

Science at Work in CDRH:

A Report on the Role of Science in the Regulatory Process

Final Report

**Submitted by the
External Review Subcommittee
Center for Devices and Radiological Health**

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1 **I. Introduction**

2 The mission of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) is to promote
3 and protect the health of the public by ensuring safe and effective medical devices and
4 safe radiological products. The Center's public health mission requires working with a
5 broad spectrum of stakeholders, ranging from consumers to medical professionals to the
6 regulated industry. All of these expect CDRH to manage risks presented by advancing
7 technology and changing use patterns and to do so with effective use of organizational
8 resources.

9 The Center programs have been shaped with stakeholder input. Center management is
10 well underway in implementing the FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA), and it appears to
11 have managed available resources responsibly. Although five years ago the Center had
12 an unacceptable backlog in medical device applications, through programmatic
13 reengineering and increases in productivity the backlog has been eliminated.

14 Yet rapid changes in culture and technology threaten to overwhelm the Center's limited
15 resources. Medical technology is changing rapidly, information systems are evolving so
16 fast that e-mails have transformed traditional communication, scientific disciplines are
17 merging, and the business of health care (as well as the manufacturing of medical
18 products) is becoming global.

19 External pressures are compounding the problem. As Congress and the Administration
20 balance the budget by shrinking government, CDRH must justify resource needs. At the
21 same time, internal shifts have compromised the Center's science base, and its
22 infrastructure is eroding in areas such as information systems, laboratory equipment, and
23 training. Personnel issues are also affecting the Center's ability to do its job with at least
24 a third of the Center's staff being eligible for retirement. Before institutional knowledge
25 is lost, it is vital to share and capture this expertise.

26 In the midst of this change, CDRH must ask itself how it can continue being an effective
27 agent of consumer protection and health promotion and how it can mold itself into the
28 medical device and radiological health agency of the future - one that embodies
29 predictability, timeliness, flexibility, transparency, interactiveness and effectiveness. To
30 accomplish this, CDRH has developed a strategic plan and is beginning the
31 implementation phase. The Center expects to update CDRH's mission, assess its current
32 situation, envision the future and identify strategic issues, set goals and strategies, obtain
33 feedback and support from staff and stakeholders, guide implementation and
34 institutionalize a scientific approach to carrying out its mission.

35 The assumptions that underlie the plan are that the Center views science as the fuel for
36 the regulatory engine. The plan aims to assure that CDRH will consider products from
37 concept to obsolescence, i.e. the total product life cycle (TPLC), will meet all statutory
38 responsibilities, meet its own quality standards, consider stakeholders as partners, and
39 will follow an approach that is least burdensome while maintaining regulatory
40 effectiveness and integrity. The Subcommittee endorses these assumptions and aims, but
41 in addition adds the importance of limiting the influence of non-scientific factors.

42 The CDRH document on Goals and Strategies includes four areas: the total product life
43 cycle (TPLC); magnet for excellence; meaningful metrics; and knowledge management.
44 Intrinsic to these four areas is the fact that CDRH is a science-based organization with
45 unique scientific expertise. Its regulatory decisions, from approving and clearing new
46 products to the surveillance of existing ones, depend on asking and answering the right
47 scientific questions in a predictable, transparent, and timely manner. In making these
48 decisions, CDRH must identify relevant scientific issues, develop and collect evidence to
49 address the issues, and then assess and judge the evidence. If CDRH is to do this, it must
50 maintain its scientific expertise and be poised to adapt to new scientific and technical
51 challenges for the future.

52 To help assure the quality and relevance of the Agency's regulatory decisions, the FDA
53 Commissioner has directed CDRH and the other FDA Centers to examine how science is
54 used in their respective organizations. This includes an assessment of whether the needed
55 scientific expertise is available currently, whether it is effectively used, and a
56 determination of the scientific expertise needed for the future. This has led to the external
57 science review presented in this report. The Subcommittee appointed to conduct this
58 review, and which has authored this report, only hopes that its findings and
59 recommendations will provide CDRH with the help it is seeking.

60 **II. Science Review Background, Subcommittee Charge, and Objectives**

61 The review of the individual FDA Centers by Subcommittees of the FDA Science Board
62 began three years ago with the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
63 and more recently included the Center for Food Safety and Nutrition (CFSAN). The
64 summaries of these reviews were presented publicly at the Science Board with
65 recommendations to the Commissioner of the FDA. These initial science reviews
66 examined only the peer review process and the research programs of CBER and CFSAN.
67 Their emphasis was primarily on laboratory research, although epidemiological and
68 statistical research programs were also reviewed.

69 CDRH could have structured its external review in a similar manner; however, it
70 chose to broaden its review. Reasoning that science is the fundamental building block of
71 almost all of the organization's activities, the Center director decided to look at the role
72 science plays throughout CDRH, and in their regulatory decisions. With the theme,
73 "Science at work", the purpose of the review was to assess the quality of science across
74 the organization and its relevance to the organization's regulatory mission.

75 The CDRH External Science Review Subcommittee charge originated from FDA's
76 Science Board. The charter provides for the assembly of a committee with at least 2
77 members from the FDA's Science Board. CDRH assembled this committee with 13
78 members (see Attachment 1) from academia, industry, and government agencies. The
79 Subcommittee was diverse, not only with respect to the source of the members, but also
80 from their areas of expertise and experience, as indicated by the following: two
81 cardiologists, one neurosurgeon, three biomedical engineering faculty, one statistician,
82 two medical device company representatives, one software expert from NASA, one

83 human factors expert, and one non-US government (Canada) regulatory agency
84 representative.

85 The Subcommittee's objectives were to make observations, conclusions, and
86 recommendations regarding CDRH's use of science and scientific expertise, its overall
87 structure, and its readiness for the future. Furthermore, The timing of this science review
88 is fortunate, in that it comes during the formative stage of the Center's strategic plan and
89 at a time where over the next five years there will be a significant number of retirements.
90 This provides CDRH with a unique opportunity, and it is hoped that the
91 recommendations of the Review Subcommittee will help the Center better utilize its
92 scientific resources, both internal and external.

93 Following an Internal Review that is described in the next section, the external process
94 started with the convening of the CDRH External Science Review Subcommittee on June
95 19 for an orientation session. This meeting was hosted by the Petit Institute for
96 Bioengineering and Bioscience on the campus of the Georgia Institute of Technology in
97 Atlanta, Georgia. This was followed by a three-day meeting held on July 24-26, at
98 multiple CDRH buildings located in Rockville, Maryland. The Subcommittee agenda
99 included the review of case studies, role-playing in focus sessions, and interviews with
100 foreign government, industry, and CDRH staff. The Subcommittee made observations,
101 drew conclusions, and developed recommendations. Finally on August 8, 2001, a
102 subgroup drafted the Subcommittee's report and this was finalized through a series of
103 electronic exchanges. On November 16, 2001 the Subcommittee's final report with their
104 findings and recommendations will be presented to FDA's Science Board, the
105 Commissioner of the FDA, and to the CDRH leadership.

106 **III. Process of Science Review**

107 The approach taken was simply to review "science at work" within CDRH. To this end,
108 the Subcommittee considered both an overview of the Center's purpose, structure, and
109 function, as well as an in-depth review focused on a specific device type, i.e., electrical
110 stimulation devices. This allowed the Subcommittee to view the science-based
111 regulatory decision-making process in action along the total product life cycle, from
112 concept to obsolescence. Even though much of the focus of this science review was on
113 electrical stimulation devices, the Subcommittee believes that its findings and
114 recommendations have a more general application to the enhancement of science in
115 CDRH's regulatory decision making.

116 **A. Internal Review**

117 An important part of the total science review process and an important input to this
118 Subcommittee was the internal review conducted by CDRH. When in July 1999, CDRH
119 Senior Management decided to conduct a science review, it was agreed that the focus of
120 the review should be on a single cross cutting technological area in order to perform a
121 detailed assessment that was sufficiently detailed but also manageable. The field of
122 electrical stimulation devices was chosen because it was felt that these products would

123 effectively illustrate the depth and breadth of science in the Center, how and when
124 scientific expertise is brought to bear on regulatory decision-making, and why science is
125 essential to protecting public health.

