, it may take the full 56 days or up to 8
14 weeks.

15 Our timeline for any type of Phase 2
16 implementation is dependent on the regulatory
17 policies that FDA mandates, availability of test
18 kits, and I didn't even list here all of the
19 implementation issues, such as those outlined for
20 West Nile virus.

21 Thank you.

22 DR. NELSON: Thank you, Dr. Stramer.

23 DR. SCHMIDT: What is NGI?

24 DR. STRAMER: Oh, I am sorry, National
25 Genetics Institute. They are a clinical reference

1 lab.

2 DR. SCHMIDT: Thank you.

3 DR. STRAMER: I was hoping to get a more
4 challenging question than that.

5 DR. SCHMIDT: I thought maybe it was a new
6 disease.

7 [Laughter.]

8 DR. STRAMER: It could be.

9 DR. NELSON: Actually, ironically, they
10 were supposed to present next, but I understand Dr.
11 Conrad isn't here.

12 DR. STRAMER: I tried to address two
13 points in his talk because he presented differing
14 sensitivity, but it is actually the same test at 20
15 copies/ml, pools of 512, and a 1 to 1,000 dilution.
16 According to my \$1.99 calculator, that comes out to
17 1.2 times 10⁷, and I did it twice to verify my
18 initial results, so it is about 10⁷ sensitivity for
19 their method.

20 DR. FALLAT: You have presented a lot of
21 data and threw out an awful lot of numbers. Can
22 you simplify it for me? What do you think is the
23 best estimate from your large sample size of the
24 general incidence of this virus in donor pools? I
25 see numbers from 1 to 500 to 1 in 25,000, and what

1 is the best number?

2 DR. STRAMER: Using sensitivity that I
3 think is reasonable to eliminate the high titer
4 units, I think we will wind up with a prevalence
5 between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 15,000.

6 Now, if a cutoff of 106 or 107 is
7 adequate, that is what the prevalence would be. If
8 we dropped the cutoff, then, we are dealing with
9 considerably different numbers.

10 DR. NELSON: Next, from the plasma
11 industry, Barbee Whitaker.

12 Fractionators/PPTA
13 Barbee Whitaker, Ph.D.

14 DR. WHITAKER: Good afternoon. Thank you
15 for the opportunity to present the PPTA approach to
16 reducing parvovirus B19 load in fractionation
17 pools.

18 I would like to mention that there have
19 been a few changes to the slides that were
20 distributed to the committee last week, and that
21 you should have the current version, the version I
22 am presenting now in front of you.

23 I would also like to mention that we have
24 three presentations as a part of our industry
25 presentation and I would like to respectfully

1 request that you hold questions until the end
2 because it's a comprehensive presentation. Thank
3 you.

4 [Slide.]

5 PPTA is the international trade
6 association and standard-setting organization for
7 the world's major producers of plasma derived in
8 recombinant analogue therapies. Our members
9 provide 60 percent of the world's needs for source
10 plasma and protein therapies. These include
11 clotting therapies, immune globulins, and alpha-1
12 antitrypsin among other products.

13 PPTA members are committed to assuring the
14 safety and availability of these medically needed
15 life-sustaining therapies.

16 [Slide.]

17 Although transmission of parvovirus B19 is
18 uncommon through plasma therapies, PPTA recognized
19 the particular vulnerability of specific therapy
20 recipients including pregnant women and
21 immunocompromised individuals. The industry opted
22 to pursue a strategy of identification and removal
23 of high-titer units as described already.

24 About the same time that we were looking
25 at this, based on experiences observed with the

1 solvent detergent treated plasma for transfusion,
2 FDA encouraged the fractionation industry to limit
3 viral loads in manufacturing pools.

4 About a year later, in 2000, the European
5 Medicinal Evaluation Agency, the EMEA, held a
6 workshop to address viral safety of nonenveloped
7 viruses. It was concluded that given the current
8 extent of knowledge, further introduction of
9 regulatory requirements should be carefully
10 considered, and to date, there have been no further
11 meetings on this subject.

12 Also, in 2000, the WHO released an
13 International Laboratory standard for parvovirus
14 B19, allowing the standardization of various
15 laboratory tests particularly NAT.

16 PPTA released its voluntary industry
17 standard for the management of parvovirus B19 in
18 mid-2001. This standard is one of five critical
19 standards in PPTA's Quality Standards of Leadership
20 Excellence and Assurance Program.

21 The goal of our Standards Program is to
22 enhance the margin of safety and quality of each
23 and every product that reaches our consumers.

24 [Slide.]

25 PPTA's parvovirus B19 standard requires

1 in-process control testing of incoming source
2 plasma by NAT for parvovirus B19 DNA. Plasma that
3 would result in a manufacturing pool exceeding 105
4 International Units/ml is removed.

5 Effective July 1st, 2002, manufacturing
6 pools may not exceed 105 IU parvovirus B19 DNA/ml.

7 PPTA's standard is designed to enhance the
8 safety of the finished product and is based upon
9 the recommendations of the September 1999 Blood
10 Products Advisory Committee specifically and
11 described by Mei-ying a little bit earlier.

12 The recommendation to treat parvovirus B19
13 is an in-process control that no studies were
14 required to validate clinical efficacy of B19 NAT
15 under IND for plasma for further manufacture. The
16 validation should proceed as an analytical test
17 only and that no clinical correlates were necessary
18 if no decisions regarding donor or recipient
19 management were taken.

20 [Slide.]

21 As Dr. Yu has described, FDA has requested
22 additional data regarding specific industry
23 practices, and I would like to introduce Dr. Steve
24 Petteway of Bayer Biological Products, who will
25 walk you through the requested data.

1 [Slide.]

2 As agreed with FDA, industry data will be
3 presented in an anonymized fashion. Companies
4 represented are as follows: Alpha Therapeutic
5 Corporation, Aventis Behring, Baxter BioScience,
6 and Bayer Biological Products.

7 Following Dr. Petteway's presentation, Dr.
8 Edward Gomperts of Baxter BioScience will present
9 the potential impact of donor notification.

10 Thank you.

11 Stephen R. Petteway, Jr.

12 DR. PETTEWAY: Thanks.

13 The FDA has requested that we provide an
14 update for our in-process control testing of source
15 plasma for parvovirus B19, but before I do that, I
16 want to address the FDA issues that are specific
17 here from testing algorithm through to profiles for
18 B19 serial bleeds. I will address those. I think
19 that you have them in front of you.

20 [Slide.]

21 However, before I do that, I want to
22 remind everyone that pathogen safety is a
23 comprehensive approach with effective redundant
24 measures that provide a high margin of safety.

25 Beginning with the donor, with donor

1 screening, management of donations, and management
2 through testing donations and inventory hold and
3 lookback, followed by manufacturing and
4 specifically the management of plasma or
5 manufacturing pools, coupled with virus
6 inactivation and removal, and this coupling is very
7 important in the whole safety profile.

8 Then, moving through the process ending
9 with postmarketing surveillance in support of our
10 patients.

11 [Slide.]

12 Specifically for parvovirus B19
13 management, we focus on two of these manufacturing
14 safeguards, the plasma or manufacturing pool, and
15 in-process control of the plasma manufacturing pool
16 again coupled with virus inactivation and virus
17 removal through the purification and manufacturing
18 processes.

19 I think to understand the value of this
20 in-process test method that we have implemented,
21 understanding the link between these two is
22 critical.

23 [Slide.]

24 Prior to implementation of our testing
25 paradigm, no plasm units were tested for B19. This

1 resulted in manufacturing or production pools that
2 ranged from 101 to 109 International Units/ml,
3 followed by process viral reduction gave us a
4 defined margin of safety, however, after
5 implementation, high-titer units are identified
6 through minipool testing and removed, now providing
7 production or manufacturing pools with a titer of
8 105 International Units/ml when coupled with the
9 same process viral reduction lead to an increased
10 margin of safety.

11 That is really the target of this testing
12 is increasing the margin of safety.

13 [Slide.]

14 To address the first issue that we were
15 asked to address, the NAT sensitivities for
16 minipool testing and original units, what we are
17 presenting is targeted testing threshold for
18 minipool testing as opposed to analytical
19 sensitivity.

20 [Slide.]

21 The reason for that is that the
22 sensitivities required to achieve reduced
23 manufacturing pool loads are a function of minipool
24 size and the manufacturing pool size. They are a
25 volume factor. So, the differences in the size of

1 the minipools i.e., the volume or the manufacturing
2 pool greatly influence what this targeted cutoff
3 is.

4 Minipool and manufacturing pool sizes vary
5 across the industry. Therefore, each manufacturer
6 has set the testing threshold based on the size of
7 minipools and manufacturing pools to achieve the
8 PPTA standard. That is why you see different
9 threshold levels from company to company.

10 [Slide.]

11 The targeted threshold levels for original
12 units we have calculated for you here because we
13 don't actually test the original units. We
14 back-extrapolated from the minipools. We remind
15 you again that each manufacturer has set the
16 testing threshold based on the size of the minipool
17 and the manufacturing pool, and the goal is to
18 achieve the PPTA voluntary standard.

19 You can see the differences, 5 times 105
20 to up to 107, and it's a volume related issue.

21 [Slide.]

22 So, minipools that are reactive and based
23 on the targeted threshold are assessed and units
24 are released or discarded based on individual
25 company processes for carrying out that activity.

1 [Slide.]

2 Looking at the prevalence and levels of
3 B19 DNA in minipools, as you can see, they range
4 from 1 in 3 minipools down to 1 in 40 minipools.
5 Of course, this is because the frequency in
6 minipools is influenced by the size of the minipool
7 and it varies across the industry.

8 [Slide.]

9 The B19 DNA levels can range up to 1011
10 International Units/ml depending, of course, on the
11 titer and the donation.

12 [Slide.]

13 The next issue is the prevalence of
14 reactive minipools, original units, manufacturing
15 pools, and the levels of B19 DNA in each, and we
16 will attempt to provide that for you.

17 [Slide.]

18 The frequency and levels of B19 DNA in
19 original donations. What we are showing here is
20 the frequency of discarded units, that is, in the
21 testing paradigm, because of the logistics of
22 testing, all the units that we discard are not
23 necessarily greater than the threshold, so what you
24 are seeing is the units that we actually discard.

25 It ranges from 1 in 2,000 to 1 in 5,000,

1 and you can see that it correlates with the
2 threshold, and some companies have a lower
3 threshold than other companies have for identifying
4 and dealing with units.

5 [Slide.]

6 For B19 DNA in manufacturing pools, I
7 think this is a very important slide and pretty
8 graphically illustrates the whole point of this
9 testing and what we gain from it and the value of
10 it.