126 Twelve internal experts in the electrical stimulation field, chosen to represent all of the
127 Offices of the Center (predominately composed of non-managerial staff) were appointed
128 to this Science Review Team and this internal group was officially charged with
129 developing a protocol for the Center’s Science Review. The objective for this review was
130 to investigate whether CDRH is a science-based organization, has taken a broad view of
131 science in the Center, and has taken the necessary steps to develop and enhance the
132 required science base. During the course of the development of the Science Review, the
133 establishment of a long-range strategic management plan for the Center was initiated.
134 Concepts from the Science Review Team helped to shape and provide the underpinnings
135 of the Center’s Total Product Life Cycle paradigm. This Team also proposed to Senior
136 Management that the science review look at case studies involving as many regulatory
137 activities across the life cycle as possible.

138 The specific product areas chosen for the case studies were cardiac pacemakers, cochlear
139 implants, deep brain stimulators and external defibrillators. These four were chosen
140 because they illustrated different scientific issues at different points in the product life
141 cycle, recurrent scientific issues at different points in the product life cycle, diverse
142 scientific issues within a single phase of the total product life cycle, and the challenges in
143 identifying and bringing all appropriate internal science-related resources to bear on a
144 specific issue in a timely manner.

145 Once the framework for the science review was established, this proposal was discussed
146 with FDA Senior Management and the independent FDA Science Board. It was agreed
147 that a report resulting from an internal evaluation would provide an external committee
148 with the prerequisite information to conduct its review. CDRH Senior Management
149 nominated Branch Chiefs and Division Directors from all of the Center's Offices to
150 conduct the internal evaluation. This Internal Subcommittee of ten and the Science
151 Review Team together finalized the protocol.

152 The ground rules for the internal review included:

- 153 • the review not be a retrospective evaluation of individual decisions, or their
154 correctness, rather an instrument to evaluate the overall role of science in the
155 Center’s decision-making;
- 156 • the review not focus primarily on “process,” i.e., on the methods employed to do the
157 job, but have process enter the assessment only to the extent that it might help
158 identify the activities performed and shed light on CDRH’s use of science in
159 decision-making; and
- 160 • the review be reflective of the Center's current practice, with a 5-year historical
161 boundary being imposed (while some areas covered during the review, such as the
162 developmental history of cochlear implants, required looking into earlier time

163 periods, the standard practice was to consider procedures/decisions made during the
164 past 5 years).

165 In February 2001, the internal science review was initiated. The Internal Review
166 Committee began by conducting in-depth interviews of CDRH staff that worked on the
167 four case studies, as well as interviews with their supervisors. The Internal Review
168 Committee members doing the interviews did not participate directly with the case
169 studies being evaluated. They identified the case study issues for this evaluation.

170 In addition to these interviews, the Internal Review Committee asked each Office
171 Director to document: a series of issues ranging from an assessment of Scientific decision
172 making in the Office, including how information comes in, how issues are identified, and
173 how science is used in those programs/functions, to an identification of the core
174 competencies that lead to good science and how CDRH can provide for this. Based on
175 the findings from the case study interviews and the responses from the Office Directors,
176 the Internal Review Committee drafted an internal review report. This report was
177 provided to the External Review Subcommittee at the June 19, 2001 Orientation meeting
178 in Atlanta, Georgia.

179 Subsequent to this orientation and prior to the on-site CDRH review, the following
180 information was provided to the Review Subcommittee:

- 181 • CDRH Current Situation Analysis;
- 182 • Recommendations and Observations From the CDRH Science Review Team and
183 Internal Review Committee;
- 184 • Top Ten List of Greatest Challenges & Problems for Science-Based Regulation at
185 CDRH; and
- 186 • Top Ten List of CDRH Recommendations to Itself for Science-Based Regulation.

187 This Subcommittee commends CDRH for the substantive nature of this internal review
188 and the spirit in which it was conducted. Not only did it provide a meaningful
189 self-assessment by CDRH, but together with the additional information provided, the
190 Subcommittee received a foundation of knowledge from which it could launch its own
191 review.

192 **B. External Review**

193 For the external part of this review, the Subcommittee's agenda included reviewing
194 CDRH's overall structure, seeing science in use by reviewing multiple cases studies on
195 electrical stimulation devices, conducting in-depth interviews with CDRH staff on these
196 cases, challenging their actions and decisions, interviewing European and Canadian
197 government officials regarding their respective regulatory processes, and role-playing
198 using historical data in focused sessions with CDRH staff. The Subcommittee was given
199 a wealth of information. This was provided in many different ways and ranged from
200 reviewing documents to interviewing staff, industry, and foreign government regulatory
201 officials.

202
203 As noted previously, the Subcommittee's objectives were to make observations,
204 conclusions, and recommendations regarding CDRH's use of science and its readiness for

205 the future. Although in many ways this external review was both extensive and
206 exhaustive, the Subcommittee did not have time to directly review the use of science in
207 the Office of Compliance. Furthermore, the Subcommittee in no way believes that it has
208 the knowledge to offer recommendations at a micro-management level. Rather, the
209 Subcommittee has attempted to provide recommendations of a more overall nature,
210 leaving it to CDRH and FDA to determine how changes that are needed should be
211 implemented.

212 **1. Documents Reviewed**

213 At the orientation session held in Atlanta, the Subcommittee was provided with a variety
214 of documents, proposed agenda items for the July 24-26 meeting, and other information.
215 This included: panel questions, a broad overview of the Subcommittee task, Total
216 Product Life Cycle (TPLC) and Science Based Regulation materials, in depth case
217 studies, and a product listing for an on-the-spot review. The Subcommittee had the
218 opportunity to review these with CDRH staff. At that point, the Subcommittee shaped the
219 final agenda and panel questions and assigned review teams for the case studies.

220 During the July 24-26, 2001 panel meeting, the Subcommittee requested additional
221 information regarding the budget and structure of the Center, as well as on specific
222 510(k) notifications and premarket approval applications. The Subcommittee reviewed
223 this information and interviewed the staff accordingly.

224 **2. Interviews**

225 **a) CDRH staff**

226 *Case Study Review Teams*

227 The Subcommittee decided to assign two to three members to be responsible for
228 reviewing in depth each of the four different case studies: Cardiac Pacemakers; Deep
229 Brain Stimulators; Cochlear Implants; and Automatic External Defibrillators. These four
230 Subcommittee review teams interviewed a variety of CDRH staff, ranging from front line
231 reviewers to mid-level management. CDRH staff included anywhere from seven to 15
232 people at any given time with, for example, some of the following expertise represented:
233 clinicians, engineers, statisticians, audiologists, physical therapists, nurses and other
234 scientists. A wide spectrum of expertise was involved in these interactive dialogue
235 sessions. In each of these interviews, a portion of the time mid-level management was
236 excused from the session to provide an environment in which staff could be totally open
237 and honest. As stated earlier, these case studies were selected because, in combination,
238 they covered the major aspects of the Total Product Life Cycle model. Although the
239 focus was on electrical stimulation devices, it was felt that the issues identified were
240 generic and, hence, conclusions drawn from the review of these case studies would be
241 generally applicable to other device areas.

242 *On-the-spot Reviews*

243 The Subcommittee tested the quality of the scientific reviews by requesting to see
244 documents about the decisions that CDRH made in the last 5 years on electrical
245 stimulation devices. Through this process, the Subcommittee was given free access to
246 any information individual members deemed of interest. CDRH staff provided all
247 requested information and coordinated interviews with respective reviewers regarding
248 their decisions. Several front line reviewers were interviewed regarding their decisions
249 and asked to summarize the issues relating to the submissions and overall review.