11 Prior to B19 in-process testing, this
12 represents, each line, each data point represents
13 the titer in a manufacturing pool and you can see
14 that many manufacturing pools have titers as high
15 as 10⁸ to 10⁹ International Units.

16 Following the implementation of the B19
17 in-process testing, however, there is a consistent
18 reduction of the titer of B19 in the manufacturing
19 pools across the same time frame. This data
20 clearly demonstrates the value of the in-process
21 control testing for manufacturing pools of B19 NAT,
22 and this again is our whole goal, is to reduce the
23 load in the manufacturing pools.

24 [Slide.]

25 Resolution Times. Now, you can interpret

1 resolution times in many ways. Resolution time may
2 be from the time a sample is received in a
3 laboratory to the time the result is available.
4 So, we interpreted resolution time as from the time
5 collection occurs, the collection of the unit, until
6 a result is available.

7 You need to understand that this doesn't
8 include time for confirmation testing and/or
9 notification of donor, and the resolution times
10 range from a mean of about 25 to 60 days.

11 As far as resolution times as it relates
12 to the single donor, that is not done in our
13 process.

14 [Slide.]

15 Now, there are factors influencing
16 resolution time, and I think this is pretty
17 critical in trying to understand how this works and
18 what the issues are. These factors, of course, are
19 shipping logistics, when samples are moved, when
20 units are moved, and how they are managed.

21 Laboratory capacity and through-put and
22 even seasonality of infection, and I will show you
23 in the next slide exactly what I mean by that.

24 [Slide.]

25 This is from one member company. This is

1 about two years, and this is the trends in the
2 incidence of parvo-positive units over time. You
3 can see that it is cyclic, as you would expect, and
4 at certain points in time there is a very low
5 incidence, i.e., the through-put through a lab
6 would be very rapid, at other points in time there
7 can be 5 to 6 times as many positives to deal with,
8 so that is certainly going to affect the
9 through-put of a lab.

10 So, I think we have to be very cautious in
11 describing or relating turnaround times, that they
12 can be a little inconsistent and they can vary on
13 us depending on the conditions.

14 [Slide.]

15 The next issue was the prevalence and
16 levels of anti-parvovirus B19 antibodies, if any.

17 [Slide.]

18 To summarize, anti-B19 antibody level is
19 not affected by the implemented in-process control
20 measures, that is, removing the high titer
21 donations. About 98 percent of manufacturing
22 pools, whether before testing or after testing, are
23 above 10 International Units/ml, and there are no
24 manufacturing pools below 5.

25 This demonstrates appropriate strategy for

1 effective management of parvovirus B19 loads in
2 manufacturing pools while, importantly, retaining
3 necessary antibody levels.

4 [Slide.]

5 I will just make a couple more comments
6 about that. We were also asked if it was possible
7 to look at serial donations and look at the
8 temporal relationship of positives, negatives
9 relative to serial donations, and this happens to
10 be a very high frequency donor, a profile from the
11 high frequency donor.

12 There are about 12 of those, and this is
13 one example, and this is meant to be a prototype.
14 Each box represents a donation and the status of
15 that donation relative to our threshold, whether it
16 is above or below the threshold.

17 What you can see is that at this
18 particular point, we were very lucky and we
19 identified a donation actually at the point of
20 initial infection, and the increase in titer was
21 very rapid up to a very high titer, and then the
22 next donations decreased very rapidly until it
23 decreased below the threshold, and then went back
24 to nondetection or non-elevated based on our tests.

25 This does not mean there is no titer.

1 This means that it is non-elevated relative to our
2 testing paradigm.

3 There is one important point to make here
4 relative to antibody levels, and that is that what
5 we have superimposed is the expected IgG profile
6 based on publications based on the literature.

7 We also have data that actually confirms
8 this, so we have got data where we actually looked
9 at titer relative to donations, and we looked at
10 IgG. What you can see, I think the first speaker
11 already pretty much said this, is that most of the
12 high-titer donations that we remove are not likely
13 to have an impact on B19 antibody titers in either
14 manufacturing pools or immunoglobulin products.

15 However, if we remove a great deal of the
16 low-titer donations, then, the possibility exists
17 for a significant impact on the antibody titers in
18 both manufacturing pools and final product, and
19 that is clearly one of the main reasons why we have
20 adopted this particular paradigm.

21 [Slide.]

22 So, in conclusion, then, PPTA member
23 companies have implemented appropriate processes
24 which have been shown to be effective in managing
25 parvovirus B19 in manufacturing pools, thus

1 achieving an increased margin of safety for
2 life-saving plasma protein therapies.

3 Ed Gomperts is going to discuss public
4 health impact of donor notification and counseling.

5 Edward Gomperts, M.D.

6 DR. GOMPERTS: Mr. Chairman, colleagues,
7 thank you for the opportunity to talk to you this
8 afternoon.

9 I will focus briefly on parvovirus B19
10 infection, summarizing briefly what actually you
11 have already heard, and then talk about resolution
12 times, as well as issues around donors and
13 contacts.

14 [Slide.]

15 The infection itself and the virus is well
16 documented, well reviewed in standards, infectious
17 disease textbooks, such as The Principles and
18 Practices of Infectious Diseases. Essentially, it
19 is an acute self-limiting disease without chronic
20 sequelae in normal individuals, normally
21 transmitted by the respiratory route.

22 Most infections are asymptomatic. Where
23 symptomatic, the donor would be deferred,
24 symptomatic being fever, headache, malaise,
25 myalgias, and rash.

1 Antibodies to parvovirus B19 confer
2 life-long protective immunity. More significant
3 sequelae are rare and usually occur in particularly
4 susceptible non-donor populations with pre-existing
5 conditions.

6 [Slide.]

7 Parvovirus B19 infections typically
8 resolve with the appearance of neutralizing
9 antibodies, in the case of IgM, approximately 10
10 days post infection and 17 days, IgG, post
11 infection, with a period of viremia being about 14
12 days and in some cases this viremia may well
13 persist for a substantial period of time.

14 The intense viremia, however, develops
15 approximately one week after infection, and this
16 usually lasts about a week.

17 [Slide.]

18 Focusing on the donor notification and the
19 counseling issue, as we have heard from Steve
20 Petteway, the average resolution time for NAT
21 testing ranges from 25 to 60 days.

22 Additional time would be required to
23 identify the unit, perform the necessary
24 confirmatory testing, and then to locate and
25 communicate with the donor.

1 This is a fairly substantial period of
2 time relative to the infection and therefore an
3 infected donor would already have cleared the virus
4 and developed sufficient antibodies to confer
5 life-long immunity by the time notification
6 occurred.

7 The infected donor also, on the basis of
8 this fair amount of time, will already have passed
9 the infection to close contacts by the time of
10 notification.

11 [Slide.]

12 Focusing on the at-risk populations and
13 close contacts. From the point of view of the
14 donor population, these individuals are deferred.
15 There are standard questions, for example, "Are you
16 feeling well and healthy today?" which ideally
17 would exclude the individuals who have an acute
18 infection, that are feeling ill.

19 Female donors, the question is asked, "In
20 the past weeks, have you been pregnant or are you
21 pregnant now?" Certainly, the questions would
22 exclude immunocompromised individuals.

23 From the point of view of prevention of
24 transmission of infection to close contacts, as
25 already mentioned, the turnaround time mean is

1 about 25 to 60 days, and confirmation testing would
2 be a minimum of additional 10 days and donor
3 notification, anywhere from 3 days to months.

4 [Slide.]

5 In conclusion, this medical information
6 related to an acute parvovirus B19 infection would
7 be nonactionable for both the donor and his or her
8 close contacts. On focusing on the ethics, we may
9 question the ethic of notification of a donor
10 regarding nonactionable medical information.

11 Certainly, counseling a donor regarding
12 nonactionable medical information certainly
13 presents difficulties.

14 Finally, donor notification and counseling
15 lacks public health benefit as this is a
16 non-chronic, acute, short duration viral infection
17 which is highly prevalent in the general
18 population.

19 [Slide.]

20 To conclude and bring the presentations
21 together, in-process control measures are designed
22 to enhance the safety margin of plasma therapies.

23 Parvovirus B19 NAT test lacks value as a
24 diagnostic or donor screening method.

25 Thank you.

1 DR. NELSON: The last three speakers are
2 open for questions or comments.

3 DR. SIMON: Just one quick one. What is
4 the confirmatory testing for this virus?

5 DR. GOMPERTS: It would be a repeat B19
6 NAT test.

7 DR. SIMON: You would just repeat to make
8 sure there wasn't an error?

9 DR. GOMPERTS: On the specific unit that
10 is collected from that specific donor.

11 DR. DiMICHELE: I can ask you, but the
12 question would be for anybody. Has anybody ever
13 heard of the CDC identifying a contact parvovirus
14 infection in a contact of a recipient of blood
15 products at all?

16 In other words, has the CDC ever
17 identified infection in the contact of a blood
18 product recipient or a plasma product recipient to
19 the best of your knowledge?

20 DR. GOMPERTS: I don't know.

21 DR. YU: I believe for CDC, B19 infection
22 is not a reportable disease, right, Dr.
23 Chamberland?

24 DR. CHAMBERLAND: We wouldn't have the
25 data to answer that question. There may be

1 isolated case reports that are in the literature
2 that someone can speak to that talked about
3 secondary transmission in a household where a
4 transfusion recipient acquired it from transfusion.

5 DR. DOPPELT: I am a little confused. How
6 are you setting your cutoff for what you consider
7 as a high titer and a low titer?

8 DR. PETTEWAY: The cutoff, as I said, is
9 coupled to the manufacturing process, and it is
10 coupled to the target of achieving no greater than
11 105 International Units/ml in a manufacturing pool.
12 If that manufacturing pool is 800 liters, then, the
13 minipool screening and the cutoff is going to be
14 different than if the manufacturing pool is 5,000
15 liters.

16 So, it is all linked together and it
17 depends on the manufacturing process for any given
18 company.

19 A cutoff at the minipool level or at the
20 donor level, when that unit now is diluted into the
21 manufacturing pool, the cutoff will be 105. The
22 titer of that unit that is diluted will be
23 dependent on the volume of the manufacturing pool.
24 That is how companies are setting their cutoff, and
25 the key is the specification or the target at the

1 manufacturing pool.

2 DR. DOPPELT: How are you picking that
3 particular target? I mean is this arbitrary?

4 DR. PETTEWAY: No, actually, it is not.
5 Remember it's coupled to viral inactivation and
6 removal, and we picked that target because we need
7 to go below the target, so if we are at 105, in
8 order to assure that we don't go above 105, then,
9 we need to be around 104, so if we are around 104,
10 so now we are excluding donations, some of which
11 are actually below 105, if we were to go much lower
12 than that, we would start excluding the low-titer
13 donations that are high IgG, and we are trying to
14 avoid that.