250 *Role Playing*

251 In order to give the Subcommittee a better idea of the difficulties CDRH staff faced in
252 making science-based regulatory decisions, the Subcommittee had the opportunity to
253 role-play as CDRH staffers during the meeting, using two actual scenarios—one a pre-
254 IDE situation and the other involving a postmarketing problem. In the pre-IDE session,
255 the Subcommittee had to deal with a new device to manage cardiac arrhythmias.
256 Fundamental questions were raised, including what expertise in software was needed,
257 what data were necessary to support the intended use of the device, and how the review
258 could be completed in a timely manner.

259 In the postmarket session, the Subcommittee was placed in the position of dealing with a
260 safety issue regarding anti-theft devices interfering with pacemakers and implanted
261 cardiac defibrillators. This focus session involved working with adverse event reports
262 and collaboration with another federal agency.

263 *Union and Senior Management*

264 The Subcommittee interviewed the union (NTEU) and Center senior management
265 regarding issues and challenges that CDRH will face in the future. The union
266 management included the NTEU FDA Chapter President and two CDRH union stewards.
267 CDRH senior management interviews included several of the office directors (OST,
268 OSB, ODE) and division directors (OSB and ODE).

269 **b) Industry Interviews**

270 CDRH arranged interviews with individuals from four companies (Dr. Eric Fain, St. Jude
271 Medical; Paul Citron, Medtronic; Peter Jacobson, ELA Medical; Dr. Steven Staller,
272 Cochlear Corp) in the industries that the case studies involved. The Subcommittee was
273 allowed to talk candidly with the industry representatives regarding their perspective on
274 CDRH science and expertise, and the Center's overall readiness for the future. These four
275 industry representative provided small versus large and US based versus non-US based
276 perspectives, in addition to a broader device industry perspective on the FDA use of
277 science.

278 **c) International Interviews**

279 To bring a global perspective into the picture, the Subcommittee interviewed two foreign
280 government officials, one from the United Kingdom and one from Canada, regarding

281 their regulatory processes. From these two interviews, the Subcommittee was able to
282 compare the U.S. with both Canada and Europe.

283 Dr. David Jefferies, Director of the Medical Device Agency (MDA) in the United
284 Kingdom, explained regulatory classification and the role of notified bodies in approving
285 medical devices in Europe. He noted the small size of the U.K. regulatory staff compared
286 with that of CDRH, and the use of outside experts and committees. For analysis of new
287 medical devices, the EU relies on independent commercial entities, designated notified
288 bodies. Notified bodies assess conformance to the essential requirements as specified in
289 the Medical Devices Directive, Active Implantable Medical Devices Directive, or *In-*
290 *Vitro* Diagnostics Directive (i.e., the European equivalents to the U.S. *Code of Federal*
291 *Regulations* applicable to medical devices and *in- vitro* diagnostic products). The
292 notified bodies are supported by fees collected from manufacturers for premarket reviews
293 and quality system audits, with the integrity of the process based on a combination of
294 government oversight by a Competent Authority in the country the notified body is
295 registered and the manufacturer's legal responsibility to comply with national medical
296 device laws (i.e., the transposition of the EU directives into national law).

297 The notified bodies place their major emphasis on confirming that devices meet technical
298 specifications and comply with appropriate international or European standards, with
299 lesser emphasis placed on clinical trials or performance (either pre-market or post-
300 market). Dr. Jeffries stated, however, that Europe needs more clinical investigations
301 before marketing medical products, and explained the drawbacks inherent in relying
302 solely on notified bodies in approving new medical products.

303 Although notified bodies have the responsibility for premarket evaluation and approval,
304 which allows for CE marking of medical devices, the MDA has the authority to take
305 appropriate regulatory action on marketed devices in the U.K. Postmarket events that
306 result in product failure or patient injury, for example, are reported to the Competent
307 Authority in the country in which the event occurs. In the U.K. such reports are
308 submitted to MDA. Dr. Jeffries noted the small size of the U.K. regulatory staff
309 compared with that of CDRH, and the need for greater reliance on use of outside experts
310 and committees.

311 Ms. Beth Pieteron, a member of this Subcommittee and the Director of Medical Devices
312 Bureau Health Canada provided her perspective on Canada's regulatory structure and
313 processes. The information she provided suggested that Canada was a hybrid of the
314 European and American systems.

315

316 **IV. Findings**

317 The Subcommittee made its evaluation of CDRH science-based decision-making and
318 future preparedness with an emphasis on: 1) focus of the scientific questions, 2) scientific
319 breadth and depth (content), 3) communication and integration of science, and 4)
320 timeliness of decision-making. The Subcommittee viewed science in the *broad sense*,

321 incorporating scientific, engineering, medical, physiological, and procedural approaches
322 and findings. In this section its findings are presented, and in this the Subcommittee has
323 grouped these observations and findings into three areas: scientific expertise, human
324 resource issues, and organizational and process issues.

325 **A. Scientific Expertise**

326 To provide a basis for making judgments about the scientific expertise of the Center for
327 Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the Subcommittee reviewed the organization
328 of CDRH as related to scientific personnel, heard presentations of four case studies and
329 asked numerous questions about them, conducted interviews of four industry
330 representatives about the quality of scientific judgments as related to applications
331 submitted by their companies, talked to personnel from the Office of Science and
332 Technology and from the Office of Device Evaluation, and conducted “on-the-spot”
333 reviews of a number of past decisions. From these multiple different perspectives of the
334 Center, the Subcommittee came away convinced of the commitment of the Center and its
335 personnel to the public welfare.

336 The Subcommittee was further convinced of the willingness of the staff to work hard,
337 often on tasks unlikely to be recognized, and to struggle with and resolve conflicting
338 goals of timelines versus complete scientific knowledge. The Subcommittee thought that
339 the staff made and continues to make decisions that are, on the whole, balanced and
340 well-founded in terms of their underlying science. The fundamental challenge to the
341 Center is to make decisions quickly and at the same time on a sound scientific basis, so
342 that beneficial technology can be available and harmful technology can be removed from
343 public use without delay.

344 The External Review Subcommittee found this Center to be an agency staffed by
345 excellent people who are doing a good job in dealing with their assigned tasks. At the
346 same time, the Subcommittee’s judgment, consistent with that of the Center’s staff, was
347 that there is stress in the system and room for improvement, especially as one looks out
348 toward future years. This is elaborated in the findings in the following paragraphs.

349 **1. Science and the Regulatory Decision-making Process**

350 The Subcommittee strongly reaffirms the fundamental principle that good science is
351 critical to good decision-making within the CDRH. Scientific and engineering expertise
352 is a core component of the decisions on the substance of the questions that come before
353 the Center, and well founded decisions require substantial scientific judgments. In the
354 case studies presented to the Subcommittee and in other studies selected for on-the-spot
355 examination by the Subcommittee, the vital issues always involved the science,
356 engineering, and related physiological and medical issues underlying the question at
357 hand. The need for sound science is broadly understood in reaching good decisions on
358 complex new initiatives.

359 The presence of strong scientific knowledge allowed rapid approvals to be issued,
360 notwithstanding paperwork or procedural problems, and also allowed serious potential

361 problems in devices already in use to be detected before many people were affected by
362 them. A consistent finding in the interviews with industry representatives was that they
363 were frustrated by delays that they saw as being merely procedural or bureaucratic but
364 were supportive of, and in some instances welcomed, those conversations with the Center
365 revolving around substantial, relevant scientific, engineering, or medical issues.

366 **2. The Present Level of Scientific Expertise in the CDRH**

367 The overall high quality of CDRH reviewers, medical officers, scientists and engineers
368 was evident throughout the presentations. Some staff members are recognized authorities
369 in their fields through publications and standards bodies. The range of expertise across
370 diverse topics --- atrial pacing, bones density, and batteries, as examples --- was
371 impressive. In-depth expertise exists on several topics studied in the labs of the Office of
372 Science and Technology and expertise in some sections of the Office of Device
373 Evaluation is considerable.