15 So, what we are trying to do is to
16 eliminate the highest titer donations without
17 eliminating the donations that are high in IgG
18 antibody.

19 DR. NELSON: And by "viral inactivation,"
20 you mean antibody primarily, right?

21 DR. PETTEWAY: No. I mean within the
22 purification process for manufacturing, we have the
23 capacity to remove or eliminate virus to a certain
24 level, and the idea is to get the manufacturing
25 pool, reduce the load in the manufacturing pool, so

1 the challenge on that capacity is less and the
2 margin of safety is greater. They are coupled
3 together, and I think that is important to
4 understand.

5 DR. LEW: I think I have a question that
6 may be linked to what was asked earlier. My
7 understanding is when CDC did their presentation,
8 they mentioned about genomic equivalents/ml based
9 on a study that looked at healthy donors, and you
10 wanted to avoid anything that was greater than 104
11 genomic equivalents/ml, because those were
12 nontransmitting lots.

13 We didn't really get the details of that
14 study where we get this cutoff from, 106, and that
15 is a problem that I am having, as well. What are
16 the studies that show 106 is the greatest, which is
17 a little different issue looking at keeping
18 antibodies in our plasma or IVIG.

19 So, the first question is what is the
20 correlation between International Units/ml with
21 genomic equivalents, is that 1 to 1? The second is
22 could we get some details on how that particular
23 cutoff was chosen, either the 104 or 106 based on
24 how you manufacture?

25 DR. NELSON: Wasn't the cutoff chosen

1 based upon a study that showed transmission of some
2 pools that had very high titers?

3 DR. PETTEWAY: No, actually, that may not
4 even be relevant to what we are doing, so I will
5 put a slide back up and try to explain.

6 DR. LEW: There is a different issue
7 between trying to keep good antibodies in these
8 products versus this cutoff of not wanting to
9 transmit, and I would like better clarification on
10 that.

11 DR. PETTEWAY: Let me see if I can help
12 you here. Remember that prior to implementing
13 testing, we had manufacturing pools or production
14 pools that were up to 10⁹ International Units/ml.
15 During our purification processes, we are capable
16 of removing virus, but removing virus to a certain
17 level. That gives us a margin of safety, but it is
18 based on the starting load, how much can you
19 remove.

20 What we wanted to do was reduce this load,
21 so by minipool testing and removing the high-titer
22 units, we are able to reduce the load to a
23 defined--we can call this a cutoff, but a defined
24 specification for the manufacturing pool of 10⁵
25 International Units/ml. That is the goal.

1 Now, when that is coupled with the process
2 viral reduction that is the same here, but with a
3 lower titer or a lower initial titer, then, we have
4 increased the margin of safety for the product.

5 The transmissibility in solvent detergent
6 plasma of 105 would not be a criteria for choosing
7 the load here. The criteria for choosing the load
8 here is a balance between removing the most virus
9 possible while not eliminating the most IgG
10 possible. That is why that was chosen, not based
11 on the 104 S/D plasma experience.

12 DR. LEW: Could you just say what is
13 equivalents between genomic equivalents versus
14 International Units?

15 DR. PETTEWAY: Well, the reason you have
16 an International standard is because people--John,
17 go ahead.

18 DR. SALDANA: John Saldana from Canadian
19 Blood Services.

20 The correlation between International
21 Units and genome equivalents is about 1 to 0.6 or
22 0.8, and the reason we use International Units is
23 to get away from the discrepancy of people using
24 different units. I think it was quite clear at the
25 West Nile Virus meeting in November that people

1 were using copies/ml, genome equivalents/ml, et
2 cetera, and it is very confusing, so the WHO has
3 adopted the IU, which is an arbitrary unit.

4 I think that tends to standardize. It is
5 completely arbitrary, but we try and make it as
6 close to the genome equivalents as possible.

7 DR. GOLDING: Basil Golding, FDA. This
8 cutoff of 106 is obviously arbitrary and it is true
9 that most manufacturing processes will remove
10 virus, but the ability to remove virus is variable
11 and this virus is removed to a lesser extent than
12 enveloped viruses, and most manufacturing processes
13 that I am familiar with will remove possibly 4 logs
14 of virus, so you are still going to have virus in
15 the product.

16 The point about the antibody, the caveat
17 there is if you are making immune globulin, sure,
18 you will have antibody in the product and it is
19 going to neutralize low levels of virus, but if
20 your fractionation process separates your virus
21 from your product like it could do for certain
22 calculation products, you could end up with 3 or 4
23 logs of parvovirus in your product without any
24 antibody in the product, so that product could
25 presumably transmit the virus, and if you look at

1 the hemophiliac population, the antibody titers
2 compared to the rest of the population indicate
3 that that is exactly what happens.

4 DR. PETTEWAY: Yes, that's true, and that
5 is another reason why our paradigm and the cutoffs
6 that we chose wasn't based on the plasma S/D
7 experience. I would also note that in many
8 processes, we have validated capability of removing
9 parvovirus up to 108 or 109, and in others it is
10 less, so that is correct.

11 DR. SCHMIDT: I would like to see us
12 remove from the discussion of what we should do,
13 the point about the contacts of the donors for
14 three reasons. First, I think we are all
15 interested in public health, but I don't think we
16 should add to the cost of blood and blood products
17 some public health activity, such as caring for or
18 considering the contacts of our donors.

19 Secondly, I don't think it is within the
20 authority of the FDA to consider that. We are
21 supposed to be worrying about the product and we
22 are already moving back to the donor's health, and
23 now we are talking about the health of contacts of
24 the donors.

25 Thirdly, I think nowadays is this whole

1 question of invasion of privacy or not invasion of
2 privacy depending which side of the fence you are
3 on these days, but we might not have any business
4 letting people know about those things when they
5 didn't ask us for them.

6 DR. FALLAT: It seems to me, though,
7 pertinent to that is there is a big difference I
8 guess between the plasma fractionators and their
9 time period and the blood center. We have to keep
10 that in mind when we look at the time period where
11 the donors or the recipients might be contacted.

12 DR. ALLEN: I would be very cautious about
13 certainly voting negatively on this question,
14 however, in the absence of some medical ethics
15 considerations, in the current environment, if an
16 organization or an agency has that kind of data,
17 and it is taken down to the individual donor level,
18 I think there are many people who would feel that
19 there is an obligation to get that information back
20 with an appropriate explanation even if there isn't
21 any necessary medical or public health significance
22 to it.

23 I think that goes back to the question of
24 if you have got minipools, is there an obligation
25 to test back to the individual unit, and that

1 perhaps could be the level of discussion. I think
2 if you have taken it back to that level of
3 identification, there may be an obligation to
4 inform the person.

5 DR. KLEIN: I would agree with that, Jim.
6 I think that if you have that information about a
7 donor, and it was I who donated last week, and you
8 told me, I might not visit my pregnant daughter
9 next week or I might not go to the obstetrical unit
10 or to the hospital where there are immunodeficient
11 subjects.

12 I think that us not discussing this and
13 deciding whether or not this is an issue, we would
14 be punting on that one.

15 DR. SCHMIDT: I guess this goes back to
16 one of my old arguments with Toby who presented the
17 point of view that the plasma industry was
18 considering serologic testing for syphilis as a
19 good thing because of its public health aspects,
20 then, I see some relation here.

21 DR. SIMON: I never advocated that. From
22 a historical perspective, that is the way it came
23 about, you know, that the testing every several
24 months at a time when syphilis was more prevalent,
25 I don't know if you want us to start discussing

1 this or not.

2 DR. NELSON: We will have time to discuss
3 the questions raised by the FDA. Since we have
4 come this far with all the presentations and people
5 have flights and are going to have to leave, could
6 you present the questions again?

7 DR. WHITAKER: Could I just answer the
8 question that was raised a minute ago?

9 DR. NELSON: Go ahead.

10 DR. WHITAKER: I would like to remind the
11 committee that the test is a threshold test. You
12 are not going to identify every one who has
13 parvovirus when you do the test, so you will be
14 identifying individuals with high titer viremia,
15 but you may also be not identifying people,
16 individuals with high titer viremia just below the
17 cutoff.

18 The purpose of the test is the product and
19 assuring a high margin of safety and that not
20 diagnosing a donor, and that there are some issues
21 here that really do need to be discussed and
22 considered.

23 It is not the same as an HIV test.

24 DR. NELSON: There are four people that
25 wanted to make a statement in the open public

1 hearing. If you could make a brief statement or
2 even provide it for the record or what I would like
3 to do is maybe discuss the questions, but the first
4 is Kay Gregory.

5 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Ken, can I just ask a
6 question because there is a time issue here. I
7 think the committee really wants to give this a
8 thorough discussion and it is a difficult issue,
9 and there are four questions. There is also open
10 public hearing that has to take place.

11 I think there is, by my watch, about 45 to
12 50 minutes left before the scheduled adjournment
13 and I think many of us, those of us from out of
14 town, scheduled flights to accommodate a 6:30
15 adjournment.

16 If people realistically think that all of
17 that can happen in 45 to 50 minutes, then, that is
18 what we planned for, but if it is not realistically
19 able to happen, I think people are just feeling
20 kind of at a loss as to what exactly to do here.

21 DR. NELSON: I think if we have come this
22 far and then we discuss, let's say, the questions
23 again at the next meeting, we would have to sort of
24 revisit all the issues. I would like to try to do
25 it in the next 45 minutes if we could.

1 D. Open Public Hearing

2 Kay Gregory, AABB, ABC, ARC

3 MS. GREGORY: You have the written
4 statement and this time I am actually representing
5 the AABB, America's Blood Centers, and the American
6 Red Cross. I am happy to just let you have it on
7 the record, but I think it may be giving a little
8 bit short shrift to the whole blood industry if you
9 don't hear the statement.

10 Primarily, what I really want you to be
11 aware of is that given the important and compelling
12 competing safety priorities of implementing West
13 Nile Virus donor screening and performing bacterial
14 detection in platelets for the whole blood sector,
15 and we are going to be doing this in the next six
16 to nine months, the additional capacity and work
17 that would be required to perform parvo B19 NAT as
18 a donor screening test simply cannot be absorbed.

19 For example, performing it as a donor
20 screening assay would require the addition of
21 another on-line assay requiring completion prior to
22 all product release, the pulling of samples and
23 further testing to resolve positive pools, the need
24 for a confirmatory assay, and the alteration of
25 510(k) cleared computer systems to accommodate

1 parvovirus B19 results as a release criteria.

2 Furthermore, current FDA policy would
3 require that donor screening be performed under an
4 IND or an IDE, which would be an additional burden
5 for test kit manufacturers who are turning their
6 efforts to West Nile virus test development.

7 We believe that the practical solution of
8 performing parvovirus B19 as an in-process control
9 at this time is supported, and we are willing to
10 look at doing that, but we think going any further
11 to call it a donor screening and requiring
12 notification, et cetera, is more than we can absorb
13 at this point in time.

14 DR. NELSON: Thank you. That was a good
15 summary.

16 Let's move to the discussion and
17 questions.

18 E. FDA Perspectives and Questions

19 for the Committee

20 Mei-ying W. Yu, Ph.D.

21 DR. YU: I will try to be short.

22 [Slide.]

23 The first FDA perspective. For whole
24 blood donations, risks to transfusion recipients
25 are sufficient to warrant withholding high-titer

1 individual positive units that is greater or equal
2 to 106 genome equivalents/ml prior to release of
3 blood components to use in transfusion.

4 This particular level was set, it is to
5 minimize the risk of infection in recipients and to
6 prevent serious consequences of B19 infections in
7 high risk recipients and to avoid the removal of
8 low titer units that may not be infectious and
9 which contain protective antibodies.

10 [Slide.]

11 Now, this is B19 profiles of B19 DNA and
12 antibodies from the serial bleeds from normal
13 source plasma donors. Dr. Gerald Zerlauth of
14 Baxter BioScience presented in December 2001 FDA
15 Workshop, and we have been collaborating with him
16 very closely, so this is a very precious panel I
17 just want to point out, but unfortunately, NGI also
18 have similar panels from serial bleeds, I believe
19 from 20 donors and show very similar pattern.

20 In red or reddish pink, that is the DNA
21 level, and the B19 DNA level, and in yellow is an
22 IgM profile, and the blue is the IgG profile. So,
23 as you can see from this source plasma donor, the
24 B19 level goes up very quickly to 10¹² and then it
25 drops quite sharply to 10⁶ or a little bit below

1 when IgG became positive. This is at day 14,
2 anti-B19 became positive, and the titer is around
3 the 7 times 10⁵ genome equivalents/ml.

4 But the viremic period can be very, very
5 long. See, it tapered off here, but then it
6 remained very, very long time through 304 days, but
7 that is his last bleed, so it is 10² or 10³ genome
8 equivalents/ml level.

9 The IgM was positive at day 10 and then
10 the level is still very high, 2 times 10¹⁰ genome
11 equivalents, so this 10⁶ genome equivalents/ml
12 above, then most likely IgG will be negative.

13 Now, we really don't know what is the
14 infectivity, the minimum infectious dose especially
15 for those unpooled products that has no antibody,
16 but I want to tell you that the IgM in this
17 particular donor became negative at day 60 and this
18 donor was positive at day 14, like I said, and then
19 later on it actually gradually increased and the
20 level reached to about 50 to 60 between 70 to 90
21 days IU/ml, 50 to 60.

22 DR. NELSON: This has been presented
23 before to the committee. I wonder, could you move
24 to the questions that you want us to consider?

25 DR. YU: Okay. I will. This is the level

1 of IgG became around 1030 or 1025, that is what is
2 found in IGIV level, in terms of 1 percent IgG
3 concentration.

4 I wanted to answer Dr. Toby Simon's
5 question.

6 The key thing I wanted to show that
7 profile is to say that you cannot be too sensitive.
8 When you are too sensitive of the NAT, then, you
9 are getting those low level units that may not be
10 infectious, and they contain IgG.

11 [Slide.]

12 The second one is a temporary deferral may
13 be warranted for high-titer apheresis donors if
14 positive donations can be resolved within several
15 weeks. As you know, the donation intervals are 8
16 weeks for whole blood, 8 to 16 weeks for red blood
17 cell apheresis, 48 hours for plateletpheresis, and
18 every 48 hours for plasmapheresis.

19 Based on the industry presentation, we
20 will see the resolution time. In Susan Stramer's
21 presentation, she said that can be in 24 to 48
22 hours, the mean time, so I put down two days here
23 for the Phase 2 approach. Now, NGI unfortunately,
24 Andy Conrad cannot come to present, but in one of
25 his slides, the average time to resolve to single

1 donation is 4.6 days to be exact.

2 Within such a short time, either two or
3 five days, you can really notify the donor, defer
4 the donor if necessary, and then if there is a
5 medical benefit for the close benefit, they can be
6 notified quickly.

7 FDA actually got inquiry from plasma
8 centers and they asked how long they can defer
9 these positive donors, but however based on the
10 PPTA presentations, you can see various companies.
11 The mean time, resolution time is ranging from 25
12 to 60 days, so within the time period, you really
13 cannot do very much for donor deferral or medical
14 benefit to the close contacts, but the range is
15 very, very high, you know, A and B companies can be
16 as short as 8 or 9 days.

17 [Slide.]

18 The third point is that FDA is seeking the
19 BPAC's opinions on conclusions made by the Ad Hoc
20 PHS panels that there are sufficient potential
21 medical benefits to close contacts, but not to
22 donors, to warrant notification of parvovirus B19
23 donors.

24 However, we believe such notification is
25 likely to be useful only in setting where testing

1 and notification can be completed within, for
2 example, less than four weeks of donation.

3 So, the questions for the committee.

4 First, if donations of whole blood are
5 tested for the presence of human parvovirus B19,
6 are risks to transfusion recipients sufficient to
7 warrant withholding high titer positive units that
8 is equal or greater than 10⁶ genome equivalents/ml
9 from use for transfusion?

10 Is temporary deferral of positive donors
11 warranted in the setting of: (a) whole blood
12 donation? (b) apheresis donation?

13 The third question is: Do potential
14 medical benefits to contacts of parvovirus B19
15 infected donors warrant identification and
16 notification of positive donors?

17 Fourth. If yes to Question 3, should
18 donor notification be limited to settings where
19 testing and notification can be completed within
20 several weeks of donation?

21 That's it.

22 Committee Discussion

23 DR. NELSON: Discussion?

24 DR. SIMON: Did you want to do these one
25 at a time? I think it is a philosophic issue here.

1 We have started with a test which was an in-process
2 control, and it has somehow evolved into
3 consideration as a specific test for the removal of
4 in-date units and for counseling of donors.

5 It only detects people who are at very
6 high titers, so if you donate a day or two, before
7 you hit that titer, it won't detect you, if you
8 donated a day or two after, it won' detect you, so
9 its public health usefulness is very limited, it
10 doesn't have the same kind of testing
11 characteristics for HIV or hepatitis B or hepatitis
12 C.

13 I think what has created a red herring
14 here, I guess is the Red Cross's intention, in its
15 Phase 3, to do this in concert with the other tests
16 and to have a positive test result at the same time
17 as they do for the other viral markers, in which
18 case they could remove the units, and I guess it
19 would make sense to do so, but that Phase 2 is a
20 while away and as they pointed out, even in their
21 situation, there is still more time needed before
22 they would be able to contact the donor. They have
23 to confirm the test result and then they have to
24 put in the process all the measures to contact the
25 donor, and there is just a lot of other time taken

1 up.

2 I think in terms of the industry, the
3 plasma industry, you know, this is coming way
4 beyond any time for medical usefulness. So, I just
5 think we have gotten off. I guess, number one, I
6 think if you had the data within the same time
7 frame as you do the others, I guess you would pull
8 in-date units, but I think it is unfortunate that
9 we moved from looking at this as an in-process test
10 for the plasma fractionation product, to begin to
11 look at it for these other purposes, because
12 obviously, a somewhat lower titer in that setting
13 could cause the problem.

14 So, I think it is unfortunate. I mean I
15 guess that the common sense answer to Question No.
16 1 is yes, but I certainly wouldn't defer the donor
17 who will get over the problem, and I think
18 contacting, it is true, of course, that you always
19 have this ethical issue when you have information,
20 but it is not very useful information and the
21 timing of it is such that it is going to come at a
22 time when it won' be useful to the donor or the
23 contacts, because simply the time it takes to do
24 all of this, whether you do it by certified letter
25 or phone call that goes into a voice mail, and by

1 the time it gets back into the system, so that I
2 think is I guess representing industry, kind of my
3 philosophic look at it.

4 I would hope we would not saddle the
5 plasma industry with having to go back to tell
6 people 30, 40 days after they have donated about
7 this.

8 DR. SCHMIDT: Considering the whole blood,
9 we have heard a statement from Ms. Gregory that
10 they can't do it right now without impeding other
11 perhaps more important activities.

12 Wouldn't it be sensible for the FDA to
13 table this request for us to consider this? I know
14 it means taking it up again next year, but that
15 might be a cheaper alternative to having everybody
16 working on this before then.

17 DR. KLEIN: We have spent a lot of time on
18 the plasma industry, and as best I can tell, the
19 questions aren't addressing that, and it doesn't
20 make much sense, since they are not resolving to
21 the single donor, and the time frame would make
22 that--

23 DR. SIMON: I think they are resolving to
24 the single donor.

25 DR. KLEIN: If they are resolving to the

1 single donor, then, the time frame would make it
2 impossible really to have any medical benefit
3 either to a donor or to the donor's immediate
4 contacts or even distant contacts.

5 However, if, in fact, we are going to be
6 resolving to the individual donor within 48 hours,
7 then, I think we need to address these issues even
8 though we may not be doing that for the next two or
9 three years.

10 I think we at least have to get on the
11 track. I think the FDA is asking us for that
12 advice. I am not saying that we need to do it
13 tomorrow. It seems to me that if you have a unit
14 of blood that has a high titer test positive
15 confirmed for parvovirus, you simply don't want to
16 transfuse it. I can't imagine that you would
17 ignore that, so I think the answer to No. 1, in my
18 mind, is yes, and I presume we will get on to No. 2
19 eventually.

20 DR. NELSON: Let's vote on No. 1.

21 DR. BIANCO: Let me just ask Dr. Klein an
22 important question. What if in the whole blood
23 sector, this testing is done after expiration of
24 the cell or components for the units that are going
25 to recovered plasma, which is what Sue Stramer

1 presented?

2 DR. KLEIN: I think again the question we
3 are being asked is about if you have an in-date
4 unit and you have a test result that indicates that
5 it may be infectious, and not only infectious, but
6 potentially cause morbidity and mortality. I mean
7 that is the question.

8 If you want to pose the question
9 differently, I may have a different answer.

10 DR. NELSON: Jay.

11 DR. EPSTEIN: It may be helpful to realize
12 that the terms of debate have shifted over time.
13 The source plasma standard has caused the need for
14 whole blood collectors to implement parvovirus
15 testing, so that they can sell recovered plasma.

16 This has caused the FDA to consider what
17 is going on in the whole blood scenario, and the
18 way we looked at it is, well, if you are now
19 testing whole blood donors, shouldn't you have a
20 proactive position to interdict the at-risk unit.