374 Nonetheless, it also was evident to the CDRH staff and to the Subcommittee that
375 expertise across fields is uneven. For example, there are no medical officers who are
376 neurologists or psychiatrists and there appeared to be no behavioral or cognitive
377 scientists. Although the Subcommittee review was limited to electrical stimulation
378 devices, it would not be surprising if there were gaps in knowledge in other scientific
379 areas important to CDRH. In other fields central to some review judgments, such as
380 human factors, or computer science (especially software reliability), expertise is limited
381 to a few people who are spread across too many tasks. Further, use of outside experts is
382 limited by organizational barriers, budgets, and time constraints, by concerns about
383 confidentiality and conflicts, and by legal requirements for action within restricted time
384 windows. It should be noted that these factors could adversely affect a scientific
385 approach. Even when the CDRH has expertise within the organization as a whole, the
386 responsible individuals within the Office of Device Evaluation are not necessarily aware
387 that such expertise is present, because they have no detailed database (electronic or
388 otherwise) as a catalog. Finally, the level of expertise among the staff about the clinical
389 environment in some cases is limited, so decisions may be sometimes rendered that are
390 problematic when applied to clinical trial designs. One example raised by a
391 Subcommittee member appeared to have been a clinical trial design that was
392 scientifically valid, but may not have had sufficient ethical review from a clinical
393 perspective.

394 **3. The Increasing Complexity of Applications**

395 The Subcommittee reviewed data on the numbers of applications submitted each year
396 over the last decade and discussed with the staff the complexity of these applications.
397 Over time, for a given kind of device, its technology, device maturity, and the associated
398 clinical uses of devices move from investigational levels into widespread use. The CDRH
399 has done a good job of reclassifying devices into categories requiring less review or no
400 review when that is justified by increased knowledge and experience. Thus, even as the
401 use of medical devices has increased substantially over the past decade, the number of
402 applications requiring review has remained approximately constant.

403 The complexity of the applications requiring review has increased, however, even as the
404 total numbers remained constant. Increased complexity has occurred because the devices
405 are intended to address more complex medical issues (e.g., atrial versus ventricular
406 stimulation), because the intended patient population changes (e.g., use in children),
407 because issues arise involving uncertain medical or physiological events (e.g., those in
408 the brain), and because of unanticipated interactions of medical and non-medical devices
409 (e.g., electronic anti-theft systems in stores with implanted stimulators). Issues arise
410 about human factors of the users (do children report failures in the same way?), about
411 proper statistical design, and about highly specialized topics (different lithium battery
412 technologies).

413 The increased complexity and limited internal resources sometimes puts the responsible
414 reviewer in a difficult position to make judgments in fields where the evaluator's
415 experience or knowledge is lacking, or, recognizing the limited knowledge, to cause
416 delays in decisions by asking for information that is irrelevant or would not be needed by
417 a more expert evaluator. Increased complexity also means that more staff time is
418 required to prepare for meetings with industry representatives, and more time is required
419 of individual staff members to respond to a single application. Increasing complexity also
420 places great demands on the staff for up to date scientific knowledge of a changing field,
421 with a corresponding need to give continuing education to the staff a high priority (see
422 Staff section of Findings).

423 **4. Science and the Long-Term Regulatory Role**

424 The Subcommittee was concerned about the balance between various CDRH
425 commitments, how these relate to the Total Product Life Cycle paradigm, and, more
426 broadly, how these relate to the overall CDRH mission. On the whole, CDRH processes
427 are driven by the timelines of required actions, ones that constitute a major part of each
428 day's workload and that involve deadlines placed on the Center for action within a certain
429 number of days. Since decisions can be controversial and subject to criticism, there is
430 substantial pressure to focus on each one immediately rather than to include consideration
431 of longer-term goals. Thus, it is unsurprising that timeliness has become the basis for
432 evaluation of individuals and organizational components, to the detriment of scientific
433 and other benchmarks.

434 It may be that at present too much emphasis has come to be placed on the timeline aspect
435 of the Center's charge. Staff time spent on development of guidelines (guidance
436 documents), standards, and peer-reviewed papers should be encouraged through the use
437 of metrics that recognize such activity. Such activities and documents often will have a
438 greater beneficial effect, per unit of staff time expended, than does an individual review,
439 even though the benefit is not as easily documented and occurs some months or years
440 later. The Subcommittee believes that working on long-term activities is desirable.
441 Unsolved was how to do it more than at present, when time is at a premium and guidance
442 documents are 10 years old and far out of date. Necessary mechanisms are currently
443 lacking for a systematic process that leads to periodic review and updating of guidance
444 documents.

445 Correspondingly, it was evident that the Total Product Life Cycle paradigm (TPLC),
446 where each phase of the review is used to improve the next, was a good basis for the
447 Center. Within a TPLC framework, the segment of the cycle receiving the least emphasis
448 was the feedback loop from post-market review of one device to pre-market design of its
449 successor. This segment of the cycle is most heavily dependent on recording present
450 experience and passing that on to the next generation of designers (and
451 reviewers/evaluators). In this regard, it was noted by staff that there is no general
452 catalogue or electronic database of decisions reached, or the basis for them, so that undue
453 weight is placed on individual people *remembering* what happened in some earlier,
454 related situation.

455 While the benefits of retaining experienced people are always large, it is not a good
456 practice to rely on that as extensively as is done now. Further, because of pressures on
457 staff time and limited recognition for extra effort, only a small portion of accumulated
458 staff knowledge makes its way into standards. Even with the unique perspective of the
459 CDRH staff, it may not be possible to recognize all of the failure modes in recently
460 designed systems.

461 **5. The Leveraging of External and Internal Expertise for ODE**

462 The Office of Device Evaluation (ODE) is the largest Office within the CDRH,
463 comprising about 40% of the total number of CDRH employees. ODE is required to
464 conduct reviews within strict time limits and within prescribed bounds of legal authority.
465 It is the initiator of and has administrative control over most CDRH device reviews.

466 It seemed to the Subcommittee that there was a strong tendency for the Office of Device
467 Evaluation to operate primarily "in-house", in fact if not by plan. This practice may
468 derive from its relative administrative simplicity or from the time pressures of day-to-day
469 work. Also, according to ODE staff, access to external expertise is too complex to be
470 suitable for dealing with most situations, for outside experts are not readily available
471 within the time and legal restrictions present. Access to such expertise must be facilitated
472 and encouraged in all areas, e.g., biomedical engineering, behavioral science, statistics,
473 medical, and ethical. Outside sources include both individuals and organizational
474 resources within entities such as the AMA, American College of Cardiology (ACC),
475 North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology (NASPE), Blue Cross/Blue
476 Shield, and others.

477 The Subcommittee was interested in learning about the use of third parties, e.g. the
478 notified bodies in Europe, registrars for quality system audits in Canada, and third party
479 reviews to a limited extent by the FDA. The Subcommittee recommends that CDRH
480 examine the feasibility of increasing the use of third parties in the United States as a
481 mechanism to direct available CDRH resources to critical science issues and to those
482 activities that can only be done within CDRH.

483 **6. Metrics for Quantity, Timeliness, and the Quality of Decision Making**

484 Most CDRH decisions involve science at some level. The level ranges from simple and
485 "apparent to a scientifically schooled reviewer" (e.g. a judgment that some paperwork
486 involves no substantial scientific issue) to the highly advanced (as when reviewing a new
487 kind of medical device based on newly understood physiology interacting with a new
488 technology). The Review Subcommittee came away convinced that at each level CDRH
489 staff work conscientiously to try to apply science, broadly understood, in an appropriate
490 way. This has the nominal but too often abstract support of management. The careful
491 application of good science routinely appears to be done without support of, and perhaps
492 sometimes *in spite* of regular operating procedures, which track the number and
493 timeliness of applications processed. Reviewer evaluations tend to be based on volume
494 metrics rather than the quality of scientific analyses.

495 Subcommittee members were surprised to find that there is no ongoing, systematic
496 retrospective review within CDRH of some fraction of decisions, either as a measure of
497 quality control or as a metric of individual and collective staff performance. Such
498 evaluations are routine in industry or academic centers and can be accomplished by
499 internal staff or sometimes by outside review. There is no doubt as to the capability of
500 CDRH to review the Center's performance. In meetings with the Subcommittee, CDRH's
501 professional expertise and its ability to identify strong and weak points was evident when
502 discussing Center performance. What is missing is an overall administrative plan for such
503 scheduled systematic reviews to occur and a plan for use of any metrics that might result.

504 There is a need for metrics to assess quality and complexity as well as just timeliness. A
505 possible classification metric system that FDA might consider is based on decisions
506 similar to the ACC/AHA Guidelines for implantation of pacemakers and antiarrhythmia
507 devices (J Am Coll Card 1998;31:1175-1209 (A-B-C on p.1177)). A decision based on
508 this would be more transparent and informative than currently possible. This is because it
509 institutionalizes the reality of non-scientific influences in the decision making process.
510 This type of metric addresses the influences related to safety and effectiveness, such as
511 the status of the clinical trial, the complexity of technological issues, regulatory and
512 legislative issues (Congressional inquiries), and public concerns.

513 **7. Scientific Expertise for the Newer, Breakthrough Technologies, including**
514 **Combination Products**

515 Even as it recognizes the good job done by CDRH staff on most tasks and in most
516 decisions taken now, the Review Subcommittee has a great concern about whether
517 CDRH will have the right expertise in future years. The concern comes because of the
518 changing nature of devices to incorporate cellular or tissue-engineering components,
519 because of the highly differentiated organizational structure of the present CDRH (which
520 tends to replace departing staff with persons holding the same expertise), because
521 scheduling and evaluation rewards short-term goals, and because there is little internally-
522 generated review of quality of work.

523 CDRH's limited funding presents a two-fold concern. First, in comparison with most
524 new medical, scientific, or engineering facilities created with expenditures of hundreds of
525 thousands of dollars and comparable operating budgets, CDRH funding level is
526 inadequate to maintain the broad number of programs needed. Second, CDRH seems to
527 be poorly organized to take advantage of outside resources that have the needed funding.

528 **B. Human Resource Issues**

529 During the three-day session, the Subcommittee had discussions with many CDRH staff.
530 The Subcommittee was impressed with the quality, professionalism and dedication of the
531 staff. It was evident that staff have the scientific expertise related to their positions, and
532 that they strive to use their expertise to impact the safety and effectiveness of medical
533 devices used in the United States. At the same time, staff brought to the attention of the
534 Subcommittee areas of weakness involved in human resource management in the Center.
535 These include: recruitment and retention, gaps in scientific expertise, staff training and
536 development, workload issues, promotion opportunities for scientists, reward and
537 recognition.

538 **1. Recruitment and Retention**

539 The Subcommittee was presented with data showing that within the next several years, a
540 significant percentage (30%) of the scientific staff will be eligible for retirement.
541 However, there is apparently no recruitment strategy or succession planning in place to
542 plan for the future. When asked, reviewers appeared unaware of how, or if, management
543 plans for anticipated future staffing needs.

544 Additionally, the existing expertise will not be the same expertise that is needed for new
545 technologies. In the discussion with industry representatives, a common theme was that
546 the breadth of existing scientific experience is not sufficient for the future.

547 Several staff stated that dealing with the workload fully occupied them and that there is a
548 lack of resources and time to plan ahead. There was also concern expressed regarding
549 immediate loss of institutional memory due to the anticipated retirement of a significant
550 number of staff and lack of electronic cataloguing.

551 Recruitment and retention of young scientists, engineers, and medical officers is, and will
552 continue to be, a challenge. This concern was expressed repeatedly by the staff and by
553 representatives of industry, and it also was recognized by the Subcommittee. The
554 Subcommittee was told that young scientists frequently join CDRH and then leave for
555 other opportunities within five years. Compensation packages, the work environment,
556 and career opportunities at CDRH must be able to compete with those available in
557 academia and industry.

558 CDRH must invest more and earlier in its technical staff to prepare for the assessment of
559 rapidly evolving new technologies incorporated into medical devices and the growing
560 number of combination products (i.e. biologic- or drug-device combinations). Without
561 such investments, CDRH will likely lose critical technical expertise through increased
562 turnover. An overall strategic staffing plan was not found to be a part of Center's

563 strategic plan. Furthermore, there appears to be no evaluation of what technical positions
564 are needed to support the Center's objectives. The Subcommittee did not find critical
565 success factors beyond essential job requirements nor did it find that incumbents were
566 sufficiently evaluated.

567 **2. Gaps in Existing Scientific Expertise**

568 There does not appear to be an exact correlation between the scientific need to perform
569 the work effectively and the current staff competencies. Both staff and the Subcommittee
570 identified several areas where there is limited expertise to deal with current scientific
571 issues. For example, there are gaps in neurology, behavioral sciences, and information
572 technology. Lack of human factors expertise and software specialists was also noted.
573 Considering the wide variety of expertise required by CDRH to carry out its mission, it is
574 unrealistic for all of this expertise to be in-house. Some types of expertise may be needed
575 for only a finite (rather than career) timeframe. This underscores the need to reach
576 outside in order to bring specialized expertise to bear.

577 **3. Staff Training and Development**

578 The budget allocation for staff training and development is *woefully inadequate*. Each
579 scientific non-laboratory position is allocated \$1500 per year. This funding envelope
580 includes all day-to-day expenses, such as pens and paper, as well as training and
581 development and conference attendance. This level of support does not provide
582 scientific staff with sufficient opportunity to remain current within their area of expertise,
583 or prepare for the future scientific challenges that the Center faces. Funding for
584 continuing education and development within scientific disciplines is inadequate and
585 often competes with base salaries and research program funding. For example, entry-
586 level junior scientists in OST, even those with Ph.D.s, are seldom given development
587 opportunities during their first five years of tenure. Even among the most senior
588 scientific staff, development opportunities are few. This calls into question the adequacy
589 of some scientific reviews by scientists hired decades ago with little opportunity for
590 continued training in their scientific discipline.

591 The Subcommittee believes that CDRH scientists may become regulators without
592 sufficient scientific training and development. In ODE, branch and division management
593 are given budgetary discretion for staff development. Typically, only one professional
594 meeting per reviewer per year is funded, and these funds may be used instead to fund an
595 academic course depending on the seniority of the staffer. In addition to the lack of
596 available funding, lack of time for training and develop was identified. The workload
597 clearly does not permit sufficient time for scientific staff to remain current.

598 **4. Workload Issues**

599 As stated in previous sections, with the emphasis on meeting submission review
600 timelines, there appears to be too few staff to carry out the necessary activities as CDRH
601 now functions. Bringing good science to bear takes time. It was also noted that lack of

602 time can prevent adequate quality assurance for the various CDRH activities. The review
603 times and volume throughput have become the primary focus for the scientific evaluator.

604 Due to the workload that staff face, there is insufficient time to think ahead and plan for
605 the future. For many special assignments, staff are asked to "volunteer" without any
606 reduction in their other work. Staff are faced with competing priorities, such as
607 completing application reviews on target and completing or updating guidances.
608 Although the workload is a challenge within the organization, there do not appear to be
609 any innovative approaches in taking advantage of external expertise to assist in the
610 process. Several Subcommittee members commented that the scientific staff were
611 overburdened with administrative tasks (e.g., paperwork) that prevent them from being
612 completely focused on their science-related responsibilities and professional
613 development.

614 The Subcommittee met briefly with union representatives. The union works with
615 management on "quality-of-life" aspects. It appears that CDRH does not have any major
616 management-union issues. The topics brought to the attention of the Subcommittee
617 included promotion opportunities, work assignments and development opportunities in
618 the Center. There was emphasis on assuring that every employee be treated with dignity
619 and respect.

620 **5. Promotion Opportunities**

621 CDRH scientists expressed concern about their lack of promotion opportunities. The
622 Subcommittee was told that managers can be promoted almost instantly, and that the
623 process is also timely for staff who wish to switch to management. However, for those
624 desiring to advance on a technical path, the promotion process is rigid, lengthy and
625 cumbersome. The process inhibits the retention of good scientists. Promotion for
626 scientists is linked, in part, to the number of presentations they make at meetings and
627 conferences; however, the resources may not be available to attend such meetings.