21 Now, what has evolved is that it can't be
22 done immediately, don't allow it, priorities may
23 not allow it, but we are sort of looking ahead and
24 it was not clear some months ago whether there was,
25 in fact, an industry intent to do what is called

1 real time testing, which basically means testing as
2 a release test.

3 There is this gray zone where you may not
4 be testing as a release test, but you have an
5 in-date unit, and you might or might not get the
6 opportunity to interdict it. That is an unpleasant
7 place to be.

8 So, you know, you sort of have these three
9 scenarios. You have testing of outdated units for
10 the purpose of screening and recovery of plasma.
11 There is nothing further you could be doing about
12 transfused units, and a lot of time has passed with
13 regard to any value notifying a donor.

14 At the other extreme you have testing
15 within 48 hours compatible with other release
16 testing, and then you have this gray zone in
17 between where you have some delay in testing, but
18 you still have some in-date units.

19 So, what the FDA is looking for is, first
20 of all, an opinion whether it is important to
21 interdict these units because they are not being
22 interdicted now when there is no testing. Then, we
23 are looking for a direction whether we should be
24 pushing from a regulatory standpoint that all the
25 testing should, in fact, in whole blood, become

1 pre-release testing eventually.

2 If testing is feasible and if ultimately,
3 it is feasible as release testing, shouldn't that
4 be what happens. So, that is where we are coming
5 from, and we recognize that you can't necessarily
6 have it overnight. I mean I think we understand
7 that point.

8 DR. FITZPATRICK: To me, that is a
9 different question. What Dr. Klein said was if we
10 know, we should interdict. What you said is should
11 we test to interdict, and that to me says does this
12 represent enough of a risk to the patient
13 population that we should advocate pre-release
14 testing.

15 I didn't see presented today any more
16 information than was available in 1999 on cases of
17 transmission by transfusion. So, those are two
18 different things to me, and I am not sure where you
19 want us to go with that.

20 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, my feeling is that if
21 whole blood donors are to be screened, that we
22 should work toward pre-release testing for the
23 purpose of interdicting potentially infectious
24 units and that, as you say, you have already heard
25 that high-titer units are almost certainly

1 infectious.

2 We know that they are a serious threat to
3 some recipients. We don't have good data on the
4 frequency of clinically significant events. Now,
5 we don't have any more data than we have previously
6 prevented. I think that is part of the problem,
7 but we were trying to focus today's meeting
8 primarily on the issue of benefit or lack of
9 benefit of donor notification.

10 I appreciate the discussion of Question 1
11 has raised the additional dimensions of that issue.
12 I think we could split it into two questions if you
13 like. One is, is there a benefit to interdicting
14 parvovirus-positive units, and the other is, if
15 testing is done now, should it become pre-release
16 testing.

17 Is your feeling that you can't vote this
18 question or you don't know what it means?

19 DR. FITZPATRICK: I am concerned about the
20 phrase, "Are risks to transfusion recipients
21 sufficient to warrant withholding high positive
22 titer units?"

23 You know high-titer units are infectious.
24 To me, if we answer yes to the question, we are
25 advocating an effort by the industry to engage in

1 an effort to do pre-release testing to protect the
2 recipient.

3 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, I would say that there
4 would likely be an evolution of policy and that the
5 first step would be retrieving in-date units found
6 to have high titers and a vote in the affirmative
7 would encourage FDA to push toward ultimately
8 pre-release testing, yes, but it doesn't all have
9 to happen at once.

10 But, yes, a vote in the affirmative would
11 put us on that course to progress from retrieving
12 in-date units potentially with lookback
13 notifications to an ultimate pre-release testing
14 scenario.

15 DR. FALLAT: We have data from the blood
16 banking industry that there is 106 titers in
17 perhaps 1 in 15,000. We give 1.5 million units of
18 blood a year. That translates into quite a number
19 of people getting that titer, of which a certain
20 percentage will be in the high-risk group.

21 For me, it is no greater to vote yes on
22 No. 1.

23 DR. SIMON: Well, for me, it is
24 unfortunate, the implications in No. 1, because I
25 think if somebody told me they had tested, and it

1 was a high-titer unit and should they remove it, I
2 would have to say yes.

3 I mean I can't imagine a different answer,
4 but on the other hand, I would not want to
5 encourage the FDA to move towards requiring this
6 testing as a donor test, in other words, because I
7 think it takes us off the track of the rationale
8 for it, and I don't believe, as Dr. Fitzpatrick
9 said, that data in the past have suggested a need
10 to look for this virus or to prevent this virus
11 transmission in whole blood, platelets, and so
12 forth, but rather as a problem in pooled product
13 particularly to hemophilia patients.

14 So, I think it is unfortunate that there
15 is that implication with a yes vote, but I agree
16 with Dr. Fallat. I mean I don't see how one cannot
17 vote yes to No. 1 if you have that information.

18 DR. EPSTEIN: Could I suggest that we add
19 a question to give you the opportunity to clarify
20 this, which would be: Has a value for screening of
21 whole blood donors for parvovirus B19 been
22 established?

23 In that way, if you wish to vote 1 in the
24 affirmative, you can still vote 2 in the negative.
25 I think that would clarify things if I understand

1 the issue here.

2 DR. KLEIN: I would like to have that
3 first part that is now split off, I like the
4 wording, because I think the wording is very
5 important. We really have never looked for this,
6 so we don't know whether it is a problem or it
7 isn't a problem, so you really don't want to
8 exclude that any more than you want to press
9 forward with it in the absence of data.

10 DR. NELSON: Great. Certainly, parvovirus
11 B19 infections are a significant problem in
12 patients with AIDS and sickle cell, and all the
13 rest, but we don't know how much of it is
14 transfusion transmitted, and I guess that is the
15 real issue.

16 DR. SIMON: We can vote on No. 1, I think,
17 while he is writing No. 2.

18 DR. NELSON: Let's vote on No. 1.

19 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question No. 1(a). If
20 donations of whole blood are tested for presence of
21 human parvovirus B19, are risks to transfusion
22 recipients sufficient to warrant withholding
23 high-titer positive units greater than 10⁶ genome
24 equivalents/ml from use for transfusion?

25 Allen.

1 DR. ALLEN: I think the data aren't
2 certain, but I am convinced that the answer
3 probably is best yes.

4 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

5 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Yes.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

7 DR. DAVIS: Yes.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

9 DR. DiMICHELE: Yes.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

11 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

13 DR. FITZPATRICK: Yes.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

15 DR. KLEIN: Yes.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

17 DR. LEW: Yes.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

19 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

21 DR. FALLAT: Yes.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

23 DR. HARVATH: Yes.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

25 DR. NELSON: Yes.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

2 DR. SIMON: Yes.

3 DR. SMALLWOOD: There is unanimous yes for
4 Question 1(a).

5 Question No. 1(b). Has a value to blood
6 transfusion recipient been established that is
7 sufficient to warrant donor screening for human
8 parvovirus B19?

9 DR. SCHMIDT: I am sorry. Would you read
10 that again?

11 DR. SMALLWOOD: Yes. Has a value to blood
12 transfusion recipient been established that is
13 sufficient to warrant donor screening for human
14 parvovirus B19?

15 DR. FALLAT: It that for whole blood
16 transfusions or are you separating out
17 transfusions? Yes? Okay.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Roll call.

19 Allen.

20 DR. ALLEN: I think most of the discussion
21 I heard was really to the absence of data although
22 we agree that there certainly is a potential risk
23 out there especially from high-titer units.

24 I am going to have to, in terms of the way
25 the question is worded, Has a value been

1 established, the answer is no. We need studies. I
2 think there is a potentially very significant risk
3 out there to certain populations. It is a real
4 concern. I don't think we have the data now. No.

5 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

6 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I would vote no for the
7 same reasons.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

9 DR. DAVIS: No.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

11 DR. DiMICHELE: I am going to abstain.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

13 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

15 DR. FITZPATRICK: No.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

17 DR. KLEIN: No.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Lew.

19 DR. LEW: No.

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

21 DR. SCHMIDT: No.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

23 DR. FALLAT: Yes.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

25 DR. HARVATH: No.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

2 DR. NELSON: No.

3 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

4 DR. SIMON: No.

5 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of voting: 2

6 yes votes, 9 no votes, 1 abstention, and the

7 industry representative agreed with the no vote.

8 Question No. 2. Is temporary deferral of

9 positive donors warranted in the setting of:

10 (a) whole blood donation?

11 (b) apheresis donation?

12 DR. SIMON: Is apheresis here

13 plasmapheresis? I am getting the word that it is,

14 (b) is plasmapheresis as of the plasmapheresis

15 industry.

16 DR. KLEIN: (b) could also be

17 plateletpheresis.

18 DR. SCHMIDT: Do we know what a positive

19 donor is?

20 DR. NELSON: No. It could be 102 or 1040.

21 DR. ALLEN: Remind me again. With the

22 plasma industry, my understanding is we are really

23 talking weeks or longer between the time that the

24 testing is done and any results are available, so

25 plasmapheresis, I mean it's a moot question.

1 Plateletpheresis is the testing is done reasonably
2 rapidly.

3 DR. SIMON: That is an interesting
4 question. Ordinarily you wouldn't do it on
5 plateletpheresis since there is no recovered
6 plasma. I mean if you take our vote on 1(b), go
7 with the majority, you wouldn't do it on
8 plateletpheresis unless you are making recovered
9 plasma with it, but ordinarily you wouldn't be.

10 DR. FITZPATRICK: With 1(b), to me, until
11 you resolve 1(b), you can't move on to 2(a) and
12 (b).

13 DR. KLEIN: I don't really agree with
14 that. I think if you have got a positive unit,
15 then, what do you do with that donor? You have got
16 a high-titer positive unit sitting here, and you
17 have a donor, someone who is going to come in 56
18 days later. Then, I think the answer is pretty
19 obvious, but someone who might come in, in 48
20 hours, you have to think about it.

21 DR. SIMON: Well, 56 days later, I assume
22 you are saying you would not defer, and 48 hours
23 you would except you won't know that for three or
24 four weeks.

25 DR. KLEIN: Not in plateletpheresis,

1 should you be doing it for plateletpheresis, and I
2 guess there are protocols where plasma and
3 platelets are collected, are there not, Jay?

4 DR. EPSTEIN: I am thinking. Again, it is
5 a case where splitting rather than lumping. FDA
6 brought it forward this way because we were
7 thinking about frequent collection, and we were
8 neutral about how long could it take to do the
9 whole cycle of testing, because there is so much
10 variation going on. We are not making the
11 assumption things stay the way they are.

12 But I think for the moment it would be
13 helpful to split out apheresis from plasmapheresis.
14 So, basically, the two scenarios come down to the
15 whole blood apheresis donor to make transfusable
16 components where that donor may indeed come back in
17 48 hours to give platelets again. Part (c) would
18 be the scenario of source plasma donation.

19 So, if we would say whole blood and
20 apheresis donation from whole blood donors, in
21 other words, the donors who meet the whole blood
22 standard, so apheresis donation to make
23 transfusable components, and then (c) would be
24 source plasma donation.

25 DR. FITZPATRICK: So, Jay, in following

1 Dr. Klein's, would you consider this the same as
2 1(a), if you had the result and knew the result in
3 time to make a decision, would you make one?

4 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, I think having posed
5 and heard the vote on 1(b), we are not now really
6 thinking in terms of the scenario where it is all
7 pre-release testing, so we are back to the scenario
8 where you might be learning later.

9 On the other hand, the donor, even though
10 you learned later, even though maybe it was 14
11 days, the donor could still be coming back, in
12 other words, they are not on a 56-day cycle.

13 DR. NELSON: This all one question that
14 includes (a), (b), and (c). Is that right? Vote
15 separately?

16 DR. SIMON: Yes, separately.

17 DR. NELSON: Let's do the first, 2(a).
18 This is a whole blood donor with an interval of 56
19 days?

20 DR. SIMON: 2(a) would be, I believe, a
21 whole blood donor with interval of 56 days. 2(b)
22 would be potentially plateletpheresis, which could
23 be twice in a week. 2(c) would be plasma donor,
24 which could be twice in a week, but you don't have
25 the results for three to four weeks.

1 DR. NELSON: Right.

2 DR. DiMICHELE: The nuance of this, the
3 time of notification I think is critical to
4 answering this question because I think in
5 answering Question 1, I mean I think we were sort
6 of looking at the data that was presented by the
7 FDA and the American Red Cross, and the possibility
8 of getting this information out in two days, which
9 is very, very different, I think, given the period
10 of viremia of someone who is determined to be
11 positive.

12 So, given the overlapping period of
13 viremia and basically the identification and
14 notification time, I mean I think those two things
15 are very, very critical. If the notification time
16 extends past the period of viremia, the question is
17 a moot point.

18 If the notification time is included in
19 the period of viremia, then, you are absolutely
20 right, then, we vote maybe the same or differently
21 on 2(a) and 2(b). I mean I think that this is an
22 issue that has to be clarified before we can vote
23 rationally.

24 DR. SIMON: I think the information we
25 were given is that the whole blood segment could at

1 some time move to having the data available within
2 48 hours. The plasmapheresis situation would not.
3 Those units are all shipped to central testing
4 laboratories that take longer to do it, and also we
5 have to keep in mind with (c), the level of
6 antibody in the final product because the donors
7 that are then forming IgG are people you would want
8 as donors for IgG.

9 I think that suggests that (a) and (b) you
10 would probably say yes, and (c) you would say no,
11 and that would be my view of it.

12 DR. NELSON: (a), you would say yes with
13 the 56 day?

14 DR. SIMON: I am sorry, I am getting
15 confused. (a), I would say no because of the
16 56-day interval; (b), I guess you would have to say
17 yes, if you had it; and then (c), I would say no
18 for source plasma.

19 DR. DiMICHELE: If that is what the
20 question is.

21 DR. STRAMER: I just wanted to clarify
22 time frames. I said we would have products tested
23 by 10 hours to 48 hours, which is about two days at
24 the longest time, but for donor notification, by
25 the time the donor gets the test results, we may

1 owe them a letter that is going to be two to three
2 weeks.

3 DR. SIMON: But if you wanted to defer a
4 plateletpheresis donor, you could put that in your
5 computer.

6 DR. STRAMER: Right, that's true.

7 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question 2(a). Is
8 temporary deferral of positive donors warranted in
9 the setting of whole blood donation? Vote.

10 Allen

11 DR. ALLEN: No.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

13 DR. CHAMBERLAND: No.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

15 DR. DAVIS: No.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

17 DR. DiMICHELE: No.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

19 DR. DOPPELT: No.

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

21 DR. FITZPATRICK: No.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

23 DR. KLEIN: No.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

25 DR. SCHMIDT: No.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

2 DR. FALLAT: No.

3 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

4 DR. HARVATH: No.

5 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

6 DR. NELSON: No.

7 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

8 DR. SIMON: No.

9 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of voting for
10 Question 2(a), unanimous no.

11 Question 2(b). Is temporary deferral of
12 positive donors warranted in the setting of
13 apheresis donation from whole blood donations for
14 further components?

15 DR. EPSTEIN: Apheresis donation to make
16 transfusable components.

17 DR. SMALLWOOD: To make, okay.

18 Corrected 2(b). Is temporary deferral of
19 positive donors warranted in the setting of
20 apheresis donation to make transfusable components?

21 Allen.

22 DR. ALLEN: Yes, and that's based on the
23 assumption that the test results are known within a
24 short period of time.

25 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

1 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Yes.
2 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.
3 DR. DAVIS: Yes.
4 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.
5 DR. DiMICHELE: Yes.
6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.
7 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.
8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.
9 DR. FITZPATRICK: Yes.
10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.
11 DR. KLEIN: Yes, assuming it's not
12 two-unit red cell apheresis in which case it's 112
13 days.
14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.
15 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.
17 DR. FALLAT: Yes.
18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.
19 DR. HARVATH: Yes.
20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.
21 DR. NELSON: Yes.
22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.
23 DR. SIMON: Yes.
24 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of voting for
25 Question 2(b), unanimous yes.

1 Question 2(c). Is temporary deferral of
2 positive donors warranted in the setting of source
3 plasma?

4 Allen.

5 DR. ALLEN: No.

6 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

7 DR. CHAMBERLAND: No.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

9 DR. DAVIS: No.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

11 DR. DiMICHELE: No.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

13 DR. DOPPELT: No.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

15 DR. FITZPATRICK: No.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

17 DR. KLEIN: No.

18 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

19 DR. SCHMIDT: No.

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

21 DR. FALLAT: No.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

23 DR. HARVATH: No.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

25 DR. NELSON: No.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

2 DR. SIMON: No.

3 DR. SMALLWOOD: The results of voting for
4 Question 2(c), unanimous no.

5 DR. NELSON: Question 3.

6 DR. SIMON: This is the notorious contact
7 question.

8 DR. YU: Do potential medical benefits to
9 contacts of parvovirus B19 infected donors warrant
10 identification and notification of positive donors?

11 DR. CHAMBERLAND: My take on Dr. Brown's
12 talk and when there was a little bit of discussion
13 about this, is that in terms of medical benefits,
14 if you stratify it by prevention of secondary
15 transmission, that just given the time frame, it is
16 unlikely to happen.

17 So, in terms of potential medical
18 benefits, you are unlikely to prevent secondary
19 transmission to a contact simply because of the
20 time considerations and the type period when there
21 is likely to be high-level viremia that could be
22 transmitted via the respiratory route.

23 However, I believe he did hold out the
24 possibility that in selected situations, probably
25 fairly rarely, that you might be able to have a

1 benefit in terms of potential treatment with
2 modalities, such as IVIG for some of the more
3 severe manifestations of parvovirus B19.

4 That was my take on it. People are
5 nodding their heads, they had a similar--

6 DR. BROWN: That was my intention.

7 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Okay. It is late in the
8 day and I wanted to make sure I (a) heard it
9 correctly; and (b) restated it correctly.

10 DR. NELSON: We have already voted yes on
11 1, didn't we, notify, or was that just defer?
12 Remove the product.

13 DR. GOLDING: Basil Golding. Sorry, I
14 will add it very quickly, I know it's getting
15 late.

16 A clinical benefit I see for people who
17 have HIV and are getting parvovirus infections and
18 are getting anemia, aplastic anemia, and it is
19 going to last for a long time, and they are going
20 to get stem cell transplants, the doctor needs to
21 know, so that they are not giving the wrong
22 treatment, instead of giving stem cell transplant,
23 as an example, where IGIV would have been much
24 better.

25 The same thing, if you have a pregnant

1 woman who had a contact early in the pregnancy, and
2 the fetus is then getting into trouble, I think it
3 would be helpful to know what the causation was,
4 and an intrauterine transfusion would also be
5 helpful.

6 Also, the question of arthritis where you
7 get long-term arthritis in some woman, it would be
8 helpful to know that it is not rheumatoid
9 arthritis, so there are diagnostic and other
10 modalities that are involved.

11 DR. SCHMIDT: I gave three reasons before
12 why I thought no. I would just like to add to
13 that. When we started testing for HIV, we told
14 people not to come in just to find out if they were
15 positive. Those are the bad guys, and we only
16 wanted to be nice to the good guys, I guess.

17 An interesting situation in the UK now,
18 they are worried about if they find a test for mad
19 cow disease, that people will stop donating blood
20 because they don't want to know that they are
21 positive for this. I mean it's a switch in the
22 other direction. But that might change if there is
23 some therapy for mad cow.

24 We have fights about whether we are doing
25 the wrong thing by giving away free T-shirts, but

1 also free cholesterol examinations. I just think
2 we ought to stay out of the whole business and just
3 do what we are supposed to do.

4 DR. BIANCO: Dr. Nelson, I am very
5 concerned about the consequences of what is being
6 discussed today. We started and actually, Dr.
7 Simon presented it very well, with a process that
8 was to try to make a product for patients that
9 receive those plasma derivatives better.

10 Now, when we move to another way, that we
11 created a complexity where maybe one or two
12 contacts a year in the country will benefit from a
13 process that will drive an entire community in the
14 way they collect blood.

15 My concern is that those regulatory
16 requirements will simply inhibit us, so instead,
17 people get it, contacts happen at home, they happen
18 in bed, husband and wife with a wife that is
19 pregnant. It is rare that we have an event like
20 Dr. Klein described. It is possible, it is
21 plausible, but it is rare.

22 If those requirements are imposed, this is
23 only going to delay the adoption of measures that
24 could help make patients, certain patients receive
25 or allow certain patients to receive a safer

1 product, because we simply are not going to do it.

2 It is so involved in so many requirements.

3 Unless there is a regulation that tell us to do,
4 and we know that that will take four or five years
5 at least to have a pre-release screening test that
6 would allow screening of all donors for testing for
7 CMV, that would be an equivalent model here, is
8 testing that is voluntary and is done in a
9 relatively small number of units, which is what
10 would probably be the approach to deal with those
11 patients at higher risk.

12 I am just concerned about the implications
13 that these will inhibit progress because of fear of
14 the impact of the regulation.

15 DR. KLEIN: I am going to disagree with
16 that point of view. I don't know whether it will
17 stop testing of single units or not, but it seems
18 to me that if you have tested individual donors,
19 you have a test result that could, in fact, impact
20 on health.