628 **6. Reward and Recognition**

629 If scientists felt that they had adequate opportunities for advancement and were given
630 adequate resources, both time and money, for training and development, it is possible that
631 there would not be frustrations with the existing reward and recognition scheme. For
632 example, entry-level junior scientists in OST, even those with Ph.Ds, are seldom given
633 development opportunities during the first five years of employment. However,
634 frustrations were expressed about current rewards and recognition approaches. For
635 example, there is no reward for doing quality work, only for meeting deadlines. Or, the
636 only reward for good work is more work.

637 There seem to be rewards and recognition of the quality of work, but no consistent
638 standards to define high quality work other than timeliness. This encouragement occurs
639 at the individual and work group level, but not necessarily at the branch, division, or
640 office levels.

641 **C. Organizational and Process Issues**

642 Over the past several years CDRH has made science-based regulatory decision-making a
643 top priority. In addition the Center has embraced the Total Product Life-Cycle concept
644 and has begun developing a strategic plan that marries science-based decision-making
645 with TPLC. If CDRH is to meet the stated objectives of the strategic plan, the
646 Subcommittee has determined that more of the Center's budget should be allocated to
647 science-based programs and technical staff development.

648 Without exception the reviewers and scientists interviewed demonstrated earnest
649 commitment to their work. They take seriously the mission of CDRH to protect the
650 American public by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. They are
651 dedicated to completing their assignments well and on time. However, they are often
652 frustrated in their work by lack of resources, lack of clear direction from management
653 (particularly when interoffice collaboration is required), lack of communication tools, and
654 lack of development and promotional opportunities.

655 Although the overall number of premarket applications submitted for review is not
656 changing appreciably, the complexity is increasing. The review staff is therefore
657 continuously challenged with meeting statutory timelines for completion of reviews
658 without sacrificing their quality. To further compound their efforts, budgetary limits
659 within the Agency have hampered the Center's ability to replace staff lost to attrition.
660 This results in excessive workloads for some and leaves gaps in scientific expertise
661 necessary to perform comprehensive science-based reviews today as well as to prepare
662 staff for the assessment of the emerging technologies of tomorrow. In addition, CDRH
663 reviewers would prefer to rely less upon data from industry and more upon data
664 generated independently within the Center, or by external contractors. Yet research
665 programs are few, underfunded, and perhaps, not focused on the most current research
666 needs.

667 A system of retrospective measurement and analysis of specific CDRH decisions and
668 their quality is lacking. There does not seem to be a systematic attempt to assess the
669 appropriateness of past decisions to learn from mistakes (either individual, group, or
670 institutional), i.e., were decisions correct, consistent, and done with minimal resources as
671 well as being timely. From a higher organizational focus, there is no periodic comparison
672 of CDRH's mission with what CDRH is doing to fulfill that mission. Is it doing what is
673 needed to evolve CDRH's professional expertise so as to be able to review new kinds of
674 devices in a knowledgeable way? Do research projects achieve relevant goals and are
675 those goals still relevant? There appears to be no quality metrics about CDRH as an
676 organization.

677 **1. Structure of CDRH**

678 CDRH is made up of some 7 offices, 27 divisions, 85 branches, and employs 1,000
679 people. Approximately 65% of the staff members hold science-related positions. The
680 volume of work performed within the Center is high, and includes premarket product
681 reviews, postmarket surveillance and compliance activities, development of regulatory

682 guidance for the medical device industry, Center-directed research, and administrative
683 tasks.

684 CDRH appears to be organized in what one Subcommittee member calls “semi-porous
685 silos.” The Center appears to be highly segmented and layered which makes
686 communication and collaboration among the various offices, divisions and branches
687 difficult and cumbersome. The lack of an appropriate electronic database has been noted
688 previously. In addition, the existing structure requires a large management staff to
689 oversee small groups of staff and can lead to unintended bureaucratic barriers to
690 communication across the center and prevents clear leadership, ownership and
691 accountability for decision-making. Theoretically the reviewer in charge of a submission
692 or project can enlist help from other staff within the Center; but such “grass roots” efforts
693 can be sluggish due to imposition on the already full workload of colleagues. These
694 issues were illustrated in comments made by individual reviewers interviewed as well as
695 in "Lessons Learned" in each of the four case studies reviewed by the Subcommittee:
696 *communication and interoffice coordination can be achieved, but it is greatly facilitated*
697 *when top management (i.e. office director or above) direct the process, and in some*
698 *instances, direct involvement of top management is necessary.*

699 **2. Office of Device Evaluation**

700 Branches within the divisions of Office of Device Evaluation (ODE) do assign team
701 leaders to manage application review projects. The team leader is responsible for
702 ensuring the right people with the right technical and scientific expertise are brought
703 together during the review period to provide input on the regulatory decision to be made.
704 The team leader’s recommendations are reviewed by the Branch Chief and possibly by
705 the Division Director. In most cases, this system works well. Most reviews are
706 completed on time, and no major backlogs exist today compared to the significant
707 backlogs that existed in the early 1990’s.

708 But at least in one case study (deep brain stimulation device), the team leader requested a
709 specific scientific review of EMI compatibility to her management, but this request was
710 denied. In this case the right scientific expertise was available within the Office of
711 Science and Technology (OST), but not utilized due to a management decision that
712 overrode the team leader’s request. This underscores the grass roots versus management
713 interest/direction issue addressed in the previous section. The EMI question arose again
714 late in the review process, and the request was then granted. As a result the OST
715 reviewer cited various deficiencies in the sponsor’s data, requested additional
716 information, which has further delayed the completion of the review. In this case more
717 open communication across the offices early in the review process may have lead to an
718 earlier resolution on the need for EMI review by bringing in the input from the OST
719 EMC expert.

720 When there is a lack of sufficient internal scientific expertise needed to make regulatory
721 decisions, one option is to contract that expertise externally. However, it appears that
722 external experts are seldom used by the Center beyond those who sit on existing FDA
723 Advisory Panels. Staffers interviewed cited conflicts of interest issues, lack of resources,

724 and a slow cumbersome process as reasons why external consultants are not used more
725 frequently by CDRH. Although advisory panel members may be available quickly and at
726 a reasonable cost, they often have conflicts of interest themselves that prevent them from
727 taking a more active role in the review of submissions. The Center is then limited in its
728 ability to bring the right expertise to bear in those instances where internal expertise is
729 not available. A more liberal Agency or Center policy with respect to contracting
730 external experts on an as-needed basis would help CDRH meet its science-based
731 decision-making objectives without increasing headcount or overhead.

732 **3. Office of Science and Technology**

733 The Office of Science and Technology (OST) represents a major resource for CDRH.
734 The organizational structure was established in the mid-1980s based on relevant
735 technologies of that time: this past history has led to the current structure of four
736 technical divisions, three of which are oriented towards engineering science and
737 technology and one towards the life sciences.

738 While OST has been and continues to provide scientific support for scientific reviews
739 when asked, and while OST staff have participated in many CDRH decisions, there was
740 clearly a communications gap between ODE and OST. In part this gap reflects the
741 limited knowledge within the ODE of the people in OST (since they work at a different
742 site) and limited knowledge of the expertise held by OST staff. There are few support
743 resources available to ODE personnel to catalog the expertise within OST (the
744 database/catalogue issue again). Further, even when the research projects undertaken by
745 the OST were judged quite pertinent to the CDRH mission, it was unclear whether or not
746 these were the best set of projects to be done “in-house.”

747 It should be noted that in some instances there are scientific programs ongoing within
748 OST which were initiated more than 20 years ago. In any assessment of OST’s scientific
749 programs, there will need to be a prioritization, and in some cases, some programs may
750 need to be abandoned and their resources redeployed. A concern is that the \$4600
751 allotted per laboratory scientist for research support is insufficient and too small to
752 undertake meaningful projects in many of the emerging scientific fields. A critical issue
753 thus is the focusing of resources and programs so that OST can continue to be a resource
754 and a leader within CDRH in emerging areas of science and technology.