21 You (a) have a moral obligation to notify
22 the donor of their test results; and (b) you have a
23 moral obligation to indicate what action could be
24 taken to prevent some infection, whether that is
25 100,000 of them or whether it is three of them.

1 If you just test pools, it becomes a moot
2 point, but if you are testing individual donors,
3 and you are not giving the donor that result when
4 it may, in fact, impact upon either his or her
5 health or someone else's, I don't think that is the
6 appropriate thing.

7 Now, we are not talking about the ethical
8 issue, we are talking about whether there is
9 medical benefit. I think there might be a small
10 medical benefit, but I think if you are thinking in
11 the patient's interests, for those of us who are
12 hospital based, I would want to do that.

13 DR. BIANCO: I am sorry, Dr. Klein, I
14 agree with you 100 percent. We, in our proposal,
15 and unfortunately, the discussion, we did not, AABB
16 did not have a chance to present our joint program,
17 our proposal has been for minipool testing, it has
18 not been for individual donor screening.

19 If we come to the individual donor
20 screening, even if we were doing this limited
21 number like we do for CMV, I think it has to be
22 communicated to donor on the basis of ethics and on
23 the basis of medicine, and I agree with you.

24 But minipool is the issue today. We are
25 discussing an issue that actually is going to

1 impede the implementation of minipool because there
2 is a question can we test in minipool without
3 resolving to the single donor.

4 What we heard today in the summary from
5 Dr. Mei-ying is that the understanding is that we
6 should resolve those to the individual donor.

7 DR. SIMON: Maybe we should sort of divide
8 this into what is and what may be, and I think
9 right now the plasma industry does have widespread
10 testing in order to provide safer product.

11 As I understand it, in order to avoid
12 throwing out units that are perfectly good, they
13 have in many cases gone down to the individual
14 unit. They get this information about 20 or some
15 days after the donor has donated and by the time
16 you would have notification, and so forth, you
17 would be talking about a month or so.

18 I think at that point, the utility of
19 transmitting this information is extremely low, so
20 I would hope that they would not be encumbered with
21 this obligation for an action they have taken to
22 make the product safer and for an in-process
23 control because they happen to identify which unit.

24 I think if the blood banking organizations
25 ultimately move to doing this, like was reported by

1 Dr. Stramer in her Phase 2, where they are doing it
2 along with HIV and hepatitis B before release of
3 units, then, it becomes another factor, and I think
4 Dr. Klein's arguments would carry much more weight.

5 DR. FALLAT: We are putting the scenario
6 in Question 3, making the scenario very different
7 from Question 1, and now we are saying it's
8 minipools, and so we really don't know that the
9 person that has the positive viremia, therefore, it
10 is not going to be possible to remove that blood.

11 It seems to me if the only thing that is
12 going to be done is minipools, then, we need data
13 to find out just how big of a problem this is if
14 you did it on single donors or resolved it to
15 single donors perhaps more rapidly, because again
16 if you go back to those figures, if you have 1 in
17 15,000 that have a high titer, and you are giving
18 out in a year and a half, you have got 1,000 donors
19 that are receiving high-titer B19.

20 I would guess that at least 10 percent of
21 those will be people in high risk groups perhaps,
22 but this is all guess work. I think we need that
23 data before we can press forward with single donor
24 identification.

25 DR. HEALY: Dr. Nelson, this is Chris

1 Healy with PPTA. I just wanted to make the
2 committee aware of a point, and that is that the
3 issue of minipools and going down to the individual
4 donations is really kind of a red herring here.
5 The way that the testing is performed, the
6 companies do have unit identification bleed
7 numbers.

8 That can be accessed, whether you are down
9 at the minipool level or whether you are down to an
10 individual donation. What they do not have is
11 donor identification information, but information
12 about an individual unit, a bleed number, a unit
13 identification number can be found out at any point
14 throughout the process, whether you are looking at
15 a minipool or whether you are looking at an
16 individual donation. There is complete
17 traceability throughout the entire process.

18 So, the distinction between minipool and
19 individual donation is really immaterial here. The
20 critical distinction is do you have a donor's name,
21 do you have a donor's identification number, do you
22 have the center where that person donated, and are
23 you in a position to contact them.

24 That information does not exist in the
25 current strategies used for NAT testing of

1 parvovirus at the fractionator level.

2 DR. FALLAT: Would you clarify that then,
3 is Dr. Simon correct in saying it would take 20
4 days before you would identify that single
5 individual?

6 DR. HEALY: Yes, that is correct. It
7 takes quite a bit of time because what we look at
8 is from the time the collection is made to the time
9 the individual donation is identified, the
10 confirmation testing is done, the center is
11 contacted, the donor's file is pulled. They are
12 identified. Notice is sent out to them.

13 By the time you add all that up, in
14 addition to the inventory hold that is in place,
15 and all these other measures, by the time you add
16 that up, you are looking at quite a span of time,
17 yes.

18 DR. EPSTEIN: I would like to ask Dr.
19 Bianco a question. If testing is done on a
20 minipool and you get a positive pool, will there be
21 an effort or will there not be an effort to notify
22 hospitals that they may have transfused a
23 high-titer unit?

24 DR. BIANCO: That was not part of the
25 program for the minipool, stopping at an average of

1 20 units.

2 DR. EPSTEIN: So, you would have knowledge
3 that out of a pool of, say, 16, or 16 to 24,
4 however the case may be, there was a high-titer
5 unit, and the plan is not to tell the hospital?

6 DR. BIANCO: In that Phase 1, as we had
7 planned, the intent was not to notify the hospital
8 or the donor, and these would be done after the
9 expiration of the cellular products, after 42 days
10 of the collection.

11 In Phase 2, that is what Sue presented,
12 that is a pre-release testing, and then it would be
13 done like HIV or HCV.

14 DR. EPSTEIN: So, where does the scenario
15 arise where there might be an in-date unit? It
16 would not.

17 DR. BIANCO: In the minipool, in the way
18 we proposed, it would not. If we resolve to the
19 individual donor, then, the scenario that we are
20 discussing here certainly would apply, but that is
21 not the intent.

22 DR. EPSTEIN: Part of the issue is that
23 there has been a moving target. You know, we hear
24 different plans at different times. That is why
25 the agency is focused on the question of whether we

1 should be proactive and say that if whole blood
2 donors are being screened, that we should be
3 pushing toward interdicting the high-titer units
4 either in an interim phase where it's product
5 retrieval and lookback notification or ultimately
6 pre-screening and upfront interdiction.

7 DR. BIANCO: That is appropriate. Let's
8 say in this pool of average 20, there may be a
9 frozen red cell. Certainly, that frozen red cell
10 would be interdicted, but for all 20 units, not
11 knowing which one of them is the positive one.

12 DR. EPSTEIN: I think that what is being
13 overlooked here is that when you are transfusing
14 units and you have knowledge that they may be at
15 high titer or that they were, that drives toward a
16 situation of lookback. You know, you want to tell
17 the doctor that you used a high-titer unit, and it
18 drives toward a scenario of product retrievals from
19 inventory.

20 That is the phenomenon that is driving you
21 to work back toward the individual unit. So, you
22 end up there, you end up either doing upfront
23 screening as a release, in which case you identify
24 individual units, so that you don't have to throw
25 out dozens of units, or you end up identifying

1 individual units because you are engaging in
2 product retrievals or lookbacks.

3 DR. BIANCO: But we will do that for all
4 the 20 units in the minipool regardless. We will
5 lose the product.

6 DR. EPSTEIN: You will lose?

7 DR. BIANCO: The 20 frozen red cells.

8 DR. EPSTEIN: I am sorry. You would pitch
9 20--well, 20 frozen red cells, yes.

10 DR. BIANCO: That is correct.

11 DR. EPSTEIN: But in the upfront screening
12 scenario, if you use minipools--

13 DR. BIANCO: Then, that is different. If
14 it is upfront, if it is for release, it would be
15 treated like NAT today for HIV or HCV with
16 resolution to the individual donor and all the
17 actions taken.

18 DR. EPSTEIN: The whole idea of going from
19 Phase 1 to Phase 2 implicitly strikes me as
20 affirming Question 3. Question 3 is whether you
21 should work toward identifying individual units.
22 Now, we are asking if you do, should you also
23 notify, but the commitment to go from Phase 1 to
24 Phase 2 is a commitment to break down to individual
25 units. You are already there. The question then

1 is should you notify.

2 DR. BIANCO: Oh, if we are in Phase 2,
3 yes, I would be sitting there and saying yes.

4 DR. SIMON: Then, Dr. Epstein, should we
5 then divide this also between the transfusable unit
6 and the source plasma?

7 DR. EPSTEIN: Well, yes. Again, I think
8 Questions 3 and 4 were intended to work together,
9 and the answer for source plasma is really that
10 it's impractical under Question 4.

11 DR. BIANCO: Under the scenario of the
12 minipool for the whole blood, as Phase 1, would you
13 include it under Question 4?

14 DR. EPSTEIN: Yes, I think if you in Phase
15 1 and you are in a scenario where you have delayed
16 identification, then, it becomes under Question 4,
17 yes. Again, the underlying issue is whether the
18 goal here is to screen units for transfusion.

19 Now, Question 1(b) said we are not there
20 yet, we shouldn't be taking that position, and I am
21 saying that if, in fact, you move to "real-time"
22 testing at any point, you are faced with the
23 scenario of Question 3.

24 DR. BIANCO: But that I think is as I
25 affirmed even to Dr. Klein, is the scenario of all

1 tests that we apply. I personally and my
2 organization would have no objection.

3 DR. EPSTEIN: But it is not true, Celso.
4 In CMV, you do not notify a donor. The one-time
5 ALT, you don't notify a donor. With the one-time
6 anti-core, you don't notify a donor. It is not
7 automatic that we think you should notify a donor.
8 It needs to be asked.

9 I have only been pointing out that to
10 argue that we never get there because we only test
11 pools is wrong thinking. We will end up, at some
12 point, testing individual units at least for whole
13 blood, and then the question becomes material
14 whether we think we should notify.

15 Again, I would suggest that we do not
16 always notify.

17 DR. BIANCO: I agree with you. I think
18 that we are not distinguishing here clearly the
19 minipool testing with no resolution of the minipool
20 versus the individual unit testing in any scenario
21 for the whole blood donor. Even if you have a very
22 delayed testing for a whole blood donor to resolve
23 to the individual unit, you certainly would come
24 with the ethical questions that Dr. Klein raised.

25 DR. EPSTEIN: I think we can disentangle

1 this if we change it to B19 infected donors and
2 just strike the word "identification," in other
3 words, if you have found an individual donor is the
4 point here.

5 DR. DiMICHELE: Are we talking about the
6 donor, though, or the contact?

7 DR. EPSTEIN: No, no, no.

8 DR. DiMICHELE: The way it is framed, it
9 is about the contact, and not about the donor.

10 DR. EPSTEIN: That is correct, but the
11 issue is do the benefits to the contact warrant
12 notifying an individual positive donor.

13 DR. NELSON: Right. So, you would notify
14 the donor,

15 DR. EPSTEIN: What I am doing is I am
16 removing the identification of because that is the
17 whole issue of breaking down a minipool.

18 DR. NELSON: Right, exactly.

19 DR. EPSTEIN: So, I am splitting the issue
20 out. If you find yourself in the situation of
21 identifying an individual positive donor, should
22 you notify based on potential benefit to contacts.

23 DR. BIANCO: If I were sitting there, I
24 would vote yes.

25 DR. NELSON: Can we vote on that? Let's

1 vote. Linda.

2 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question No. 3, as
3 modified. Do potential medical benefits to
4 contacts of parvovirus B19 infected donors warrant
5 notification of positive donors?

6 Vote. Allen.

7 DR. ALLEN: Yes.

8 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.

9 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Yes.

10 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.

11 DR. DAVIS: No.

12 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.

13 DR. DiMICHELE: Yes.

14 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.

15 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.

17 DR. FITZPATRICK: I am going to abstain
18 because I think that notification is a due process
19 of medical ethics and when you have a result, you
20 need to notify the donor, and it is not because of
21 the medical benefits to contacts.

22 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.

23 DR. KLEIN: Yes.

24 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.

25 DR. SCHMIDT: No.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.

2 DR. FALLAT: Yes.

3 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.

4 DR. HARVATH: Yes.

5 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.

6 DR. NELSON: Yes.

7 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.

8 DR. SIMON: Yes, under the assumption we
9 will get to several weeks in No. 4.

10 DR. FALLAT: Dr. Nelson, are we going to
11 consider the question of should we notify the
12 recipient of a high titer B19?

13 DR. NELSON: That is a question we weren't
14 asked, but theoretically, if you identified a
15 high-titer specimen, you wouldn't transfuse it.

16 DR. SMALLWOOD: Results of voting for
17 Question 3. There were 8 yes votes, 2 no votes, one
18 abstention, and the industry representative agreed
19 with the yes vote.

20 DR. NELSON: No. 4. I am ready to vote.

21 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Question 4, there is a
22 lot of wiggle room. It says should donor
23 notification be limited to settings where testing
24 and notification can be completed within several
25 weeks of donation.

1 What are people's view of what "several
2 weeks" are?

3 DR. SIMON: I think the intention here
4 would be to split--I hope I am interpreting
5 correctly--the transfusable product situation where
6 they are going to be doing this rather soon after
7 donation and discriminating down to minipool
8 individual unit versus the source plasma situation
9 where it is going to be several weeks.

10 It might be clearer to say, if yes to
11 Question 3, should this exclude the source plasma
12 donation situation, or if that is how it is
13 interpreted, I would say yes to Question 4. I know
14 that several weeks is kind of questionable, but I
15 think that is the intention, to discriminate
16 between those two situations.

17 I would hope we agree that in the source
18 plasma situation with this passage of time, that it
19 would not be appropriate to notify.

20 DR. DiMICHELE: I think you could
21 interpret that question in a different way. I mean
22 the way you could also interpret it would be, you
23 know, if it is past the two-week period of viremia,
24 is it going to make any difference to the contact,
25 if you notify them or you don't notify them.

1 I think based on some of the information
2 that has been presented by Dr. Brown, I guess in
3 some circumstances, it might still benefit the
4 contact. It becomes a tricky issue again the way
5 it is stated and depending on how you interpret it.

6 DR. NELSON: If the contact is an AIDS
7 patient who is now on erythropoietin, yes, it would
8 make a difference.

9 DR. CHAMBERLAND: I think you are really
10 stuck here because you can always come back to
11 that. For some people, the rare person, there
12 might be a potential medical benefit.

13 I totally share the concerns that have
14 been raised about the implementation of this and
15 the communication of these messages is just really
16 extraordinarily difficult to think about, but I am
17 no sure in all honesty that you can say, or unless
18 people have--I mean there are ways to go about
19 trying to model this and do all those sorts of
20 things, these medical decision analyses, and things
21 like that.

22 I don't know whether this is one of these
23 situations where it is potentially amenable where
24 you can try and put a quantifiable handle on it,
25 although oftentimes in the setting of questions

1 that relate to the safety of the blood and plasma
2 supply, people are somewhat averse to reducing it
3 to quantifiable estimates, but that is where I
4 continue to just kind of get stuck at.

5 DR. SIMON: I think we haven't, in this
6 discussion, talked about down sides of
7 notification, and we are talking about a very rare
8 benefit here, the AIDS patient, the
9 immunocompromised who might get IVIG, which could
10 still be considered experimental therapy, versus
11 people are going to have consternation for no
12 reason, get a lot of medical testing and evaluation
13 for no reason, see the doctor, and accumulate bills
14 they can ill afford.

15 So, there are significant down sides and
16 when we are out several weeks and the contacts have
17 already been made, it seems to me we have such
18 elusive possible benefits that the down sides
19 become--to me, they outweigh the benefits.

20 DR. NELSON: I am not sure about the down
21 sides. A person could get a hemoglobin and if it's
22 okay, or a reticulocyte count, if it's okay, then,
23 the infection is over.

24 DR. SIMON: Those cost money. Often
25 people don't have money for that, and there is

1 medical-legal risks or people who don't think they
2 have been notified appropriately. So, I mean I
3 think there are down sides and I think the benefit
4 here is so elusive and so minimal that I personally
5 don't feel that, at this time level, that it is
6 reasonable to ask the industry to make a contact.

7 DR. BIANCO: I would like to suggest a
8 solution. It is not just the source plasma, Toby,
9 it is also the minipool testing where we did not
10 resolve to the individual donor.

11 What Dr. Epstein has suggested, remove
12 identification from No. 3, I would transfer
13 identification to No. 4. If yes to Question 3, if
14 the donor is identified within several weeks of
15 donations, or should notification be limited to
16 settings where the donor has been identified within
17 several weeks of donation, because then we focus on
18 the individual that would be the object of that
19 donation, can we notify the donor within a certain
20 reasonable period of time or we miss the boat, or
21 we did not resolve the minipool.

22 DR. DiMICHELE: It seems to me that
23 Question 4 actually still refers to the contacts,
24 which is what we answered in Question 3, you know,
25 whether we should limit it to contacts is one

1 issue, but I believe it refers to Question 3.

2 I just wanted to make one other statement,
3 and that is, you know, when we try to resolve this
4 on medical-ethical issues, it becomes very
5 complicated, because the question involves
6 expectation of the donor, expectation of donor
7 contacts. It involves social good and ultimate
8 making decisions on the basis of good to society or
9 making decisions on the basis of good to individual
10 patients.

11 You know, do we develop a policy that
12 protects the least among us or the greater good. I
13 think this becomes a very, very complicated
14 question. Certainly, the testing and notification
15 policies that have gone on heretofore have
16 certainly focused on the individual and the
17 expectation of an individual and an individual
18 donor, which is sort of a very individualistic
19 approach to this philosophy, but it is a tricky
20 question and I think we have to decide on which
21 basis we are going to answer that question.

22 DR. FALLAT: Could I get a clarification?
23 If you find something like this, do the blood banks
24 consider that they have to go directly to the
25 patient, and not through their physician? If you

1 go through the physician, isn't that kind of
2 helping resolve a lot of these ethical issues?

3 DR. SIMON: No, you go to the donor. The
4 blood bank has a relationship with the donor. You
5 have no idea who the physician is, and some
6 organizations have the center physician assume that
7 role, but you are definitely going to the donor.

8 DR. SCHMIDT: The question was about
9 patient, not donor.

10 DR. SIMON: These are donors here.

11 DR. NELSON: The other big problem is this
12 might be pretty frequent from some of the data that
13 was presented.

14 DR. SIMON: It is only the high titer. I
15 mean this is a hit or miss thing, which is the
16 other thing. If somebody donates right before they
17 hit their high titer, and their brother has AIDS,
18 they are not going to be notified.

19 DR. NELSON: Right.

20 DR. DiMICHELE: Are we answering the
21 question about the contacts, though, or the donors?

22 DR. NELSON: You are not notifying the
23 contacts. It is the donor's responsibility if his
24 wife is pregnant or if his roommate has AIDS, or
25 something like that, in other words, you would

1 educate him about what this means. The donor would
2 almost always be healthy by the time you got to
3 this.

4 DR. DiMICHELE: But we are notifying the
5 donor based on potential medical benefit to the
6 contact, even if it's beyond several weeks after
7 donation. That's the question we are answering.

8 DR. NELSON: Right. That is the issue.

9 DR. KLEIN: This says within several
10 weeks.

11 DR. CHAMBERLAND: Right, and so in Toby's
12 shorthand, I mean it includes both the whole blood
13 donors, as well as the source plasma donors. That
14 is what the shorthand here is for.

15 DR. SIMON: You are answering no, right?
16 Yes would not include the plasma donors as I
17 interpret it, and no would.

18 DR. NELSON: Because of the word "limited
19 to."

20 DR. SMALLWOOD: Question 4. If yes to
21 Question 3, should donor notification be limited to
22 settings where testing and notification can be
23 completed within several weeks of donation?

24 Vote. Allen.

25 DR. ALLEN: Yes.

1 DR. SMALLWOOD: Chamberland.
2 DR. CHAMBERLAND: No.
3 DR. SMALLWOOD: Davis.
4 DR. DAVIS: Abstain.
5 DR. SMALLWOOD: DiMichele.
6 DR. DiMICHELE: No, on the basis of a
7 slightly different interpretation of the question
8 that Toby has sort of iterated.
9 DR. SMALLWOOD: Doppelt.
10 DR. DOPPELT: Yes.
11 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fitzpatrick.
12 DR. FITZPATRICK: No.
13 DR. SMALLWOOD: Klein.
14 DR. KLEIN: Yes.
15 DR. SMALLWOOD: Schmidt.
16 DR. SCHMIDT: Yes.
17 DR. SMALLWOOD: Fallat.
18 DR. FALLAT: Yes.
19 DR. SMALLWOOD: Harvath.
20 DR. HARVATH: Yes.
21 DR. SMALLWOOD: Nelson.
22 DR. NELSON: No.
23 DR. SMALLWOOD: Dr. Simon.
24 DR. SIMON: Yes.
25 DR. SMALLWOOD: Results of voting for

1 Question No. 4. Six yes votes, 4 no votes, 1
2 abstention, and the industry representative agreed
3 with the yes votes.

4 DR. NELSON: I guess that's it.

5 [Whereupon, at 7:00 p.m., the meeting was
6 adjourned.]

7 - - -