755 Although the Subcommittee did not have the charge nor the time to carefully examine
756 OST, it believes that now is the time to assess through an independent review how OST
757 can prepare itself for the science and technology of this 21st century. OST needs to lead
758 CDRH into these new areas, and the review recommended by this Subcommittee should
759 focus on organizational, management, and programmatic issues.

760 **4. Combination Products**

761 Products combining devices, pharmaceuticals, and/or biologics have been made possible
762 by technologic advance. Such products are likely to increase in importance and numbers
763 in the next few years, and they represent an example of the complexity in products which
764 CDRH and FDA as a whole will need to face. Whether these are regulated as devices or

765 other has depended on the primary intended use of the product; however, *a clear pathway*
766 *for such products and guidelines for related regulations are needed.* This includes the
767 degree of input from each regulatory Center, balancing safety and effectiveness with the
768 desire for timely decisions. This may require creating a totally new structure within FDA.
769 Whatever the case these combination products need to be regulated with an approach that
770 embodies the philosophy of CDRH, one that is least burdensome, predictable, timely,
771 flexible, transparent, interactive, and effective.

772 **5. Communication Within and with Outside Organizations**

773 As mentioned above the hierarchical structure of CDRH may inhibit good
774 communication among the various offices. Although the office directors meet regularly
775 to keep the communication channels open, there was some evidence among the reviewing
776 and scientific staff of “competition” and perhaps perception of status differences among
777 the offices, which may also limit communication and collaboration. The importance of
778 interoffice communication and collaboration to the full implementation of a TPLC
779 program within CDRH cannot be over emphasized.

780 To break down some of these communication barriers, an effective database and
781 catalogue system based on information technology solutions must be employed. Several
782 staffers expressed the need for quicker and more effective information sharing across the
783 Center. Rapid access to regulatory decisions made and lessons learned, and
784 internal/external resources prevent duplicative (and perhaps conflicting) decisions in the
785 review of similar products or issues. Even though access to precedent decisions lead to
786 efficient, complete, and consistent outcomes and the Center archives thousands of
787 documents annually, it appears that data retrieval and access is unable to meet reviewers’
788 needs. IT tools must be implemented to provide more efficient utilization of information
789 among the staff.

790 As illustrated in the pacemaker interference case study, interagency communication and
791 collaboration can be extremely beneficial to the solution of real-world problems not
792 identified during the premarket review. However, there is no clear process or mandate
793 for FDA collaboration across government agencies, such as with FTC, FCC, CDC, etc.

794 **6. Regulatory Review Process**

795 The review time statistics of CDRH are quite impressive. Premarket applications are
796 generally reviewed within statutory timelines. Based on the case histories presented, the
797 Center further appears to respond quickly and effectively to urgent issues as they arise.
798 Balancing the need for sufficient scientific information with significance of the risk of the
799 problem can be challenging, however, as evidenced in the automatic external defibrillator
800 case study. In this case the two tools used by the Center team of experts and reviewers
801 (i.e. Health Risk Analysis and Health Hazard Evaluation) seemed less than objective and
802 lead to somewhat different risk assessments, which were then used to make the regulatory
803 decision. The Center must also deal with a variety of non-science based influences. These
804 range from public or industry-originated “scares” about certain products to Congressional
805 or Administration policy directives.

806 Upon receipt, premarket applications are triaged by the branch chief within the
807 appropriate reviewing division within ODE. The branch chief then assigns the review of
808 the application to a lead reviewer. Although the assignment is intended to be based on
809 the specific scientific expertise needed, or to the reviewer with the most experience with
810 the particular type of medical device under review, assignments are more often based on
811 distribution of workload. This system can result in an inefficient and potentially lower
812 quality review and should be reconsidered.

813 The lead reviewer acts as a team leader, identifying and bringing together the right
814 scientific personnel to conduct the review. However, one staffer stated that OST and
815 other non-ODE resources are needed early in the review process, but timeclock pressures
816 often preclude their use. This failure to use available OST resources may reflect either
817 priority or process issues associated with interoffice collaboration. This again touches on
818 the issue of process via grass roots versus management interest/direction, as addressed in
819 a previous section.

820 There was concern expressed by some staffers that the scientific reviewers may be
821 overburdened by excessive paperwork that could be done at a more administrative or
822 managerial level. Movement of paperwork to administrative staff would free up valuable
823 time of the scientific staff that could be better applied to more science-related activities.

824 Given fixed budgetary constraints, some variation on the notified body concept may be a
825 relevant approach to addressing regulatory needs while allowing FDA to focus its limited
826 funding on in-house tasks that cannot be done by external groups. Although a third-party
827 review program has been implemented as provided for in FDAMA of 1997, it could be
828 expanded to include a wider range of products (e.g., PMA supplements or those that
829 require clinical data for premarket clearance), thus freeing up reviewing resources with
830 the Center.

831 In each of the case studies presented, lessons learned were well articulated and fairly
832 balanced. Upon questioning various reviewers involved in the individual cases, however,
833 it appears that routine postmortem analyses do not occur, nor is information learned
834 shared widely across the Center.

835 Taking all the above discussion on the CDRH Regulatory Review process in total, the
836 Subcommittee concludes that CDRH does not have a comprehensive Quality System in
837 place to support the execution of the FDA mission. Quality Systems, implemented in
838 concert with international standards, e.g. the International Standards Organization (ISO)
839 9000 family, are common place in industry and have become a prerequisite for doing
840 business. Academia and other government organizations have adopted similar quality
841 systems. If CDRH were to be viewed as a business enterprise, its products would be:
842 decisions on product approval submissions, guidance documents, comments and
843 endorsement positions on standards, and actions on product problems encountered in use
844 in the field. The Subcommittee saw no comprehensive process, as would be found in a
845 typical Quality System, that addresses the quality of CDRH products.

846 **V. Recommendations**

847 Based on the observations and findings presented in the preceding section, the following
848 recommendations are offered.

- 849 1. CDRH needs to communicate, both internally and externally, a clear vision of the
850 fundamental role of science in the regulatory process. This vision should define the
851 role of science in developing relevant guidance documents and in developing,
852 modifying, and approving appropriate standards. The vision should delineate the role
853 of science in determining how effectively CDRH responds to new technologies and
854 facilitates the introduction of those technologies to users in a safe and effective
855 manner. Development of a system for summarizing the scientific and other factors
856 leading to guidances or approvals (or rejections) would be useful both for FDA, as it
857 reviews its decisions, and for the public.
- 858 2. So that science can play this fundamental role, CDRH needs to rethink how it carries
859 out its mission, prioritizes its activities, outsourcing those functions it can while still
860 maintaining oversight, and reallocating its resources so as to expand its investment in
861 science, in all Offices. As part of this rethinking, CDRH should examine its existing
862 organizational structure as well as other regulatory models, with consideration for
863 change to implement and support the TPLC concept. Given fixed budgetary
864 constraints, one model would be for FDA to focus its in-house expertise on selected
865 tasks, and delegate others to official notified bodies or similar entities that derive
866 funding from non-governmental sources.
- 867 3. As part of its restructuring of activities to enhance the fundamental role of science,
868 CDRH should assess and reconsider the structure of OST to focus on emerging
869 science and technology; this assessment likely will require a separate review of OST.
- 870 4. CDRH should develop a plan for enhancing cross-office and inter-agency (e.g., FTC,
871 FCC) communication and collaboration.
- 872 5. CDRH should establish an electronic database for liaison functions and internal and
873 external expertise inventory.
- 874 6. CDRH should develop and implement a formal process for capturing institutional
875 knowledge through more time spent on guidance documents, standards, other written
876 publications, and archiving and retrieval systems, with written precedent files so that
877 when a decision is reached it does not only remain in the “mind” of the reviewer.
878 Professional credit should be given to the contributors, and the contributors should be
879 rewarded.
- 880 7. In recognition of the large staff turnover anticipated in the next 5 years and in order to
881 fill gaps in scientific expertise, CDRH should expeditiously perform an assessment of
882 the current level and breadth of expertise and use this to develop a long-term strategic
883 staffing and recruitment plan. Major gaps in expertise should be identified and filled
884 during recruiting for staff replacements due to attrition and turnover. For each

885 position, the options of full-time, part-time, or contract (external) personnel should be
886 considered.

887 8. CDRH needs to develop procedures and implement staff development/training
888 opportunities to ensure that reviewer mandates for such issues as sample size or
889 randomized trials are shaped by realistic clinical perspectives and relevant ethical
890 considerations.

891 9. In recognition of its staff being its greatest resource, CDRH needs to streamline
892 processes that encourage scientific growth within the staff and the maintenance of
893 scientific expertise; these processes need to provide for a more inviting career path
894 and a reward structure for scientific personnel, and will require a reallocation of
895 budget resources so that stated goals of staff growth can occur.

896 10. CDRH should encourage and facilitate the use of internal but non-ODE expertise and
897 also external expertise, including the development of operational and budget policies
898 that promote a more liberal use of external experts.

899 11. CDRH should expand its outreach to and scientific interactions with industry and
900 universities through visitor programs and the creation of appropriate forums for
901 professional development and for information exchange between FDA staff, industry,
902 and academia with particular emphasis on new scientific fields that may result in new
903 medical devices within the next 5 years.

904 12. CDRH should develop a plan in collaboration with other Centers for the evaluation of
905 combination products; this plan may require changes in organizational structure and
906 operational procedures. Whether it is a new structure or some amalgamation of
907 existing structure, the regulation of these products requires an approach that is least
908 burdensome and embodies the philosophy of CDRH.

909 13. CDRH should develop and implement a quality evaluation and improvement
910 program, and as part of this, the evaluation system should develop metrics for the
911 assessment of quality as well as the timeliness of results. The focus of these activities
912 should be to achieve high quality product reviews in a timely manner. Management
913 should implement a system for recognizing, rewarding, and encouraging high quality
914 product reviews and investigations.

915 14. CDRH should implement a quality system with both continuous evaluation and
916 improvement programs in accordance with ISO 9000 or other relevant standards. The
917 focus should be on CDRH as an organization with a specific mission and on the
918 development of activities that contribute to high quality decisions making the most
919 productive use of resources and with a high degree of consistency.

920 **VI. Conclusions**

921 In summary, this external review team believes that CDRH is doing an excellent job in
922 carrying out its mission. Even so, with new products arising out of the biological

923 revolution and with breakthrough technologies which will be increasingly complex,
924 CDRH will be significantly challenged.

925 This review thus was conducted in the spirit of assisting CDRH as it faces up to these
926 challenges. The review consisted of a self-study carried out by an internal CDRH team
927 followed by a three-day extensive (and exhaustive) assessment by an external review
928 team. This external team found the internal self-study to be an important learning
929 experience in its own right for CDRH and commends CDRH for the dedication, integrity,
930 and commitment to excellence exhibited by this effort.

931 The external assessment, as represented by this report, provides an additional perspective.
932 CDRH must institute major changes. The needed changes are reflected in the specific
933 recommendations presented in the previous section. These changes are necessary if
934 CDRH is to significantly increase the role of science in regulatory decision making. They
935 include possible changes in structure and a rethinking of how the business of CDRH is to
936 be conducted, a reinventing of the CDRH staff through strategic recruitment, the
937 continuous professional growth of existing staff, and policies that reward staff for the
938 quality of their scientific expertise. CDRH must reach out to external resources, including
939 not only universities but also industry, to create partnerships that will accelerate making
940 new technologies available that are both safe and effective so as to enhance patient
941 benefit in America.

942 Finally, the Subcommittee appreciates the fact that these recommendations, if accepted,
943 cannot be put into place overnight. The Subcommittee suggests that these
944 recommendations be incorporated as explicit components of the CDRH strategic plan.
945 Annual objectives derived from the recommendations should be established,
946 communicated to the organization, and included in individual performance plans.
947 Progress against meeting objectives should be monitored and appropriate actions taken if
948 objectives are not met.

Attachment 1: CDRH External Science Review Subcommittee

Robert M. Nerem, Ph.D. (CHAIR)
Professor and Director
Parker H. Petit Institute for
Bioengineering and Bioscience
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0363
FDA Science Board Member
Phone 404-894-2768
Fax: 404-894-2291
robert.nerem@ibb.gatech.edu

Alexa I. Canady, M.D. (Co-CHAIR)
Former, Vice-Chairman
Prof. Neurosurgery
Wayne State University
Chief, Neurosurgery
Children's Hospital of Michigan
Phone: 850-477-7091
alexacanady@aol.com

Roger C. Barr, Ph.D.
Professor, Biomedical Engineering
Department
Associate Professor of Pediatrics
Duke University
136 Hudson Engineering Center 90281
Durham, NC 27708
Phone: 919-660-5123
Fax: 919-684-4488
roger.barr@duke.edu

John D. Fisher, M.D.
Director, Arrhythmia Services
Cardiology N2
Montefiore Medical Center
111 E. 210th Street
Bronx, NY 10467
Phone: 718-920-4291
Fax: 718-547-2111
Jfisher@Montefiore.org

Barry H. Beith, Ph.D.
President
Human Centric Technologies, Inc.
111 James Jackson Avenue, Suite 221
Carey, NC 27513
Phone: 919-481-0565
Fax: 919-481-0310
bbeith@humancentrictech.com

Patricia L. Garvey, Ph.D.
Vice President
Regulatory Affairs and Quality
Edwards Lifesciences, LLC
One Edwards Way
Irvine, CA 92614
Phone: 949-250-3504
Fax: 949-250-2340
patricia_garvey@edwards.com

Louis J. Blazy, Ph.D.
Director
Performance Engineering & Analysis
NASA Headquarters
300 E. Street S.W.
Washington, DC 20024
Additionally: Adjunct Professor of
Software Engineering at the University
of Maryland, University College
Phone: 202-358-1891
Fax: 202-358-2920
Lblazy@HQ.NASA.GOV

Kinley Larntz, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Dept of Applied Statistics, University of
Minnesota
6339 E. Greenway, #102-172
Scottsdale, AZ 85254-6517
Phone:(480) 659-2353
Fax:(602) 682-4515
KinleyL@aol.com

Anne B. Curtis, M.D.
Professor of Medicine
Dept of Medicine, Division of
Cardiology
University of Florida
1600 S.W. Archer Road
Gainesville, FL 32610
Additionally: CDRH Circulatory System
Devices Panel
Phone: 352-392-2469
Fax: 352-846-0314
Curtisa@mail-cs.med.ufl.edu

Rosenberg, Martin, Ph.D.
Senior Vice President & Director
SmithKline Beechman Pharmaceutical
Research and Development
1250 South Collegeville Road
P.O. Box 5089
Collegeville, PA 19426-0989
Tele: 610-917-5729
Fax: 610-917-7901
Martin_Rosenberg@sbphrd.com

Beth N. Pieterston
Director, Medical Devices Bureau
Health Canada
Room 1605 Main Stats Canada Building
Tunney's Pasture A.L. 0301H1
Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA KIAOL2
Phone: 613-957-4786
Fax: 613-957-7318
Beth_Pieterston@HC-SC.GC.CA

Dominique M. Durand, Ph.D.
Professor, Biomedical Engineering
Case Western Reserve University
10900 Adelbert Road, CB Bolton 3510
Cleveland, OH 44133
Phone: 216-368-3374
Fax: 216-368-4872
dxd6@po.cwru.edu

Rhall E. Pope, Ph.D.
Vice President
Research and Development, Sims
Deltec, Inc.
1265 Grey Fox Road
St. Paul, MN 55112
Phone: 651-628-7179
Fax: 651-628-7406
rhall.pope@deltec.com